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ABSTRACT
Despite the fact that the Commission of the European Community has
made Korea one of three main target countries of anti-dumping measures,
because Korea is pressing to export more of the electronics products
which the Community is struggling to protect, study of the Community Anti-
dumping Law in Korea has barely begun. 	 Therefore, in this thesis, the
measures that may be imposed by Community authorities with respect to
trade with countries not members of the European Community, especially
with Korea, under the Community Anti-dumping Regulation, in the context of
the GATT Anti-dumping system are explained and analysed.
With regard to the Community's anti-dumping rules, protectionist
bias in their application is examined, in particular the determination of
normal value and export price, constructed normal value and constructed
export price, the comparison of normal value and export price, the calcu-
lation of dumping margin, and the determination of injury, and proposals
are made as to the extent to which the Community anti-dumping rules need
to be revised to diminish the bias in their range that explicitly favours
Community producers and a finding of dumping, in the context of the GATT
rules.
With regard to the Korean Anti-dumping rules, on the other hand,
they are introduced, generally. Anti-dumping measures in Korea have not
been applied properly in favour of Korean producers, mainly because of the
lack of transparency and institutional inertia. Therefore, enactment of a
special Act governing anti-dumping complaints, modelled on a unitary
system rather than a bifurcated system, should be considered for the
,
transparent and speedy investigations. Institutional inertia must be
1
rectified, i.e., more precise definition is required in some terminolo-
gies, and provisions on cumulation and anti-circumvention should have been
prescribed before their application.
Through a comparative study of the anti-dumping laws in the Commun-
ity and Korea, it becomes clear that various aspects of the technical
methodology applied by the authorities in anti-dumping determinations have
a tendency to make findings of dumping largely automatic and inevitable.
Therefore, it must always be borne in mind that anti-dumping measures can
be imposed only where dumping and resulting injury is actually estab-
lished, not artificially.
This study has looked at anti-dumping laws in the Community and
Korea comparatively, in the context of the GATT Anti-dumping rules. 	 The
Community refers to GATT and the Code in the preamble of its anti-dumping
regulation, which has no binding effect in Court, and adopts the regula-
tion in accordance with existing international obligations, in particular
those arising from Article VI of the GATT and from the GATT Anti-dumping
Code. However, this does not ensure an interpretation in conformity with
GATT rules and its spirit, because the wording of the GATT anti-dumping
rules taken literally is very ambiguous and can be interpreted very dif-
ferently. Therefore, a comparative study with the Community's anti-
dumping rules and its practice as a legislative model should be very
helpful, in order to improve the current Korean anti-dumping system,
because the GATT anti-dumping rules can play a very limited role only as a
guideline.
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Chapter 1 : INTRODUCTION
1. BACKGROUND
Despite the fact that the Commission of the European Community has
made Korea one of three main target countries of anti-dumping measures,
study of the Community Anti-dumping Law in Korea has barely begun.' At
the end of 1994, the Community had 151 anti-dumping measures in force, of
which 124 were original measures and 27 were measures maintained after a
review in accordance with Article 15 of the Community Anti-dumping Regula-
tion; 2 128 were in the form of duties and 23 in the form of undertakings.
Of these 151 measures in force, 26 measures, 16 measures, and 12 measures
were imposed against China, Japan and Korea respectively. 3 The sectors
most involved in the investigations initiated by the Commission over the
period 1988 to 1993 were those of chemicals and electronics. The largest
number of investigations took place in the electronics sector in 1992 and
1993. 4 From this viewpoint, there are obvious conflicts of interest
between Korea and the Community because Korea is ranked as the world's 6th
largest electronics producer and, in the consumer electronics field, it is
1. The three main target countries are Korea, Japan and China. See, Commission, 10th annual
report from the Commission to the European Parliament on the Community's anti-dumping and
anti-subsidy activities, SEC(92) 716 final, p7, (hereinafter referred to as "10th anti-dump-
ing report").
2. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from coun-
tries not members of the European Economic Community, OJ (1988) L 209/1 (hereinafter referred
to as the "Community Antidumping Regulation").
3. Commission, 13th anti-dumping report COM(95) 309 final, pl, p80-87. These 151 anti-dump-
ing measures were imposed upon 64 products, of which 12 were from Korea.
4. The number of investigations in the electronics sector in 1992 was 13 and in 1993, 7.
Furthermore, the biggest trade values are generated by high-technology, high added value
products, such as electronics. See, Commission, 12th anti-dumping report, COM(95) 16 final,
P7.
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third only to Japan and USA. 5
 As a result, most of the Community anti-
dumping measures against Korean products were concentrated on
electronics. 6 Given that the volume of trade between Korea and the Eur-
opean Community has been increasing 7 and that in 1994 electronics occupied
about 25% of Korea's whole exports, 8 anti-dumping proceedings are more
frequently resorted to by the Community, 9 because Korea is pressing to
export more of the products which the Community is struggling to protect
through anti-dumping measures. Therefore, the object of this thesis is to
5. M.G. McDermott, "The Internationalisation of the South Korean and Taiwanese Electronics
Industries: The European Dimension", Europe and the Multinationals, 1992, New Horizon in
Int'l Business, p213. Seoul Shinmun, Aug. 14, 1995, p17. Korea has emerged as the world's
second largest maker in such areas as VCR, facsimile, colour TV picture tubes and computer
monitors. It ranks third in colour TVs, integrated circuits, including memory chips, and
recording media such as tapes and discs. See, Korea Newsreview, May 20, 1995, p26. The
Community has imposed antidumping duties against all the above-mentioned products except
facsimile and computer monitors.
6. SCTVs, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2900/91, OJ (1991) L 275/24; Audio tapes in cassettes,
Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1251/91, OJ (1991) L 119/35; Car Radios, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2306/92, OJ
(1992) L 222/8; DRAMs, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 611/93, OJ (1993) L 66/1; REWS, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No
2887/93, OJ (1993) L 263/1; LAECs, Coun.Reg.(EC) No 1384/94, OJ (1994) L 152/1; Microdisks,
Coun.Reg.(EC) No 2199/94, OJ (1994) L 236/2; CTVs, Coun.Reg.(EC) No 710/95, OJ (1995) L 73/3.
7. Korean exports to the EC grew to 10.6 billion US dollars in 1994 from 2.8 billion US
dollars in 1982, while the EC exports to Korea during the period rose to 13.2 billion from
1.5 billion. As a result, Korea suffered 2.64 billion US dollars trade deficit with the EC
in 1994. See, Seoul Shinmun (one of the main daily newspapers in Korea), Apr.1, 1995, p5.
8. OECD, OECD Economic Survey - Korea, OECD Publication, 1994 May, p56. Korea Foreign Trade
Association, Trade Annual 1993, Dong-A Publication Co., 1993, p137 (hereinafter referred to
as "KFTA"). The share of electronics in exports expanded to 31.4% in 1994. See, Seoul Shin-
mun, May 26, 1995, p18.
9. Compared to the fact that no safeguard measure nor any measure based on Article 1115 of
the EEC Treaty was adopted in 1993 and in 1994, antidumping proceedings could be regarded as
the most important Community instrument of commercial defence. See, Commission, General
Report on the Activities of the European Union - 1994, p350, and Commission, 27th General
Report on the Activiteis on the European Communities - 1993 (hereinafter referred to as
"General Report"), p312.
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introduce and explain the Community anti-dumping law in the context of the
international rules.
2. AIMS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The Commercial Policy Chapter of the EEC Treaty l ° declared that the
common commercial policy was to be established by the end of the trans-
itional period (by 1970) .11 In order to achieve this common commercial
policy, two important pieces of legislation (Regulation 2603/69 12 provi-
ding common rules for exports and Regulation 1025/75 13 stipulating common
rules for imports which was succeeded by Regulation 288/82 14 ) were intro-
duced and are still in force. In relation to external economic relations,
Regulation 288/82 sets out general common rules for imports from all other
countries excluding imports from state trading countries. 15 Although any
imports governed by other more specific legislation such as Regulation
10. Treaty establishing The European Economic Community as amended by the Treaty amending
Certain Financal Provisions, the Single European Act, the Merger Treaty, the Greenland Trea-
ty, and the Acts of Accession (hereinafter EEC Treaty), Mar. 25, 1957, reproduced in N.
Foster, Blackstone's EEC Legislation, Blackstone Press Ltd, 1990. It entered into force on
January 1, 1958.
11. Article 111 and Article 113 of the EEC Treaty. It was not until 1975 that the European
Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the ECJ or the Court) decided that the Communi-
ty's competence in matters of commercial policy was exclusive. See, Opinion 1/75, on the
compatibility with the EEC Treaty of a draft 'understanding on a local cost standard', [1975]
ECR 1355.
12. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2603/69, on common rules for exports, OJ (1969) L 324/25.
13. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1025/75, OJ (1975) L 124/6.
14. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 288/82, on common rules for imports, 0J(1982) L 35/1. This regulation
was repealed by Coun.Reg.(EC) No 518/94, OJ (1994) L 67/1.
15. Article 1 of the Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 288/82. This Regulation applies to imports of products
originating in third countries, except for textile products, products originating in state-
trading countries, China and Cuba.
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109170, 16 which provides common rules for imports from state-trading
countries, are not covered by this regulation, Regulation 288/82 sets out
Community surveillance where there is a threat of injury to Community
producers 17
In addition to the Community's measure concerning 'normal trade',
the Community has some measures for protection of its industries against
so-called "unfair trade practices")-8
 With regard to unfair international
trading practices, Regulation 2324/88 19 and Regulation 2641/84 20 play very
important roles in protecting the Community's industry. Since most of the
existing trade rules dealing with third countries are concerned with the
effect of imports on Community industry, Regulation 2641/84 was primarily
designed to protect the export markets of Community industry, 21 and to
defend the legitimate interests of the Community within GATT.22
The purpose of this thesis is, however, to analyse the measures
that may be imposed by Community authorities with respect to trade with
third countries under the Community Anti-dumping Regulation 23 and to ana-
lyse anti-dumping law and practice in the European Community and Korea
16. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 109/70, 0J(1970) L 19/1.
17. Articles 10 and 14 of the Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 288/82, OJ (1982) L 35/1. In general, see
Chapter 2 in this thesis.
18. In general, see Chapter 2 of this thesis.
19. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2324/88, 0J(1988) L 209/1. As a result of the adoption of the Uruguay
Round Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, the Council adopted the new Anti-dumping
Regulation in Dec. 1994. Coun.Reg.(EC) No 3283/94, on protection against dumped imports from
countries not members of the European Community, OJ (1994) L 349/1.
20. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2641/84, on the strengthening of the common commercial policy with
regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial practices, OJ (1984) L 252/1.
21. F, Schoneveld, "The European Community Reaction to the 'Illicit' Commercial Trade Prac-
tices of Other Countries', (1992) 26 JWT 2, P21.
22. The preamble of Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2641/84, OJ (1984) L 252/1.
23. This thesis is mainly based on Regulation 2423/88, even though a new Anti-dumping Regula-
tion 3283/94 has been adopted.
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comparatively, in the context of the international rules, i.e., Article VI
of GATT and its Anti-dumping Code. 24 On January 1, 1980, the 1979 GATT
Anti-dumping Code entered into force for governments which had accepted or
acceded to it by that date. 25 Acceptance by the European Community led it
to bring its anti-dumping law in conformity with the international
rules. 26
On the other hand, Korea joined the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code in
February 1986. 27 As a result, both parties had to implement the Code
provisions and the international obligations into domestic law, and both
parties have their own anti-dumping laws which are required to be in accor-
dance with the Code.
Korea exported 96.3 billion US dollars and imported 102.3 billion
US dollars in 1994. In 1995, the volume of trade is growing faster than
ever. On the one hand, the Korean economy is growing in scale and it is
24. Since the WTO Agreement entered into force on 1 Jan. 1995, the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement
(hereinafter referred to as "the 1994 GATT Antidumping Code") succeeds the 1979 GATT Anti-
dumping Code, and all WTO members will be bound by the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code. Article
II(2) of Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization provides that the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1,2 and 3 are integral parts of this Agree-
ment, binding on all Members. This thesis, however, is mainly based on the 1979 GATT Anti-
dumping Code.
25. Article 16 (4) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code. The term "government" is deemed to
include the competent authorities of the European Economic Community.
26. Coun.Dec. 80/271/EEC, Council Decision of 10 December 1979 concerning the conclusion of
the Multilateral Agreements resulting from the 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations, OJ (1980) L
71/1.
27. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (hereinafter referred to as 'KIEP,),
The Present Situation and Its Improvement Direction on the Policies and Systems related to
Trade in Korea (hereinafter referred to as "Policies Related to Trade in Korea"), KIEP, 1992,
p201. From 1986 to 1993, only 15 investigations were initiated involving imports from 11
countries. Of these 15 investigations, only 7 investigations were concluded by imposition of
definitive duties.
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accompanied by an increased volume of imports as a result of the increased
purchasing ability of national economy. On the other hand, the fact that
the average normal tariff was reduced to 8.9%, and the so-called "import
liberalisation ratio" reached 98.1% in 1993 28 means that trade liberalisa-
tion is complete and unlimited competition from overseas is waiting.
Furthermore, in 1989, Korea moved under the terms of Article 18(2)(b) of
the GATT, out of the developing country status which enabled it to apply
quantitative restrictions for balance of payments purposes in a manner
which takes full account of the continued high level of demand for imports
likely to be generated by its programmes of economic development 29 in
1989. 30
Summing up the situation, it is inevitable that imports are increas-
ing rapidly and some imports cause difficulties to the domestic indu-
stries.	 Furthermore, dumping from overseas, mainly in the field of the
precision chemistry industry, hinders Korea's national aim of establishing
itself as a developed country as complaints have been mainly filed upon
newly localised, high value added products. 31 In spite of the fact that
dumped imports cause a lot of difficulties to domestic industries, anti-
dumping measures have not been applied properly in favour of domestic
producers in Korea, mainly because of institutional inertia. In order to
achieve proper anti-dumping practice, anti-dumping law should be put in
good order. In order to adopt proper anti-dumping rules in accordance with
28. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p427 and 429.
29.Article 18(2)(b) of the GATT.
30. KIEP, 'Policies Related to Trade in Koorea', p18. As a result, in accordance with Arti-
cle 11 of the GATT, Korea should not prohibit or restrict the importation of any product of
the territory of any other contracting party through quotas, import licences or other mea-
sures other than duties, taxes or other charges.
31. Dumpings by foreign companies are in part aimed at discouraging the efforts of domestic
producers to localise high, capital and information intensive technology.
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existing international obligations, in particular those arising from
Article VI of the GATT and its Anti-dumping Code, a kind of legislative
model is needed and the Community Anti-dumping Regulation itself and its
practice could be a model.	 Therefore, this comparative study with the
Community's anti-dumping rules should be very helpful in improving the
current Korean anti-dumping system.
The current Korean anti-dumping law was amended in 1993 32 to comply
with GATT guidelines and it was designed to model the US law and proce-
dures. Therefore, Korea has a bifurcated anti-dumping system under which
the Korean Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as "KTC") is to
conduct the primary material injury investigation while the Office of
Customs Administration (hereinafter referred to as "OCA") is to invest-
igate the existence of dumping. The Ministry of Finance co-ordinates the
entire investigation and calculates the dumping margins. However, there
is a proposal for amendment which is designed to model the European Com-
munity anti-dumping system.33
Then, through the analysis of the Community's anti-dumping regula-
tion, its own characteristics in anti-dumping regulation, for instance its
original provisions, judicial review system, 34
 and the protectionist
tendency in its practice and application, are explained.
The Community's anti-dumping legislation, which is allegedly based
32. Cho Sang-Won, Tax Law Codification '94, Hyun-Am Publication Co. Ltd., 1994. The inter-
pretation of Korean Customs Act which follows is based on this Tax Law Codification, and when
there is contradictory undertanding of the legal text, the Korean version shall take prece-
dence over the author's interpretation.
33. This means that the bifurcate system is going to be switched to a unitary system, with
the KTC in charge of the entire investigation into the existence of dumping and injury to the
domestic industries. See, Seoul Shinmun, May 8, 1995, p17, and June 3, 1995, p17.
34. Article 173 (by direct action to the ECJ) and Article 177 (by references to it by natio-
nal courts) of the EEC Treaty. On the judicial review, see Chapter 7 in this thesis.
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on and in full accordance with GATT rules, 35 spells out the criteria and
rules for taking effective action against dumping. The most important of
these provisions, which are not compulsory under the GATT 36 and which are
not applied, or only partially applied, 37 by other contracting parties,
are "the lesser duty rule" 38 , "the community interest test" 39 and "the
sunset provision". 40 The Community applies its original provisions be-
cause the Community regards anti-dumping measures as a part of its common
commercial policy41 and is trying to take broader policy considerations
into account before applying protective measures.42
Anti-dumping law can be divided into two parts, procedural and
substantive anti-dumping law. Procedural anti-dumping laws in the Commun-
ity and Korea are compared and analysed, respectively, in Chapter 3 of
this thesis.
The anti-dumping policies have been criticised by exporting coun-
tries for being protectionist, primarily because they are biased in favour
of finding dumping. In many respects, Community anti-dumping regulations
35. Preamble of Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1, pl.
36. As a result of the Uruguay Multilateral Trade Negotiations, "the lesser duty rule" and
"the sunset provision" were stipulated in the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "the 1994 Code"). See, subparagraph 1 of Article 9 and subparagraph 3 of Arti-
cle 11 of the 1994 Code. Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclu-
sion of the result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation (1986-94), COM(94)
143 final. The text of the 1994 Code which follows is based on this publication.
37. Commission, 11th anti-dumping report, COM(93) 516 final, p4.
38. Article 13(3) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
39. Article 11(1) and 12(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. See Chapter 5 in this
thesis.
40. Article 15 of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
41. See Chapter 2, title 1 in this thesis.
42. Article 113 of the EEC Treaty provides that the common commercial policy shall be based
on uniform principles, particularly in regard to ... the achievement of uniformity in
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.
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reproduce the bland generalities of the GATT Anti-dumping Code, thereby
conferring substantial discretionary room for action. Even though anti-
dumping rules are often ambivalent, they are intransigently interpreted to
provide textual justification for some very harsh determinations.
Various aspects of the technical methodology applied by the Commun-
ity authorities in anti-dumping determinations have a tendency to make
findings of dumping largely automatic and inevitable. Therefore, the
analysis is primarily concerned with the practical application of the
Community Anti-dumping Regulation against dumped imports mainly from
Korea. Furthermore, the protectionist tendency in the application of the
Community's anti-dumping rules, in particular the determination of normal
value and export price, normal value and export price based on constructed
value, the comparison of normal value and export price, the calculation of
dumping margin, and the determination of injury, are examined, and propo-
sals are made as to the extent to which the Community anti-dumping rules
need to be revised to diminish the "tilt" in its range that explicitly
favours domestic producers. Therefore, two components of substantive
anti-dumping laws, dumping and injury therefrom, are discussed in Chapters
4 and 5.
When an anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of a finished pro-
duct, the duty may be avoided by all or the majority of the parts not
subject to the duty being imported separately and subsequently assembled
by a subsidiary of the producer/exporter in the Community. On the other
hand, as a result of trade liberalisation policy, one of the main issues
is to protect the domestic industry concerned in Korea, because imports
are increasing rapidly. Anti-dumping measures have been regarded as the
9
most efficient measure for the protection of the domestic industry, 43 and
they will be applied more frequently than before. Therefore, it could be
predicted that foreign producers or exporters will try to avoid or circum-
vent the anti-dumping duties.	 That is why anti-circumvention measures
need to be prescribed in the Korean rules. 44
 However, such assembly
operation is considered not to lead but to be likely to lead to circumven-
tion of the anti-dumping duty. 45 Therefore, in Chapter 6, anti-circumven-
tion is discussed, as Korean direct investment in the Community has in-
creased recently.
The anti-dumping measures, including anti-dumping duties and price
undertakings may be subject to administrative and judicial review. The
imposition of anti-dumping measures by the Community authorities in the
field of commercial defence may be subject to review by the European Court
of Justice," in spite of the fact that there is no special provision
for judicial review in the Community anti-dumping regulation. 47 Any
43. In case of Phosphoric Acid (Chian) FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, 89.3% of the total
quantity of imports was from China, in 1992. However, it decreased to 68.1% in 1993, after
investigation started, and to 46.8% in 1994. In case of Soda Ash (China) FHA No 1993-75, OG
(1993) No 12606, 12.5% of the total imports were from China, in 1993. owever, this was
reduced to 4.6% in 1994 because of anti-dumping measure. See, Seoul Shinmvn, 'Imports re-
straint effect of anti-dumping duties', Jan. 25, 1995, P18-
44. There is no anti-circumvention provision in the Korean antidumping system, and no anti-
circumvention determination, either.
45. Preamble of Coun.Reg.(REC) No 1761/87 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2176 84 on protection
against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Economic
Community, OJ (1987) L 167/9.
46.Jurisdiction in respect of measures to protect trade was transferred from the ECJ to the
Court of First Instance (hereinafter referred to as the "CFI' _ Coun.Dec_94 I49/ECSC,EC
amending Dec.93/350/Euracom,ECSC,EEC amending Dec.88/591/ECSC,EEC,Eurarom establishing a
Court of First Instance, OJ (1994) L66/1.
47.There is no special provision for judicial review in the Korean Customs Act or its Enfor-
cement Decree, either.
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natural or legal person may institute proceedings against a decision which
is of direct and individual concern. 48 If the action is well founded, the
ECJ will declare the act concerned to be void, either wholly or in part.49
Therefore, appeal to the ECJ is the only way to make anti-dumping measures
void. For Korean exporters to the Community, who are one of main targets
of Community anti-dumping measures, it would be worthwhile using the
judicial review system in the Community more frequently than at present.5°
Therefore, the anti-dumping measures, the system for administrative review
of the anti-dumping measures, and the extent to which the ECJ could review
the Community's anti-dumping determinations are scrutinised in Chapter 7.
In Chapter 8, based on the Community's experiences during the last
15 years, 51 and major changes of anti-dumping rules in the Community and
the GATT Code, future prospects on the anti-dumping laws are offered.
This study analyses anti-dumping law and practice in the European
Community and Korea from August 1988 to approximately December 1994.
During this period, the 1988 Community anti-dumping regulation was in
force; and Korea started to impose definitive anti-dumping duties in
1991.52
48.Article 173, para. 2 of the EEC Treaty.
49.Article 174 of the EEC Treaty. Article 174, para. 2 provides that in the case of regula-
tion, however, the Court of Justice shall, if it considers this necessary, state which of the
effects of the regulation which it has declared void shall be considered as definitive_
50. There has been only one Court case concerned with a Korean exporter. Case C-105/90,
Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council, [1992] ECR 1-677.
51. Since 1983, the Commission has submitted its antidumping reports and its first anti-
dumping report (COM(83) 519 final) covered the period since the entry into force of the 1979
Community anti-dumping regulation, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3017/79, OJ (1979) L 399/1.
52. Polyacetal resin (Japan, USA), Finance Ministry Announcement No 1991-61, Official Gazette
(1991) No 11276, p135, (hereinafter referred to as "FMA" and"OG").
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Chapter 2 : THE EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY OF
THE EC AND THE KOREAN TRADE POLICY
IN THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION
not be treated differently from products produced within the C •mmunity,
and products both originating in the Community and WV orted from third
I. COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY
1. INTRODUCTION
The main task of the European Community is to improve the economic
situation and standard of living of the states belonging to it by estab-
lishing a common market l and progressively approximating the economic
policies of Member States. 2 In order to achieve this task, the activities
of the Community are defined in Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome as includ-
ing the elimination of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions and
of all other measures having equivalent effect, the abolition of obstacles
to freedom of movement for goods, capital, persons and services, and the
establishment of a common customs tariffs and of a common commercial
policy toward third countries.
In addition, the internal market was to be completed by the end of
1992 according to a new Article 8A of the EEC Treaty. 3
 Fm "
	view
point of the concept of a customs union through the establishment of the
common customs tariff, products originating from third countries should
countries are to be in free circulation in Member States 4
 without any
obstacles including customs duties, quantitative restrictions	 and any
1.Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome.
2. The concept of a common market used in Treaty provisions is not defined by the Treaty it-
self.
3. Article added by Article 13 of the SEA.
4. Article 9 of the EEC Treaty.
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charges or measures having equivalent effect, 5 and any internal taxation.6
In order to be regarded as a single trade unit in the world, the
Community should establish not only a common customs tariff but also a
common commercial policy. Even though Article 113 of the EEC Treaty which
expressly required the completion of the common commercial policy over the
transitional period by 1970, it had to wait until 1975 when the Court
decided 7 that the Community had exclusive competence on the field of
commercial policy.8
Besides the political motive for a common commercial policy, the
Community desperately needs a common commercial policy because, without
it, a product originating in a third country may reap the benefit of the
rules on free circulation within the common market. 9
5. Article 12 and 30 of the EEC Treaty.
6. Article 95 of the EEC Treaty.
7. Opinion 1/75 on the compatibility with the EEC Treaty of a draft 'understanding on a local
cost standard', [1975] ECR 1355.
8. It should be noted that the 1969 Council Decision 69/494 (OJ 1969, L 326/39) on the rene-
wal or extension of agreements entered into by member states empowers member states to conti-
nue to negotiate their own agreement and this legislation is still in force, although the
Council's authorisation of such measures is given only where the agreements in question are
not contrary to existing Community commercial policy and with regard to areas not covered by
agreements between the Community and the third countries concerned. See, Article 1 of
Com.Dec.87/229/EEC, authorising extension or tacit renewal of certain trade agreements con-
cluded between member states and third countries, OJ (1987) L 95/25.
9. Without common commercial policy, so-called 'trade deflection' is likely to be caused,
because exporters in third countries would export their products to a member country where
the customs tariff is lower and then enjoy free circulation in the Community.
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2. TRADE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN GENERAL
2.1 Background
The Treaty of Rome (hereinafter EEC Treaty) was signed by the six
original Member States in 1957. 1 ° The Community's aim based on EEC Treaty
was to create a custom union in which goods, persons, capitals and ser-
vices could move from one Member state to another without any obstacles.
However, this aim was not completed as originally planned. The original
deadline to establish a common market by the end of 1969 could not be met
due to economic and institutional causes.11
In the 1980s, the European Community economy was characterised by
economic stagnation, increasing unemployment, and loss of competitiveness
mainly because of a fragmented Community market. In order to reverse this
tide and renew a sense of purpose and dynamism, an ambitious and funda-
mental approach was launched to revitalise the integration process by
completion of the internal market, establishment of concrete institutional
reforms, and creation of a European Union.
In 1985, the Commission presented its White Paper on completing the
internal market which proposed the removal of the remaining obstacles to
the establishment of the internal market, dividing them into physical,
technical and fiscal barriers. With regard to the common commercial
policy, the Commission took the view that abolition of national protection
measures and regional quotas by 1992 was 'not an unreasonable aim'. The
Commission insisted that 'after the completion of the internal market it
will no longer be possible to use border controls at internal frontiers to
10. The six original member states were Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands.
11. Jones, "Putting 1992 in perspective", (1989) 9 N.W.J.Int'I L.& Bus., p469.
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apply such restrictions' .12
While the White Paper invigorated the drive toward economic integra-
tion and ensured its realisation, institutional reforms were brought about
by the Single European Act (SEA) 13 which came into force on 1 July 1987.
In general, the SEA amended specific provisions of the EEC Treaty relating
to the Internal Market programme 14 to 'ensure smoother functioning of the
Communities'. 15 The SEA is being implemented on two levels. On an econo-
mic level, it has had a revitalising effect on employment, economic growth
and investment. On an institutional level, it provides for qualified
16majority voting where the EEC Treaty required unanimity. 	 Furthermore,
the SEA amended the EEC Treaty to give a bigger say to the European Par-
12. Commission, Industrial policy in an open and competitive environment, COM(90) 556 final,
p14. In this communication, the Commission insisted that member states continue to apply
over 2000 national quotas on imports from third countries, in particular in execution of
Article 115 of the EEC Treaty, and a variety of bilateral "voluntary export restrictions".
13. Single European Act (hereinafter SEA), OJ (1987) L 169/1.
14. According to Article 13 of the SEA, the Community was to establish the internal market
over a period expiring on 31 December 1992.
15. Preamble of the SEA.
16. See, Article 16 of the SEA amending Articles 28, 57(2), 59, 70(1) and 84(2). Article
100a of the EEC Treaty was added by Article 18 of the SEA which estalished qualified majority
voting for Council decisions on the internal market. Unanimity has been, however, preserved
for provisions on the internal market relating to fiscal matters and to the free movement of
persons or the rights and interests of employed persons (Article 100a(2) of the EEC Treaty).
See also, Campbell, "The Single European Act and the Implications", (1986) 35 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q., p 934.
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liament through the cooperation procedure 17 and the assent procedure.18
The SEA also provides for institutional reforms to confer on the Commis-
sion powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays
down. 19 However, there is still a reluctance to give clear and full
executive power to the European Commission. 20 It should be noted that the
major concern of the SEA is establishing an internal market through elimi-
nation of the physical, technical and fiscal barriers to the free movement
of goods, persons, capital and services.21
Since the Dublin European Council meeting of 28 April 1990 22 which
decided that amendments to the EEC Treaty "with the aim of strengthening
the democratic legitimacy and efficiency of the Union and of ensuring
unity and coherence in the Community's international action" 28 were neces-
sary, there has been a series of several drafts and proposals on commer-
cial policy or external economic policy throughout the Rome, 24 Luxem-
17. This cooperation procedure provides the European Parliament with the power to reject,
accept or propose amendments to the Commission's proposal. It make little difference, how-
ever, because the final decision still rest with the Commission. See, Article 149(2)(c) &
(d) of the EEC Treaty.
18. Only in the matters dealing with enlargement of the Community and association agreements
is the European Parliament given the true power of co-decision. See, Articles 237 & 238 of
the EEC Treaty (Articles 8 & 9 of the SEA).
19. Article 145 of the EEC Treaty (Article 10 of the SEA).
20. Commission, 'The European Single Act: countdown to 31 December 1992', (1990) European
File 13/90, p3.
21. See, Section II Provisions relating to the foundations and the policy of the Community of
the SEA.
22. The special meeting of the European Council, Dublin, Bull. EC 4-1990, point I, p7.
23. Commission, 'Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with a view to political union (herein-
after referred to as "Commission opinion in 1990"), EC, Bull., supplement 2/91, p69.
24. Rome Presidency, 1/7/90 - 31/12/90.
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bourg 25 and Dutch Presidencies. 26 In the Commission's contribution to the
intergovernmental conference, 27 the Commission expressed its view on
external economic policy under the Title of 'Common External Policy'. In
its contribution, the Commission proposed this new title including provi-
sions on common foreign and security policy (Articles Yl-Y15), external
economic policy (Articles Y16-Y19), development cooperation policy (Y20-
Y24) and the conclusion of international agreements (Y25-Y32).
	 This
proposal aimed at "ensuring unity and consistency in the Community's
action on the world scene by including among the powers of the union
aspects of external relations" 28 and avoiding possible conflicts between
policies involved. The Commission, in Article Y16a of its contribution,
proposed that "external relations in the areas covered by economic and
monetary union shall be governed by Article Y17". Article Y17 which was
proposed as a amendment to Articles 110-116 of the EEC Treaty on Commer-
cial Policy, defined a common policy on external economic relations to
cover not only trade but also economic and commercial measures. 29 Based
on this definition, the Commission stipulated the power of Union in this
field, providing that "the Union shall have sole power to take measures,
autonomous and conventional, in the field of economic and commercial
policy, and it may authorise the Member States to take some measures
within limits and subject to conditions which it shall lay down".3°
Therefore, there was no room for Article 115 in the Treaty according to
the Commission's contribution. Furthermore, it expressed the representa-
25. Luxembourg Presidency, 1/1/91 - 30/6/91.
26. Dutch Presidency, 1/7/91 - 31/12/91.
27. EC, Bull., Supplement 2/91 (hereinafter referred to as "Commission's contribution"), p83.
28. Commission's opinion in 1990, EC, Bull., supplement 2/91, p70.
29. Article Y17(1) of Commission's contribution, EC, Bull., supplement 2/91, p92.
50. Ibid, Article Y17(2) and (5).
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tive character of the Commission very clearly, stipulating that in exer-
cising these powers the Union shall be represented by the Commission in
relations with non-member states and in international organisations and
conferences. 31 Therefore, the exclusive competence of the Union in exter-
nal economic policy was confirmed because only the Commission is respons-
ible for representing the Union on the external scene, where non-Member
countries and international organisations are involved.
Common commercial policy in the Maastricht Treaty was virtually
based on the second Dutch draft for political union of 8 November, 1991.32
The sections of the EEC Treaty regulating the commercial policy (Articles
110 to 116) were modified very little under the Treaty on European Union
signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. Three Articles were repealed33
while Articles 110 and 112 remained untouched. Articles 113 and 115 were
partly redrafted.	 From the viewpoint of the Commission, therefore, the
final provisions on "common commercial policy" in the Maastricht Treaty
are very disappointing. Contrary to the position of the Commission in the
White Paper which insisted that "it is not an unreasonable aim to achieve
this abolition of national and regional quotas by 1992", 34
 Article 115
with a slightly modified version was survived in the Treaty.
The main area of controversy with regard to Article 115 was the
provision stipulated that "failing this, the Commission shall authorise
Member States to take necessary protective measures, the conditions and
details of which it shall determine". The new version inserted in the Maa-
31. Ibid, Article Y17(6).
32. Agence Europe, Europe Documents, No 1746/1747 of 20 November 1991.
33. Articles 111 and 114 on the transition period, and Article 116 on common action in inter-
national economic organisations were repealed.
34. Commission, Completing the Internal Market : White Paper, COM(85) 310 final, pll, and
24th General Report on the Activities of the European Communities (1990), p67.
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stricht Treaty changed the word "shall" to "may" which allows much more
discretionary power to the Commission. As a result, the Commission can
grasp real power of authorisation over Member States' protection measures.
In order to establish the Internal Market completely, the Commission
should not authorise Article 115 measures, in as far as such measures
would not be compatible with the completion of the Internal Market.
	 It
was merely hoped that the Commission would not authorise Article 115
measures. According to the wording of Article 115, the Commission has the
capability to authorise national protective measures. 	 This means that
whether an authorisation is granted or not, depends not on Member States
but on the Commission. Therefore, from the point of view of Member
States, they can avoid the blame for not applying Article 115 measures.
2.2 The Institutional Process
The Rome Treaty provides that the Council has power to take deci-
sions and confer on the Commission powers for the implementation of the
rules which the Council lays down. 35 Therefore, the Commission is the
executive arm and the Council is the legislative arm of the Community.
Once a policy proposal has been drawn up by the Commission and the
draft proposal has been submitted to the Council, the Council consults the
Economic and Social Committee where appropriate 36
 and the European Parlia-
35. Articles 145 and 155 of the Treaty of Rome.
36. Article 198 of the Treaty of Rome provides that 'the Committee must be consulted by the
Council or the Commission where this Treaty so provides. The Committee may be consulted by
these institutions in all cases in which they consider it appropriate'.
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ment. 37 Commission proposals undergo a decision-making process with
Member States, coordinated by working parties and Committee of Permanent
Representatives (COREPER).38
Council decisions are taken by three voting procedures; a simple
majority, a qualified majority and unanimity.	 Except for certain cases
where unanimity is required, 39 a simple or a qualified majority is needed.
As a result of a series of Commission proposals on the streamlining of the
decision-making procedures in certain instruments of commercial defence,"
the Council' voting rules were changed to require only a simple majority
vote to impose dumping duties, instead of a qualified majority vote.41
3. MAJOR TRADE INSTRUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
When taking account of trade instruments governing the Community's
trading relation with its partners, measures concerned with the volume of
trade are paid more attention than measures designed to control quality.
From this viewpoint, the EEC Treaty embraces several measures in order to
37. With respect to the consultation to the European Parliament, there is no provision like
Article 198. The Court, in the Isoglucose, ruled that 'consultation is the means which
allows the Parliament to play an actual part in the legislative process of the Community'.
See, Case 138, Roquette Freres v Council, [1980] ECR 3333, and Case 139/79, Haizena GmbH v
Council, [1980] ECR 3393.
38. Unlike the working parties, COREPER was recognised by Article 4 of the Merger Treaty
(1965). It provides for a committee consisting of the permanent Representative of the member
states, carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council. See further on decision-
making in general, DAC Freestone & JS Davison, The Institutional Framework of the European
Communities, Routledge, 1990, pp90-114.
39. See, Article 99, 100, 149(1), 157(1), and 161 of the Treaty of Rome.
40. See, Chapter 8 of this thesis.
41. Coun.Reg. (EC) NO 522/94 on the streamlining of decision-making procedures for certain
Community instruments of commercial defence and amending Regulation (EEC) No 2641/84 and No
2423/88, OJ (1994) L 66/10.
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establish the commercial policy. 	 According to Article 113, the common
commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in
regard to a common tariff, the conclusion of trade agreements with non-
member countries, and the achievement of uniformity in measures to protect
trade, such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.
The main Community trade policies can be divided into these areas:
measures for normal trade (tariff measures ,42 quantitative restrictions)43
and measures against unfair trade.44
3.1 Tariff Measures
Based on Article 9 of the EEC Treaty, the Common Customs Tariff
(hereinafter CCT) which requires harmonisation of the different tariff
levels of the Member States, 45 was achieved through the Council Regulation
950/68. Current Regulation 2886/89 is made up of two short articles and
an Annex which contains the actual duties as well as the nomenclature
(classification of goods). Therefore all imports into the Community are
subject to duty or duty free entry based either on their classification in
the EC Harmonised Tariff Schedule or on some other arrangement such as the
Free Trade Agreement between the individual EFTA countries and the Commun-
42. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 950/68, The Common Customs Tariff, OJ (1968) L 172/1, as amended by
Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2886/89, OJ (1989) L 282/1.
43. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 288/82, The Common Rules for Imports, OJ (1982) L 35/1.
44. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from coun-
tries not members of the European Economic Community, OJ (1988) L 209/1. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No
2641/84 on the strengthening of the common commercial policy with regard to protection
against illicit commercial practice, OJ (1984) L 252/1.
45. The country which joins the Community as a member is required to adjust its own tariff
to the CCT over a transitional period.
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ity. 46 In addition, developing countries are the main beneficiaries of
the Communit y 's generalised system of preferences (GSP) 47 or of the Lome
.	 48Convention.
3.2 Quantitative Restrictions Through National Quotas
And Free Circulation
The common commercial policy is applicable not only to trade poli-
cies which can cover the whole Community, for example, tariffs, anti-
dumping and antisubsidy measures, and most quantitative restrictions; but
also to trade-related policies which individual Member States have ap-
plied. Certain quantitative restrictions which individual Member States
have applied against imports from non-member states are likely to be
circumvented by indirected imports through the free circulation rule. To
close this loophole, the necessary protective measures may be authorised,
including temporary border control between Member States and suspension of
Community treatment to certain products.
The exclusive power of the Community in the field of commercial
policy has been well established through a series of Court rulings, for
46. Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the agreement on the
European Economic Area, SEC(92) 814 final.
47. Com.Reg. (EEC) No 3831/90 applying generalised tariff preference for 1991 in respect of
certain industrial products originating in developing countries, OJ (1990) L 370/1. Com.Reg.
(EEC) No 3832/90 applying generalised tariff preference for 1991 to textile products origina-
ting in developing countries, OJ (1990) L 370/126. Com.Reg. (EEC) No 3833/90 applying gener-
alised tariff preference for 1991 in respect of certain agricultural products originating in
developing countries, OJ (1990) L 370/86, as amended by OJ (1993) L 338/22.
48. Council and Commission, Decision of the Council and the Commission of 25 February 1991 on
the conclusion of the Fourth ACP-EEC convention, OJ (1991) L 229/1.
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example, Opinion l/75 	 the Donckerwolcke case, 5 ° in spite of a Coun-
cil Decision 74/393 51 that so-called cooperation agreements are not cov-
ered by the exclusive Community power. The principal aim of the internal
market through the establishment of a common customs tariff is, according
to Articles 9 and 10 of the EEC Treaty, that goods imported from third
countries should enjoy the Community treatment and benefit from the prin-
ciple of free circulation as long as Member States' individual quotas are
created by Community instruments. Through a series of cases, 52 the Court
has made it clear that goods imported into a particular Member state under
a Community tariff quota are to be considered as products in free circula-
tion which can be imported into other Member States without any obstacles.
In addition, the Court, in Commission v. Council," held that it
was inappropriate to allocate Community quotas into national quotas unless
there were compelling circumstances which made it impossible to do other-
wise.
The remainder of Article 115, with only slight modification in the
Maastricht Treaty, therefore, is not compatible with the aim of the single
market to eliminate all border controls and enhance free circulation in
the internal market, because it means that the Member States may be per-
49. Opinion of the Court 1/75 on the compatibility with the EEC Treaty of a draft 'Under-
standing on a Local Cost Standard' , [1975] ECR 1355, at 1363.
50. Case 41/76, Donckerwolcke v Procesureur de la Republique de Lille, [1976] ECR 1921.
51. Coun.Dec.74/393/EEC establishing a consultation procedure for cooperation agreements
between Member States and third countries, OJ (1974) L 208/23. It requires a consultation
procedure for cooperation agreements negotiated between Member States and third countries.
52. Case 218/82, Commission v Council, [1983] ECR 4063, and Case 288/83, Commission v Ire-
land, [1985] ECR 1761.
53. Case 51/87, Commission v Council, [1988] ECR 5459, at 5481. The Court held that until
the overall Community quota is exhausted, goods may be imported into a Member State which has
exhausted its share without having to bear customs duties at the full rate or to be rerouted
via another Member State whose share has not been exhausted.
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mitted to impede free circulation of certain imported goods.54
3.2.1. Protective Quotas and Free Circulation
There is another way to tackle the import of goods in free circula-
tion in another Member state under Article 115 of the EEC Treaty. Based
on Article 113, the Commission has been given the power to conclude trade
agreements and at the time of the Tezi decision, 55
 the Community was a
party to the Multi Fibre Arrangement 56 (hereinafter MFA)
	 which was to
control international textile trade under the auspices of the GATT.
Contrary to the Court ruling in case 51/87, however, the Court in this
case held that the Commission has power to authorise national-type protec-
tive commercial measures under Article 115. As a result, the Netherlands
is able to protect the quota allocated to the Benelux countries within the
context of the Community quota. In this case, the Court made a definition
on a common commercial policy. According to the Court ruling, the common
commercial policy should be based on uniform import rules which are not
subject to alteration between Member States once imported to the Community
from third countries. 57
 Therefore, only when the Member States are not
treated differently by all instruments of the common commercial policy, is
the idea of a single internal market or of a common commercial policy
54. Member States have protected the automobile, textile, consumer electronics and banana
industries against imports from non-member countries. see, Commission, Industrial policy in
an open and competitive environment, COM(90) 556 final.
55. Case 59/84, Tezi Textiel B y v Commission, [1986] ECR 887 (hereinafter "Tezi I"); Case
242/84, Tezi BY v Minister for Economic Affairs, [1986] ECR 933 (hereinafter "Tezi II").
56. The Multi Fibre Arrangement establishes a framework of voluntary restraint agreements
covering trade with approximately 30 low cost exporting countries. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3589/82,
OJ (1982) L.
57. Tezi I, [1986] ECR 924-25. In this case, the Court ruled that the MFA did not constitute
a common commercial policy because it covered only the textile sector through the Commis-
sion's intervention. See, Ibid at 930.
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completed. In the Tezi II case, the Court reaffirmed the priority of
establishing a single internal market by ruling that the Commission re-
stricts its Article 115 authorisations in the light of the impending
single internal market.58
3.2.2. The Commission and Article 115 Measures
In 1987, the Commission issued a decision 59 on the conditions and
details of measures under Article 115 with a view to tightening the gen-
eral criteria for authorisation. This replaced the prior decision.°
The 1987 Decision applies to "imports into a Member state of pro-
ducts originating in a third country and put into free circulation in the
Community which are not subject to uniform conditions of import in the
Member States". 61 According to the 1987 Decision, therefore, the Commis-
sion can authorise the issuance of an import document for surveillance
purposes, 62 and in the case of actual difficulties, Member States may
apply for protective measures.°
In the 1987 Decision, the Commission argues that Article 9(2) of
the EEC Treaty preclude any administrative procedure designed to establish
58. Tezi II, [1986] ECR 945.
59. Com.Dec.87/433/EEC (hereinafter referred to as the "1987 Decision") on surveillance and
protective measures which Member States may be authorised to take pursuant to Article 115 of
the EEC Treaty, OJ (1987) L 238/26.
60. Com.Dec.80/47/EEC on surveillance and protective measures which Member States may be
authorised to take in respect of imports of certain products originating in third countries
and put into free circulation in another Member State, OJ (1980) L 16/14.
61. Article 1 of the 1987 Decision.
62. Ibid, Article 2.
63. Ibid, Article 3.
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different rules for the movement of goods regardless of origin." How-
ever, the Commission also recognises that the full application of free
circulation presupposes the effective establishment of a common commercial
policy. 65 Therefore, Article 115 continues to be necessary because not
only have Article 115 measures not yet been replaced by uniform common
rule but also, disparities among the Member States' commercial policy can
cause deflections of trade. 66 Referring to the establishment of a common
commercial policy and to the objectives laid down by the Single European
Act, the Commission emphasised that the measures adopted pursuant to
Article 115 should be interpreted strictly and applied only for a limited
period and where the gravity of the situation so warrants. 67 As a result,
Member States can interfere with the movement of goods in the Single
Market through national protectionist trade policies unless a common
commercial policy which eliminates the application of national trade
policies based on Article 115. 68
Therefore, two prerequisites should be satisfied in order to
establish a large unified market without internal frontiers.	 First, the
64. Ibid, the 1987 Decision, p26. Article 9(2) of the EEC Treaty provides that the provi-
sions of Chapter 1, Section 1, and of Chapter 2 of this Title shall apply to products origi-
nating in Member States and to products coming from third countries which are in free circu-
lation in Member States.
65. The 1987 Decision, p26.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid, p27.
68. Article 115 authorisations have been successfully restricted. In 1985, 1,800, in 1988,
800, and in 1989 522 surveillance measures were in place in Member States respectively. By
July 1992, however, only 3 measures remained. The number of authorisations for actual pro-
tective measures are even lower. In 1988, 128 and in 1990, 79 Article 115 protective mea-
sures were authorised respectively. In mid-1992, however, only 3 measures were authorised.
See, Commission, 'The European Community as a World Trade Partner; The Second Trade Report',
(1993) 52 European Economy, Annex I - A concise overview of the EC Trade Policy (hereinafter
referred to as "Overview of Trade Policy"), p195.
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Commission should reduce use of Article 115 and eventually eliminate its
use. It must be noted, however, that elimination of Article 115 measures
will not result in common import rules. 	 Second, therefore, a complete
common commercial policy with uniform import formalities should be estab-
lished. 69 In order for the common commercial policy to be completed,
however, the Community is relying on more protection rather than free
trade principles and liberalisation of the Community market, mainly
through the selective use of unfair trade measures such as anti-dumping
laws to protect its domestic industries against foreign competition.70
3.3. Measures Against Unfair Trade (Anti-dumping Action)
Alongside the regulations for 'normal trade', which has been men-
tioned above, the Community has had measures to protect its industry
against so called unfair international trading practices. As a main
instrument, the Community has had its own anti-dumping regulation.71
Anti-dumping action, which is expressly provided for in Article 113
of the EEC Treaty under the Title of commercial policy, against imports
from third countries which cause injury to domestic industries, is one of
the main instruments of the Community's trade policy. 	 The Community's
69. Starla Henrich-Cohen, "EEC Treaty Article 115 - The Surviving Safeguard: Ridding Residual
Member State Protection in the Single Market", (1993) 24 Law Pol'y Int'l Business,.
70. It is worth noting that methods for the elimination of the various "ill-matched" protec-
tion measures, including voluntary restriction agreements (VRAs), and replacement of current
restrictions with other Community measures such as anti-dumping measures, were suggested by
the Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations. See, Commission, 'Trade Policy:
EEC Commission Modifies Application of Article 115', Eur.Rep. (Eur. Info. Service, Brussels),
July 22, 1987, at 14.
71. The original antidumping regulation was enacted by the regulation 459/68 which came into
force on 1 July 1968, the same day as the common customs tariffs entered into force.
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anti-dumping rules were adopted in accordance with Article VI of the GATT
and the 1979 Anti-dumping Code which condemns dumping where it causes
material injury to the industry in the importing country because it stems
from a contrived rather than a true comparative advantage. 72 The current
Community legislation governing anti-dumping practice against imports from
third countries is Council Regulation 2423/88.
	 basic regulation
provides some changes including rules on the normal value, 74 dumping
margin and export prices, and on the circumvention of anti-dumping duties
by assembly operation.
In addition to the Commission's report 75
 urging the replacement of
current restrictions with other Community measures such as anti-dumping
measures, the Commission pursued increased use of its anti-dumping and
antitrust laws, in its electronics report, 76 to protect its domestic indu-
stries against imports from non-member countries, especially in its elec-
tronics market. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Commission has
three main target countries of anti-dumping action; they are Japan, China,
and Korea. 77 The GATT has complained that the Community's excessive use
72. See, Chapter 4 of this thesis.
73. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
74. It should be noted that the concept of a normal value may not be compatible with the
concept of a transaction value for the purpose of customs valuation. See, N. Green, T.C.
Hartley and J.A. Usher, The Legal Foundation of the Single European Market, Oxford University
Press, 1991, p8.
75. Commission, Trade policy: EEC Commission Modifies Application of Article 115, Eur.Rep.
(Eur. Info. Service, Brussels) July 22 1987, at 14.
76. Commission, The European Electronics and Information Technology Industry: State of Play,
Issues at Stake and Proposals for Action: Communication from the Commission to the Council
and to the European Parliament, SEC(91) 565 final (hereinafter Electronics Report), reprinted
in Commission in the European Communities, European Industrial Policy for the 1990s, EC
Bull., supplement, March 1991, 3/91, p38-39.
77. Commission, 10th anti-dumping report (1991), SEC(92) 716 final, p7.
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of anti-dumping measures has caused some foreign producers to refrain from
exporting to the Community.78
At the end of 1992, the Community had 158 anti-dumping measures in
force, 108 of which were original anti-dumping measures and 50 of which
were measures maintained after a full review. 	 114 were in the form of
duties and 44 in the form of price undertakings. 79 Of 158 measures in
force, 21 measures, 20 measures, and 13 measures were imposed against
Japan, China, and Korea respectively. 80
78. William Dullforce, "Anti-dumping Duty under Scrutiny", Financial Times, Apr. 17, 1991,
p6.
79. Commission, 11th anti-dumping report (1992), COM(93) 516 final, p10.
80. Ibid.
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II. KOREAN TRADE POLICY IN ITS EUROPEAN DIMENSION
1. INTRODUCTION
The European Community aims at economic as well as political
unity. 81 Furthermore, with the reunification of Germany, the creation of
the European Economic Area with possible dismemberment of the European
Free Trade Association (hereinafter EFTA), 82 and countries of eastern and
central Europe aiming at eventual EC membership, it will certainly witness
an enlargement of its borderline.
In spite of the fact that market integration would restore the
Community's economic vitality and create trade, non-member countries have
been concerned about the possible creation of a "Fortress Europe". From
this viewpoint, attempt at realisation of economic integration in other
regions" and increasing foreign direct investment in the Community can be
explained as a counter-plot on the part of non-member countries. Among
non-member countries, Korea which is one of the Newly Industrialised
Economies of Asia (hereinafter ANIEs) has closely watched and has had
special concern regarding market integration in Europe. Diversification
of the export market away from the American market which has hitherto been
81. See generally, Commission, Intergovernmental Conference: Contribution by the Commission,
EC Bull., Supplement 2/91, p69-117.
82. Referendum schedule of the Nordic nations on EC membership was as follows; Finland-
October 16, '94, Sweden-November 13, '94, and Norway-November 28, '94. Among these Nordic
nations, Sweden and Finland decided to join the EC as a result of their referenda, while
Austria will join the EC in 1995. EFTA will be reduced to four nations which are Norway, one
small nation (Switzerland, population 7m) and two dwarfs (Iceland and Lichtenstein with
population 260,000 and 28,000 respectively).
83. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asian-Pacific Econo-
mic Co-operation (APEC).
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1the biggest market for Korean exports, is desperately needed because of
increasing protectionism, rising labour costs as a result of labour
strife, and the appreciation of the currency against the US dollar under
pressure from the American administration, which wants to reduce its trade
deficit with Korea.	 In addition, the World trade environment has great
influence on Korea's national target to join the developed world because
it has been undertaking export-oriented growth strategies.
During the past 40 years, Korea has transformed from an impover-
ished agricultural subsistence economy into a newly industrialised econ-
omy. In 1962, when Korea introduced its first five-year economic develop-
ment plan, its gross national product (GNP) was a mere 2 billion U.S
dollars, per capita GNP stood at just 87 U.S dollars and the value of
Korea's export was 55 million U.S dollars. 	 By 1994, they had grown to
376.9 billion dollars, to 8,438 dollars and to 96.3 billion dollars
respectively. 84 As a result, by 1994, Korea emerged as the world's thir-
teenth largest exporting nation. This impressive growth based on export-
oriented economic development strategy was achieved since 1962, despite
unfavourable initial conditions for development, such as limited natural
resources, negligible domestic savings, a lack of technology and a narrow
domestic market.	 The Korean government has played a major role in the
country's economic development.	 In order to meet its raw material and
capital goods needs during this expansion, Korea increased its imports
dramatically, from nearly 0.4 billion U.S dollars in 1962 to 102.3 billion
84. Seoul Shinmun, 16 Mar., 1995, pl, (Bank of Korea). The presentation from the Ministry of
Trade , Industry and Energy (now, the Ministry of Trade and Industry) on the occasion of the
31st Korean Trade Day, reprinted in the Korea Newsreview, Dec. 3 1994, p14. Financial Times,
17 October 1994, p29. In 1993, GNP was 328.7 billion US dollars, per capita GNP was 7,466 US
dollars, and the value of Korea's export was 82.2 billion US dollars.
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U.S dollars in 1994.85
Although Korea formed its own government after annihilation of
Japanese colonialism in 1945, it had neither an obvious trade policy,
because Korea had relied heavily on aid from USA, mainly in the form
consumption goods based on the necessities of life, nor a stabilised
government which could have provided direction in internal and/or external
affairs. Furthermore, its economy was devastated by the war between the
relatively industrialised communist North and the agrarian capitalist
South.
In the 1960s, however, the Korean government launched a series of
five-year plans for economic development and adopted an export-oriented
economic growth policy. Because of its cheap, hard-working and relatively
skilled labour, Korea increased its exports of labour-intensive low-tech
products quickly. This was possible partly because of the liberal world
trading environment in the 1960s 86 and partly because of the Korean pro-
tectionism in government's policy and an exporting-oriented policy.
Korea's export strategy, which in the 1960s prioritised light indu-
stry moved to a policy of modernisation of exporting structure with prior-
ity attached to the heavy petrochemical industry. Despite the oil shock in
the early 1970s, exports continuously increased throughout the 1970s.87
From the early 1970s, the Korean government mobilised a series of legisla-
85. Seoul Shinmun, Jan. 4. 1995, p9 (source: the Ministry of Trade and Industry, hereinafter
the MTI). Korean Overseas Information Service, A Handbook of Korea (9th ed.), Samhwa Print-
ing Co. Ltd., 1993, p370, (hereinafter referred to as "A Handbook of Korea (9th ed.)").
86. Throughout the 1960s, the volume of world trade was expanding by nearly 8 per cent an-
nually, accompanied by relatively low trade protectionism and low oil and raw materials'
price. See, A Handbook of Korea (9th ed.), p370.
87. The average export increase rates during the five-year economic development plans were
43,9% (1962-1966), 33.8% (1967-1971), and 50.9% (1972-1976).
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tions 88 and announced a Heavy and Chemical Industry Development Plan in
1973, in order to develop the heavy petrochemical industry.
In order to expedite financing and to expand the productivity of
exporting industries, a National Investment Fund (INF) was established in
1974 to support strategic industries, for example electronics and ship-
building industries. A series of supporting measures" for exporting
industries played an important role in increasing exports continuously.
In addition, the building of the export industrial complex, a general
trading company, establishment of the export-import bank (1976) and the
setting up of a Free Export Area, all supported export-oriented industries
in Korea.
Because of all-round difficulties which resulted from its export-led
economic growth strategy, development of the heavy petrochemical industry
relying on foreign capital, the second oil shock" and internal political
chaos, 91 Korea, in the 1980s, started to establish a private sector-led
88. The Machine Industry Promotion Law (1967), The Petrochemical Industry Upbringing Law
(1969); The Electronics Industry Promotion Law (1969), The Car Industry Upbringing Plan
(1969), and The Basic Plan for Promotion of the Shipbuilding Industry (1970).
89. Customs tariff restoration on imported raw materials for export (1975), moratorium of
customs tariff (1977), introduction of customs tariff on imported capital goods for export
(1974) and exemption from the special consumption tax (1976).
90. Oil prices in 1973-73 quadrupled and in 1979-80 doubled again. This oil price increase
hit the Korean economy very hard because of Korea's lack of natural resources. In 1992, for
instance, Korea imported 8.1 billion U.S dollar of oil and 35.2 billion U.S dollars of other
raw materials, out of a total import figure of 81.5 billion U.S dollars. Korea Foreign Trade
Association (hereinafter "KFTA"), Trade Annual 1993, Dong-A Publication Ltd., 1993, p272.
91. President Park who had held power for the last 18 years was assassinated on 26 October
1979, and following violent student demonstrations that culminated in a major insurrection in
Kwangju in southern Cholla province, general Chun Doo Hwan took power through a coup d'etat-
like military incident 12 December 1979 and bloody suppression of the Kwangju insurrection,
in may, 1980. As a result of political turmoil, Korea's economic performance in 1980 was the
worst for more than 20 years.
33
economic development system instead of a government-led policy centring
around large conglomerate enterprises (so-called chaebols), in order to
ensure industrial concentration. Privatisation of banks, introduction of
an autonomous monetary system, internationalisation of capital market and
protection of small-medium size enterprises (SMEs) can be enumerated as
examples. Korea established two guides for basic economic policy; a
policy of self-control, free from government intervention and open-door
policy in trade, in the belief that an advanced economy could be achieved
only through liberalisation based on market economic mechanism.
	 There-
fore, in the early 1980s, the Korean government introduced a retrenchment
policy in order to achieve price stability and continued economic growth
based on the trade liberalisation policy. 	 As a result, price stability
was achieved92 and Korean products became more competitive in the interna-
tional market. Thanks to a favourable international exchange rate (weak
Korean currency), international interest rate and low oil and raw mater-
ials prices - the so-called "three low phenomena" - Korea enjoyed its
first merchandise trade surplus (3.5 billion dollars) and its first cur-
rent account surplus (4.65 billion dollars) in 1986 and witnessed surplus
in the balance of payment for the next three years.
Through import expansion, rather than export reduction, the Korean
government tried to avoid trade conflict resulting from trade surplus for
4 years. As a result, the so-called import liberalisation ratio increased
each year from 68.6% in 1980 to 98.1% at the end of l993.
supporting measures for promoting export, such as the Science and Techno-
92. Since 1983, inflation has been suppressed under 5%, compared to 20-30% in the 1970s.
Wholesale price rises accelerated to nearly 18% each year from 1972 to 1979. See, KIEP,
Policies Related to Trade in Korea, KIEP, 1992, p17.
93. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, 1993, p427.
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logy Development Law (STDL, 1986) were either abolished or relaxed.94
Prior to these measures, furthermore, the Korean government announced
long-term plan for internationalisation of the capital market (1981) and
the introduction of an import liberalisation indication system (1984).95
In order to expand foreign direct investment and introduce foreign techno-
logy which is indispensable to development, the Foreign Capital Inducement
Law (FCIL) was passed in 1983 and entered into force in 1984. As a re-
sult, Korea switched from a positive list system (i.e., only those activi-
ties specially permitted could have foreign direct investment) to a nega-
tive list system (unless specifically restricted, an activity is open to
foreign investment) in the field of foreign investment. 96 A similar
policy for imports was adopted in 1968. As part of its import substitu-
tion policy, Korea had formerly relied upon a positive list system on
import authorisation, but it was converted to a negative list system which
permits imports unless specifically restricted. 97 In addition, the ratio
of items authorised for Automatic approval status in Korea's import licen-
sing system was increased each year by the Ministry of Trade and Industry
(MIT) 98
Korea's first trade surplus, in 1986, was mainly because of the so-
94. For example, the abolition of the import surveillance ayatem (1988), the alleviation of
substantial import restriction by special laws (1988), the total abolition of export finan-
cing to large conglomerate enterprises (Chaebols) and a drastic curtailment of trading finan-
cing (1988), and abolition of the deferment system on customs tariff collection and its
convertion to the customs tariff restoration system (1988).
95. KIEP, Policies Related to Trade in Korea, p18.
96. Ibid, p330. Article 7 of the Foreign Exchange Control Act.
97. Ibid, p48. Article 18 of the Foreign Trade Transactions Act.
98. Peter F. Allgeier, "Korean Trade Policy in the Next Decade: Dealing with Reciprocity",
(1988) 16 World Development (No. 1), p89-90. Products listed for automatic approval receive
import licenses automatically; a recommendation from the concerned Ministry or industrial
association is not necessary.
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called "three low phenomena" - low oil price, low interest rates and the
rapid depreciation of the U.S dollar against the Japanese yen. Among
them, the strong yen especially made Korean products popular. However,
they did not maintain this popularity when the Japanese currency was
stabilised because corporate Korea poured profit into the stock market and
real estate instead of investing in Research and Development and factory
automation. As a result, Korea started once again to suffer trade deficit
in the 1990s.
In the beginning of 1994, the yen strengthened more than 20 per cent
- from 111 yen to around 92 yen - against the U.S dollar. 99 Korean
companies, however, faced the so- called "three highs" - high wages, high
interest rates and high domestic prices, especially for land.
	 To avoid
repeating their past mistake, Korean companies have been urged to take
advantage of their price competitiveness by promoting overseas marketing,
developing high-tech and more value added products and localising the
production of parts and machinery that they import from Japan. Expanding
markets in Southeast Asia and China, and the strong yen offer the best
chance to Korean companies' international presence through direct invest-
ment in foreign countries. Setting up plants overseas will increase
margins for Korean companies and help them hold on to their market share
once yen appreciation is no longer a factor. Furthermore, a strong yen
offers a good opportunity for localising parts and machinery because it
makes imports more expensive.
Korea has kept opening its economy to the world, as mentioned
above, in order to escape trade conflicts, upgrade industrial structure
through competition, and increase people's welfare. As a result, liberal-
isation is almost completed in the commodity market except for part of the
99. Financial Times, Mar. 13, 1995, p28 and Mar. 20, 1995, p28.
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agricultural market, 100
 and the import liberalisation ratio in manufactur-
ing products reached 99.8% in 1990. 1 ° 1
 Although Korea has tried to avoid
trade conflicts with its major trade partners through the alleviation of
restrictions on foreign direct investment and partial liberalisation of
the service market, e.g. insurance, its major trade partners including USA
and EC are forcing it to open its markets completely including agricultur-
al products, financing and insurance, and demanding protection of their
intellectual property rights. 102
Up to the middle of the 1980s, the United States was the only
market in which Korea could achieve economies of scale necessary to become
competitive in more sophisticated manufactured goods. As a result of
European Economic Integration, however, the European Community has emerged
as another market in which Korea can become competitive. In order to
expand Korea's export to the Community, it is important to convince the
political and business leadership in the Community that Korea is providing
the Community with fair access to the Korean economy, because lopsided
export expansion without reciprocity in market access could be a short-cut
to trade conflict and cause protectionism from the trade partner.
Korea's major export sectors, ironically, have been major import
sectors as well. Korea has relied heavily not only on foreign raw mater-
ial and inputs for major export goods where Korea adds value or assembles
components, but also on equipment necessary for manufacturing
100. The import liberalisation ratio in agriculture products has reached 89.9 per cent in
1993. See, KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p427.
101. KIEP, Policies Related to Trade in Korea, KIEP, 1992, p22.
102. This was one of the chief irritations between Korea and EC. When Korea introduced a
system of protection that benefited only US companies, the EC tried unsuccessfully to negoti-
ate equal treatment, and then in December 1987, the EC Commission suspended benefits under
the Generalised System of Preferences in protest at Korean disregard for European intellect-
ual property rights.
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processes. 103 The principal sources of such machinery and capital goods
to Korea have been Japan and the United States. 104
Europe, however, offers what Japan and the United States are reluc-
tant to offer - some of the latest technologies in industries where Europe
is strongest, such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and transport
equipment. 105
 But the Europeans are wary of transferring technologies to
Korea, possibly because Korea is regarded as a high-tech player, even
though once it was one of the Community's main suppliers of labour inten-
sive goods. Korean exports to the European Community grew to 10.6 billion
U.S dollars in 1994 from 2.8 billion U.S dollars in 1982, while the Commu-
nity's exports to Korea during the period rose to 13.2 billion U.S dollars
from 1.5 billion U.S dollars. 106
Up to the middle of the 1980s, Korea's trade policy pursued export
promotion and import restriction aimed at selective localisation, combined
103. For instance, machine tools, heating and cooling machines, and manufacturing equipment
for semiconductors. This is why inducement of foreign direct investment in Korea and locali-
sation of higher technology, information-intensive industries are critical to the Korean
economy.
104. Korea's trade deficit with Japan is 12.0 billion U.S dollars (estimates) of 6.05 billion
U.S dollars of its total trade deficit in 1994. Among them, trade deficit with Japan in
manufacturing eqipments, parts and components expanded to 11.3 billion U.S dollars until
October, 1994, compared to 10.5 billion in 1993.
105. TGV of France won the two-year-long race for the Korean supertrain project. The French
bidder beat its German and Japanese competitors mainly because of the terms and conditions of
technology transfer & localisation and cost. See, Korea Newsreview, Aug. 28, 1993, p8 and
p9.
106. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p 183, and p274. Korea's trade deficit with the EC was 2.64
billion U.S dollars in 1994. Therefore, Japan was followed by the EC in terms of trade
deficit of Korea. See, Seoul Shinmun, Nov. 29, 1994, p6, and Dec.27, 1994, p6, and Apr.1,
1995, p5, the presentation from the EC Ambassador in Korea on 'The Future of Korea-EU Rela-
tions'.
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with protecting the agricultural sector.'"
	 Since 1980, however, there
has been a trend toward a more liberalised trade policy which pursued
diversification in trade, liberalisation of imports, and localisation of
selected products.
2. KOREAN TRADE POLICY
2.1 Diversification in Trade
Under any circumstance, it would be risky for an exporting country
to be so dependent upon a single market, the United States, and it would
be even more risky for Korea to rely heavily upon a single country, Japan,
as a source of capital goods for its exporting industries. Korea, there-
fore, has to diversify its export market, and open its economy, both
imports and investment, to foreigners. In fact, Korea is already seeking
to diversify its export outlets. The number of Korea's export markets has
increased due to the rapid expansion of its export and the normalisation
of diplomatic ties with the former communist countries. Korea's export
markets which were only 33 countries in 1962 have increased to 201 coun-
tries including Russia and the Eastern European countries. 108 Thanks to
the diversification of export markets, the imbalance in the export market
has gradually decreased.
	 In 1970, 75.6 per cent of the country's whole
exportation was destined for the United States and Japan. In 1992, how-
ever, only 38.7 per cent was exported to the abovementioned two
107. General reading on Korean trade policy prior to 1984 appeared in Koo Bohn-Young, " A
review of the industrial incentive system in Korea", Mimeo (Seoul: Korea Development Insti-
tute, Aug. 1984).
108. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p181.
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countries. 1" The rest of Asia and the Pacific gave Korea an opportunity
for export diversification. Korea's export to those regions grew from 9.9
per cent of its total exports in 1975 to 27.8 per cent in 1992.110 As a
result, Asia emerged as the biggest export market for Korea.
Export to the Community continued to grow as well. As a proportion
of Korean exports, export to the Community increased from 10.8 per cent in
1985 to 12.0 per cent in 1992.111
In Contrast to this successful export diversification, however,
imports continued to rely heavily on Japan and the United States. 112
Nevertheless, imports from the Community have grown rapidly and emerged as
an alternative source of manufactured goods for • Korea's exporting indu-
stries.
2.2 Liberalisation
Import liberalisation is continuously being carried out in pursuit
of the country's open-door and internationalisation policy, as indicated
by systematic tariff reduction, fewer items subject to restricted import
licensing, less frequent application of higher emergency or adjustment
tariffs, and more activities open to foreign investment.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid, p182.
111. Korea exported to the Community 9.41 billion U.S dollars in 1993, and more than 10
billion U.S dollars in 1994. See, Seoul Shinmun, Jan. 4, 1995, p9.
112. Imports from Japan and the United States occupied 46.2 per cent of the country's total
import. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p275.
40
First of all, the average normal tariff was reduced from 25 per
cent ad valorem equivalent in 1982 to 8.9 per cent by 1993. 113
 The so-
called "liberalisation ratio" (percentage of 10,220 ten-digit HS num-
bers 114 in Korea's tariff schedule with AA status) increased each year
from 1980 (when it was 68.6 per cent), to reached 98.1 per cent in
1993. 115 As a result, only 197 out of 10,417 articles are subject to the
list of restricted import licensin g. Of these, a further 47 was liberal-
ised in 1994, and the remaining import restricted articles will be conver-
ted to Automatic Approval status in Korea's import licensing system up to
1997.116
Since the Foreign Capital Inducement Law (FCIL), 117 foreign invest-
ment is gradually being liberalised by annually removing activities from
the FCIL's prohibited or restricted lists.
	
In order to simplify the
approval process for foreign investment, Korea switched from a license
system to a report system in March, 1993. As a result, Korea liberalised
83.0 per cent or 924 sectors of the 1,148 sectors subject to foreign
investment in the Korean economy. 118
 Among various broad categories of
113. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p429. This average tariff will be reduced to 7.9 per cent
according to the five-year tariff reform scheme announced in 1983 by the Korean government.
This reduction pursuant to the tariff scheme has been maintained unilaterally in order to
improve the competitiveness of the country's economy. The schedule of reductions is an-
nounced in advance so that both the affected local sectors and the overseas exporters to
Korea would have time to adapt to the lower tariff.
114. Korea used CCCN method, as an article classification method, up to 1987. Since Korea
joined the HS agreement, a 10-digit HS method based on the original 6-digit HS method has
been applied. Ten-digit HS numbers in Korean tariff schedule numbered 10,417 items in 1993.
115. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p427. The import liberalisation tatio in agricultural products
has reached 80.3 per cent in 1990. The liberalisation trend in this field would be kept
expanding throughout the 1990s. See, KIEP, 'Trade Related Policies in Korea', p22.
116. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p428.
117. It was passed in 1983 and entered into force in July 1984.
118. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p442.
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sectors, however, the liberalisation ratios vary enormously. For example,
by 1991, agriculture, for example, had a liberalisation ratio of 20 per
cent, services were 61.8 per cent, and manufacturing industries were 97.7
per cent liberalised.119
In spite of the fact that liberalisation has been carried on, it
could be argued that Korea's trade policy concentrates on targeted import
substitution and aggressive export promotion. 	 Through special laws and
regulations, and administrative guidance as substantial leeway from the
economic ministries, the Korean government can restrict imports in prior-
ity areas for development of indigenous capabilities, and influence on the
final parameters of an approved investment.
Recently, in order to attract more foreign capital and technology,
Korea unveiled measures to attract foreign investment. The measures
included permission for foreign business operations in Korea to purchase
land for plant construction and housing for their staff without obtaining
government approval; permission for foreign business investing high-tech
industries to finance plant construction with loans from abroad; and
permission for foreign business to import from Japan certain machines
which the government had put on the import ban list)-20
The first two measures are very important, as they would improve
the approach to the financial market in Korea as well as abroad.
	
In
Korea, neither credit loan nor low interest rates are well established,
compared to those of the advanced countries. Permission to purchase land,
therefore, would enable foreign business to take loans on the security of
land. In addition, the establishment of free investment zones which would
119. KIEP, Trade Related Policies in Korea, p332. Korea had a liberalisation ratio of 83 per
cent which was subject to the foreign investment by 1993, compared to 80.3 per cent by 1992,
and 79.4 per cent by 1991.
120. Korea Newsreview, Nov. 13, 1993, p14.
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be relieved of a variety of red tape, regarding such matters as investment
approval from government to acquisition of plant sites exclusively for
high-tech foreign businesses could attract foreign direct investment.
Korea aims to open an additional 132 industrial sectors by 1997,
and increase investment liberalisation ratio to 93.6 per cent by the
target year. 121
As a result of a variety of measures to attract foreign investment,
the approved foreign direct investment sharply increased and represented
1.11 billion U.S dollars during the January to September period in
1994.122 During this period, foreign direct investment in non-manufactur-
ing sectors almost tripled to 0.83 billion, while investment in manufac-
turing sectors declined 26.8 per cent to 0.28 billion.123
2.3 Localisation
As we have seen above, export-led economic growth based on substan-
tial imports of technologies, machinery and components, and mainly under
OEM (Original Equipment Manufacture) deals, 124 provides a method of rapid
industrial development.
121. Korea Newsreview, July, 3, 1993, p14. This additional foreign investment liberalisation
was decided at a meeting of the Foreign Capital Introduction Deliberation Committee which was
held at the end of June, 1993.
122. Korea Newsreview, Oct. 22, 1994, p23.
123. Ibid. This meant that foreign investers started to regard Korea as a market rather than
a manufacturing centre.
124. Korea had 49.1 per cent of the proportion of own-brand sales out of the nation's total
export. As a result, indigenous producers relied on OEM business for more than half of total
sales. Therefore, more than half of the Korean economic sectors were exposed as being vul-
nerable. The solution was to increase the proportion of own brand sales based on localisa-
tion of higher technology and information-intensive industries. See, KFTA, Trade Annual
1993, p168.
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Unlike Japan which had already been ranked as an advanced country
even before World War II and has penetrated into export markets with well-
experienced industries, Korea has exploited export markets with little
experience at home, relying on imported capital goods. 	 Furthermore,
Korean export performance has tended to rely heavily on technology inflows
and imported machinery. It is a very risky strategy, therefore, especial-
ly where there is no large domestic market or strong technological base.
Since the mid-1980s, lower cost countries in South-east Asia star-
ted to win OEM contracts at the expense of Korea where production costs
rose as a result of rising international interest rates, prices of raw
materials and wages due to unionisation of the labour. Even though inter-
national interest rates will affect all companies, wherever they are
located, rising wages 125
 and raw material prices 126 have been the main
reasons that led to Korea being regarded as a less attractive location for
sub-contracting. Therefore, localisation, designed to decrease the import
of capital goods (mainly from Japan), 127
 increase international marketing
presence, and establish technological independence, is a consistent policy
125. According to the Korea Productivity Centre, the rate of a normal increase in wages minus
the rate of productivity gains during the period from 1980 to 1992 was 8.51 per cent for
Korea, 4.54 per cent for Singapore and 5.2 per cent for Taiwan.
126. Korea imports all the oil which it needs. Imports of raw material occupied 52.0 per
cent of Korea's whole import in 1992. See, KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p272.
127. Trade with Japan has been the major cause of Korea's trade deficit. Korea suffered a
trade deficit of 9.65 billion U.S dollars in 1991, 5.41 billion dollars in 1992, 1.56 billion
dollars in 1993, and 6.05 billion dollars in 1994. Among them, the trade deficit with Japan
was 8.76 billion dollars in 1991, 7.85 billion dollars in 1992, 8.4 billion dollars in 1993,
and 11.4 billion dollars in 1994. Trade deficit with the EC had been 0.15 billion dollars in
1991, 0.35 billion dollars in 1992, 0.76 billion dollars in 1993, and 2.64 billion dollars in
1994 (as of Nov. 1994). See, KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p137 and p138, Korea Newsreview, Feb.
13 1993, p13, and Jan. 14, 1995, p2, and Seoul Shinmun, Dec. 27, 1994, p6, and Dec.1, 1994,
P8.
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regarded as an important measure to improve the country's international
competitiveness.
Special laws, such as the Telecommunication Basic Law, the Science
and Technology Development Law, Electronics Industry Promotion Law, Compu-
ter Network Law and Semiconductor Industry Fostering Plan give ministries
the authority to set up or maintain local content requirements, to turn
down import applications and to permit public sector procurement of pro-
ducts containing a stipulated level of local content.
	 Recommendations
from domestic industry associations are required for import approval. 128
The difficulty of obtaining recommendations from domestic industry asso-
ciations which are directly competing against imported products constitute
a stumbling block to free trade, in spite of the fact that this system has
contributed to localisation or import substitution of strategic parts or
products.
It is worth noting, ironically, that the reasons why foreign direct
investment and OEM manufacturing in Korea have been decreased could share
the same reasons why Korean companies have increased direct investment in
foreign countries, where access to cheap labour and raw materials is easy.
The Korean trade deficit widened mainly because of import of capital
goods from advanced countries. Furthermore, advanced countries are get-
ting more reluctant to transfer technologies to Korea. Therefore, locali-
sation and import diversification policies are pursued. Import diversifi-
cation, however, is not compatible with GATT's Most-Favoured-Nation prin-
ciple. The political repercussions of successful export expansion relying
on import restriction in the form of import diversification and localisa-
tion could cause trade conflicts.
128. For instance, import licence applications are subject to the recommendation of the
Korean Machine Tool Industry Association.
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Between 1992 and 1994, the Ministry of Trade and Industry supported
266.4 million U.S dollars for localisation of 2,290 products. 	 As a re-
sult, Korea could have enjoyed 3,100 million U.S dollars worth of import
substitution and export expansion)- 29 However, machinery, parts, and
components for exporting industries still relied heavily on import from
Japan. 130
Technological self-reliance efforts, however, have not been easy.
Even though some Korean companies succeeded in localising, large local
companies which are major buyers do not choose Korean products in prefer-
ence to products imported mainly from Japan, because of high price. Even
when the prices of Korean and imported products are similar, Korean consu-
mer companies prefer imported products which have proved their quality for
years. 131 Another main reason, however, is that the dumping onrush of
Japanese products targeting the latest Korean-developed items on the
domestic market has driven them out of the market.132
129. Seoul Shinmun, Jan. 28, 1995, p10.
130. The reliance on imports for machinery, parts and components from Japan was 39.8 per cent
in 1991 and 39.2 per cent in 1994. Seoul Shinmun, Jan. 28, 1995, p10.
131. Korean consumer companies give as reasons why they are not eager to use localised pro-
ducts, lack of confidence in quality (63%) and high price (15%). Seoul Shinmun, Jan. 28,
1995, p10.
132. KFTA, Trade Annual 1993, p228. Dongsung Semiconductor Co., for instance, a small- and
medium-sized local computer chip maker, succeeded in localising a pressed diode, a key colour
TV and microwave oven component, in March, 1992. A few months later, this promising company
was bankrupted becaused of a 25 per cent price cut in electronics components by Sankei and
Fujitsu, the two dominant Japanese suppliers in Korea. See, Korea Newsreview, Jun. 27, 1992,
p15.
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2.4 Korean Direct Investment in Foreign Countries
Overseas investment by Korean companies has risen sharply.'" New
investment by Korean companies by overseas subsidiaries was 1,872 million
413.993U.S dollars in 1	 This was 53.6 per cent higher than that of
1992. 135
Southeast Asia accounted for the largest slice of Korean overseas
investment, attracting 519.3 million U.S dollars in 358 projects. 	 North
America was second, with 391.6 million U.S dollars and the European Com-
munity was third, with 144.2 million U.S dollars (in 37 projects) in 1992.
Europe-wide, Korea leads the ripple of non-Japanese Asian investment : its
cumulative direct investment in the Community, mostly in electronics, in
the four years to 1993, amounted to 560 million U.S dollars.136
As mentioned above, the reason for the sharp rise in Korean over-
133. The definition of international direct investment - OECD Paris 1992 - was adopted by the
IMF in the 5th edition of its Balance of Payments Mannual. According to this definition, a
direct investment enterprise is an incorporated enterprise in which a single foreign investor
controls 10 per cent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated enter-
prise - or the equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise - or has an effective voice in the
management of the enterprise. See, Commission, Direct Investment in the EC 1984-1991, euro-
stat, 1992, pll.
134. KFTA, Trade Annual 1994, p363. Korea Newsreview, March 5, 1994, p25. Compared with
overseas direct investment by British companies, new investment by Britain in foreign coun-
tries was 17 billion pounds (about 27 billion U.S dollars), while Korea invested 1,872 mil-
lion U.S dollars in 1993. See, Financial Times, Feb. 1, 1995, p16.
135. In 1992, Korean investment in foreign countries was 1,218 million U.S dollars. The
Korean government approved 2,367 million U.S dollars in 1,369 direct investments in foreign
countries during the Jan.-Sep. period in 1994. This represented a 99.9 per cent increase, or
1,183 million U.S dollars, over the corresponding period of last year (Source: the Ministry
of Finance), Korea Newsreview, Oct. 22, 1994, p23.
136. Korean investment in the European Community was 95.2 million in 1990, 90 million in
1991, 144.2 million in 1992, and 231 million U.S dollars in 1993. See, KFTA, Trade Annual
1994, p .
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seas investment in advanced countries like America or the European Commun-
ity is to gain high-technology and/or set up localised production aimed at
exploring foreign markets directly and avoiding protectionism, while its
investment in the Southeast Asia countries is mainly to employ cheap
labour.
In the case of Korean direct investment in the EC, especially,
securing market accessibility has been the most important motivation as
the EC's protective measures, particularly anti-dumping action, have proved
to be relentlessly effective in impeding exports of Korean products.
Local-content requirements and rules of origin are other factors that
induce forced investment.
Furthermore, there are several reasons for Korea to invest in the
EC. First, the EC has emerged as the world's largest single market of 370
million people with 15,828 U.S dollars GDP per head. 137 This is 40.2 per
cent of the total population of the developed market economies and 6.4 per
cent of the world population.138
Korean foreign direct investments in the Community have coincided
with either actual or threatened imposition of anti-dumping duties by the
European Commission on products made in Korea. When the Council imposed
21.3 per cent and 20.1 per cent anti-dumping duties on imports of Haitai's
and Inkel's compact disc players respectively, 139
 both companies estab-
lished plants in the Community in 1990.
137. Financial Times, Oct. 11, 1994, p3, Commission, "A Community of Twelve: key figures",
European File, Eurostat, 6-7/1991, p8.
138. U.N., Handbook of the International Trade and Development Statistics, New York, 1989,
p422.
139. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 112/90, OJ (1990) L
13/21. These measures were repealed by Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2347/93, OJ (1993) L 215/4.
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Samsung of Korea announced a plan to invest 700 million U.S dollars
to build a manufacturing complex which would cover the production of
computer monitors, microwave ovens, facsimile machines, personal compu-
ters, monitor tubes, facilities to make 8 inch semiconductor wafers, and
colour television. This announcement followed the Commission's determina-
tion of anti-dumping on colour television sets from Korea. 140 Further-
more, Samsung Electronics and NEC of Japan will collaborate in producing
memory chips for the European market)-41 The link-up will enable Samsung
to avoid anti-dumping duties of 14.6 per cent on memory chips imported
into the European Community, 142 even though the tariff saving is not
likely to have been an important element of the deal.
In 1995, when a powerful group of European Excavator manufacturers
filed a complaint to the European Commission, Hyundai announced its inten-
tion to invest in Belgium and Samsung decided to establish its first for-
eign excavator manufacturing plant near Harrogate, North Yorkshire,143
before the Commission started its anti-dumping investigation.
In order for foreign investment to contribute to Korea's economy,
the effect of export substitution and re-importation to Korea should be
minimised, and furthermore, exports of parts and components to overseas
140. Financial Times, Sept.16, 1994, pl. Coun.Reg. (EC) No 2376/94, OJ (94) L 255/51, at 62.
Commission imposed 18.0 per cent and 16.8 per cent provisional antidumping duties on Samsung
and Goldstar respectively. Goldstar announced a 10 million pound colour TV plant after this
antidumping determination. See, Financial Times, Oct. 18, 1994, p12.
141. Financial Times, Feb. 7, 1995, p20.
142. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 611/93, OJ (93) L66/1, p5.	 Undertakings from the Korean companies
have been accepted by Com.Dec. 93/157/EEC, OJ (93) L 66/37.
143. Financial Times, Jan.10, 1995, p6, Jan. 11, 1995, p6, Jan. 13, 1995, p4, and Jan. 24,
1995, p10.
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subsidiaries from parent companies in Korea should be increased) -44 As
long as subsidiaries in foreign countries rely on cost advantage based on
the parent companies' relatively cheap parts and components, Korean for-
eign direct investments in the EC are very vulnerable to the trade-
oriented investment policies of the EC because the EC may change the rate
of local-content requirements and use this as an arbitrary protectionist
instrument. Therefore, they should invest jointly with parts and material
suppliers and/or have other sources of supply under better conditions,
such as lower labour cost and local raw materials.145
On the other hand, foreign direct investment in order to escape
protectionist measures by manufacturing on the spot, what was formally
exported, may cause some difficulties in the EC. The anti-dumping com-
plaints may leave European manufacturers facing a competitor strengthened
by producing within the Community, which is the last thing the European
producers need.	 Furthermore, anti-dumping complaints may encourage or
force foreign companies to set up more factories in the Community, which
might exacerbate the European industry's manufacturing overcapacity.
Ironically, in this respect, the European Community has contributed
144. The result of the Ministry of Trade and Industry's survey of 1,393 Korean manufacturers
that operate overseas offshoots showed that 82.3 per cent of the pollees said neither produc-
tion nor exports of Korean manufacturers at home had declined, despite a considerable volume
of overseas investment. Korea's locally incorporated companies in foreign countries exported
40.5 per cent of their total output to enterprises in Korea. They imported from Korea 50 per
cent of the raw materials needed to produce finished goods in foreign countries. 55 per cent
of the pollees replied that they had succeeded in business and only 3 per cent said that they
had failed. Seoul Shinmun, Feb. 3, 1995, p9. The MT1 jointly conducted the survey for three
months starting Sept. 1, 1994 with the Korea Foreign Trade Association in order to analyse
the effects of overseas investment on exports, imports, technology improvement and employ-
ment.
145. Korea's favourite investment areas are the Southeast Asian countries and China, mainly
because of cheap labour and easy access to local raw materials.
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to the internationalisation of Korean companies by imposing anti-dumping
duties on Korean products, as well as enhancing their competitiveness. At
the same time, other localised foreign manufacturers in the Community, for
instance the Japanese, which have a significant trade deficit to the Com-
munity, may enjoy relief from low-cost competition until Korean manufac-
turers are localised in the European Community. On top of that, countries
in the Community which have usually offered generous grants 146 have conti-
nued to bid against each other for inward investments from non-EC compa-
nies in their efforts to defeat European Companies they are striving to
protect.
2.5 Korean Trade Policy in the Next Decade
Korea needs to achieve successful economic growth continuously in
order to join developed and industrialised world. This economic growth
can only be sustained by the preservation of a market-based economy and
by an international scramble for market through competition. The Korean
economy is, however, facing challenge from all sides. It is increasingly
handicapped by baggage from its past which desperately requires a radical
redefinition of the role of government in its economy and adherence to a
stronger market-based economy. The situation is made even worse by chal-
lenges from stronger regional competition with cheap labour. 147 Union-
146. The U.K government offered Samsung 58 million pounds (about 92.8 million U.S dollar) in
regional grants and loans to secure the company's 700 million U.S dollar project. Together
with indirect aid, the support from the U.K government is equivalent to 20 per cent of Sam-
sung's investment. It may be argued that one member country's grant to solve its regional
unemployment could threaten jobs in other member countries. See, Financial Times, Sept. 16,
1994, pl.
147. Wage levels in China, Malaysia and Thailand are just one tenth of those in Korea. See,
Financial Times, 17 October 1994, p29.
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isation of labour in Korea has caused wage rises, which have outstripped
increases in productivity.	 To stay ahead of regional rivals, the basic
requirement is the elevation of productivity corresponding to wage rises.
In addition, overall economic performance based on original equipment
manufacture (hereinafter OEM) and labour intensive industry should be
quickly switched to levels in the industrialised world, with own-brand
sales, and capital- and technology-intensive industries.
Some countries which went ahead of Korea in developing their econo-
mies have not joined the developed world, but have lost their competitive-
ness, and suffered high-unemployment, high-inflation and low economic
growth because unionised labour have pressed governments to pursue public
welfare at the expense of competitiveness. Once they lost their competi-
tive power, they could not but rely upon protectionism. Korea, nowadays,
is in similar situation. Trade protectionism has appeared again in Korea
as its trade balance is aggravated again and Korea views that liberalisa-
tion pressure from its major trading partners as unfair. Furthermore, the
so-called "three highs" (rising labour and raw material costs, and appre-
ciation of the currency) at the end of 1980s made matters worse. Korea,
however, needs to adopt a more liberalised economic policy and active
industrial adjustment policy rather than protectionism in order to enhance
its economic performance. Market liberalisation should be carried out not
from the viewpoint of alleviation of trade conflicts but from a more
positive prospective of elevation of international competitiveness which
would certainly guarantee economic growth, although it could result in
unemployment and idle facilities in some service industries and agricul-
ture. To overcome the difficulties arising from liberalisation, a time-
table for phased liberalisation should be prepared and adumbrated in
advance. This could have the effect of clarifying Korea's liberalisation
policy toward abroad, and its domestic industries could have rooms to
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prepare against liberalisation.
It must be noted that market liberalisation could be constrained by
several factors. The "Hermit Kingdom Legacy" which is Korea's historical
inwardness has given rise to a widespread view among Korean public that
market liberalisation hurts Korean interests. Additionally, in trading
policy-making procedure, resistance from the interest groups which exer-
cise influence over politicians can be exerted at the expense of the
economic imperative for liberalisation. Strict precautions should be
taken against the protectionist forces which may exert additional power in
the process of democratisation. Otherwise, Korea may not achieve enough
economic growth to join the developed world.
3. LEGISLATION RELATED TO TRADE IN KOREA
3.1. General
The relevant Korean laws concerning trade are composed of the
Foreign Trade Transaction Acts, the Foreign Exchange Control Act, and the
Customs Act.
The Foreign Trade Transactions Act 148
 which is a basic law regula-
ting export-import business contains provisions related to trade
148. In 1946, the Foreign Trade Transactions Rule was enacted based on the laws and ordinance
of the American military administration. In 1956, the Presidential Decree on a Grant for
Export Promotion was promulgated. In 1957, the abovementioned two systems were combined into
a Trade Act. In 1961, the provisional Act on the Export Bounty was enacted. In 1962, the
Export Promotion Act was enacted alongside execution of the first five year plan. From 1967
the Trade Transaction Act which integrated the abovementioned three Acts was carried into
effect. In 1986, the Foreign Trade Transactions Act was newly formulated; it entered into
effect from June,1987, by Presidential Decree, and its administrative regulation was enacted
June, 1987 by the notification from the Ministry of Trade and Industry (the "MTI").
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business, 149 tr ade agency, 15 ° licensing of export-import business,151
investigation of in j ury caused by import,152 and maintenance of orderly
export and impor t. 153 It aims to: promote external trade; establish fair
transactions; keep the balance of payments; expand external commerce and
contribute to the development of national economy. 154 	 Compared to the
previous Trade Transactions Act in 1967 which advocated the managed trade
system, this new Act is more market-oriented and aims to cope with rapid
changes in the internal-external trade environment under full scale liber-
alisation.
The Foreign Exchange Control Act 155
 regulates foreign exchange and
its transactions, and credits and debits resulting from external trade.
By the fourth amendment of this Act, unnecessary and complicated proce-
dures were simplified in order to establish the institutional background
for the liberalisation of the finance and capital market.
The Customs Act 156
 which was enacted in 1967 and amended in 1993
regulates all exported and imported products which pass the customs line.
In 1993, institutional complement was required as, in the process of
internationalisation and liberalisation, products could be imported at a
price below normal value and cause injury to competing domestic indu-
149. Articles 7 and 13 of the Foreign Trade Transactions Act (hereinafter the FTTA).
150. Article 14 and Article 17 of the FTTA.
151. Article 18 and Article 31 of the FTTA.
152. Article 31(2) and Article 43 of the FTTA.
153. Article 44 and Article 54 of the FTTA.
154. See, Article 1 (objects) of the FTTA.
155. The Foreign Exchange Control Act was enacted at the end of 1961. Since 1961, this Act
has been amended four times, most recently in 1991. Its Enforcement Decree was entered into
force in 1962 by a Cabinet Ordinance, and its Administrative Regulation was proclaimed in
1964 by a notification from the MTI.
156. The Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act was promulgated in 1967 by a Presidential
Decree and its enforcement regulation was notified in 1979 by a decree from the MOF.
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stries. In addition, increasing quantity of exports and imports has made
it necessary not only to improve customs formalities but also to accept
international standards for customs formalities. The Customs Act aims to
ensure tariff revenue through the imposition and collection of customs
tariff and appropriate customs clearance. 157	This Act, which could be
characterised, like the taxation law, as having the dual nature of a
substantive law and an adjective law, stipulates not only a requirement
for reduction and exemption, and imposition of customs tariff but also
procedures for those provisions.	 Furthermore, it has customs clearance
law character and a criminal law character as well because it makes exten-
sive provisions regarding violations, investigations and punishment.
Customs tariff, which is divided into basic rates and provisional
rates, contains an elastic tariff system and an international cooperation
tariff system by which the Executive is authorised by the National Assemb-
ly to impose customs tariff under special terms and conditions and within
a limited scope, in order to cope with changes in the economic environ-
ment.
The elastic tariff system is composed of a anti-dumping tariff, 158
 a
retaliative tariff, 159 and countervailing tariffs 160
 against a trade which
is regarded as unfair.
	 In case of fair trade, there are three kinds of
tariffs; an emergency tariff, an adjustment tariff and an allocated tar-
iffs. The emergency tariff 161
 is imposed, within the limit of 40/100 of
the basic rate, against products being imported in such increased quanti-
157. Article 1 of the Customs Act in 1993.
158. Article 10 of the Customs Act; this will be discussed later in detail.
159. Ibid, Article 11. It would be imposed against imported products from the country which
has treated Korean exports, ships and aircraft unfavourably.
160. Ibid, Article 13.	 It provides relief to domestic industries injured by subsidised
, imports.
161. Ibid, Article 12
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ties as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat there-
of, to the domestic industry producing a product like or directly competi-
tive with the imported product. The adjustment tariff 162 is imposed,
within the limit of 100/100 of the basic rate, for the rectification of
imbalanced tariff rates and when an urgent restraint to the import of
specified products is requested.
	 The allocated tariff 163 applies double
tariff rates subject to fixed maximum and minimum tariff rates could be
imposed. 164
The international cooperation tariff 165 is a concessionary tariff
through tariff negotiation with a foreign country or with an international
organisation.
In addition to these systems, tariff reduction and exemption,
tariff restoration 166 and tariff instalment systems are in force. Tariff
reduction and exemption 167 are applied only when expressly stipulated by
the Customs Act, the Foreign Capital Inducement Act, and agreements or
162. Ibid, Article 12(2).
163. Ibid, Article 16.
164. In addition, there is a convenience tariff (Article 14) for a non-treaty signatory and a
price equalisation tariff (Article 15) for price stabilisation.
165. Ibid, Article 43(8). It provides tariff concessions within the limit of 50/100 of the
basic rate when it is authorised. Korea joined GATT in 1967, participated in the Kennedy
Round and the Tokyo Round, and has made tariff concessions to products in which major trading
countries are interested as counter-presentations because it has benefited as a result of
tariff negotiation based on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle. Korea has made 220
tariff concessions in GATT joining negotiation, the Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round. In
the Uruguay Round, Korea planned to make 7,300 tariff concessions. See, KIEP, Policies Rela-
ted to Trade in Korea, p76.
166. A special Act on tariff restoration on imported material for export in 1984, accelerated
localisation of components for exporting products and import substitution.
167. Article 28 of the Customs Act. Tariff reducement and exemption rates have been reduced
each year; 1991-60%, 1992-50% and 1993-40%. See, KIEP, Policies Related to Trade in Korea,
p79.
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treaties .168
This is a kind of favour granted to diplomatic pouch, pro-
ducts re lated to high-tech industries and defence industries, procurement
and re-exports.
	
Tariff instalment, 169
 within	 5 years' time, could be
authorised on products notified by the MOF such as machinery, basic equip-
ments, construction materials and equipments, products imported by the
government or a self-governing body, and products imported by a nonprofit-
making corporation for the public good.
3.2 Anti-dumping Law in Korea
Customs tariff rate in Korea is determined by the National Assembly
as a part of the Customs Act. Customs tariff rates determined by law are
composed of the basic rate and the provisional rate as mentioned above.
The Executive, however, has the authority to determine what tariff rates
to apply in practice, in accordance with fluctuation of the internal and
external economic environment.	 A series of elastic tariff systems and
international cooperation tariffs (tariff concessions), as mentioned
above, fall under the authority of the Executive.
Anti-dumping duty, as a part of the elastic tariff system, may be
imposed where imports are sold at a price below normal value or threaten
to cause material injury to a domestic industry and if it is deemed neces-
sary to protect the domestic industry. 17 ° Although the Korean anti-dumping
system was enacted in 1963 under the title of "Tariff for Prevention of
Unfair Bargain Sale" as a part of the Customs Act, Korea did not apply
168. For examples, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). American forces in Korea based on the
Korea-America Mutual Defence Agreement have been exempted from customs tariff by the Korea-
America Agreement on Status-of-Forces in Korea.
169. Article 36 of the Customs Act.
170. Article 10 of the Customs Act.
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this system frequently up to the middle of the 1980s. The new Korean
anti-dumping system was amended in 1988 following joining of the GATT
Anti-dumping Code in 1986. This system started to be active after its new
administrative regulation was enacted.
The relevant Korean law concerning anti-dumping is contained in
Article 10 of the Korean Customs Act, Articles 4(2) to 4(15) of the Enfor-
cement Decree of the Customs Act by the Presidential Decree (hereinafter
the EDCA), the Administrative Regulation on Anti-dumping and Antisubsidy
(the MOF notification 89-6), Article 37 and Article 40(6) of the Foreign
Trade Transactions Act, and Article 31 and 32 of the Regulation on the
Operation and Procedure for the Investigation on Injury by the Imports.
According to these rules, the MOF coordinates the entire investiga-
tion and imposition of duty, while the Korean Trade Commission (herein-
after referred to as the "KTC"), an independent arm of the Ministry of
Trade and Industry (hereinafter referred to as the "MTI"), is to invest-
igate the primary material injury to the domestic industry, and the Office
of Customs Administration (hereinafter referred to as the "OCA") is to
investigate whether the imports are dumped or not, and calculate the
dumping margin if dumping has occurred.171
171. Article 4(4)(2) of the EDCA.
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Chapter 3 : PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
THE ANTIDUMPING LAWS
1. INTRODUCTION
Since 1968, 1 the European Community and its authorities have had
exclusive competence in the field of anti-dumping law. The principle was
repeatedly expressed in ECJ Opinion 1/75, 2 and in the Donckerwolcke case,3
that Member States should not exercise a power simultaneous to that of the
Community, embodied in the common commercial policy, to govern trade with
non-Member States in the Community dimension and in the international
sphere. The original EEC Anti-dumping Regulation has been amended several
times 4
 and dumping is currently governed by Council Regulation 2423/885
(hereinafter the Community Anti-dumping Regulation).
The Community Anti-dumping Regulation applies only for protection
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Economic
1. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No. 459/68, on protection against dumping or the granting of bounties or
subsidies by countries which are not members of the European Economic Community, OJ (1968) L
93/1.
2. In Opinion 1/75, Opinion of the Court given pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty of
11 Nov. 1975 [1975] ECR 1355, at 1364, the Court said that it can not be accepted that, in a
field which is covered by the common commercial policy, the Member State should exercise a
power concurrent to that of the Community, in the Community sphere and in the international
sphere.
3. Case 41/76, Donckerwolcke v Procureur De La Republique [1976] ECR 1921, at 1937. In this
case, the Court held that its full responsibility in the matter of commercial policy was
transferred to the Community by means of Article 113(1). Measures of commercial policy of a
national character are only permissible after the end of transitional period by virtue of
specific authorisation by the Community.
4. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2011/73, OJ (1973) L 206/3, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1411/77, OJ (1977) L
160/4, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1681/79, OJ (1979) L 196/1, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1580/82, OJ (1982) L
178/9, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2176/84, OJ (1984) L 201/1, and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1761/87, OJ (1987)
L 167/9.
5. Coun.Reg. No 2423/88, on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries
not members of the European Economic Community, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
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Community. 6
 Although this Regulation applies to products from non-EC
Member States in general, it is beyond the limit of this Regulation to
apply to coal and steel products which are within the scope of the ECSC
Treaty. 7 Furthermore, as provided for in Article 17(2) of the Anti-dump-
ing Regulation, it also can be applied to agricultural products, 8 but not
to services.9
2. ROLE OF THE pROPEAN COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES
In the European Community, at least three different authorities are
significantly involved in anti-dumping proceedings: the Commission, the
Council, and the Member States via the Advisory Committee. 10 Besides, if
anti-dumping decisions are appealed under certain circumstances, the Eur-
opean Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) 11 should review the legality of
6. Article 1: Applicability of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. Only one exception to
this provision was trade between the west Germany and the east Germany which was considered
to be German internal trade. Nowadays, however, there is no exception at all as a result of
reunification between the west and the east Germany.
7. Com.Dec.2424/88/ECSC on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not
members of the European Coal and Steel Community, OJ (1988) L 209/18.
8. Article 17 of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation provides that 'this Regulation shall
not preclude the application of the Community Regulations in the Agricultural sector'.
9. In this thesis, however, applications of anti-dumping measures on agricultural products
will not be analysed, because they are largely governed by the Common Agricultural Policy;
moreover, there has been no anti-dumping determination on agricultural products from Korea.
10. For the authorities of the Community in general, see Emile Noel, "The Institutions of the
European Community", (1992) 15 Suffolk Transnat'l L.J., p 514.
11. The Court is composed of 13 judges and 6 advocates-general. Act Concerning the Accession
of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portugese Republic and the Adjustment to the Treaties, OJ
(1985) L 302/1.
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anti-dumping decisions made by the Commission or the Counci1. 12 This role
of the ECJ is discussed later in Chapter 7 infra in detail. 13 In addi-
tion, the European Parliament has received annual reports from the Commis-
sion on the Community's anti-dumping activities since 1983.14
Not only the general division of powers under the Treaty 15
 which
grants exclusive competence on anti-dumping proceedings to the Commission,
but also the ambiguity of Article 113 16 of the Treaty, have given rise to
concern by Member States regarding independent implementation by the
Commission instead of strict application of the Anti-dumping Regulation.
The Community authorities, however, have developed cooperation skills
rather than antagonism for handling anti-dumping proceedings.17
12. Case 191/82, Fediol v Commission [1983] ECR 2193, Joined Cases 239 and 257/82, Allied
Corporation v Commission [1982] ECR 1005. Since these cases, the Community anti-dumping
measures were subject to judicial review, removing the uncertainty as to the exact circum-
stances under whiich foreign exporters are entitled to bring suit left by the 1979 Ball
bearings judgment. See, Case 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing v Council [1979] ECR 1185, at 1205.
13. On the ECJ's jurisdiction in general, see David Stoelting, "The Jurisdictional Framework
of the European Court of Justice", (1991) 29 Colum.J.Transnat'l L., p 193-214., H.-J. Rabe &
M. Schutte, "EC Anti-dumping Law: Current Issues in the Light of the Jurisdiction of the
Court", (1989) 26 CML Rev., p 643-674.
14. Current report is 13th anti-dumping report, COM(95) 309 final. Previous reports were
given in COM(83) 519 final; COM(84) 721 final; COM(86) 308 final; COM(87) 178 final; CON(88)
92 final; COM(89) 106 final; COM(90) 229 final; SEC(91) 92 final; SEC(91) 974 final; SEC(92)
716 final; COM(93) 516 final and CON(95) 16 final.
15. See Articles 137-192 of Treaty on European Union.
16. Article 113(1) of Treaty on European Union provides that the common commercial policy
shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of
liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such those to be taken in the
event of dumping or subsidies.
17. E. Vermulst, Van Bael Bellis, Anti-dumping Law and Practice in the United States and
the European Communities: A Comparative Analysis, N.H.P.C., Amsterdam, New York, Oxford,
1987, p194, (hereinafter referred to as Vermulst).
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2.1. The Commission
The Commission is the authority to which complaints may be submit-
ted; 18 it holds consultations, 19 notifies the Member States and specify a
period within which they shall be entitled to express their opinions or to
request an oral consultation when the consultation may be in writing
only. 20
 The Commission decides whether there is sufficient evidence to
justify initiating an anti-dumping proceeding, and then commences and car-
ries out investigations at Community level. 21
 It may terminate anti-dump-
ing proceedings without imposing any protective actions where those mea-
sures are unnecessary. 22
 The Commission can accept undertakings and
terminate the investigation even during the course of the investigation,
without the imposition of provisional or definitive anti-dumping duties.23
The Commission takes provisional anti-dumping duties and submits a propo-
sal for extension of provisional measures or for definitive anti-dumping
duties to the Council. 24 As a leading player in the Community legislative
process, the Commission submits proposals not only on amendments to the
Community anti-dumping Regulation but also on any new Community trade
legislation to the Council, which enacts the Community law based on those
proposals. In addition, the Commission has submitted annual reports to the
European Parliament on the Community's anti-dumping activities since
18. Article 5(3) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
19. Ibid, Article 6(1)
20. Ibid, Article 6(3).
21. Ibid, Article 7.
22. Ibid, Article 9.
23. Ibid, Article 10.
24. Ibid, Article 11.
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1983.25
Within the Commission, enforcement of the EC anti-dumping law is
entrusted to a special Directorate (Directorate C) in the Directorate
General in charge of External Relations of the Community (DGI). This
anti-dumping unit is critically understaffed. 26
 Therefore the Community
is pressing for the Commission's anti-dumping unit to be doubled in size
to help improve the speed and efficiency of investigation into unfair
trade. 27
25. Annual reports of the Commission have been submitted to the European Parliament following
its Resolution of 16 December 1981 on the Community's anti-dumping activities, OJ (1981) C
11/37, and the more recent report of the European Parliament's Committee on External Economic
Relations on the Anti-dumping policy of the European Community, PE 147.178/fin of 30.11.1990,
rapporteur: Mr. Gijs DE VRIES.
26. The Commission's anti-dumping report said that the number of professionals handling
cases at the Commission dropped from 94 to 89 in 1992, making a total of some 130 including
supporting staff. See, Commission, 11th anti-dumping report (1992), Com(93) 516 final, p97.
Proposal for increasing staff, shortening inquiry deadlines and restructuring the anti-dump-
ing unit was approved by the Commission on November 11, 1993 and submitted to the Council,
see Financial Times, Nov. 4, p6 and Nov. 5, p8, 1993.
27. Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the introduction of time-limits for
investigations carried out under the Community instruments of commercial defence and modifi-
cation of the relevant Council Regulations, COM(93) 51, OJ (1993) C 328/8. Based on this
proposal, Council Regulation (EEC) No 288/82 on common rules for imports, OJ (1982) L 35/1 as
last amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/91, OJ (1991) L 284/1, and Council Regula-
tion (EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1 were to be amended. See, Coun.Reg.(EC) No 521/94,
on the introduction of time limits for investigation procedures carried out against dumped or
subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community and amending
Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1994) L 66/7, and Coun.Reg.(EC) No 522/94 on the streamlin-
ing of decision-making procedures for certain Community instruments of commercial defence and
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2641/84 and No 2423/88, OJ (1994) L 66/10.
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2.2. The Council
The Council, consisting of one delegate from each Member State,
plays a limited but very decisive role in anti-dumping proceedings. The
Council shall decide what proportion of the provisional anti-dumping duty
should be definitively collected where a provisional duty has been ap-
plied. 28 In addition, only the Council can impose a definitive anti-
dumping duty or extend provisional measures, acting by simple majority on
a proposal submitted by the Commission. 29
 In spite of the fact that the
Commission can terminate the proceeding in the course of investigation,
after consultation with the Advisory Committee, where objection is raised
within the Advisory Committee the Commission should submit to the Council
immediately a report on the result of the consultation, together with a
proposal that the proceeding be terminated. The proceeding shall stand
terminated if the Council has not decided otherwise within one month.3°
Nevertheless the Council has generally accepted the Commission's
proposal 31
28. Article 12(2) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
29. Ibid, Article 11(6) and 12(1).	 The terms 'qualified majority' in Article 11(6), 12(1)
and (2)(a) were replaced by the terms 'simple majority'. 	 See, Coun.Reg.(EC) No 522/94, OJ
(1994) L 66/10.
30. Ibid, Article 9(1). It should be noted that the Council still acts by a qualified major-
ity when the Commission submits a report of the consultation on termination of proceedings
without protective measures because an objection has been raised within the Advisory Commit-
tee.
31. It is exceptional for the Council, acts by qualified majority on a proposal for defini-
tive action submitted by the Commission, not to impose protective measures. See,
Magnesite(dead-burned) (China and North Korea), OJ (1986) C 149/2, and Kraftliner, Com.Dec.
88/125/EEC, OJ (1988) L 62/39, where the Commission proposals encountered resistance from
certain Member States which felt that such measures would be harmful to their home countries'
industries.
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Following the adoption of the Single European Act, the Council
discontinued its old unanimity practice. 32 Since the Single European Act,
most of the Council's decisions have been taken by qualified majority,33
on the basis of Commission proposals. This decision-making structure
through the qualified majority system promotes relatively speedy resolu-
tion of anti-dumping disputes and avoids delaying tactics of Member States
in the Council. In the field of commercial defence, however, the effecti-
veness of the Community's instruments of commercial defence has been
strongly criticised by the Commission. 34 As a result, definitive measures
are imposed by the Council, acting by simple majority.35
2.3. The Member States : The Advisory Committee
Any consultations provided for in the Anti-dumping Regulation take
place within an Advisory Committee which is chaired by a representative of
the Commission and consists of representatives of each Member State. 36 In
accordance with the Anti-dumping Regulation, the Commission should consult
32. 'Section I: Institutioanl Provisions' of Chapter II of Title II in Single European Act,
OJ (1987) L 169/1, p5 and 7.
33. Qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers requires 54 out of 76 votes, divi-
ded among the Member States as follows when the number of member states were 12:
Belgium 5 Greece 5 Italy 10 Portugal 5
Denmark 3 France 10 Luxembourg 2 Spain 8
Germany lo Ireland 3 Netherland 5 United Kingdom 10
34. The Commission critised that excess time delays cause uncertainty, reduce the chance
that measures, once taken, have the desired effect, and contribute to the creation of a lacke
of confidence in the effectiveness of Community commercial policy. Commission, Proposal for
a Council Regulation on the introduction of time limits for investigations carried out under
the Community instruments of commercial defence and modification of the relevant Council
Regulations, COM(93) 541 final, pl.
35. Coun.Reg.(EC) No 522/94, OJ (1994) L 66/10.
36. Article 6(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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the Advisory Committee whenever consultations are required by this Regula-
tion. 37 Consultation should in particular cover:38
(a) the existence of dumping and the methods of establishing the
dumping margin
(b) the existence and extent of injury;
(c) the causal link between the dumped imports and injury
(d) the measures which, in the circumstances, are appropriate to
prevent or remedy the injury caused by dumping and the ways and
means for putting such measures into effect.
The principal role of the Advisory Committee which should be empha-
sised is the fact that the Commission should submit to the Council a
report on the results of the consultation, together with a proposal if
there is disagreement in the Advisory Committee on a Commission decision
to commence or terminate a proceeding, or to impose provisional duties.39
The Council, acting by a qualified majority, can decide differently within
one month. For example, the Commission is not entitled to impose a provi-
sional anti-dumping duty if at least one Member State disagrees. In addi-
tion to respective Member States' participation in the Advisory Committee,
they play an important role in collecting anti-dumping duties through their
customs authority.
37. Consultation is required in following Articles: Article 5(5) complaint; Article 7(1)
initiation and subsequent investigation; Article 9(1) termination of proceedings without pro-
tective measures; Article 10(1) undertakings; Article 11(2) provisional duties; Article 14(2)
and Article 15(2) review, and Article 16 refund.
38. Article 6(4) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
39. See, Article 6(4) and Article 9(1) jointly.
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3. ANTI-DUMPING PROCEDURES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.
According to the 1979 GATT Code, an investigation should be initia-
ted upon a written request by or on behalf of the industry affected,
including sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link between
the two. 40 The Code, however, keeps silence on the details of the proce-
dures to be adopted. Therefore, all countries may adopt their own style
of procedures. As a result, the Community has set up its own essential
procedural provisions to cover complaint, 41
 initiation of proceeding and
subsequent investigation, 42
 termination of proceedings where protective
measures are unnecessary, 43
 relief measures including acceptance of under-
takings, 44 and imposition of provisional duties 45 and definitive duties."
40. Article 5(1) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
41. Ibid. Article 5.
42. Ibid, Article 7.
43. Ibid, Article 9.
44. Ibid, Article 10.
45. Ibid, Article 11.
46. Ibid, Article 12. Relief measures will be discussed in detail infra chapter 7.
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3.1. Complaint
Any natural or legal person, or any association not having legal
personality, acting on behalf of a Community industry 47 which produces the
like product and which considers itself injured or threatened by dumped
imports may lodge a written complaint containing sufficient evidence48 of
the existence of dumping and injury resulting therefrom to the Commission
or a Member State. 49
Generally, complaints are lodged by the European manufacturers'
associations of the industry concerned like CEFIC, EECA, Alarm and SCAN.5°
Complaints, however, can also be brought by individual Community produ-
cers 51 of the product in question as long as they meet the 'major propor-
47. For the definition of the 'Community Industry', see Ibid, Article 4(5).
48. The term 'sufficient evidence' has not been clearly defined. However, according to Art.
7 of the 1968 Community Anti-dumping Regulation (Coun.Reg. No 459/68), the complaint should
provide a description of the allegedly dumped product; the name of the exporting country;
where possible, the names of the country of origin, the producer and the exporter of the
product in question; and evidence both of dumping and injury resulting therefrom for the
industry which considers itself injured or threatened.
49. Article 4(5), 5(1),(2) and (3) can be read jointly, and see the definition of the term
'Community industry' in the Article 4(5) of the Anti-dumping Regulation and infra chapter 5.
50. CEFIC (the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers' Federation) in Audio tapes in
cassettes (Korea, Japan and U.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, p5. EECA (the
European Electronic Component Manufacturer's Association) in DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No
2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p13. Alarm (the Association for Legal Audio-Radio Measures) in
Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p8. SCAN (the
Society for Coherent Anti-dumping Norms) in Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China,
Singapore and Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No 2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50.
51. In Retail electronic weighing scale (hereinafter REWS), 9 Community producers represent-
ing approximately 80% of the total Community production of REWS lodged a complaint. See, REWS
(Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p20. In Oxalic acid (Korea,
Taiwan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 699/88, OJ (1988) L 72/12, the complaint was lodged by a manufac-
turer accounting for a large proportion of Community production.
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tion of the total Community production' test. 52 Whether a complaint is
submitted initially to the Commission or a Member State, in practice, it
would be submitted to the Commission because a Member State receiving a
complaint should forward it to the Commission. 53 The Commission must send
a copy of any complaint it receives to Member States.54
According to Article 5(6), a Member State which is in possession of
sufficient evidence of dumping and caused injury should communicate such
evidence to the Commission. Furthermore, it should be noted that accord-
ing to Article 5(1) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code, 55 the Commission
may lodge a complaint on its own initiative, when the Commission holds
sufficient evidence of dumping and injury against Community industry, 56
even though there is no such a provision in the Anti-dumping Regulation of
the Community. If a complaint is withdrawn, the proceedings may be termi-
nated unless such termination would not be in the interest of the Commun-
52. Article 4(5) of the Anti-dumping Regulation. Dr. Beseler, Head of the Commercial Defence
Division, DG-1, at the CEFIC Anti-dumping Seminar held in Brusel, 1981, suggested that a
share of production of 25% or more of the Community total production would be regarded as
acceptable as a major proportion of the Community production. Ivo Van Bael & J.-F. Bellis,
Anti-dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws of the EEC (2nd ed.), CCH Editions Limited,
1990, (hereinafter referred as to Bael & Bellis). In most determinations, the Commission has
not defined clearly but just said a major proportion of the Community production.
53. Ibid, Article 5(3).
54. Ibid, Article 5(3)-
55. Article 5(1) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that an investigation to determine
the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall normally be initiated upon a
written request by or on behalf of the industry affected. In special circumstances, the
authorities concerned may decide to initiate an investigation without having received such a
request.
56. There is no provision in the Community Anti-dumping Regulation to authorise the Commis-
sion to start a proceeding on its own initiative. However, according to Article 7(1) and
Article 14, the Commission may start an anti-dumping proceeding on its own initiative. In
practice, however, no anti-dumping proceeding has ever been initiated by complaint from the
Commission. See, Vermulst, supra note 17, p204, and Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 52, p181.
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ity. 57
3.2. Initiation of Proceedings
Where, after consultation in the Advisory Committee it is obvious
that there is sufficient evidence to defend commencing a proceeding, the
Commission should initiate a proceeding within one month of the lodge of
the complaint and publish a notice in the Official Journal of the Eur-
opean Communities; 58 so advise the exporters and importers known to the
Commission to be concerned as well as representatives of the exporting
country and the complaints; 59 and commence the investigation at Community
level which covers both dumping and injury resulting therefrom."
When it becomes obvious after consultation that the complaint does
not contain sufficient evidence to justify initiating an investigation,
the complainant should be so informed, and the case is terminated. 61 The
Complainant, however, may appeal to the ECJ.62
57. Article 5(4) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
58. Article 7(1)(a) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation, amended by Coun.Reg.(EC) No
521/94, OJ (1994) L 66/7, p8.
59. Ibid, Article 7(1)(b).
60. Ibid, Article 7(1)(c). The investigation of dumping normally covers a period of not less
than 6 months immediately prior to the initiation of the proceeding.
61. Ibid, Article 5(5). See Article 5(3) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code, which provides
that an investigation should be terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are
satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify
proceedings.
62. See, Section II of infra chapter 7: Judicial Review. For the admissibility standards
used by the Court, see Bellis, "Judicial Review of EEC Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Determi-
nations After "Fediol": The Emergence of a New Admissibility Test", (1984) 21 CML Rev., p539,
and A.Arnull, "Challenging EC Anti-dumping Regulations: The Problem of Admissibility", (1992)
13 ECLR (Issue 2), p73-81.
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3.3. Role of the Commission in Investigation
If the Commission decides to commence investigation, after consul-
tation, it should seek all necessary information and carry out investiga-
tion into the company concerned, even in a third country.° Furthermore,
the Commission may request co-operation from Member States and the inter-
ested parties and evaluate information supplied by the interested par-
.64ties.	 The investigations of the establishment of dumping and injury
therefrom are carried out concurrently. 65
 This could be an unfortunate
tilt against the producer/exporter because it means that the exporter must
comment on the issue of injury before the complainant's reply to the
injury questionnaire.66
3.3.1. Searching for Information
and Requesting Co-operation
The Commission should seek all information it deems to be neces-
sary. In order to obtain the information necessary to determine whether
dumping took place, the Commission will send questionnaires to all known
exporters and importers of the allegedly dumped products. Replying fully
to questionnaires within the short time allocated, however, causes much
63. Article 7(2) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
64. Ibid, Article 7(3).
65. Article 7(1)(c) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation provides that 'such investiga-
tion shall cover both dumping and injury resulting therefrom'.
66. Ivo Van Bael, "EEC Anti-dumping Law and Procedure Revisited", (1990) 24 JWT (No 2), p18.
However, if the exporter can prove that no material injury has been caused, the Commission
will refrain from any further investigation into the existence of dumping. Thin Polyester
film (Korea), Com.Dec.91/303/EEC, OJ (1991) L 151/89, Polyester Yarn (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC)
No 2904/91, OJ (1991) L 276/7, p18, Polyester film (Korea), Com.Dec.89/560/EEC, OJ (1989) L
305/31, Sacchalin and its salts (Korea, USA, China), Com.Dec.83/626/EEC, OJ (1983) L 352/49,
p50.
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trouble to defendants.° The burden of reply could be reduced without
making the Commission's task of establishing the facts more difficult, if
the Commission relied more on on-the-spot verifications.68
Where it is necessary, the Commission shall carry out investigations
which cover dumping and injury resulting therefrom 69 in third countries
with assistance of officials of those Member States which so request.7°
In addition, the Commission may request Member States to supply informa-
tion, to execute all necessary checks and inspections, and to carry out
investigation in third countries with officials of the Commission who are
authorised to assist the officials of Member States in performing their
duties. 71 Such requests from the Commission have binding force, in prac-
tice, because Member States should do whatever they can in order to give
effect to the requests according to Article 7(3).
Although the Commission should seek information and where it consid-
67. In REWS (Retail Electronic Weighing Scale), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1130/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20,
the Commission sent questionnaires to the exporting companies in Korea on Apr. 8, 1992, and
asked them to reply by Jun. 30, 1992. During this period, an exporting company had to spend
almost all its business operation on preparing 372 pages of reponse, because all the weighing
scale exporting companies are small and medium-sized enterprises. See, D.T. Lee, "An Analy-
sis on the European Community's Anti-dumping Procedures and Korea's Countermeasures", (1993)
Journal of Int'l Management (Korean publication), p 134.
68. Ivo Van Bael, supra note 66, p17. In this article, the author insisted that the Commis-
sion's "right to seek all information it deems to be necessary" be subjected to a rule of
reason or to the proportionality principle.
69. Therefore, it is possible to escape from further antidumping investigation where the
exporter can prove that there has been no material injury, and where it becomes clear that
there has been no dumping. See, Wheeled loaders(Japan), Com.Dec.89/111/EEC, OJ (1989) L
39/35, p35; Dead burned natural magnetic (China, North Korea), Coun.Dec.86/59/EEC, OJ (1986)
L 70/41, p41; Saccharin and its salt (China, Korea, USA), Com.Dec.83/626/EEC, OJ (1983) L
352/49, p49; Monochrome portable television sets (Korea), Com.Dec.81/1012/EEC, OJ (1981) L
364/49, p49.
70. Article 7(2)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
71. Ibid, Article 7(3)(a) and (d).
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ers it appropriate, examine and verify the record of importers, exporters,
traders, agents, producers, trade associations and organisations, it can
not compel information to be submitted by any interested parties except
Member States because it can carry out its investigations in third coun-
tries only when the firm concerned and the government of the country in
question give their consent. 72 Therefore, voluntary co-operation of the
interested parties is indispensable and is in their interest as well. The
reason is that without voluntary co-operation, the Commission may make its
preliminary or final findings on the basis of the facts available. 73 As
demonstrated in Video cassette recorders, 74 this means the Commission
makes its preliminary or final findings on the basis of the allegations
set forth in the complaint.75
Where information supplied by any interested party or third country
is false or misleading, such information may be disregarded and any claim
to which it refers disallowed. 76 In Video cassette recorders, 77 the
Commission discovered that there were partial discrepancies between the
companies' replies to the questionnaire and their internal documents, so
the Commission relies on the facts available. It is worth pointing out,
however, that in this case, concerning partial discrepancies in costs of
72. Article 7(2) and (3) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
73. Ibid, Article 7(7)(b). In Video cassette recorders (Korea, Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No
501/89, OJ (1989) L 57/55, and Video tapes (Korea, Hong Kong), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 4062/88, OJ
(1988) L 356/47, p52, the highest dumping margin found with regard to an exporter who had co-
operated in the investigation was applied to non co-operating parties.
74. Video cassette recorders (Korea, Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 501/89, OJ (1989) L 57/55, and
see, Daisy wheel printers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 34/89, OJ (1989) L 5/23.
75. In LAECs (Korea, Taiwan), Com.Reg.(EC) No 371/94, OJ (1994) L 48/10, pll, in the complete
absence of information from the Korean producing exporters, normal value and export price was
established on the basis of the available facts which were given in the complaint.
76. Article 7(7)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
77. Video cassette recorder (Japan, Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2684/88, OJ (1988) L 240/5, p5.
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production between the companies' replies and their internal documents,
the Commission disregarded all cost of production data and made its find-
ings on the basis of the facts available. Therefore, the Commission may
disregard information which is favourable to the exporter, where false or
misleading information is supplied. 78	It can be argued, however, that
this article is duplication because the Commission has made findings on
the basis of the facts available where the investigation is "significantly
impeded".79
There has been no clear guideline, therefore, in this respect,
although the Commission has tried to justify its findings based on the
facts available in accordance with Article 7(7)(b) with the reason that
the use of a more favourable method would reward non-co-operation and
would create an opportunity for circumvention of the duty. 80
 It is worth
recalling the Allied case, 81 in which the Court held that the Commission
should use those facts which are closest to economic reality and the
'Recommendation Concerning Best Information Available' of the GATT Commit-
tee on Anti-dumping Practice.82
78. C. Norall, "The New Amendments to the EC's Basic Anti-dumping Regulation", (1989) 26 CML
Rev., p100.
79. J-F. Bellis, E. Vermulst and P. Waer, "Further Changes in the EEC Anti-dumping Regula-
tion: A Codification of Controversial Methodologies", (1989) 23 JWT (No 2), p31.
80. Dot-matrix printers (Japan), Coun.Reg. (EEC) No 3651/88, OJ (1988) L 317/33, p44.
81. Case 53/83, Allied Corp. v Council, [1985] ECR 1621, at 1658.
82. The GATT Committee on Anti-dumping Practice, the Recommendation concerning best informa-
tion available, reproduced in Van Bael & Bellis, supra note 52, p 191. It said that 'it is
clear that if an interested party does not co-operate and thus relevant information is being
withheld from the investigating authorities this situation could lead to a result which is
less favourable to the party than if the party did co-operate'.
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3.3.2. Executing Investigation
The Commission, where it considers necessary, would examine and
verify all information and carry out on-the-spot investigation at the
premises of importers, Community producers and foreign exporters who are
producing or selling the product in question during the investigation
period, 83 even in a third country if the firms concerned and the govern-
ment of the country in question have been officially informed and raise no
objection. 84 The Commission, sometimes, choose representative firms for
inspection with the agreement of the exporters. 85 The Commission offi-
cials conducting on-the-spot investigation are accompanied by an official
of a Member State and vice versa."
In practice, verifications at the premises of the parties concerned
take no longer than two or three days. 87 The Commission, therefore,
informs in advance the parties concerned of the date of inspection and of
the type of information to be verified.
	 The purpose of a verification
visit is to ensure the reliability of the data supplied in the question-
83. In Orthoxylen (Puerto Rico, USA), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1411/81, OJ (1981) L 141/29, p29, the
Commission carried out inspection not only at the premises of a Belgian company in connection
with sales made by two related exporters located respectively in Panama and Puerto Rico but
also in its own offices in Brussels.
84. Article 7(2)(a) and (b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. It is usually to the
advantage of the interested parties to co-operate in order to escape from the Commission's
preliminary or definitive findings based on th facts available, as discussed above.
85. Cotton Yarns (Turkey), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3453/81, OJ (1981) L 347/19, p19.
86. Article 7(2)(b) and 7(3)(d). The officials from a Member States, however, play a very
limited role in substantive determinations because they are not permitted access to the
confidential data gathered by the Commission during the investigation.
87. Van Bael & Bellis, p195. There is no guideline in the Community Regulation on the exact
procedure to be followed during the verification. No official report on the verification is
accessible to the parties concerned.
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naire. As we have seen in Video cassette recorders, 88 the Commission
officials usually pay attention to cost of production data and sales data
(including domestic and export) of the Companies involved. The results of
verifications are very important to the Commission's findings, so no
provisional determination is made without an on-the-spot investigation.
To make matters worse, the Commission may disregard any information which
it has been unable to verify. 89
3.4. Legal Status of Interested Parties in Investigation
Affected by the first anti-dumping cases in the ECJ", the Commun-
ity has improved lack of transparency as well as developed case law in the
field of anti-dumping procedures which may establish some restrictions to
the discretionary powers of the Commission. 91 As a result, the Community
anti-dumping practices are considerably clearer and more transparent now
88. Video cassette recorders (Korea and Japan), Com.Reg. (EEC) No 2684/88, OJ (1988) L 240/5,
p15.
89. Article 7(7)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
90. Cases 113, 118-121/77, Japanese Ballbearing cases [1979] ECR 1185, see, footnote 101.
After these cases, the Council immediately enacted a special regulation which introduced the
right of the respondents to be informed of the essential facts and considerations in the
Commission's findings. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1681/79, OJ (1979) L 196/1. A few months later, the
Community approved the Tokyo Round Agreements in Coun.Dec 80/271/EEC, concerning the conclu-
sion of the Multilateral Agreements resulting from 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations, OJ (1980)
L 71/1, and adopted the new anti-dumping regulation in order to accommodate the changes of
the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code. Coun.Reg. (EEC) No 3017/79, OJ (1979) L 339/1.
91. J.K. Lockett, "EEC Anti-dumping Law and Trade Policy After Ballbearings II: Discretionary
Decisions Masquerading as Legal Process?", (1987) 8 Nw J.I.L. & Bus., p 369. Ivo Van Bael, "A
Practitioner's Guide to Due Process in EEC Anti-trust and Anti-dumping Proceedings", (1984)
18 Int'l Law., p 858.
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than they were before the Japanese Ballbearings cases.92
Consequently, the Anti-dumping Regulation stipulates basically
three kinds of rights of interested parties: the right to inspect informa-
tion; the right to be informed of the essential facts and considerations;
and the right to be heard.
3.4.1. The Right to Inspect Information
In parallel to the Commission's right of investigation, 93 the
complainant and the exporters and importers known to be concerned, as well
as the representatives of the exporting country, may inspect all informa-
tion available to the Commission by any party to an investigation 94 as
distinct from internal documents prepared by the authorities of the Com-
munity or its Member States. 95
 In order for them to be able to inspect
such information, it should be relevant to the defence of their inter-
ests, it should not be confidential within the meaning of Article 8, and
it must be used by the Commission in the anti-dumping investigation. To
this end, they shall address a written request to the Commission indica-
ting the information required.%
Information should ordinarily be considered to be confidential if
its disclosure is likely to have a significantly adverse effect upon the
92. Ivo Van Bael, Ibid, p858-861. For a review of the earlier period, see generally P.
Didier, "EEC Anti-dumping Rules and Practices", (1980) 17 GML Rev., p349; Van Bael, "Ten
Years of EEC Anti-dumping Enforcement", (1979) 13 JWTL, p398.
93. Article 7(2) and (3) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
94. Concerning this term, the Court held very broadly in the Timex case that 'all non-
confidential information, whether supplied by a Community undertaking or an undertaking in a
non-member country, which has had a decisive influence on its decision must be made available
to the complainant requesting it', Case 264/82, Timex v Council & Commission [1985] ECR 861,
at 869.
95. Article 7(4)(a) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
96. Ibid, Article 7(4)(a).
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supplier or the source of such information. 97
 However, if it appears that
a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if the supplier is
unwilling either to make the information public or to authorise its dis-
closure in generalised or summary form, the information in question may be
disregarded. The information may also be disregarded where such request
is warranted and where the supplier is unwilling to submit a non-confiden-
tial summary, provided that the information is susceptible of such sum-
mary. 98
In this connection, it can be argued that the confidentiality
provisions of the Article 8 should be interpreted as narrowly as pos-
sible99 based on the hypothesis that if the confidentiality afforded by
the Commission is broader than necessary to protect business secrets, the
rights of other parties to the investigation are unduly restricted. 	 It
should be recalled, however, that information received pursuant to this
Regulation should be used only for the purpose for which it was requested,
and the disclosure of information in general and as the evidence in court
proceeding, must take into account the legitimate interest of the parties
involved and that their business secrets should not be revealed.'"
97. Ibid, Article 8(3).
98. Ibid, Article 8(4).
99. European Parliament Resolution on the Commission's Anti-dumping activities, OJ (1982) C
11/37. It states on the rights of defendants that it considers that defendants or their
representatives should have right of access to all material facts on which the Commission
based its decision to open an investigation, subject only to the confidentiality provisions
of Article 8 which should be interpreted as narrowly as possible.
100. Article 8(1) and (5) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. As we have seen, the
right of the interested parties to inspect information is very limited by the confidentiality
rules. This limitation, however, could be partly overcome through the introduction of an
"administrative protective order" system, whereby counsel for interested parties have access
to confidential information but are not allowed to reveal it to their clients. See, Ivo Van
Bael, "EEC Anti-dumping Law and Procedure Revisited", (1990) 24 JWT 2, p18.
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3.4.2. The Right to be Informed of Essential Facts
and Considerations
In the Japanese ballbearing I cases, 101 the Advocate General criti-
cised the lack of disclosure of essential information by the Commission to
the parties concerned which led to a situation in which nobody but the
Commission knew what was really going on in its investigation. 102 As a
result of this criticism, exporters' and importers' right 103 to be in-
formed of essential facts and considerations on which Commission's deter-
minations were based was officially acknowledged after the Japanese Ball-
bearing cases.'" It is stipulated that exporters and importers of the
product subject to the investigation and the representatives of the coun-
try of origin, may request to be informed of the essential facts and
101. The "Japanese Ballbearings I cases" means five judgments of the ECJ concerning anti-
dumping. Case 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v Council [1979] ECR 1185; Case 118/77, Import
Standard Office v Council [1979] ECR 1277; Case 119/77, Nippon Seiko K.K. v Council [1979]
ECR 1303; Case 120/77, Koyo Seiko co. v Council [1979] ECR 1337; and Case 121/77, Nachi
Fujikoshi Corp. v Council [1979] ECR 1363, (hereinafter referred to as "Japanese Ballbearing
I").
102. The Opinion of Advocate General J.P. Warner, covering all five cases, was delivered on
Feb. 14, 1979. [1979] ECR 1185, at 1212.
103. In the Timex case, Case 264/82, Timex v Council & Commission, [1985] ECR 849, at 869,
the Court made it clear that the right to be informed is a fundamental right which can be
claimed by all parties to the proceeding, including the complainants, although the Anti-dump-
ing Regulation refers only to exporters and importers. This right, however, does not extend
to determination such as a provisional duty and acceptance of undertakings.
104. In Timex, the Commission refused to provide the complainant with certain basic details
concerning the dumping calculations. As a result, the complainant was unable to ascertain
whether or not the Commission was using the correct facts. The Court held that in failing to
disclose the facts, essential procedural requirements were breached. The Court annulled the
regulation. Ibid, at 870-71.
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considerations ln
 on the basis of which it is intended to recommend the
imposition of definitive duties or the definitive collection of amounts
secured by the way of a provisional duty. 106
Such requests of the interested parties must be addressed to the
Commission in writing; the particular issues on which information is
sought must be specified; and the request be received, in cases where a
provisional duty has been applied, not later than one month after publica-
tion of the imposition of that duty. 107 The Commission's
	 response to
this request from the parties involved may be orally or in writing in-
formed. 108
 Comments of the interested parties on the information given by
the Commission should be taken into consideration if they are received
within the period set by the Commission in each case, which should be at
least 10 days. 109
According to Article 8 of the Anti-dumping Regulation, disclosure
of confidential information is strictly applied. In practice, the parties
to an Community anti-dumping proceeding only have a limited access to the
non-confidential summary of the confidential information supplied by other
parties. Therefore, introduction of a special disclosure system like the
U.S. protective order system may be very helpful from a due process point
of view. 110
105. In Japanese Ballbearing I, the Commission refused to inform the exporters of any detail
concerned with: the alleged dumping margins and their method of calculation; the use of
constructed normal value; method of injury determination. See, Japanese Ballbearings I,
supra note 101, at 1253-66.
106. Article 7(4)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
107. Ibid, Article 7(4)(c)(i).
108. Ibid, Article 7(4)(c)(ii). However, information should be given no later than 15 days
prior to the submission by the Commission of any proposal for final action. Ibid, Article
7(4)(c)(iii).
109. Ibid, Article 7(4)(c)(iii).
110. See, supra footnote 100.
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3.4.3. The Right to be Heard
Where, after consultation it is apparent that there is sufficient
evidence to justify initiating a proceeding the Commission should state in
the Official Journal of the European Communities the period within which
interested parties may apply to be heard by the Commission. For this
purpose, the Anti-dumping Regulation stipulates two kinds of hearing,
namely, an oral hearin gill and a confrontation meeting.112
In case of an oral hearing, the Commission not only may hear the
interested parties at any stage of the proceeding but also must hear them
if they have, within the period prescribed in the notice published in the
Official Journal of the European Communities, made a written request for a
hearing showing that they are an interested party likely to be affected by
the result of the proceeding and that there are particular reasons why
they should by heard orally. 113 These oral hearings are more in the nature
of informal meetings, because not only are there no formal hearing proce-
dure and official transcript, but also, they are not in public.- 4
 As a
result of the Commission's strict policy on deadlines for reply to ques-
tionnaires, hearings become more meaningful because they may be the only
forum where exporters have the opportunity to present additional comments
on the question of injury after the expiry of the deadline for question-
naires. 115
111. Article 7(5) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
112. Ibid, Article 7(6).
113. Ibid. A number of interested parties stopped requesting hearings preferring to discuss
their case with Community officials in informal meetings rather than to present a written
request.
114. It should be remembered that there are no guidelines for hearing procedure in the Com-
munity Anti-dumping Regulation.
115. Because the exporters are requested to comment on the injury allegations at the same
time as their answer to the dumping questionnaires. See, supra note 66.
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Furthermore the Commission should, on request, give the parties
directly concerned an opportunity to meet, so that opposing views may be
presented and any rebuttal argument put forward. 116 Such confrontation
meetings played a very important role in Community anti-dumping proceedings
in the 1970s. However, they have lost popularity because of increase of
the Community anti-dumping staff and legalisation of the investigation
after the 1979 Japanese Ballbearing cases. In providing this opportunity
the Commission shall take account of the need to preserve confidentiality
and of the convenience of the parties. There shall be no obligation on
any party to attend a meeting and failure to do so shall not be prejudi-
cial to that party's case.117
3.5. Termination of Proceedings Without Measures118
Anti-dumping investigations are concluded with out protective mea-
sures where the Community authorities determine after consultation that
such measures are unnecessary 119
 because there has been no dumping or
injury caused therefrom12 ° or for other reasons such as the withdrawal of
116. Ibid, Article 7(6).
117. Ibid, Article 7(6).
118. Termination of investigation with protective measures will be analysed in section I of
Chapter 7.
119. Article 9(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
120. Cotton yarn (Egypt), Com.Dec.92/179/EEC, OJ (1992) L 82/70, p70. The Commission termi-
nated this anti-dumping proceeding without protective measures because of de minimis dumping
margin (0.1%).
Haematite pig iron (Turkey), Com.Dec.423/ECSG, OJ (1992) L 230/30, p30. The Commission
terminated the proceeding on the basis of the fact that the Turkish contribution to any
material injury suffered by the Community industry was negligible.
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the complaint, 121 a lack of cooperation from the Community industry l 22 and
other bilateral trade arrangements, 123
 or because it is discovered that
the export to the Community did not originate from the country under
investigation. 124
 If objection is raised within the Advisory Committee on
the Commission's determination that no protective measures are necessary,
the Commission should submit to the Council a report on the results of the
consultation, together with a proposal that the proceeding be terminated.
The proceeding should automatically be concluded if, within one month, the
Council, acting by a qualified majority, has not decided otherwise. 125 It
seems that a Member State has power to veto a Commission proposal. How-
ever, this Commission's determination is likely to pass in its original
form because of the role of the Council acting by a qualified majority in
decision making procedures. 126
121. In 1993, 1 investigation was terminated without protective measures due to a finding of
no dumping, 1 due to finding of no injury and 4 due to withdrawl of the complaint. Commis-
sion, 12th Anti-dumping Report (1993), COM(95) 16 final, p 67 and p 104-107.
122. Manganese steel wearparts (S. Africa), Com.Dec. 93/318/EEC, OJ (1993) L 122/46. In this
proceeding, during the course of the investigation on injury, the Commission received infor-
mation about only a small proportion of the total Community production. In the absence of
information on the rest of the Community industry, it was impossible to make findings of
injury.
123. Seamless steel tubes (Czech and Slovak), Com.Dec.93/526/EEC, OJ (1993) L 252/39.
124. Electronic typewriters (Taiwan), Com.Dec. 86/193/EEC, OJ (1986) L 140/52, p52. This in-
vestigation was terminated because the operation performed in Taiwan did not confer Taiwanese
origin on the product in question, even though the typewriters were shipped from Taiwan.
125. Article 9(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
126. The imposition of definitive measures remains in the competence of the Council, but
decision has been taken by simple majority since 15 March 1994. Coun.Reg.(EC) No 522/94, on
the streamlining of decision-making procedures for certain Community instruments of commer-
cial defence and amending Reg. (EEC) No 2641/84 and No 2423/88, OJ (1994) L 66/10. It should
be noted that this amendment does not cover Article 9 of the Community Anti-dumping Regula-
tion. As a result of this amendment, the Commission has more weight than the Council in
decision-making procedures.
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In Audio tapes on reels, the anti-dumping proceeding was terminated
without any protective measures, 127
 because audio tapes on reels are a
different product from audio tapes in cassettes, 128 on which definitive
anti-dumping duties had been imposed. Subsequently, the complainant in-
formed the Commission that it had decided to withdraw the complaint with
regard to audio tapes on reels owing to the imposition of definitive
duties on tapes in cassettes. The Commission therefore decided to termi-
nate the proceeding concerning audio tapes on reels without protective
measures.
The termination must be notified to any representatives of the
country of origin or export and the parties known to be concerned and must
be announced in the Official Journal of the European Communities, setting
forth its basic conclusion and a summary of the reasons therefor)-29
4. ANTI-DUMPING PROCEDURES IN KOREA
4.1. Anti-dumping Procedures
The new Korean anti-dumping law 130 was amended in 1993 to comply
with GATT guidelines and it was designed to model the US law and proce-
dures. Under this law, the Ministry of Finance (hereinafter referred to
as "MOF") coordinates the entire investigation and imposition of duty and
127. Audio tapes on reels (Korea, Japan and Hong Kong), Com.Dec.92/62/EEC, OJ (1992) L 28/25,
p26.
128. Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan and Hong Kong), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1251/91, OJ
(1991) L 119/35.
129. Article 9(2) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
130. The "new Korean anti-dumping law" means Article 10 of the Korean Customs Act and Artii-
cle 4(2) through 4(15) of the Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act.
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imposes the anti-dumping duty, 131
 while the Korean Trade Commission (here-
inafter referred to as "KTC"), an independent arm of the Ministry of Trade
and Industry (hereinafter referred to as "MTI") investigates the primary
injury to the domestic industry, and the Office of Customs Administration
(hereinafter referred to as "OCA") investigates whether the imports are
dumped and calculates the dumping margin. 182 The apparent procedure in a
Korean anti-dumping proceedings is as follows:
(1) Once any person having an interest in or the competent Minister
having jurisdiction over the domestic industry requests the imposition of
an anti-dumping duty, 183 the KTC decides whether or not to initiate an
investigation and report the result of the investigation to the Mini-
ster 134 within 1 month.135
(2) The Minister notifies matters for imposition of anti-dumping
duties and the initiation of investigation within 10 days after receipt of
the report, and publishes in the Official Gazette (hereinafter referred to
as
(3) Within three months or so, the investigation authorities submit
reports 137 to the MOF, 138
 and the MOF decides whether or not to initiate
a full investigation within 1 month from the date on which reports are
submitted. 139
131. Article 1, 2 and 7 of the Korean Customs Act (hereinafter referred to as "Act").
132. Article 4(4)(i) of the EDCA.
133. Article 4(2)(i) of the EDCA.
134. The Minister means the Minister of Finance.
135. Article 4(3)(i) of the EDCA.
136. Article 4(3)(iii) of the EDCA.
137. The KTC issues a report on the result of a provisional investigation, and the OCA issues
a letter of resolution on a provisional determination.
138. Article 4(4)(ii) of the EDCA.
139. Article 4(4)(iii) of the EDCA.
85
(4) The investigation authorities initiate a final investigation
from the day after the date on which provisional reports are submitted,
and submits final reports within 3 months. 140
(5) The MOF decides whether anti-dumping duty should be imposed
within 1 month from the date on which final reports are submitted, 141 and
takes a measure for the imposition of an anti-dumping duty within 1 year
from the date of the request for investigation. 142
In Korea, complaints are lodged by the individual company instead
of the manufacturers' association of the industry concerned)- 43 Com-
plaints, however, can also be brought the corporations and organisations,
as long as they are composed of domestic producers or acting on their
behalf. 144
4.2. Confidentiality of Materials Concerned and
Legal Status of Interested Person
The Minister or the investigation authorities requests information
related to the administration agency concerned, domestic producers, expor-
ter, importers and other interested persons. 145 Materials submitted under
a condition of confidentiality should not be disclosed. 146 However, if an
140. Article 4(4)(v) of the EDCA.
141. Article 4(4)(vii) of the EDCA.
142. Article 4(4)(viii)of the EDCA.
143. Korea Precision Co. in Ballbearings (Thailand), Finance Ministry Announcement (herein-
after referred to as "FMA") No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p136, Dong Yang Chemical Co. in
Soda Ash (China), FMA No 1993-75, 00(1993) No 12606, p183, Hwekst Industry Co. in Printing
Plate (Japan) FMA No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p190, and Hankuk Vetrotex Co. in Glass
Fiber (USA, Japan and Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p26.
144. Article 4(2)(iii) of the EDcA. Korea Promotion Association for Precision Chemistry in
Phosphoric Acid (China), FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p21.
145. Article 4(8)(i) of the EDCA.
146. Article 4(8)(ii) of the EDCA.
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interested person fails to present relevant documents, or refuses or
prevents an investigation, or it is difficult to verify materials for any
reason, the investigation authorities may take anti-dumping measures using
available materials.147
The rights of interested persons are inadequate compared to the
Community anti-dumping law, while confidentiality of materials submitted is
well protected by the Korean anti-dumping law. Although the Minister should
accept a request for an inspection of relevant documentary evidence from
an interested person, 148 the interested person's opportunity to address a
public hearing, or to consult an interested person with opposing views149
is at the discretion of the MOF and the investigation authorities.150
147. Article 4(8)(v) of the EDCA. Soda Ash (China), p184, printing Plate (Japan), p191, and
Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan), p27.
148. Article 4(8)(vii) of the EDCA provides that if an interested pperson request an inspec-
tion of relevant documentary evidence presented and materials submitted or informed, the
Minister or the investigation authorities, excluding those to be kept confidential, shall
accept it unless there is any special circumstance.
149. In Glass Fibre, a confrontation meeting was held. Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA
No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p27. Before this determination, the interested persons did
not cooperate to submit related materials. As a result, no confrontation meeting could be
held. See, Ball bearings (Thailand), p137, Soda Ash (Chiina), p183, and Printing Plate
(Japan), p192.
150. Article 4(8)(viii) of the EDCA.
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4.3. Termination of Proceedings Without Measures
The Minister suspends or terminates the final investigation where
dumping margin or material injury is deemed to be minimised according to
the result of the provisional investigation, 151
 or the withdrawal of the
complaint. 152	In this case, any provisional measure taken is
withdrawn, 153
 and as a result the MOF should refund the provisional anti-
dumping duty paid or release the offered security. 154
Between 1986 and 1993, in Korea, only 15 anti-dumping investigations
were initiated. Of these, 6 were terminated without protective measures;
in 7, measures were imposed in the form of anti-dumping duties, 155
 and in
2, in the form of undertakings. 156
 At the time of writing this thesis,
the full text of the Korean anti-dumping determination is available only
for 6 determinations in which anti-dumping duties were imposed. 	 There-
fore, in this thesis the discussion is based on those 6 determinations.
151. Article 4(4)(iv) of the EDCA. In Acet Aldehyde (Japan), 86.12.9. Alginic Acid (Hong
Kong), 86.4. Slider Fastner (Japan), 88.2.19. and Polyacrylamid (UK, France, Germany) 91.2.
21., the antidumping proceedings were terminated because material injury etc. was minimised
even though dumping was found. See, Shin U-Kyun, "The Relief System for Industrial Injury
After Uruguay Round in Korea", The Customs Journal /994.(No 6), p35. KIEP, 1992, p202.
152. Article 4(5)(i) of the EDCA. In Organic Peroxides (Japan, Holland), 1989.2.27., and H
-Acid (Japan, India, China), 1992.12.15., the investigations were not to initiated or termi-
nated since the request for the imposition of antidumping duty were withdrawn. See, Ibid.
153. Article 4(5)(ii) of the EDCA.
154. Article 4(5)(iii) of the EDCA.
155. Polyacetal resin (USA, Japan), 1991.9.14., Phosphoric Acid (China), FMA No 1993-6, OG
(1993) No 12350, p21, Ballbearings (Thailand), FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p136, Soda
Ash (China), FMA No 1993-75, OG (1993) No 12606, p182, Printing Plate (Japan), FMA No 1993-
76, OG (1993) No 12606, p190 and Glass Fibre (USA, Japan, Taiwan), FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994)
No 12786, p26.
156. Dicumyl Peroxide (Japan, Taiwan), 1988.12.16. and Alumina Cement (France), 1989.8.17.
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Chapter 4 : SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF
THE ANTIDUMPING LAWS -
DETERMINATION OF DUMPING
1. INTRODUCTION
Under Council Regulation 2423/88, 1 the Community's anti-dumping law,
the a priori requirement for the imposition of anti-dumping duties is the
establishment of existence of dumping. 	 Article 2 (1) of the Regulation
provides that an anti-dumping duty may be applied to any dumped product
whose release for free circulation in the Community causes injury. Thus,
there are three requirements; existence of dumping, injury caused by the
dumped products, and causal link between the dumped imports and the injury
suffered by the Community industry. A product shall be considered to have
been dumped if its export price to the Community is less than the normal
value of the like product. 2 For the determination of normal value, Com-
munity authorities have to determine whether the models sold by the expor-
ters in their domestic markets were like products with features that were
sufficiently akin to those of the exported models to allow a valid price
comparison; 3 whether sales in the exporters' domestic market could be
considered as being representative; whether they were made in the ordinary
course of trade; and whether sales in the exporters' domestic market were
made at prices which covered the full cost of production.4
1. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88 on protection against dumped or subsidised imports from cuntries
not members of the European Economic Community, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
2. Ibid. Article 2(2). Such a finding is usually achieved by a three step procedure: the
determination of normal value; the determination of export price; and the comparison of the
two.
3. Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p10.
4. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p18.
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2. NORMAL VALUE
2.1. Domestic Market Value
Normal or fair value usually means the price set by the exporting
firm in its home market. Following the pattern of the GATT Anti-dumping
Code, the EC Anti-dumping Regulation requests the Community institutions to
establish normal value preferably on the basis of the 'comparable price
actually paid or payable in ordinary course of trade for the like product
intended for consumption in the exporting country or country of origin'.5
However, in addition to the price in the exporting country or country of
origin, alternative standards may be used as normal value in certain
cases. These are export price to a third country or constructed value.6
The normal value will correspond to the weighted average 7 of the
domestic market prices of all sales to independent customers during the
investigation period8 (at least six months and usually a maximum of twelve
months). 9
 The Commission will usually establish a specific normal value
5. See, supra note 1, Article 2(3)(a).
6. Ibid, Article 2(3)(b). It provides that when there are no sales of the like product in the
ordinary course of trade on the domestic market of the exporting country or country of ori-
gin, or when such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the normal value shall be the
comparable export price to any third country, or the constructed value.
7. 'bid, Article 2(13). When comparing normal value with export price, the Community is
comparing a normal value established on a weighted average basis with an export price decided
on a transaction-by-transaction basis. This double standard may cause inflation of dumping
margin.
8. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p8.
9. In DRAMs, however, the Commission accepted the exporter's argument that normal value
should be established on a quarterly basis, because DRAM production in general is character-
ised by substantial cost reductions over time due to the learning curve effect and those cost
reductions are reflected in sales prices in both the domestic and export markets. DRAMS
(Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p16.
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for each exporter who has made sales on the domestic market. If the
exporter sells all his products abroad or if he does not produce the
product, the Commission will use the domestic prices of other exporters.1°
Where an exporter sells on its home market to related companies,
normal value is computed on the basis of the prices set by the related
companies for their first independent buyers on the home market) 1 Fur-
thermore, the Commission uses domestic market prices as it finds them and
regards them as representatives prices.12
On the other hand, establishment of separate normal values should
be considered for sales to OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) and sales
to specific categories of independent customers. In the case of sales for
OEM, that is to say, sales to customers who sell under their own brand
name and therefore incur costs normally incurred by the manufacturers,
such as advertising, warranty etc., separate normal values were estab-
lished. 13 However, regarding sales to specific categories of independent
customers, i.e. independent distributors, dealers and end-users, separate
normal value is established only for independent distributors, 14 and not
10. Ibid, Article 2(3)(c).
11. Ibid, Article 2(7) and Electronic Typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ
(1985) L 163/1.
12. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p8.
Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, p7.
Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, pll. DRAMs
(Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p16. Retail electronic weighing scale
(Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, oJ (1993) L 112/20, p27.	 Microdisks (Korea,
H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, p6. Among them, in Retail electronic
weighing scale (hereinafter referred to as NEWS), and in Microdisks, normal value for the
models exported to the Community passed the 5% threshold.
13. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p8.
Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore and Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p57.
14. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p8.
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for dealers and end-users 15 with the reason that a specific level of trade
can only be adequately identified if a demonstration is made of all rele-
vant factors including the functions of both seller and buyer and the
consistency of quantities, costs and prices at the distribution level in
question, in relation to other levels.
2.2. Alternatives to Domestic Market Prices.
As already noted, not the market price in the exporting country but
alternative standards, such as constructed value or export price to a
third country, should be used as normal value in the following situations:
First, where there are no sales of the like product on the domestic
market of the exporting country or country of origin.16
Second, when there are no sales in the ordinary course of trade on
the exporting country's home market. 17	For the purpose of determining
normal value, transactions between parties which appear to be associated
or to have a compensatory agreement with each other may be considered as
not being in the ordinary course of trade unless the Community authorities
are satisfied that the prices and costs involved are comparable to those
involved in transactions between parties which have no such link.18
Under its previous practice, the Commission regarded transactions
between related parties as not being in the ordinary course of trade and
established normal value on the basis of constructed value.19
15. Ibid, p9. REWS (Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p22 and
23.
16. See, supra note 1, Article 2(3)(b).
17. Ibid, Article 2(3)(b).
18. Ibid, Article 2(7).
19. This practice has been given up since the Electronic Typewriters determination. See,
Electronic typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1.
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The Community's current practice, however, is that when an exporter
sells in its home market to related parties, the Community will set normal
value based on the prices charged by the related firms to their first
independent buyers, because the Community now regards sales firms as the
sales departments of a manufacturer and treats them as a single economic
unit. 20 In Canon v. Council, the ECJ supported the Community authorities'
view and held that regard must primarily be had to the price actually paid
or payable in the ordinary course of trade in order to establish the
normal value, the other possibilities being merely subsidiary. 21 Setting
normal value at the sales price adopted by sales firms rather than man-
ufacturing firms makes it easier for the Community to find the existence
of dumping because of inflation of normal value. 22 It is worth noting
that this Community practice may really discourage exports from third
countries which have a more complex and hierarchically long vertical
distribution structure.
Third, when sales on the domestic market of the exporting country
or country of origin do not permit a proper comparison, 23
 the export price
to the third country or the constructed value shall be regarded as the
normal value.
	
Therefore, if home sales of the exporting firms are too
small to compare with export sales, the representative character of home
sales has been denied by the Community.	 After Electronic Typewriters,
20. The Commission took the view that the specific division of both production and sales
activities within a group made up of legally distinct companies can in no way alter the fact
that the group is a single economic entity. See, Compact disc players (Korea, Japan),
Com.Reg. (EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p9. This Commission's method was supported by
the ECJ. See, jointed cases 277/85 and 300/85, Canon Inc. and Others v Council, [1988] ECR
5731, at 5799.
21. Joined cases 272 and 300/85, Cannon Inc. and Others v Council. [1988] ECR 5731, at 5799.
22. Details will be discussed in 'part 3. Comparison' in this Chapter.
23. See, supra note 1, Article 2(3)(b).
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therefore, the Commission adopted the 5% rule, eg., home sales of the
exporting firms would be regarded as sufficiently representative if they
represent on a model-by-model basis at least 5% of exports by volume to
the Community. 24 Since Printers, 25 the Community authorities have denied
the representative character of home sales when the sales have made below
cost in the home market of the exporting country, even though such sales
constituted not less than 5% of the total quantities imported.26
2.3. Constructed Value.
Based on the reasons in Article 2(3)(b) of the EC Anti-dumping
Regulation, the Community enjoys discretion to use the export price to
third countries or the constructed value as the normal value. The Regula-
tion provides that the constructed value is determined by adding the cost
of production and a reasonable margin of profit. 27
 In EC practice, export
price to a third country has seldom been used to establish the normal
value. One reason for this may be to do with administrative convenience.
The other is that the exporting firms in EC anti-dumping action have
rarely claimed use of export price to a third country to establish normal
value. 28
24. Electronic Typewriters (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3643/84, OJ (1984) L 335/43, p44.
25. Serial-Impact Dot-Matrix Printers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3651/88, OJ (1988) L 317/33,
p36.
26. In Radio-broadcast receivers, normal value was constructed even though the exporter sold
to related parties because domestic sales of comparable models to independent buyers either
fell below, in volume terms, 5% of sales of products exported to the Community, or were
sufficiently representative but made at a loss. Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.
(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, pll.
27. Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the Community anti-dumping regulation.
28. P. Waer, "Constructed Normal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations", (1993) 27 JWT
(No.4), p48.
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The main issue in constructed normal value is to determine a rea-
sonable amount for selling, administrative and other general (SGA) ex-
penses and a reasonable amount of profit. 	 According to Article
2(3)(b)(ii) of the 1988 Regulation, 29 three problems can be outstanding.
The first issue is the question of whether the use of domestic SGA is
reasonable. The second issue is the question of whether the use of other
producers' domestic SGA expenses is reasonable for a finding of dumping.
The last issue is whether the provision concerned with constructed normal
value in the EC Anti-dumping Regulation is compatible with current GATT
rules.
2.3.1. Reasonableness of Domestic SGA Expenses
As mentioned above, the mere fact that the domestic SGA expenses of
the exporters are higher than their export SGA expenses, can cause a
finding of dumping. 30 However, where there are no or insufficient sales
of the like product on the domestic market of the exporting country, or
where sales are not profitable, the treatment of SGA expenses is the
essence of the problem.
As has been explained in Electronic Typewriters, 31 the Commission
29. It provides that 'The cost of production shall be computed on the basis of all costs, in
the ordinary course of trade, both fixed and variable, in the country of origin, of materials
and manufacture, plus a reasonable amount for selling , administrative and other general
expenses. The amount of for selling, general and administrative expenses and profit sahll be
calculated by reference to the expenses incurred and the profit realized by the producer or
exporter on the profitable sales of the like products on the domestic market'.
30. There may be numerous reasons for high domestic SGA expenses, eg., distribution struc-
ture, advertising costs and so on.
31. Electronic typewriters (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3643/84, OJ (1984) L 335/43, p44.
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has regarded constructed value as a surrogate for domestic market price.32
Therefore, the normal value includes all SGA expenses incurred by expor-
ters home sales since Electronic Typewriters. 33 It has become the Commis-
sion's practice to include SGA expenses in the constructed value, where
there are no such sales on the exporters' home market, as if sales on the
home market had taken place. 34
 A finding of dumping can arise merely from
the fact that the domestic SGA costs of the exporter's sale in the domes-
tic market of the comparable models are higher than the export SGA
costs. 35 Thus, these artificial SGA expenses make the normal value high in
favour of a finding of dumping. In DRARrs, 36 for instance, the Commission
allocated all R&D (Research and Development) expenses incurred in the
period of investigation which related to DRAMs, be it current or future
products, to the DRAMs sold in the period of investigation. Taking par-
ticular account of the high future R&D costs and the large capital invest-
ment requirements of this industry, the fact that R&D expenses for future
products which were never exported to the Community were allocated to the
constructed normal value indicated the Commission's intention to create
artificial and higher domestic SGA expenses for a finding of dumping.
32.	 This has consistently been supported by the ECJ.	 See,	 Case 250/85,	 Brother v Council,
[1988] ECR 5683, at para. 	 18, Joined Cases 277 and 300/85, 	 Cannon v Council,	 [1988] ECR 5731,
at para.
	 26,	 Joined Cases	 273/85	 and	 107/86,	 Silver Seiko
para.	 16, and Case C69-89, Nakajima All Precision v Council,
v Council,
[1991] ECR
[1988]
1-2069,
ECR	 5927,
	 at
at para.	 64.
33.	 Ibid.
34.	 In Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p10,
the Commission took the view that where there were no or insufficient sales on the domestic
market, the amounts used in the constructed values for SGA expenses and profit were the
weighted averages of the expenses incurred and profit realised by the same producer or expor-
ter on its other profitable models sold on the domestic market.
35. Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L
313/5, p8. Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, pll.
36. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p16.
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Therefore, with respect to R&D, R&D costs incurred in the past and de-
ferred to the period of investigation only for the current exported pro-
ducts should be the basis for the constructed normal value. It remains
to be seen how the Community authorities react to the 1994 GATT Anti-
dumping Code providing that costs should be adjusted appropriately for
t,116se.104on-recurring items of cost which benefit future and/or current
production.37
It has been suggested that the Community's approach on this basis
'as if sales on the domestic market had taken place' may be necessary to
avoid 'would be' dumpers using cheaper material or more efficient produc-
tion plants for their output sold for export, compared with their produc-
tion sold on the domestic market. 38 However, the method of using the
costs incurred for those inadequate home market sales is used consistently
because constructed value is theoretically used only where home market
sales are inadequate.
2.3.2. Reasonableness of the Use of Other Producers'
Domestic Expenses
According to Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the EC Anti-dumping Regulation,
where the amount for SGA expenses and profit of the producer or exporter
is unavailable or unreliable or is not suitable for use they shall be
calculated by reference to the expenses incurred and profit realised by
other producers in the country of origin or export on profitable sales of
the like product. Therefore, in case where sales on the domestic market
37. Article 2(2)(1)(1) of the 1994 GATT Antidumping Code. Commission, Proposal for the Coun-
cil Decision Concerning the conclusion of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (1986-94), Com(94) 143 final, p146.
38. Beseler & Williams, Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Law: the European Community, London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, p59.
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are unprofitable but sufficient quantities are sold, or where the producer
or exporter does not have sales of other comparable models, the SGA ex-
penses are calculated by reference to the expenses incurred by other
producers on their profitable sales of the like product in their domestic
market. 39 However, the question may arise of whether the use of other
producers' domestic SGA and profit, where an exporter has no such sales on
its home market, is reasonable, since that the exporter concerned does not
usually know other producers' exact SGA expenses and whether they are
dumping. In the Electronic Typewriters case, however, the ECJ held that
'contrary to TEC's (Toyo Electronic Company) argument that the method
adopted by the institutions leads to results which are unforeseeable
because the manufacturer concerned cannot know the profit margins of its
competitors; it must be observed that references to factors not known to
the manufacturer concerned often prove necessary under the system laid
down by Regulation No. 2176/84 where, as in the present case, it is not
possible to take real price as a basis, and a certain degree of unforesee-
ability has to be accepted in such operations'. 40
The other question is that use of other producers' domestic SGA may
ascribe dumping margins of exporters who have domestic sales and who are
clearly dumping, to exporters who do not have domestic sales and who may
obtain reasonable profit margins on their export sales. As have seen in
the Nakajima case, 41 the Commission's methodology which establishes the
39. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p 10,
and Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990)
L313/5, p8.
40. Cases 260/85 & 106/86, Toyo Electronic Company Ltd. v Council, [1988] ECR 5855, at 5917.
41. Serial-Impact Dot-Matrix Printers (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1418/88, OJ (1988) L 130/12,
p18. Case C-69/89, Nakajima v Council, [1991] NCR 1-2069, at 1-2188 and 1-2189. In this
case, Nakajima was an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), wholly engaged in export sales,
mostly on an OEM basis.
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price of the exported products as if they had been sold on the domestic
market, where the foreign producer does not sell the product concerned in
his home market, becomes problematic, because the producer does not incur
any cost (or make any profit) for the product in his home market.
According to the Commission, however, 'where no or insufficient
such sales took place, the allocation was based on a weighted average of
expenses incurred and profit realised by the other exporter, investigated
on their profitable sales to OEM's (Original Equipment Manufacturer) 42 on
domestic market of the like product. 43 In addition to the Commission's
determination, the ECJ held that 'the normal value of a product must in
all cases be constructed as if the product was intended for distribution
and sale within the domestic market, regardless of whether or not the
producer has, or has access to, a distribution structure'. 44
In Radio-broadcast receivers, 45 even though the exporter's domestic
sales of the comparable models exceeded 5% of sales of products exported
to the Community, the normal value was constructed based on sales on the
domestic market to independent distributors." However, as domestic sales
to independent distributors failed to exceed the 5% threshold, SGA ex-
42. In joined Cases C-133/87 & C-150/87, Nashua Corporation v Commission and Council, [1990]
ECR 1-719, at para. 3, and in Case C-156/87, Gestetner Holdings v Council and Commission,
[1990] ECR I-781, at para. 3, the Court defined an OEM as a supplier under its own brand of
products manufactured by other undertakings.
43. Idem, OJ (1988) L 130/12, p18.
44. Idem, Case C-69/89, at 1-2187.
45. Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, pll.
46. On the Korean market, most domestic sales to independent buyers were made to car manufac-
turers. The sales to car manufacturers, a significant difference in price structure and
quantities sold was found. In spite of the fact that there are price difference between type
of customer, the price difference lay in the lower profit margins on sales to car manufactur-
ers, according to the investigation. This means the exporter obtained a certain amount of
profit margin on their domestic sales.
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penses were calculated by reference to the average expenses of the other
producers' domestic SGA. For this price to be genuinely comparable with
the export price, as pointed out in the Second Report of the Group of
Experts, 47 the Commission should have considered differences between the
quantities sold to distributors and the quantities sold in the Community,
because the quantities sold to car manufacturers were more comparable to
the export sales.
There are several criticisms which can be made with regard to the
Community's position on the use of other producers' domestic SGA. First,
the Community should take into account the cost structure of a particular
producer, in particular its export cost structure, when considering the
'reasonable SGA expenses' to be used in constructing normal value. Other-
wise, overestimated SGA expenses may give rise to an artificial dumping
margin.
Second, the exporter may never be able to check whether the Commis-
sion calculated the constructed normal value correctly as the SGA and
profit used by the Commission are those of other producers and the related
data will be treated as confidential within the meaning of the Anti-dump-
ingRegulation. 48
 Above all, the determined normal value should be genui-
nely comparable with the export price.
2.3.3. The Determination of Profit
The amount of profit is calculated by reference to the profit
realised by the producer or exporter on the profitable sales of like
products on the domestic market. Where the exporter concerned does not
47. Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, Second Report adopted on 27 May 1960, GATT BISD
9th supp. 194, at 196.
48. J.-F. Bellis. E. Vermulst & P. Waer, "Further Changes in the EEC Anti-dumping Regulation:
A Codification of Controversial Methodologies", 25 JWT (No.2) 1989, p26.
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have sufficient profitable domestic sales, the amount of profit is calcu-
lated by reference to profit realised by other producers or exporters on
the profitable domestic sales of like products. 49 If there are no domes-
tic sales of like products, the Community authorities will use the profit
by the exporter or other producers or exporters in the same business
sector. 50
Since Electronic typewriters, 51 profit margin has been determined
on the basis that constructed normal value is a surrogate for domestic
market price and should therefore approximate the result which would be
obtained if sufficient profitable domestic sales had been made. 52	The
result of the methodology adopted in Electronic typewriters has been to
raise the profit margin used in constructed normal value determinations:53
7 to 14% in Small screen colour TV receivers; 54 and 13.5% in DRAMs. 55
As far as constructed values for OEM export sales are concerned,
49. Synthetic fibres of polyesters (Korea, India), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1956/92, OJ (1992) L
197/25, p27.
50. Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. In the judgment in Case C-
69/89, Nakajima All Precision v Council, [1991] ECR 1-2069, at 2186, para. 61, it was held
that the three methods of calculating the constructed normal value thus laid down in Article
2(3)(b)(ii) of the basic regulation should be considered in the order in which they are set
out. This was upheld in Case C-105/90, Goldstar Co.Ltd v Council, [1992] ECR 1-677, at 1-725.
51. Electronic typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1, p3.
52. Prior to Electronic typewriters, the Commission usually select a single profit margin for
all the constructed value, regardless of the profitabiility of each specific exporter's
domestic sales. See, 1% in Chemical fertilizer (USA), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 349/81, OJ (1981) L
39/4, p5, 10% in Louvre doors (Singapore, Malaysia), Com.Dec.81/366/EEC, OJ (1981) L 135/33,
p33.
53. 14.6% in Photocopiers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 535/87, OJ (1987) L 54/12, p13; 37% in
Dot-matrix printers (japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3651/88, OJ (1988) L 317/33, p36.
54. Small screen colour TV receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3232/89, OJ (1989) L 314/1,
p4.
55. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p17.
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since Electronic typewriters, constructed normal value for OEM is a surro-
gate for domestic market price and would be obtained if there had been OEM
sales on the domestic market and 5% of a profit was used as a standard
profit margin. 56
 However, in current determinations, the Community author-
ities, in line with previous practice, 57
 usually apply a lower profit
level to the constructed value and the profit used when constructing
normal value for OEM transactions is one third of the profit realised on
own brand sales.58
2.3.4. Compatibility of the EC Anti-dumping Law
with GATT Rules
According to Article 2(4) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code, 59 it is
clear that the GATT Anti-dumping Code does not clearly mandate use of
domestic SGA, but only imposes a standard of 'reasonableness'. Therefore
the text of the GATT Code does not prescribe any particular method for
determining the SGA costs to be used in the constructed market value,
except that the amount should be reasonable. The standard of reasonable-
56. Small screen colour TV receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3232/89, OJ (1989) L 314/1,
p4. Plain paper photocopiers (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 535/87, OJ (1987) L 54/12, p14.
57. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p10,
and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 112/90, OJ (1990) L 13/21, p25. In this determination, the Commission
applied a profit rate which only corresponded to 30% of that realized on the exporter's brand
sales.
58. Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p57.
59. Article 2(4) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that 'When there are no sales of the
like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market or when, because of the
particular market situation, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of
dumping shall be determined by comparison.. .with the cost of production in the country of
origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and any other costs and for
profits.'
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ness in the determining of SGA cost in the GATT Code is also incorporated
in Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the EC Anti-dumping Law. It follows that the EC
rules are, as such, not a clear GATT violation.
However, in the Second Report of the Group of Experts adopted in
1960, 60 the report stated that 'whatever the particular method used for
determining both production and sales cost, the aim should always be to
arrive at a normal value which was genuinely comparable with the export
price'. Thus, the fair export price can be an alternative standard, for
the concept of constructed value rather than the cost of inadequate home
market sales.
2.4. Sales at a Loss.
The EEC Anti-dumping Regulation was amended in 1979 61 to incorporate
the concept of sales below cost. As a result, the EC adopted a very broad
conception of cost which indicates average cost (or fully allocated cost)
rather than marginal cost as having been provided in Article 2(4). 62 From
the viewpoint of economic reality, pricing between average cost and margi-
nal cost should not be regarded as dumped price if such price is set only
for a short period, as rational firms are willing to reduce prices to the
level of marginal cost in short-term periods of slack demand.
In this respect, the Commission has refused to allow any exception
60. Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties, Second Report adopted on 27 May 1960, GATT Bisd,
9th Supp. 194, at 196.
61. Cou.Reg.(REC) No. 3017/79, OJ (1979) L 339/1.
62. Article 2(4) of the EC Anti-dumping Regulation provides that 'Where there are reasonable
grounds for believing or suspecting that the price at which a product is actually sold for
consumption in the country of origin is less than the cost of production as defined in para-
graph 3(b)(ii), sales at such prices may be considered as not having been made in the ordi-
nary course of trade'.
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to the rule that normal value should cover full allocated costs of produc-
tion63
 even in the case of production facilities in a start-up or expan-
sion phase where it is unrealistic to expect full costs to be covered
within the investigation period." 	 Such a practice undoubtedly avoids
difficulties for investigation, mainly with regard to administrative
convenience, but can also cause severe distortion in dumping margins
found. It remains to be seen how the Community authorities react to the
1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code providing that costs should be adjusted appro-
priately for circumstances in which costs during the period of investiga-
tion are affected by start-up operations.65
3. EXPORT PRICE"
3.1. Background
Article 2(8) of the EEC Anti-dumping Regulation provides that the
export price shall be the price actually paid or payable for the products
63. Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5,
p8, DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p16, and REWS (Korea, Singa-
pore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p22. In these determinations, the
Commission took the view that normal value is established on the basis of the weighted aver-
age domestic selling price and at prices permitting the recovery of all or full cost of
production reasonably allocated in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market of the
expoorters.
64. J.-F. Bellis, "The EEC Anti-dumping System", Anti-dumping Law and Practice (J.H. Jackson
& E. Vermulst ed.), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Chicago, 1989, p75.
65. Article 2(2)(1)(1) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code. Commission, Proposal for a Coun-
cil Decision Concerning the conclusion of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiation (1986-94), Com(94) 143 final, p146.
66. For the determinatiion of dumping and/or dumping margin, normal value is compared with
the export price of the imported products to the Community whiich is basically the dumped
price.
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sold for export to the Community. 67 In fact, the Commission always nets
back the export price to the ex-factory level in the exporting country. 68
These export prices to the Community include those for export via indepen-
dent exporters. 69 Where exporters made sales to independent buyers in the
Community directly, the export price is established on the basis of the
price actually paid or payable by the independent buyers to the expor-
ters. 70 In some determinations, 71
 the Commission has developed the prac-
tice of restricting the volume of transactions investigated so that at
least 60% of all export sales of each particular exporter are covered.
In accordance with the GATT Anti-dumping Code, 72 the EEC Anti-
dumping Regulation provides that the export price may be constructed on
the basis of the price at which the imported product is first resold to an
independent buyer. 73 There are three conditions to be satisfied, however,
in order to construct the export price: first, where there are no export
67. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
68. Article 2(8)(a) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation provides that the export price
shall be the price ... net of all taxes, discounts and rebates actually granted and directly
related to the sales under consideration.
69. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p17. Therefore, export
prices were partly determined on the basis of the prices actually paid or payable to the the
independent exporter, Texas Instruments Ltd.
70. REWS (Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg. (EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p22. In this
determination, the Korean producers identified sales as being made at the level of
importer/distributor or dealer, and the Commission was satisfied, on the basis of the evi-
dence presented, that this was the case.
71. In Daisy wheel printers (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2005/88, OJ (1988) L 177/1, p5, and
Audio tapes in cassettes ( Korea, Japan, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5,
p9, the Commission verified at least 70% of all transactions during the investigation period.
However, in Colour TVs receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg. (EC)
No 2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p59, a minimum of 60% of all export transactions made by the
exporters concerned during the investigation period were considered.
72. Article 2(5) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
73. Article 2(8)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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price; or second, where it appears that there is an association or a
compensatory arrangement between the exporters and the importer Or a third
party; 74
 or third where, for other reasons, 75
 the export price is unreli-
able. 76
3.2. Alternatives to Export Price
3.2.1. Categories of Customers
The export price is the price actually paid or payable for the
product sold for the export to the Community when the foreign producer
sells directly to the importer in the Community. In some cases, however,
the foreign producer does not sell directly to the Community importer,77
or their export sales were made to OEM basis. 78 In these cases, the
74. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p17. 	 Radio-broadcast re-
ceivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3113/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p12. REWS (Korea, Singapore),
Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p22. Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No
534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, p7.
75. In Synthetic fibre hand-knitting (Turkey), Com.Dec.84/131/EEC, OJ (1984) L 67/60, p61,
the Commission constructed the export price for an importer who invoiced his deliveries for
the Community via an intermediate company in a third country, because the export prices
expressed in that company's invoices could not be regarded as those obtained in normal trad-
ing.
76. The Regulation does not elaborate on what those 'other reasons' could be. Nor does
Article 2(5) of the 1979 GATT Antidumping Code mention the other reasons. It stipulates that
the export price may be constructed if the products are not resold to an independent buyer,
or not resold in the condition as imported, on such reasonable basis as the authorities may
determine.
77. Housed bearing units (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2516/86, OJ (1986) L 221/16, p17. Styrene
monomer (USA), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1570/81, OJ (1981) L 132/17, p17. In Styrene monomer, the
Commissiion used the price charged by the producer to the broker or trader or trading house
as the export price even though the seller did not know whether the material was destined for
the Community or for other export markets.
78. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p7.
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export price is determined on the basis of the price paid or payable to
the intermediary. Such intermediary should have the same treatment as an
independent exporter, 79 because the exporter to the Community is not the
producer but the intermediary, i.e. trading house, broker, or trader.
When export sales were made on the OEM basis, separate export prices are
established for these sales on the basis of the prices charged when the
products were sold for export by the manufacturer to the OEMs. 8° That is
to say, the export price is determined on the basis of the price paid or
payable by the OEM purchaser. All these approach by the Commission to
determining the export price are nothing else but to make the export price
as low as possible and create a dumping margin artificially.
3.2.2. Constructed Export Price
In accordance with the EC Anti-dumping Regulation, the Commission
may construct the export price whenever it finds an association or a
compensatory arrangement between parties concerned, as has been seen in
several anti-dumping determinations. 81
Where the Commission decides to construct the export price, it uses
the resale price to the first independent buyer in the European Community.
From this resale price, the Commission gives allowance with three reasons:
79. See, DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p17.
80. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p7.
Photocopiers (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2640/86, OJ (1986) L 239/5, p8.
81. Serial-Impact Dot-Metrix Printers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3651/88, OJ (1988) L 317/33,
p37, Video Cassette Recorders (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2684/88, OJ (1988) L 240/5,
p9, and see, supra note 73. In such determinations, the Community institutions constructed
the export price almost automatically when exports were made to exporter's subsidiary compa-
nies in the Community.
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- all costs incurred between importation and resale,82
- a reasonable profit margin, 83 and
- the costs incurred by the exporter from the moment the product
left the factory (eg., CIF cost and transportation).84
Article 2(8)(b) of the Regulation providing that such allowance
shall include a reasonable margin for overheads and profit, 85 makes it
clear that the deduction for constructing the export price includes indir-
ect costs as well as direct costs, in spite of the fact that only direct
costs are deducted with respect to normal value.
Besides, a reasonable profit margin for the importers is deducted
in the construction of the export price. This allowance for indirect cost
and a reasonable profit margin may cause an artificial dumping finding.
Therefore, the profit margins deducted in the construction of export
82. These costs include customs duties, any anti-dumping duties and other taxes payable in
the importing country by reason of the importation or sale of the goods. See, Article
2(8)(b)(ii) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. In Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malay-
sia, China, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p60, the
'Imposts Erariale di Consumo', a luxuries tax levied in Italy was deducted from its resale
price.
83. A reasonable margin for overheads and profit and/or any commission usually paid or agr-
reed should be deducted. See, Article 2(8)(b)(iii) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
84. These costs includes usual transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs.
See, Artiicle 2(8)(b)(i) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
85. Usually around 5%. See, Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L
68/5, p7, REWS (Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p22, DRAMs
(Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p17, Audio tapes in Cassettes (Korea,
U.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, p9, and Compact disc players (Korea,
Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p7. But see Radio-broadcast receivers
(Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p12: 8%, and Housed Bearing Units
(Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 374/87, OJ (1987) L 35/32: 6%.
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prices should be kept at the lowest possible level." Furthermore, the
Community Regulation 2(8)(b) 87
 provides that such deductible 'costs shall
include those normally borne by an importer but paid by any party either
in or outside the Community which appears to be associated or to have a
compensatory arrangement with the importer or exporter'.
	 Thus, if the
product is a consumer branded one, which is in need of the establishment
of a well-established distribution, servicing and advertisement 88 network,
allowance may cause serious distortions by the use- of constructed export
price. It can be observed, for example, that a company selling to both
related and unrelated distributors may find that prices to independent
importers result in no dumping while the same price to related importers
results in dumping margins. 89 Therefore, the exporters who want to escape
a finding of dumping from the Community must carry out their business
without advertising and the related elaborate distribution and servicing
network, while their competitors in the Community enjoy all those facili-
ties.
4. COMPARISON
In accordance with Article 2(6) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provi-
ding that the purpose of making adjustments to the price is to effect a
86. For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison, the profit margin should not be deducted
as it is not deducted in the construction of normal value. It should be noted that the level
of the profit margin in the construction of normal value is usually much higher than that of
the export price.
87. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
88. In Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5,
p9, the Commission adjusted the export price for aadvertising costs corresponding to sales
made in the Community but paid or reimbursed by the exporters associated with the importers.
89. J.-F. Bellis, supra note 64, 00.
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fair comparison between the export price and the domestic price in the
exporting country, the EC Anti-dumping Regulation before August 1988, 90 was
an almost verbatim repetition of Article 2(6) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dump-
ing Code. The amendment to the EC Anti-dumping Regulation in 1988,91
however, significantly changed the provisions applicable to comparison.
In practice, the EC has used its policy on making adjustment for compari-
sons which cannot be regarded as fair.
According to the comparison provision provided in the EC Regulation
2(9)(a), 92 two main symmetry issues arise, in cases where the price actu-
ally paid or payable for the product sold for export to the Community is
unreliable.	 The first issue is the differential treatment of indirect
selling expenses in each market, and the second issue is the widespread
use of averaged normal value as the standard for comparison with individ-
ual export sales prices.
In case of the former issue, where the exporter carries out distri-
bution through its sales subsidiary in the Community, the EC gives allow-
ance to all indirect expenses incurred by the sales subsidiary of the
exporter, 93
 while it make virtually no deduction for the indirect expenses
90. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2176/84, OJ (1984) L 201/1.
91. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
92. Article 2(9)(a) of the 1988 Community Anti-dumping Regulation provides that the normal
value and the export price shall be compared as nearly as possible at the same time. For the
purpose of ensuring a fair comparison, due allowance in the form of adjustments shall be made
in each case, on its merits, for the differences affecting price comparability, i.e. for
differences in: (i) physical characteristics; (ii) import charges and indirect taxes; (iii)
selling expenses resulting from sales made.
93. In Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5,
P9, the Commission made it clear and took the view that on any occasion that an allocation of
sales, administrative and other general expenses was not made on the basis of turnover, the
amount to be allocated was calculated on the basis of the exporter's available cost account-
ing data directly related to the sales in question.
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incurred by a related subsidiary in the exporter's home market, as already
noted above. Therefore, in cases where it is necessary to construct the
export price, allowances are made for all costs incurred between importa-
tion and resale and for a profit margin. 94 It may be argued on the Commu-
nity's part that the cost data handed in by the exporter may be unreli-
able. However, this methodology in the operation of the anti-dumping
system can technically cause artificial inflation or creation of a dumping
margin. Therefore, the Community should verify those cost data from the
exporter rather than apply antitrades biased methodology.
The second issue is that the normal value established on a weighted
average basis is normally compared with export prices on a transaction-by-
transaction basis. 95 Export prices can vary over a anti-dumping invest-
igation period simply because of inflation, volatility of exchange rates,
changes in market condition and so on. Thus, it seems to be abuse of
anti-dumping laws, if dumping is found to have occurred, in spite of the
fact that the pattern of price variation is identical and so the price is
identical in the exporter's home market and its exporting market.96
Therefore the EC Anti-dumping Regulation should be amended to guar-
antee equal treatment of sales on the exporter's home market and importing
94. Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p60, Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, 0J (1994)
L 68/5, p7, REWS (Korea, Singappore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p22,
DRAMs(Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p17, Compact disc players (Korea,
Japan), Com.Reg.(REC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p7.
95. Article 2(13) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No
2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p17. Colour TV receivers (Korea, China, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No 2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p61.
96. Consider a case in which an equal number of sales is made in each market at a price of
10 in the first half, and the same quantity of sales in each market is made at a price of 5
in the second, the normal value established on a weighted average basis is 7.5. Since the
export price in the second half is 5, they are dumped by a margin of 50%.
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market i.e., individual sales to contemporaneous individual sales, or
average export prices to average home market prices over an equivalent
period, and equal treatment for any adjustment in both markets. Confron-
ted with these arguments the Community has responded that these issues
from the exporter's side confuse two different problems.97
The Commission has taken the view that the construction of the
export price is one thing and the comparison is quite another; when the
domestic and export price have been established, a subsequent allowance is
made for differences affecting price comparability when comparing these
prices. 98 However, it is worth pointing out that the price comparison is
based on the established normal value and the constructed export price.
Therefore, the construction of the export price is a kind of prerequisite
for the comparison between normal value and export price. 	 The rule
against adjustments for indirect selling expenses of both normal value and
export price, therefore, defies all logic and fairness."
It is very clear, according to the GATT Anti-dumping Code, 100 that
the construction of the export price is obligatory. Therefore the costs
referred to are to be deducted automatically from the resale price of the
related parties and only after this is done, do the comparison provisions
start to play a role. As mentioned in Article 2(6) of the 1979 GATT Anti-
97. Housed bearing units (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2516/86, 0J(1986) L 221/16, p17 and 18,
Plain Paper Photocopiers ( Japan), Coun.Keg.(EEC) No 2640/86, OJ (1986) L 239/5, p9 and 10,
and Electronic Typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1, p5.
98. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, pll.
99. Ivo Van Bael, "EEC Anti-dumping Law and Procedure Revisited", (1990) 24 JWT (No 2), p9.
K. Matsumoto & G. Finlayson, "Dumping and Anti-dumping: Growing Problems in World Trade",
(1990) 24 JWT (No 4), p7. J.-F. Bellis, supra note 64, p83.
100. GATT Anti-dumping Code, Article 2(6). This provision provides that '...Allowance for
costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between importation and resales, and for profits
accruing, should also be made'.
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dumping Code, it should be remembered that the purpose of making adjust-
ments to the prices is to effect a fair comparison between the export
price and the normal value.
4.1. Levels of Trade and Quantities.
Evolutions in the EC practice in permitting adjustments have been
characterised by an increasingly restrictive application of the rules.
Although Article 2(9)(a) stipulates the broad principles of fair compari-
son including due allowance for the differences at different levels of
trade, or in different quantities, 101 the guidelines set out in Article
2(10) provide that any adjustment to take account of the differences shall
be made pursuant to the rules specified in this provision. 102 Thus the
Community authorities have broad discretionary power, whether they choose
the adjustments for sales at different levels of trade or sales of differ-
ent quantities in the respective markets. 103 However, with regard to
adjustments for sales at different levels of trade, the few exceptions to
the Community policy were made in Plain Paper Photocopiers'",
101. Article 2(9)(a) stipulates that the normal value and the export price shall be compared
as nearly as possible at the same time.
102. The adjustments for sales at different levels of trade and sales of different quantities
in the respective markets can not be granted unless adjustments for such differences fall in
the exhaustive lists in Article 2(10) of the Community Antidumping Regulation.
103. In Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p12, the
Commission rejected the argument that the sales made to car manufacturers should be compared
to the export sales since the quantities were more comparable to the export sales, and took
the view that any fair comparison requires prices to be compared at comparable levels of
trade.
104. Plain paper photocopiers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 535/87, OJ (1987) L 54/12.
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Printers 105
, Video Cassette Recorders106 , and Compact disc playersl°7
determinations. In these determinations, the Commission has accepted that
own-brand sales and OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) sales are not
comparable. As a result, the allegation that the rules on adjustment
could have overridden fair comparison requirement makes sense. Therefore,
the Community's practice, as codified in Article 2(9) and Article 2(10),
is incompatible with the purpose stated in Article 2(6) of the GATT Anti-
dumping Code which is to effect a fair comparison. 	 Besides, the EC's
administrative practice is incompatible with GATT Code Article 2(6) prin-
ciple that comparison shall be made 'at the same level of trade, normally
at the ex-factory level'.
4.2. Import Charges and Indirect Taxes
Article 2(10)(b) of the Regulation provides that normal value shall
be reduced by an amount corresponding to any import charges or indirect
taxes borne by the like product and by materials physically incorporated
therein, when destined for consumption in the country of origin or export
and not collected or refunded in respect of the product exported to the
Community.
In accordance with Article 2(10)(b) of the Regulation, there can be
the question of whether this import charge which is regarded as a cost can
105. Serial-Impact Dot-Metrix Printers, Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1418/88, OJ (1988) L 130/12, p18,
and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3651/88, OJ (1988) L 317/33, p36.
106. Video cassette recorders, Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2684/88, OJ (1988) L 240/5, p8 and p10.
107. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p10.
The Commission has generally applied a reduced profit margin where export sales were made to
such OEM customers in the Community. In this determination, the Commission applied a profit
rate which only corresponded to 30% of that realized on the exporter's brand sales or, if the
exporter had no domestic sales, 30% of the average profit made by other exporters.
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include anti-dumping duties to the imported product. 108
 In practice, as
the Community considers anti-dumping duties as a cost, fair comparison
between the normal value and the export price is distorted more.
4.3. Conditions and Terms of Sale
Article 2(10)(c) establishes the guideline on adjustment for dif-
ferences in conditions and terms of sale. As far as differences in condi-
tions and terms of sale are concerned, allowances are granted and limited
to those which bear a direct relationship to the sales under considera-
tion. The basic principle is that the deduction shall be made only in
respect of directly related costs, for an exhausted list of the expenses.
There are transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs,
packing, credit, warranties,'" guarantees, technical assistance and other
after-sales services, and other selling expenses including commissions and
sales-men's salaries. 110
The possibilities for unfairness included in Article 2 (10)(c) for
indirect selling expenses became clear in several consumer branded pro-
108. On the question of additional anti-dumping duty and refund procedure, see chapter 7.
109. In Colour TV receivers (Korea, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC)
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, the allowance claimed in respect of these costs were adjusted
downwards with the reason that they included costs which were not directly related to the
sales, and a claim for the cost of credit was rejected because the Commission considered that
these costs were not directly related to the sales under consideration.
110. For salespersons' salaries, a number of allowances claimed have been rejected with the
reason that not all salaries claimed concerned salaries of salespersons wholly engaged in
direct selling activities. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p17.
In REWS (Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p23, not only
salespersons' salaries but also the amount for transport was reduced since the costs included
general travel and communication expenses.
115
ducts determinations, such as Electronic Typewriters, 111 Video Cassette
Recorders, 112 and Colour TV receivers, 113 because such products involve
substantial sales operations, for example, marketing, distribution and
advertising, in addition to the traditional manufacturing and selling.
In order to determine the export price, the Community considers an
export price charged by an exporter, deducting marketing, distributing,
advertising and all general expenses. However, in case of consumer bran-
ded products, the real price is not the constructed export price but the
price charged by the distributor of the imported products. Furthermore,
indirect selling expenses for consumer branded products are substantial,
often in the order of 15 to 20% of the selling price. 114
 Therefore, a
producer who sells a consumer branded product at exactly the same price in
both domestic and export markets, will systematically be credited with a
dumping margin because of the indirect selling expenses of his sales
organisation in the exporting market for which allowance will be made.
For fairer comparison, the Community should give allowance to indirect
sales expenses in the exporter's home market, as long as indirect expenses
in the exporter's domestic market are greater than those in exporting
market.
111. Electronic typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1.
112. Video cassette recorders (Korea, Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 501/89, OJ (1989) L 57/55.
113. Colour TV receivers (Korea, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EEC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p 62. In this determination, the Commission rejected the claims
that normal value should be adjusted to take account of various advertising costs incurred in
the exporters' domestic market on the ground that the costs did not correspond to any of the
selling expenses as specified in Article 2(10)(c) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
114. J.-F. Seine, op. cit., supra note 64, p83.
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4.4. Insignificant Adjustments
Article 2(10)(e) of the Regulation provides that 'claims for adjust-
ments which are insignificant in relation to the price or value of the
affected transactions shall be disregarded. 	 Ordinarily, individual ad-
justments having an ad valorem effect of less than 0.5% of that price or
value shall be considered insignificant'.
This provision seems neutral because it affects equally (normal)
value or (export) price of the affected transactions, even though it is
motivated by reasons of administrative convenience. However, closer
examination reveals that it can have a major impact on dumping determina-
tion, because, in fact, the insignificant adjustment rule does not apply
to the constructed export price under Article 2(8)(b), but applies to the
normal value only)- 15
 This means that insignificant costs for insurance,
loading, unloading and wharfage and so on, will no longer be deducted from
the normal value, but an allowance for them will still be made in the
constructed export price)-'6
Needless to say, arbitrary application of insignificant adjustments
may have the effect of creating an artificially increased dumping
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margin. Accordingly, Article 2(10)(e) of the Regulation is not compat-
ible with the GATT Anti-dumping Code, which provides that adjustments be
made for the 'differences affecting price comparability': the Code does
115. In Colour TV receivers (Korea, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p61, an allowance for salespersons salaries for the construc-
tion of normal value was rejected because the amount concerned was found to be insignificant.
116. In Radio-broadcast receivers ( Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p13,
the Commission took the view that in this particular case the allowances in question, even
though they were insignificent, taken altogether, had an appreciable effect on the price or
the transactions and did not deducted in the constructed export price.
117. J.-F. Bellis, E. Vermulst & P. Waer, supra note 48, p29.
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not ask that individual adjustment less than 0.5% of that price or value
be ignored.
5. Dumping Margin
According to Article 2(14)(a) of the Regulation, dumping margin is
defined as the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price.
Therefore, dumping margins are determined by a comparison between the
weighted average normal value and the export price based on the transac-
tion-by-transaction method)--8
 As a result, the dumping margin is equal
to the difference between normal value and export price, duly adjusted.119
A single dumping margin is calculated for the whole Community because
weighted average margins for each exporter may be established when dump-
ing margins vary. 120
This transaction-by-transaction method tends to overestimate dump-
ing margin, because negative dumping is regarded by the Commission as not
real injurious dumping. 121
 Furthermore, the ECJ upheld this view and held
that the transaction-by-transaction method is the only method capable of
dealing with certain manoeuvres in which dumping is disguised by charging
different prices, some above the normal value and some below it. 122 The
118. Article 2(13) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
119. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, pll.
120. Article 2(14)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. Radio-broadcast receivers
(Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p13.
121. This method of the Commission was supported by the ECJ. In Case 240/84, NTN Toyo Bear-
ing and Others v Council and Commission, [1987] ECR 1809, at 1854 and 1855, the ECJ held that
export prices above normal value are irrevalent to the question of the extent to which export
sales below normal value have occurred and, therefore, to the real extent to which dumping
has taken place.
122. Case 240/84, NYN Toyv Bearing Co. Ltd and Others v Council, [1987] ECR 1809, at 1855,
and Case 255/84, Nachi Fujikoshi v Council, [1987] ECR 1861, at 1891.
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Community authorities enjoy a margin of discretion in the choice of metho-
dologies for the calculation of dumping margin to achieve their
policies. 123 However, this margin of discretion should be strictly inter-
preted under the principle of fair comparison.
For the case of any other exporting producer or exporter who failed
to reply to the Commission's questionnaire or did not otherwise make
itself known, the Commission considered that the highest dumping margin,
determined with regard to a producer which had cooperated in the invest-
igation, was appropriate)-24
 In Radio-broadcast receivers, however, the
Commission calculated dumping margin for non-cooperating exporters on the
basis of the weighted average margin of three car radio models most sold
for export, of the exporter with the highest dumping margin) -25
 As a
result the dumping margin for non-cooperating exporters amounted to 34.4%
even though the highest dumping margin for a cooperating company was
29.37..126
If none of the producers from an exporting country nor the importer
known to the Commission replied to the Commission's questionnaire, 127
 the
123. Case 256/84, Koyv Seiko v Council, [1987] ECR 1899, at 1917, Case 258/84, Nippon Seiko v
Council, [1987] ECR 1923, at 1967, and Case 260/84, Plinebea Co. Ltd. v Council, [1987] ECR
1975, at 2007.
124. Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L
313/5, p10. Nicrodisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, p7. In these
determinations, the Commission insisted that this is in accordance with consistent practice,
and took the view that if such firms should be attributed a dumping margin lower than the
highest established for the cooperating companies, it would constitute a bonus for non-
cooperation and could lead to circumvention of anti-dumping measures.
125. Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p14.
126. Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2306/92, OJ (1992) L 222/8, pll.
127. Large aluminium electrolytic capscitors (Korea), Com.Reg.(EC) No 371/94, OJ (1994) L
48/10, pll. In this determination, the dumping margin for Korean products, when expressed as
a percentage of the free-at-Community-frontier price, was 70.6%.
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constructed normal value as established on the basis of the facts avail-
able 128 was compared at an ex factory level with the export price as
determined on the basis of the facts available 129 , in accordance with
Article 7(7)(b) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88.
However, it must be noted that the GATT Anti-dumping Code does not
deal with the determination of dumping margin. The Code does not provide
any methodology for the calculation of dumping margins in cases where
normal value and/or export prices vary during the investigation period and
is also quiet on the issue of a residual dumping margin for exporters
whose exports have not been included in the investigation)- 30
 In addi-
tion, for a fairer comparison, the export price should be calculated on a
weighted average basis, if normal value had to be calculated on a weighted
average basis for the investigation period.
6. DETERMINATION OF DUMPING IN KOREA
6.1. Normal Price
Normal price in Korea means the ordinary trade price of identical,
homogeneous or similar goods which are consumed in the country exporting
them)- 31
 If goods are not imported directly from the country of origin,
but through a third country, the ordinary trade price in the third country
128. Normal value established on the basis of the facts available means that the Commission
considers the facts set out in the complaint as the most reasonable basis.
129. The facts available for the export price means the export price of a representative
model given in the complaint.
130. M. Koulen, "Some Problems of Interpretation and Impletation of the GATT Code", Anti-
dumping Law and Practice (J.H. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed.), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Chicago,
p370.
131. Article 4(6)(i) of the EDCA.
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is considered as the normal price. 132
 However, when sales in the third
country do not permit a proper comparison, the ordinary trade price in the
country of origin is considered as the normal price.133
In addition to the ordinary trade price, alternative standards used
as normal price are export price to a third country134 and constructed
price. 135 These alternatives to domestic market price are used as normal
price if there is no trade of such identical, homogeneous or similar
goods, or if it is impossible to apply the ordinary trade price due to a
special market situation. 136 There is no definition of "a special market
situation" in the Act or the Decree. However, where there are no or
insufficient sales of such identical etc. goods, 137 or where transactions
occurred between parties which appear to be associated, 138 or where sales
are not profitable, such could be considered as "a special market situa-
tion".
The established normal price based on the constructed price corre-
sponds to the average of the domestic market prices of all sales during
132. In this case, in the Community, "the comparable price" actually paid or payyable for the
like product on the domestic market of the third country is regarded as a normal value in-
stead of "the ordinary trade price" in the third country.
133. Article 4(6)(ii) of the EDCA. "When sales in the third country do not permit a proper
comparison" means if the goods are merely transshipped, or there is no production of such
identical, homogeneous or similar goods or no price to be deemed as a normal price in the
third country.
134. The highest representative price of the prices at which such goods are exported to a
third country from the exporting country. Article 4(6)(i) of the EDCA.
135. A price summing up the production cost in the country of origin, management and distri-
bution costs at a reasonable level.
136. Article 4(6)(i) of the EDCA.
137. Ballbearings (Thailand), FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p137.	 Normal price was
established based on the constructed price.
138. Ibid. A part was purchased from an associated party. The production cost was adjusted
on the basis of the price of the part provided by the petitioner.
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the investigation period. 139 In Ballbearings, the constructed price was
computed on the basis of the cost of production and reasonable amount of
profit plus packing, 140 selling and general expenses. Then direct selling
expenses were deducted.	 In Glass Fiber, however, transportation and
packing expenses were deducted from the normal price)-41
6.2. Dumping Price
Article 4(6)(iv) of the EDCA provides that dumping price is a price
actually paid or to be payable at a price lower than a normal price with
respect to goods which are imported from foreign countries. If there
exists a special relation or compensation agreement between the exporter
and the importer or a third person, and it is thereby impossible to rely
on the price, the dumping price is the price at which such imported goods
have been first resold to an independent buyer, 142
 or if there is no
resale to such a buyer, the dumping price is the price which conforms to
reasonable criteria as prescribed by the MCF.143
If there exists a special relation between parties, and there is no
resale to an independent buyer, then the dumping price is calculated on
139. Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p 31. However, the
Community' normal value corresponds to the weighted average of the domestic market prices
which may cause artificial inflation of dumping margin.
140. Phosphoric Acid (China) FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p23.
141. Packing expenses have always been deducted from normal price since Soda Ash. Soda Ash
(China) FMA No 1993-75, OG (1993) No 12606, p184.
142. In Korea, an association or a compensatory agreement between parties concerned has never
occurred, so far. However, if the goods are imported by the associated party in Korea, the
selling price to an independent buyer is the dumping price, but in the Community, the export
price is constructed on the basis of the price to an independent buyer.
143. Article 4(6)(iv) of the EDCA.
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the basis of a reasonable criteria by the MOF. 144
 In this case, a more
precise definition of reasonable criteria is needed for the transparency
of the anti-dumping proceeding.
6.3. Comparison of Normal Price and Dumping Price
The dumping price is the price in an invoice. 145 In fact, the
export price is adjusted to the ex-factory level in the exporting country
for the comparison of normal price and dumping price)-46 In this case, if
a physical characteristic, quantity or condition of sale, and difference
in taxation have an effect on such a comparison of prices, the MOF can
adjust the normal and the dumping price. However, the rules for granting
an allowance to take account of differences affecting price comparability
should be specified in detail.147
In order to adjust to the ex-factory level, allowance for the
dumping price includes all the costs incurred by the exporter from the
moment the product left the factory, i.e.: transport expenses (for convey-
ing the product concerned from the premises in the exporting country to
its destination in Korea), insurance, handling, loading and ancillary
costs, packing costs for export, and the commission paid in respect of the
144. Article 4(6)(iv) of the EDCA.
145. Phosphoric Acid (China), FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p23, and Glass Fiber (USA,
Japan, Taiwan), FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p31.
146. Article 4(6)(v) provides that a comparison between the normal and dumping price is made
at the same time and at the same trade level (ordinarily "the ex-factory level") as far as
possible. Phosphoric Acid (China) FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p23, Soda Ash (China)
FMA No 1993-75, OG (1993) No 12606, p184, and Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-
57, OG (1994) No 12786, p31.
147. See, as an instance, Article 10 under the title "Comparison" in the Community Antidump-
ing Regulation, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1, p5.
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sales. 148 However, credit, technical assistance and the salaries paid to
salesmen are not usually deducted.149
If an interested person requests a price adjustment due to a dif-
ference in physical characteristic, 150 selling quantity and condition,151
he must prove the fact that such difference has a direct effect on man-
ufacturing cost or market price.152
Dumping margins are determined by a comparison between the adjus-
ted average normal price and the adjusted dumping price based on a trans-
action-by transaction method. 153
 The average normal price means the
average of the domestic market price of all sales during the investigation
period in the country of origin or exporting country. 154
 This method may
be not capable of dealing with certain dumping which is disguised by
charging different prices, some above the normal value and some below it.
However, this method is more close to the market or economic reality.
148. Phosphoric Acid (China) FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p23, Soda Ash (China) FMA No
1993-75, OG (1993) No 12606, p184, Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan), FMA No 1994-57, OG
(1994) No 12786, p31.
149. Ibid.
150. In Soda Ash (China) FMA No 1993-75, OG (1993) No 12606, p186, the interested person
requested a price adjustment due to a difference in physical characteristic, but the invest-
igation authority (OCA) refused to adjust because the interested person did not submit suffi-
cient documentary evidence.
151. Ibid. The investigation authority refused to adjust because of lack of sufficient docu-
mentary evidence.
152. Article 4(6)(vi) of the EDCA.
153. Soda Ash (China) FMA no 1993-75, OG (1993) No 12606, p185, Glass Fiber (USA, Japan,
Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p31.
154. In the Community, normal value is normally established on a weighted average basis, not
an average basis. The first paragraph of Article 13 of the Community Antidumping Regulation.
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Chapter 5 : SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF
THE ANTI-DUMPING LAWS -
DETERMINATION OF INJURY
I. DETERMINATION OF INJURY
1. INTRODUCTION
Under the 1968 Regulation l and subsequent Regulations, 2 anti-dumping
measures may only be imposed where the dumping causes or threatens to
cause material injury to an established Community industry or materially
retards the establishment of such an industry. 3 Article VI of GATT in-
cludes the principle that the mere presence of dumping practices or a
finding of dumping does not automatically result in the adoption of anti-
dumping measures.
Different from the 1968 Regulation which had stipulated that the
injury must be substantial and the dumping practice must be the principal
cause of the injury, current 1988 Regulation 4 simply provides for "mater-
ial injury". The injury caused by the dumping practice, however, should
be more substantial than the sum total of the injuries caused by all other
factors which were harmful to Community industry. 5 Otherwise, any form of
or extent of injury may justify the imposition of anti-dumping measure,
because injury has become very easy to establish, as explained below.
However, the Community skipped over any obligation concerning the relative
1. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 802/68, 	 OJ	 (1968) L 148/1.
2.	 Coun.Reg.(EEC)
	 No 2011/73, OJ	 (1973) L206/3, Coun.Reg.(EEC)	 No 1411/77, OJ
	 (1977) L 160/4,
Coun.Reg.(EEC)
	 No 1681/79,	 OJ (1979)	 L 196/1, Coun.Reg.(EEC)	 No	 1580/82,	 OJ	 (1982) L	 178/9,
Coun.Reg.(EEC)	 No	 2176/84,	 OJ (1984)	 L 201/1, and	 Coun.Reg.(EEC)	 No	 1761/87,	 OJ (1987)	 L
167/9.
3. See, supra note 1, Article 4(1).
4. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
5. Pierre Didier, "EEC Antidumping Rules and Practice", (1980) 17 CML Rev., p359.
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importance of injury in its 1979 Regulation 6 and subsequent amendments.
Consequently, any form of allegation of injury may justify the using of
anti-dumping measures, because there is no direct or unequivocal defini-
tion of what should be meant by this 'material injury' notion. Thus,
unless the European Court of Justice gives a more precise ruling, the
Commission will retain a very wide field of discretion in this field.
2. LIKE PRODUCT AND COMMERCIAL REALITY
The discussion of which products constitute like products plays an
important role in the dumping investigation as well as in the injury
investigation. The following discussion will be entirely concerned with
the issue of exported products complained of, which are like products sold
by domestic producers in the importing country.
The regulation defines the term 'like product', in Article 2(12),
to mean a product which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects, to the
product under consideration, or, in the absence of such a product, another
product which has characteristics closely resembling those of the product
under consideration. Thus the definition in the EC regulation is regarded
as a literal re-expression of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code.7
From the 1979 GATT Code and the current Community's anti-dumping
Regulation, two principles can be drawn for the injury investigation.
First, the strict standard in order to compare products for "likeness" is
whether the products are physically identical. Therefore, mere commercial
competitiveness is not sufficient to make products which are not physic-
6. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1681/79, OJ (1979) L 196/1.
7. Article 2(2) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
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ally identical alike for the purpose of injury determination. 8
 A second
principle is that the domestic product alleging the injury has to have
characteristics closely resembling, at last, those of the imported pro-
ducts.
This rather narrow definition of like product has merits and demer-
its for domestic producers. It is easy to make an injury determination if
an injury has actually occurred as this definition restrains the range of
the relevant industry. This narrow definition does not protect, however,
merely commercially competitive products.
Under the Code, anti-dumping duties may not be imposed unless the
domestic industry makes a like product. In the absence of such a product,
if domestic products under consideration do not have characteristics
closely resembling those of the imported product, there is no like pro-
duct, thus no domestic industry, thus no injury, and thus no case. 9 While
all this is very logical, the Community has not been able to neglect the
commercial reality that exporting firms may escape EC anti-dumping duties
by bringing 'parts' for EC assembly. In order to deal with this problem
without distorting the GATT definition of like product, the Community has
not used a 'product definition' methodology but an "origin of goods"
methodology. This "origin of goods" method prevents only upstream circum-
vention, the only circumvention that creates European jobs in the Commun-
8. The 1967 and 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code have rejected a test based on commercial inter-
changeability. See, Article 2(2) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code. It provides that 'the
term like product shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e., alike in
all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another
product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling
those of the product under consideration'.
9. S.A. Baker, "Like Products and Commercial Reality", Anti-dumping Law and Practice (J.H.
Jackson & E. Vermulst ed.), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Chicago, 1990, p288.
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ity, 10 because assembly by foreign direct investment could be threatened
by the origin rule. This may be particularly the case where multinational
firms are being investigated, because more and more firms are engaging in
globally integrated manufacturing.
A broad definition of the like product under investigation can solve
a lot of problems, but not all of them. Furthermore, narrow and strict
definition of like products would not exclude the development of circum-
vention provisions, as the coverage of components, processed and pin-
striped products, should depend on the interpretation of anti-circumven-
tion rules, not on the artificial manipulation of like product concepts.
The Commission, therefore, has to apply the 'like product' notion very
restrictedly. This does not mean that the Commission fails to notice
'substitutability' of the products concerned, but rather that the Commis-
sion regards substitutability as merely one of the factors in an analysis.
Therefore, if there are suspicions about sufficient physical similarity,
this substitutability may turn the scale. 11 In Colour TV receivers,- 2 the
Commission took the view that a distinction between small and larger
screen TV sets is no longer permitted because of a high degree of substi-
tutability.
The wording of Article 2(12) of the Regulation theoretically has
the possibility that the Community may terminate an investigation based on
the non-existence of a like product. In Outboard Motors, 13 for example,
the Community did not include Japanese outboard motors above 85 horse
10. See the details in Chapter 6. 'Anti-Circumvention'.
11. See, for example, Video Cassette Recorders (Japan, Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2684/88, OJ
(1988) L 240/5, p7, and Daisy Wheel Printers (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2005/88, OJ (1988) L
177/1, p2.
12. Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore and Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p53.
13. Outboard Motors (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1305/87, OJ (1987) L 124/1, p2.
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power within the scope of investigation because there had been no European
producer of such motors, nor was there strong evidence that such produc-
tion would be established in the EC. However, it is worth noting that the
Commission has attached importance to functional similarity in recent
determinations. 14 In Radio-broadcast receivers 15 and in Colour TV receiv-
ers,
16 furthermore, the Commission took the view that there is no clear
dividing line because of interchangeability and substitutability of the
products, resulting in the definition of a number of categories of like
products 17
There may be criticism on the ground that the European Community
did not focus on the real question of whether Community industry could be
injured by dumping a wide range of models of a product, including models
not produced by Community industry. 18 According to the definition in
Article 2(12) of the Regulation, 19 it is possible that Community industry
may be injured even though such production is not established in the
Community, but that does not make it a like product.
14. DRAMS (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p13. In this determination,
the Commission took the view that DRAM wafers and dice, finished DRAMs, DRAM-modules or
'stack' DRAMs and DRAMS in different variations falling within the different categories have
the same technical and physical characteristics and similar uses. It held that even future
generation of finished DRAMs fall within the same general category of products because they
perform the same basic function and are used for the same basic purpose.
15. Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p8.
16. Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore and Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p53.
17. The Commission relied on interchangeability again in Microdisk in order to result in the
definition of like product. Microdisk (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L
68/5, p6.
18. W.J. Davey, "An Analysis of European Communities Legislation and Practice relating to
Anti-dumping And Countervailing Duties", Anti-trust and Trade Policies of the EEC (B. Hawk
ed.) 1983, p66-67.
19. Coun.Reg. (EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
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3. COMMUNITY INDUSTRY
The dumped import should cause or threaten to cause material injury
to an established industry in the importing country or materially retard
the establishment of such an industry in order to trigger the determina-
tion of injury and subsequently the imposition of anti-dumping duties. The
1979 GATT Code defines the term industry as 'the domestic producers as a
whole of the like product or those of them whose collective output of the
products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production
of those products. 2° The definition in Article 4(5) of the Regulation is
a literal reproduction of Article 4 of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
In examining whether the complainants constitute a major proportion
of the total Community production of the like product, 21 the Commission
has considered three categories of parties concerned, the Community produ-
cers, independent buyers, and parties which are related to the exporters
or importers. 22 Having excluded the related parties from the Community
industry, the complainants have to manufacture more than a certain amount
of the remaining total Community output of the like product in order to
form a major proportion of the total Community production. However, there
is no criterion as to what percentage of the remaining total Community
20. Article 4 of the 1979 GATT Code.
21. The Commission requests and obtains information from all producers in the Community in
order to examine whether the complainant constitutes a major proportion of the total Commun-
ity production of the like product. See, Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 534/94,
OJ (1994) L 68/5, p8.
22. Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan, H.K.), Com.Reg.(REC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L
313/5, p7.
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output constitutes a major proportion of the total Community production.23
There are three exceptions to this standard definition of the
domestic industry of the Community, namely, related parties who are rela-
ted to the exporters or importers , or who are themselves importers of the
allegedly dumped products, 24 regional industry when the Community is
divided into two or more competitive markets, and product lines when the
Community production of the like product has no separate identity.25
3.1. Related Parties
According to Article 4(5) of the Regulation, when producers are
related to exporters or are importers themselves of the allegedly dumped
product, the Community industry may be limited to the rest of the produ-
cers. It appears that the mere fact the Community producers are expor-
ters' subsidiaries, 26 have links with them, 27 or are importers themselves
at the same time 28 may be sufficient grounds for exclusion. Contrary to
the opinion of the group of experts in the 1980 Understanding, 29 the
23. Statement by Dr Beseler, then Head of the Commercial Defence Division, DG-I. at the Cefic
Antidumping Seminar held in Brussels on 2-3 April 1981, suggesting that a share of production
of 25% or more would be regarded as acceptable as a major proportion of the Community produc-
tion. In practice, however, the Commission has tended to require a share of production at
least 70% when examining complaints against imports from Korea. See, Audio tapes in cass-
ettes (Korea, Japan, ILK.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, p7, (80%), Radio-
broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p14, (75%), DRAMs
(Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p18, (80%), and Microdisks (Korea,
H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, p9, (72%).
24. Article 4(5) of the Community Anti-dumping regulation.
25. Ibid, Article 4(4).
26. Caravans for Camping (Yugoslavia), Com.Dec.83/428/EEC, OJ (1983) L 240/12, p14.
27. Electronic Scales (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 757/84, OJ (1984) L 80/9, pll.
28. Textured Polyester Fabrics (USA),Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1337/81, OJ (1981) L 133/17.
29. GATT BISD (1969), Supp. No. 27 at 33.
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Community does not consider it necessary to establish that there should be
grounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship
is such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently from
unrelated producers in order to be deemed to be related.
In addition, there have been some outstanding exceptions for exclu-
sion from Community industry. The first exception is in relation to
complaints from Community producers who were importers of the dumped
products in the past. The second exception is a number of Japanese-Eur-
opean joint ventures. In the case of the former, Community producers have
generally been included in the domestic industry on the ground that they
had been forced to be the importers of the dumped products. 3° Further-
more, in Microdisks, 31 the Commission regarded complainant producers who
imported dumped imports as Community producers, if the level of imports
was limited and their own output was temporarily insufficient.
In the latter, a number of Japanese-European joint ventures were
regarded as Community industry because of 'the high level of local content
in their outputs and their long-term commitment to investment and employ-
ment in the Community'.32
In DRAMs, 33 the Commission held that a complainant company which
was itself an importer could be considered as part of the Community indu-
30. Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p14. 	 In
this determination, the Community took the view that as regards the limited imports of car
radio from Korea by the Community producer in question, the Community producer took a legiti-
mate measure of self-protection because it is clear that the purpose of the said imports was
to remain on the market with a complete range of models or even to secure market segments
which would have been lost without sales of the models in question. Plain paper photocopiers
(Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2640/86, OJ (1986) L 239/5, p15, and Printers (Japan), Coun.Reg.
(EEC) No 3651/88, OJ (1988) L 317/33, p38.
31. Microdisks (Korea), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L68/5, p9.
32. Video cassette recorders (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2684/88, OJ (1988) L 240/5, P7.
33. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p18.
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stry, as long as the purchased imported products were not resold on the
Community market and its primary interest did not transfer from producing
to importing. Then, the Commission insisted that the complainant company
in question, Siemens AG, was organised in different product sector groups
(i.e. systems, semiconductors, etc.) and purchases made by Siemens' system
groups could be considered to be an act of economic self-defence and as
such a legitimate and justified business decision. As a result, the
Commission offered good protection to some Siemens' groups, i.e. semicon-
ductors groups, and opened the way to import of the allegedly dumped
products to other Siemens' groups, i.e. systems. In the same proceedings,
one of the complainant companies did not carry out all separate production
steps in the Community. The Commission, however, held that the complai-
nant was considered as part of the Community industry because it carried
out the major part of its total production in the Community. 34
 Therefore,
the Community seems to regard the major part and the like product as the
same products.	 However, the major part of the total product cannot be
identical to the product under consideration.
Furthermore, in Colour TV receivers, 35 the Commission showed a new
approach, that producers whose main core of business lies outside the
Community should be excluded from the definition of the Community indu-
stry. 36
 Therefore, the Commission regarded the producers as part of the
Community if they were merely supplementing their Community production
with an additional activity based on imports. 37
	The Commission cannot
34. Ibid, p19.
35. Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50.
36. Ibid, p54.
37. If those producers were importers with relatively limited additional production in Com-
munity, they should be excluded from the definition of the Community industry.
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escape from the criticism that it expanded the scope of the Community
industry to producers who are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped
imports and/or who are actually not the producers of like products which
means products identical to the allegedly dumped product under considera-
tion.
3.2. Regional Industry and Product Lines
Article 4(5) of the Regulation provides that 'in exceptional cir-
cumstances the Community may, for the production in question, be divided
into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market
regarded as a Community industry if, (a) the producers within such market
sell all or almost all their production of the product in question in that
market, and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree
supplied by producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the
Community. In such circumstances injury may be found to exist even where
a major proportion of the total Community industry is not injured, provi-
ded there is a concentration of dumped or subsidised imports into such an
isolated market and provided further that the dumped or subsidised imports
are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production
within such market'.
A regional market could consist of either a group of Member States,
one Member state, or a part of a Member state. The necessary degree of
isolation and of concentration would make it likely that in practice such
a region could only be found in the periphery of the Community. 38 In
38. J. Cunnane & C. Stanbrook, Dumping and Subsidies, European Business Publications, London,
1983, p71.
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Glass, and in Plasterboard, 39 the Commission has applied the regional
industry standard.
Article 4(4) of the Regulation provides that 'the effects of the
dumped imports shall be assessed in relation to the Community production
of the like product when available data permit its separate identifica-
tion. When the Community production of the like product has no separate
identification, the effect of the dumped imports shall be assessed in
relation to the production of the narrowest group or range of production
which includes the like product for which the necessary information can be
found'.
The concept of "Product lines" in this Article does not restrict
the range of Community industry; rather, it broadens the range of Commun-
ity industry as it stipulates that the impact of the dumped products shall
be assessed in relation to the production for which the necessary informa-
tion can be found. The Community, however, is not willing to apply a
broad scope of products even though the Community production of the like
product has no separate identity. This attitude of the Community has been
seen in several cases. For example, in Louvre Doors, the Commission
stated that 'in the absence of separate identity of the dumped production
connecting with Louvre Doors alone, it is not easy to gauge the size of
the Community market for such units; whereas, nevertheless, the best
information available suggests that the total Community market has re-
,40mained relatively static....	 However, the Commission's attitude to use
39. Certain categories of glass (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechos-
lovakia), Com.Dec.86/36/EEC, OJ (1986) L 51/73, p75, and Plasterboard (Spain), Com.Dec.
85/209/EEC, OJ (1985) L 89/65, p65. In these determinations, the Commission considered that
the complainant producers fro* Greece and Ireland constituted a Community industry for the
drawn glass products and plasterboard respectively.
40. Louvre Doors (Malaysia and Singapore), Com.Dec.81/366/EEC, OJ (1981) L 135/34, and Louvre
Doors (Taiwan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 88/84, OJ (1984) L 11/13.
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of the notion 'the best information available' is not compatible with both
the 1979 GATT Code and the Regulation.	 If available data do not allow
separate identification, the Commission must rely on the necessary infor-
mation for the product line.
4. MATERIAL INJURY
One of the most complex problems in an injury determination is the
requirement that the injury should be material. In addition to a finding
of the dumped imports, the GATT Code requires that there must be evidence
of injury from the dumped imports, but that this need not be the major or
the only factor causing injury. 41 The Code also allows the possibility of
only a threat of injury.
As expressed from the opinion of Advocate General Warner in the
1979 Ballbearing cases, the Commission enjoys considerable discretion in
its assessment of injury. 42
According to the Regulation, 43 there is a special reference to the
need to limit the reason of injury to the direct effects of dumped imports
and distinguish from volume and prices which are not dumped, or contrac-
tion in demand that is unrelated to the dumped import, despite negative
impact on Community industry. However, in practice, the European Commun-
ity has tended to include all imports that affect a particular industry in
41. The 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code Article 3(4).
42. Opinion of Advocate General Warner in the Japanese Ballbearings, case 113/77, [1979] ECR
1212, at 1266. In this opinion, he said that 'the findings were necessarily based in large
part on the confidential information supplied to the Commission by the European industry,
which the Commission was precluded from disclosing. Moreover, they were by their very nature
findings that could only be based on an assessment of complex economic facts, not readily
open to judicial review'.
43. Article 4(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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arriving at a determination of injury, which obviously biases the results
substantially. 44
Article 4(1) of the Regulation sets up three stages of test whereby
a determination of injury to an established Community industry shall be
made only if the dumped imports are;
i) causing material injury, or
ii) threatening to cause material injury, or
iii) materially retarding the establishment of a Commun-
ity industry.
4.1. Actual Material Injury
The term "material injury" is not defined in the GATT Article 6(6)
nor in the Regulation, Article 4. However, both Article 3(1) of the GATT
Code and Article 4(2) of the Regulation mention three basic factors which
are to be considered.
(a) the volume of dumped imports, in particular whether
there has been a significant increase of a like
product, either in absolute terms or relative to
production or consumption in the Community,
(b) the prices of dumped imports, in particular whether
there has been a significant price undercutting as
compared with price of a like product in the Commun-
ity,
(c) the consequent impact on the industry concerned.45
44. Bellis, "The EC Anti-dumping System", Anti-dumping Law and Practice (J.H. Jackson & Ver-
mulst ed.), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Chicago, 1989, p89.
45. Article 4(2) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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Although the provisions concerned in both the GATT Code and the
Regulation seem to be the same, it is worth pointing out that the Regula-
tion Article 4(2)(c) does not include all the economic factors mentioned
in the 1979 Code Article 3(3)• 46 This does not mean that the Commission
will not consider the factors in Article 3(3) of the 1979 Code, because
the factors mentioned in the Regulation are not intended to be exhaustive.
It might be considered, however, that the Community has not regarded those
factors as the most important causes of injury. Furthermore, the injury
determination in the Community is made on a case-by-case basis and the
inevitable variations caused by this practice make it difficult to formu-
late general rules. Despite this practice of the Community, the mere fact
that certain factors are always pointed out, while others are usually
disregarded, provides a certain practice.
4.1.1. The Volume of Dumped Imports
As expressed in the provisions concerned, the 1979 GATT Code and
the 1988 Community Regulation regard a significant increase of the volume
of imports and an increase in market share as the most important test for
a finding of injury.	 It has meaning, however, only with regard to the
increase in dumped imports.
If imports and their market share were increased when consumption
of the product in question in the Community was stable, or increased while
sales by the Community industry fell and its corresponding market share
declined, 47 the increased volume of the dumped imports is justifiable
cause for injury findings. In addition, if imports and their correspond-
46. Economic factors, such as productivity, wages, growth and the ability to raise capital or
investment, are not mentioned in the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
47. Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p63.
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ing market share were increased, even when Community consumption decreased
and as a result both sales and market share of the Community industry
declined, 48 the increased volume of dumped imports is justifiable cause
for injury findings.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the Community industry
cannot be considered as being injured if it substantially increased its
sales volume and market share when Community consumption was increased,
even though imports and their market share were increased as well
	 The
Commission, in	 DRAMs, however, quibbled that the Community industry's
market share grew by 2.5% (actually 2.8%) 	 this growth was below the
level that could normally have been expected at a time when domestic
consumption rose, 50 and that an increase in sales and market share is a
necessary consequence of the appearance of the European DRAM on the mar-
ket. 51 However, in Microdisks, it should be noted that the Community
48. REWS (Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p24.
49. In DRAMs, the total Community consumption of DRAMs in 1990 was 150,000 thousand megabits,
and the total production of Community producers in 1990 was 45,000 thousand megabits. There-
fore, the Community production's market share reached around 33%. However, in its determina-
tion, the Commission held that the Community production's market share was around 20% in
1990. This kind of mistake was occurred again in Microdisks.
50. Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, p10 and 11. In
Microdisks, the Community consumption of the microdisks concerned increased from 295 million
units in 1989 to 656 million units in the investigation period, an increase of 122%, and over
the same period, the volume of Community production increased from 31 million units to 87
million units, an absolute increase of 180%, and its corresponding market share increased
from 10.5% to 13.3%. Furthermore, its capacity utilization rates went from 49% to 84%.
51. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p17. This Commission's
argument is not easy to prove economically. Unless a producer who enters the market later
has a superior product which is clearly differentiated from those of its competitors, it will
have a more difficult time gaining a market share initially. If a new manufacturer is produ-
cing basically the same product, the only way it can gain a substantial market share initi-
ally is through undercutting its competitors' prices.
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production increased by 180% with 84% of capacity utilisation rates when
its market share reached 13.3% in the investigation period from 10.5% in
1989. This growth can be regarded as the maximum level that could have
been expected, since 84% of capacity utilisation means almost full utili-
sation. As far as Community consumption, volume and market share of the
Community and of the dumped imports are concerned, the Community industry
should not be considered as being injured in those determinations.
Although a minimal market share, or minimal increase in market
share has usually precluded finding of injury, in some determinations, a
relatively small market share or small increase therein has also been a
reason for injury findings. 52 It should be noted that the Commission
calculates market shares not on an individual producers basis but on a
whole country basis, and often accumulates the market share of several
exporting countries under investigation.
Furthermore, as noted above, in spite of the fact that there is a
special reference to the need to limit the reason of injury to the direct
impacts of dumped imports in the Regulation, the Commission generally
looks at the total volume of imports. The Commission's practice in this
respect can be regarded to be in violation of the Regulation.53
4.1.2. The Prices of Dumped Imports
The prices of dumped imports are not only the basic factors to be
examined but are also to be taken into account in determining what kind of
remedy should be given to eliminate the injury. In order to assess the
pricing behaviour of the exporters, a detailed evaluation of their prices
obtained on the Community market during the period of investigation is
52. Mounted Piezo-Electric Quartz Crystal Units (Korea, Japan, and the USA), Com.Dec.
80/603/EEC, OJ (1980) L 162/62, p63.
53. This issue will be discussed more detail in part 5 'causation'.
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undertaken.	 This evaluation is carried out on the basis of
transaction-by-transaction sales reports by both the exporters and the
Community producers, for identical models, covering sales to the first
independent purchaser in the Community. 54
In early determinations, the Commission made its decisions based on
a general estimation of the situation without making any special calcula-
tion with respect to the level of prices necessary to eliminate injury.55
In recent determinations, however, the Commission has relied on two
different methods for the purpose of calculating injury margins, which
means the amount by which the price of a like product in the Community
exceeds the "weighted" average resale price of importing product. First,
the Commission usually compares the constructed weighted average resale
prices of importing products with the prices of like products in the
Community.	 This method implies also that the negative impact of the
resale price of imported products is disregarded, e.g., its injury margin
is zero.
Second, in many determinations, 56 the Commission compares the
adjusted resale price of importing product with constructed target price57
of the Community product, when the price of the dumped product has depres-
sed or prevented Community price increases. 58 This method is compatible
54. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p19.
55. Mechanical wrist-watches (the USSR), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2347/87, OJ (1987) L 213/5, P7.
Ball bearings (Japan and Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 744/84, OJ (1984) L 79/8, pll and
Coun.Reg.(EEC) NO 2089/84, OJ (1984) L 193/1, p4. The position of the Commission in these
determinations were that 'having regard to the extent of injury caused, the rates of anti-
dumping duty should correspond to the margins of dumping provisionally established'. IIn
other words, a definitive duty, which would eliminate the dumping found, should be imposed.
56. Hydraulic excavators (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1877/85, OJ (1985) L 176/1, p3.
57. Target price consists of the full costs of the EC producers, including SGA and a reason-
able profit.
58. These two methods will be discussed in detail in part 5, 'causation'.
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with the 1979 GATT Code. 59 Under this approach, however, it is rather
easy to make claims of price depression or suppression by a Community
producer.
In DRAMs, however, the Commission took the view that for all expor-
ters, substantial price undercutting existed, and the sales of DRAMs from
Korea were made below cost of production. Taking into account the fact
that a new producer usually faces large start-up costs, both in terms of
sunk costs and in advertising and other related expenses, 60 and that
extensive R&D expenses by Korean producers, covering DRAMs three gener-
ations ahead of current commercialisation which had nothing to do with the
allegedly dumped DRAMs, had been allocated to the DRAMs sold in the period
of investigation, the Commission's argument on price undercutting and
sales below costs, as far as the prices of dumped imports of DRAMs were
concerned, was unreasonable for injury findings.
4.1.3. The Consequent Impact on the Industry Concerned
The factors most often used in the determination of injury are
Community production, utilisation of capacity, market share, Community
stock, and employment levels, in addition to price depression and suppres-
59. The second paragraph of Article 3(2) of the 1979 GATT Code provides that 'with regard to
the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider
whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared
with the price of a like product of the importing country, or whether the effect of such
imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increase,
which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree'.
60. DRAMs manufacturing is a kind of a equipment industry which needs huge start-up costs and
R&D expenses. Therefore it must establish itself quickly in the market and gain a share in
order to guarantee its viability in the future. This could be a reason why the Commission
wanted to protect higher DRAMs prices through the anti-dumping measure. The infant industry
argument for protecting new companies in less developed or developing countries is based on
this notion.
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sion. Furthermore the Regulation provides evaluation of relevant economic
factors such as profits, return on investment, and cash flow.61
The Commission has considered that the Community industry suffered
material injury which consisted mainly in persistent financial losses
resulting from decreased production, decline in market share, capacity
utilisation and depressed prices, employment cutback and a decrease in
investment. 62
However, even though production and capacity utilisation of the
Community industry increased, and its sales and market share grew, if
Community producers prices fell, their profitability was deteriorated, and
the investment in R&D by the Community industry slowed down, the Commis-
sion has concluded that the Community industry has suffered material
injury. 63
4.2. Threat of Material Injury
Article 4(3) of the Regulation sets up the guidelines for a deter-
mination of threat of injury. A determination of a threat of injury may
only be made where a particular situation is likely to develop into actual
injury. In considering whether there is a threat of injury to the Commun-
ity, the Commission may take into account factors such as the rate of
increase of dumped imports into the Community, export capacity in the
country of origin or export, and the likelihood that the resulting exports
61. Article 4(2)(c) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
62. REWS (Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p24. Radio-
broadcast receivers (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 313/92, OJ (1992) L 34/8, p15 and 16. Audio
tapes in cassettes (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, p14.
63. Microdisks (Korea, U.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, p10 and 11. DRAMs
(Korea), Com.Reg. (EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p20.
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will be to the Community. 64
Up to now, the Commission has not usually based an injury finding
on threat of injury alone but has found an injury in combination with
material injury. Under very exceptional situations such as those which
caused severe market disruption during the steel crisis of 1978, protec-
tive measures have been imposed on the basis of threat alone.65
In Quartz Crystals, 66 the Commission determined that there was
injury, or at least a threat thereof, because exports had increased 300%
over the previous two years, and there was evidence that exports would
double again during the next year. In Sodium Carbonate, 67 on the other
hand, the Commission did not accept that there was threat of injury, in
spite of the fact that the exporter had recently built and planned new
production facilities in some countries, because it was not clear that
exports to the Community would be increased significantly through such
increased production capacity.
According to the above two determinations, in order to make an
injury determination, three issues appear. They are (1) the increase in
export will continue; (2) the production capacity in the country of origin
or export is not fully used; (3) the exports will be made to the Community
excluding non-member countries. But the problem is that these issues are
not compatible with Article 3(6) of the 1979 GATT Code, because this
Article provides that a determination of threat of injury shall be based
on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility.
The change in circumstances, therefore, which would create a situation in
64. Article 4(3)(a) and (b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
65. J.-F. Beseler & A.N. Williams, Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Law: the European Communi-
ties, Sweet & Maxwell/ICC, London, 1986, p164-5.
66. Quartz Crystals (Korea), Com.Dec.80/603/EEC, OJ (1980) L 162/62, p63.
67. Sodium Carbonate (the USSR), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 407/80, OJ (1980) L 48/1, p2.
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which the dumping would cause injury, must be clearly foreseen and immi-
nent.
4.3 Material Retardation of the Establishment of
Community Industry
As a result of fears of exports from Germany's chemical giants, the
US Anti-dumping Act of 1921 provided that injury could be found if dumped
imports were retarding or preventing the establishment of domestic indu-
stries. This concept was followed in the 1979 Anti-dumping Code and is
known as the material retardation standard. Despite its relatively long
history, this material retardation standard has been little used.
In Outboard Motors, 68 the Community refused to issue a finding of
material retardation. The Commission excluded these types of motors from
the scope of investigation because Community industry did not actually
produce this type of Motor and it had not made a substantial commitment to
commencing production.
5. CAUSATION
In accordance with the 1967 GATT Anti-dumping Code, the original
anti-dumping regulation 459/68 of the Community provided that a determina-
tion of injury could only be made when the dumped imports were demonstrab-
ly the principal cause of such injury. Furthermore, the consequences of
dumping had to be weighed against all other factors which, when taken
together, might adversely affect the Community industry.
This position of the Community has changed substantially because of
68. Outboard Motors (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1305/87, OJ (1987) L 124/1, p2.
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the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code which replaced the 1967 Code. Consequent-
ly, in accordance with the 1979 GATT Code, Article 4(1) of the Regulation
provides in the relevant part that 'determination of injury shall be made
only, if the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, causing
injury'.	 In addition to Article 4(1) of the Regulation, Article 13(5)
also stipulates another aspect of the causation issue. It provides that
where a product is imported into the Community from more than one coun-
tries, duties shall be levied at an appropriate amount on a non-discrimi-
natory basis on all imports of such product found to be dumped and causing
injury. 69
The Commission does not always separate material injury from causa-
tion and it is hard to do. The Commission routinely investigates the
volume, prices and consequent impact of non-dumped imports." However the
injury could be caused not by the dumped imports, but by lower or compe-
titively priced non-dumped imports. It should be noted that the purpose
of the anti-dumping law is not to provide protection from fairly-traded
imports.
The Commission has to examine whether the material injury suffered
by the Community industry was caused by the dumped imports and whether
other factors might have caused or contributed to that injury.
In examining the effects of the dumped imports, according to the
Commission, if the increasing volume and growing market share of the
dumped imports coincide with the loss of market share, price erosion, an
69. This issue will be discussed in detail in subsection 5.2 cumulation.
70. See, DRAMs, Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p21. The Commission took the
view that injury and its causation must be established taking account of all imports from the
country concerned. However, determination of injury should be made only if the dumped im-
ports are, through the effects of dumping, causing injury. Therefore, injury and its causa-
tion should be established taking account of all dumped imports from the country concerned.
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increase in stock volume and the deterioration in the financial situation
of the Community industry, the causal link between the dumped imports and
the injury suffered by the Community industry is established.
	 In other
words, when the increasing volume and growing market share of the dumped
imports coincide with any of these negative situations in the Community
industry, the causal link is established. The loss of market share 71 and
the depression of Community DRAM market prices 72
 combined with the Commun-
ity industry's increasing financial losses have been considered as indica-
tions that dumped imports had considerably contributed to the injurious
situation suffered by the Community industry.
The Commission, in addition, has to consider whether factors other
than dumped imports, i.e. production overcapacity, imports from other
countries, falling exports to third countries by the Community industry,
contraction in demand, the effect of non-dumped imports and Community
manufactured products, could have caused the injury to the Community
industry found.
In Audio tapes in cassettes, although the Commission accepted that
the effect of non-dumped imports and Community produced cassettes had had
a detrimental impact on the Community industry, it took the view that the
consequences of the dumped imports are weighed against these other fac-
tors, with the reason that the Community industry was already in a weak
position caused by the dumped imports and this made it more vulnerable to
the effect of competition from non-dumped imports and Community produced
cassettes. 73 Therefore, if a substantial growth in import volume and a
71. Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L255/50, p65.
72. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Rsg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p21.
73. Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L
313/5, p16.
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resulting increase in market share, together with substantial price under-
cutting by the importers were established, 74 the Commission has concluded
that the Community industry could be considered as materially injured,
even though factors other than dumped imports had a negative impact on the
Community market.
5.1. Margins Analysis.
5.1.1. Introduction
How much anti-dumping duties should be levied is the most important
issue throughout the whole anti-dumping proceeding. Thus, in accordance
with Article 8(1) 75 of the 1979 GATT Code, Article 13(3) of the Regulation
provides that 'the amount of such duties shall not exceed the dumping
margin provisionally estimated or finally established; it should be less
if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove injury'. As a result, the
amount of anti-dumping duties to be levied to remove injury from the
dumped product is as important as the amount of dumping margin.
The Community institutions, therefore, enjoy significant discretion
in setting the level of the duty because of the lack of binding rules in
GATT and of detailed rules in the EC Regulation. In Audio Tapes in Cass-
ettes, 76 the Commission explained its position as follows: 'the Commission
recalls that the very purpose of the Community's anti-dumping legislation
is to counteract dumping and material injury caused thereby. .... There
74. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, 21.
75. Article 8(1) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that 'it is desirable that the
imposition be permissive in all countries or customs territories Parties to this Agreement,
and that the duty be less than the margin, if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove
the injury to the domestic industry'.
76. Audio Tapes in Cassettes (Japan, Korea, Hong Kong), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1251/91, OJ (1991)
L 119/35, p41.
148
is, however, an additional responsibility on the institutions to avoid
measures which can have excessive consequences. .... Article 13(3) entails
an assessment and a forecast of the future effects on the Community market
of any anti-dumping measures which by its very nature is judgmental. This
assessment, for which the legislation gives no guidance, has to be reason-
able and take into account the particularities of each case'.
This lesser duty rule, however, has two critical problems: first,
none of the interested parties will know the injury margin that the Com-
mission has found through the investigation, because of the confidential-
ity of the data; second, anti-dumping duties based on the injury margin
are not refundable, because the Community authorities only take into
account for refund, the dumping margin, not the injury margin.77
5.1.2. Calculation of Injury Margin78
The level of the duty is mainly determined by the level of the
price undercutting of the weighted average resale price of the dumped
imports into the Community or by the level of resale price that would be
required to cover the costs of Community producers and provide reasonable
profit. 79
 According to Article 4(2)(b), it is required that the respec-
tive prices be compared if there is any price undercutting. However, in
77. See, Article 16(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. This issue will be discussed
further in Chapter 7, part 5, 'refund'.
78. Injury margin means the amount which is adequate to eliminate injury from the dumped
imports. Where the amount of injury margin is more than that of the dumping margin, the
dumping margin is imposed. As far as the amount of the injury margin is less than that of
the dumping margin, the antidumping duty is set at the level of the injury margin.
79. J.-F. Bellis, supra note 44, p85.
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some recent determinations," the Community compared a target price with
the dumped price. This approach seems to have been rather popular with
regard to the imported consumer branded electronic products. This prac-
tice of the Commission, however, is not compatible with its own Regulation
Article 4(2)(b) because the provision stipulates that the price of dumped
imports should be compared with the price of a like product in the Commun-
ity. The price of a like product in the Community should be its actual
market price, not a target price.
Nevertheless, the calculation of the injury margin is based on two
different approaches. 	 In Electronic Typewriters, 81 the Commission de-
clared that an examination of price undercutting was not necessary since
the prices realised by the Community producers had been depressed by the
prices of the imported products. Before price depression, calculation of
injury margin is normally based on comparison between the adjusted weigh-
ted average resale prices of the imported products and the price of a like
product in the Community. However, if the price of a like product in the
Community, has been depressed or suppressed by prices of the imported
products, the Commission will construct a target price, consisting of the
full costs of the Community producers, including SGA and a reasonable
profit. 82
 In this case, the amounts of anti-dumping duty will be calcula-
80. Electronic typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1, p7. Com-
pact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p19. Video
cassettes and video tape reels (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 4062/88, OJ (1988) L 356/47,
p55.
81. Electronic typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg. (EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1, p7.
82. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p15.
In this determination, the Commission set a 10% profit margin. Later, the Council decided
that a 12% return on sales could be regarded as appropriate, taking account of all relevant
economic factors.
	 See, Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 112/90, OJ
(1990) L 13/21, p30.
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ted with the intention of raising Community price to a certain level,
namely the target level.
Neither the GATT Code nor the Regulation of the Community would
stipulate the target price method, even though price depression is rele-
vant for injury determination. 83 Therefore, applying this methodology is
not only in violation of the GATT Code and the Community's own Regulation,
but also protectionist in character.
It is worth remembering that Advocate General Verloren Van Themaat
criticised the target price methodology and stated, 'I do not consider it
compatible with the wording of Article 4 or with the market-economic
aspect of its background if, for the purpose of that price comparison, the
Commission determines a model market price for Community producers on the
basis of production costs plus a normal profit margin'. 84
In order to determine production costs of the Community's produ-
cers, the Commission has used three tests 85
 at least: first, the produc-
tion cost of the most efficient Community producer, 86
 second, the costs of
a representative producer 87
 and third, the weighted average cost of pro-
83. The draftman of both bills must have thought that the price of a like product in the
importing country should be the comparable actual market price of the import competing produ-
cers.
84. Case 53/83, Allied Corporation v Council (Allied II), [1985] ECR 1621, and (1986) 3 CMLR
605, at 619, Opinion of Advocate General Verloren Van Themaat.
85. E. Vermulst & P.Waer, "The Calculation of Injury Margins in EC Anti-dumping Proceedings",
(1993) 25 JWT (No.6), p18.
86. Standardized Multiphase Electronic Motors (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Po-
land, Rumania, and the USSR), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3019/86, OJ (1986) L 280/68, p72.
87. Urea (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad, Tobago, and
Yogoslavia), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3339/87, OJ (1987) L 317/1, p7 and p8. Compact disc players
(Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, p14.
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duction of all Community producers. 88 Among those tests, the Commission
has given more attention to the weighted average cost of production of all
Community producers for the imported consumer branded products.
As demonstrated in Electronic Typewriters, the Council considered
several factors when assessing reasonable profit for consideration in
constructing target prices.
	 In this determination, the Council consid-
ered, '... the product life cycle of electronic typewriters, the existence
of financial risks when embarking on new research and development pro-
grammes, the need to carry out a number of such programmes in order to
keep pace with the new development, a continuing level of investment to
finance yet more production automation, the cost of financing at normal
market rates in the Community and the need of the Community producers to
be able to spend an amount on advertising similar to that of the Japanese
exporters' 89
The Commission institutions have used a relatively high profit
margin in the case of the imported consumer branded products, especially
from Japan. It has justified its practice of using a higher profit margin
(10% to 25%) for these products which have a short economic life span,"
since all investments relative to their production have to be recovered
over a relatively short period.
It should further be noted that in the large majority of determina-
88. Electronic Typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1, p7 and p8.
Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994), L 68/5, p13. In Microdisks, the
Commission contructed production costs of the Community's producers based on the production
costs of the complainant industry.
89. Ibid, p8. In Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L
205/5, p19, the Commission considered several factors, such as investment in factory automa-
tion, research and development and design of new products, for reason of profit.
90. For instance, Ball bearings have five to ten years, and DRAM has only one to three years
economic life span.
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tions, no details on profit margins employed were provided other than that
they were reasonable and that the basis for calculating profit has varied
from a percentage on cost 91 to a percentage on turnover.92
5.1.3. Recent Developments in the Calculation
of Injury Margins
In two specific determinations which involved consumer branded
electronic products from the Far East, the Commission has shown novel
approaches in the calculation of injury margins. In both determinations,
the Commission's approach was adopted because foreign producers had
caused material injury, even though they had sold their products in the EC
at prices higher than those of the Community products.
In Compact disc players, 93 deporting from its previous practice,
the Commission did not calculate injury margin based on comparison between
the constructed weighted average resales prices of the imported products
and the price of a like product in the Community or target price of the
Community products. Instead, the Community increased the prices of the
imported products by the amount by which the target price exceeded the
sales prices of the directly competitive Community products. In the
provisional determination of Compact Disc Players, 94 the position of the
Commission was expressed as follows: 'In order to allow the Community
industry to proceed to these necessary price increase to remove the in-
jury, the prices of the directly competing . models have also to increase by
91. EPROMs (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 577/91, OJ (1991) L 65/1, p14.
92. Aspartame (Japan, USA), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1391/91, OJ (1991) L 134/1, p5. 	 Microdisks
(Korea, ILK.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, p13.
93. Compact Disc Players (Japan and Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5, and
Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 112/90, OJ (1990) L 13/21.
94. Ibid, OJ (1989) L 205/5, at 20.
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the same amount. All significant models of each exporter were thus allo-
cated an amount of the necessary increase to remove the injury suffered by
the most directly competitive Community-produced models'. The Community
Institutions' basic position to regarding removal of injury was that the
Community industry should be put in a position where prices could be in-
creased to profitable levels without loss of sales volume.95
Therefore, foreign exporters may have injury margins imposed even
though they did not undercut the prices of the EC products and, further-
more, they sold their products at prices higher than any target prices set
by the Community. What this means is that foreign exporters cannot decide
their sale prices: the Community dose, instead. The injury margin calcu-
lation based on the hypothesis that domestic products can be injured even
by relatively higher-priced imported products will not provide individual
justice, at least, to those exporters who have been setting prices higher
than the target prices of Community products and thus can not be regarded
as injury causing dumpers.%
In Audio tapes in cassettes, 97 the Community has tried to remedy
the injury in forms of a loss of sales and a reduced profitability. 98
 For
the purpose of this remedy, the Community introduced a three steps calcu-
lation of injury as follows:
1) First, the Commission calculated a target market share as well
as a target profit for the Community industry by calculating the profit as
the total amount of target profit, and a reasonable turnover for the
95. Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, p13. Audio tapes in
cassettes (Korea, Japan, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, p18.
96. E. Vermulst & P. Waer, supra note 85, p23.
97. Audio tapes in cassettes (Japan and Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5,
p17, and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1251/91, OJ (1991) L 119/35, p45.
98. Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, p13.
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Community industry which could have been realised if its capacity had been
fully utilised; 99 then,
2) the global profit shortfall as well as price depression caused
by the reduction of the turnover of the Community industry was calculated
to determine the amount by which the prices of the Community products
should be raised; and then,
3) the Commission determined that foreign exporters should increase
their prices by the same rates in order to enable the Community industry
to raise its price by this amount.100
Furthermore, the individual contributions of the foreign producers
to the causation of the injury had to be taken into account sufficiently
through the introduction of a price factor and a volume factor. The
reason for introducing these new elements was the fact that the prices of
the Community industry had not been significantly undercut by the major
exporters to the Community, and therefore a traditional target price
calculation would have not worked effectively.
In this injury calculation, the Community relied on turnover on
sales, which is not calculated on the basis of the actual turnover but on
a theoretical ideal turnover of full production and sales. 101 Moreover,
the Community distributes total injury between the individual exporters
based on Article 4(2)(a) of the Regulation which is limited to the gen-
eral determination of whether injury has been caused.
As has been seen above, the Community authorities have retained
much discretion in the calculation of injury margins and changed methodo-
logies for calculation frequently so that it is almost impossible to
99. A turnover in full capacity utilization is not a reasonable but a maximum turnover.
100. Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan, R.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L
313/5, p18.
101. Ibid.
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predict what method is going to be applied. Therefore, if the Commission
relies on totally different methodologies in the calculation of injury
margin in different cases, interested parties should be given the relevant
data, in order to compare the results under different calculation methodo-
logies.
5.2. Cumulation
Cumulation is prescribed by the GATT Anti-dumping Code and the
Regulation. In accordance with Article 8(2) of the GATT Code, 102 Article
13(5) of the Regulation provides that 'where a product is imported into
the Community from more than one country, duty shall be levied at an
appropriate amount on a non-discriminatory basis on all imports of such
product found to be dumped and causing injury, other than imports from
those sources in respect of which undertakings have been taken'. There-
fore, it seems to be compulsory to cumulate under the 1979 Code and the
Regulation for several exporting countries. 	 At the first glance, it is
logical to cumulate because the total of the dumped imports cause injury
to the Community industry of a like product.	 In addition, in Propan-I-
oil " the Commission stated that 'the Commission is of the opinion that it
is appropriate to cumulate the factors of injury caused by several expor-
ters from one particular country, since a possible exclusion from an anti-
dumping measure would grant the other exporters of the same country a
competitive disadvantage for the future, which is not the object of an
102. Article 8(2) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that when an antidumping duty is
imposed in respect of any product, such anti-dumping duty shall be collected in the appropri-
ate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all
sources found to be dumped and causing injury.
103. Propan-I-oI, Com.Dec.84/229/EEC, OJ (1984) L 106/55, p58.
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anti-dumping proceeding'. Thus, the Community seems to cumulate the
injury caused by several exporters from one exporting country as well.
There are, however, at least two significant problems. First, at
variance with the 1979 GATT Code, the Regulation stipulates to cumulate
dumped imports of several suppliers from more than one country, but not of
several exporters from one particular country. 104
	Second, even though
the GATT Code and the Regulation stipulate that 'duty shall be levied on
all imported products found to be dumped and causing injury', the Commis-
sion cumulates the factors of injury. That is, it could have imposed a
duty on a non-discriminatory basis as an easy catch-all provision relative
to all other imports, without any serious examination into dumping and
causing injury to the domestic industry. 	 Therefore, only after it has
been proved that imported products are dumped and causing injury to the
domestic industry of the like product, should a duty on a non-discrimina-
tory basis be taken into account. 105 Since Iron or steel coil for re-
rolling, the fact that the effect of the dumped imports concerned on the
Community industry has to be assessed jointly seems to be an established
104. Article 8 of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that 'if several suppliers from
one or more countries are involved, anti-dumping duties may be imposed on imports of the
product in question found to have been dumped and to be causing injury...'.
105. The Commission, however, delivered different criteria from the above determination in
Iron or steel coil for re-rolling (Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela) Com.Dec. No
2182/83/ECSC, OJ (1983) L 210/5, p5. The Commission stated that 'in analysing whether cumu-
lation was appropriate in each case, the Commission considered whether the dumped imports
were a contributory factor to material injury sustained by the Community industry'. This
means that cumulation is not an automatic matter, but rather depends on fulfillment of a
number of conditions. In other words, first it must be proved that dumped imported products
are causing injury, then cumulation can be considered.
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practice of the Community Institutions. 106 It has been the standard
practice of the Community institutions to cumulate imports from several
countries when the imported products and the like product of the Community
industry meet the following criteria: interchangeability of end-uses,
simultaneous competition on the Community markets, similarity of channels
of distribution, and finally, not negligible scale of volumes imported.107
However, some questions remain. If the scale of the volume imported
is negligible, and as a result its market share is too small to cause
material injury, even though most of the above-mentioned criteria were
satisfied, should the negligible imports be cumulated with imports from
other countries? 	 The Community Institution took the view that imports
from Turkey should not be cumulated because its market share amounted only
to 1.5% and exports from Turkey had been declining. 108 However, in an
other determination, imports from Korea were cumulated with the reason
that Korea's share is above the level that can be considered de
• 109minims.	 Therefore, the imports from Korea were not considered negli-
gible. Before the Commission, however, decided whether the exporting
country's market share in the Community could be considered de minimis, it
should have set the criteria for de minimis, otherwise it can be accused
106. REWS (Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p24. Colour TV
receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No 2376/94, OJ (1994) L
255/50, p63.
107. Ibid, Colour TV receivers, p63. Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg. (EC) No 534/94, OJ
(1994) L 68/5, p9.
108. Ibid, Colour TV receivers, p63.
109. Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), p9. In Microdisks, products imported from Korea had 2.4% of
the Community market and exports from Korea had been declining as well.
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of discretionary behaviour in favour of the Community industry.110
Furthermore, it is worth noting that this decision came after the Uruguay
Round Anti-dumping Code was adopted in December 1993. 111
Cumulation may cause serious discrimination among dumping importers.
It would not be rational to expect that parallel cheap exporters who are
not included in a given dumping investigation would be willing to adjust
their own prices upwards just because others' prices are adjusted as a
result of dumping duties. If these dumping proceedings include only a few
of the many cheap suppliers, the latter may extend their market share at
the expense of exporters charged with dumping earlier.
5.3. Technical Dumping
There may be three different situations to which an alignment
defence, known as technical dumping, could be applied. First, exporters
set their prices at the level prevailing in the market of the importing
country. In this case it can be argued that competitively priced products
at the prevailing level of the importing country's market prices cannot
cause injury unless they have a price depressing or suppressing effect.
Second, exporters set their prices at the level of other low
110. Fibre Building Board (a number of East-European Countries), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1633/82, OJ
(1982) L 181/19, p22. The Commission excluded Bulgaria because of its low market share of
0.2 to 0.7%, stating that protection measures were not necessary.
It is worth noting, however, that an anti-dumping duty was imposed on imports from Romania
whose market share was only 0.8%.
111. According to Article 5(8) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code, the volume of dumped im-
ports shall normally be regarded as negligible if the volume from any particular country
represents less than 3% of market share. Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision con-
cerning the conclusion of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation
(1986-1994), COM (94) 143 final.
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priced, but non-dumped imports. In this situation, if the volume of the
non-dumped imports is clearly larger and the prices lower than those of
the dumped imports, it is not the dumped imports which cause injury, but
the non-dumped imports. Besides, in this case imposition of anti-dumping
duties would not protect domestic producers but simply increase the market
share of the non-dumping producers at the expense of the dumping producer.
Third, exporters set up their prices to other, dumped imports. In
other words, smaller exporters are forced to align their prices to the
prices of their more powerful competitors.
From these three situations, it is questionable whether dumped
imports at prices which make the foreign product competitive with the
importing countries' product are regarded to be unfair. The Community has
seldom recognised technical dumping on the ground that competitively
priced imports may nevertheless cause injury because of their price de-
pressing or suppressing effects.112
Furthermore, only a few cases have been terminated on the basis
that the dumped imports did not undercut Community prices113 and in some
cases
114
 a determination either of no injury or not 1 F
 the Community
interest or both has been issued, because the prices of the dumped imports
were in fact higher than the prices of the non-dumped imports; therefore
112. Studded-welded Link Chain (Spain and Sweden), Com.Dec.80/783/EEC, OJ (1980) L 231/10,
pll. Sodium Carbonate (USA), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3018/82, OJ (1982) L 317/5, p6. 	 In Sodium
Carbonate, the European Commission noted that whereas resale prices of imported sodium carbo-
nate in general were below those prevailing in the market concerned, albeit in part only
marginally, they nevertheless prevented intended price increases and led to price depression.
113. American Xanthan Gum, Com.Dec.83/493/EEC, OJ (1983) L 268/60, p61, and Codeine,
Coun.Dec.83/9/EEC, OJ (1983) L 16/30, p32.
114. Saccharin and its salts (China, Korea and the USA), Com.Dec.83/626/EEC, OJ (1983) L
352/49, p50 and Unwrought nickel (the USSR), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2907/83, OJ (1983) L 286/29,
p30.
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imposition of anti-dumping duties was likely to lead to a shift in market
share from the dumping exporters to the non-dumping exporters, and this
shift in market share could have had an even worse effect in terms of
injury to the Community producers.
6. DETERMINATION OF INJURY IN KOREA
6.1. Similar Goods and Domestic Industry
The term "identical, homogeneous or similar goods" (hereinafter
referred to as "similar goods") is defined as goods which are identical,
i.e., identical in all respects including physical characteristics, qual-
ity, and consumer recognition, 115 even though it is not defined by the
Korean Customs Act or its Enforcement Decree.
From the Korean rules, therefore, three principles can be drawn for
the injury investigation: identification in all respects, the same func-
tion and substitutability. 116
 Mere commercial competitiveness is not
sufficient for the purpose of injury determination. In judging "similar-
ity", the KTC decides on the basis of physical and chemical characteris-
tics, major production processes, use, substitutability, distribution
routes, recognition from the customers or the producers, and common fea-
tures of production equipment or producers.117
115. Article 2 of the Administrative Ordinance of Anti-dumping duty and Countervailing duty,
FMA No 1992-18 ('92.12.31). In the absence of such goods, another product which bears the
same function, and has characteristics and components so similar that subsitutability is
possible.
116. Ibid.
117. Soda Ash (China) FMA No 1993-75, OG (1993) No 12606, p188, Printing Plate (Japan) FMA
No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p194, and Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57,
OG (1994) No 12786, p34.
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However, this definition of "similarity" is such that an investiga-
tion may be terminated based on the non-existence of similar goods. 	 In
Printing Plate, 0.4mm printing plate was not included in the scope of
investigation because there was no Korean producer of such a producer dur-
ing the investigation period nor was there strong evidence that such goods
were substitutable for Or competed with the other, 0.25mm or 0.30mm,
printing plates. 118
The dumped import should cause or threaten to cause material injury
to an established domestic industry or materially retard the establishment
of such an industry in the importing country in order to trigger the
determination of injury. The Decree defines the term "domestic industry",
in Article 4(2)(ii), to mean all domestic producers of goods identical,
homogeneous or similar to the imported goods concerned, or a group of
domestic producers accounting for a considerable portion of the gross
domestic output) 	 are two issues in this standard definition of
the Korean domestic industry : a considerable portion of the gross domes-
tic output and related parties.
In examining whether the petitioner constitutes a considerable
portion of the gross domestic output, there is no criterion as to what
percentage of the remaining total output constitutes a considerable por-
tion)-20
 If the petitioner is the only producer and constitutes the whole
quantity of the domestic production, the petitioner is regarded as the
118. Printing Plate (Japan) FMA No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p194. In Glass Fiber, 3
allegedly dumped goods were excluded from the scope of investigation for the same reason and
the KTC determined that there was no evidence that those 3 goods had caused injury materially
retarding the establishment of such an industry. Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan), FMA No
1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p36.
119. Article 4(2)(ii) of the EDCA.
120. In the author's opinion, it has to be over a simple majority, at least, in order to be
constituted a considerable portion.
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domestic industry. 121
According to Article 4(2)(ii) of the Decree, when producers have a
special relation with exporters and importers of such imported goods,
producers importing them are excluded from the scope of the domestic
industry. Therefore, if the domestic producers are exporters' subsidiar-
ies, or are importers themselves at the same time, they may not be consid-
ered as the domestic industry. So far, in the most of the determinations,
domestic producers have not had a special relation with exporters, nor
have they imported the dumping goods. 122
 However, in Fiber Glass, 2 out
of 3 domestic companies which were regarded as the domestic industry were
not included in the scope of the domestic industry because they were
themselves importers of the dumped goods and had a special relation with
the exporters)- 23
 Given that a number of Japanese-European joint ventures
were regarded as Community industry, this determination shows that the KTC
applies a more strict interpretation of the definition of the domestic
industry.
121. Ballbearings (Thailand) FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p137 and 138, Soda Ash
(China) FMA No 1993-75, OG (1993) No 12606, p188 and Printing Plate (Japan) FMA No 1993-76,
OG (1993) No 12606, p195.
122. Phosphoric Acid (China) FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p22, Ballbearings (Thailand)
FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p137, Soda Ash (China) FMA No 1993-75, OG (1993) No
12606, p188, and Printing Plate (Japan) FMA No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p195. In the
first two determinations, the KTC determined that the petitioners which were themselves
importers were part of the domestic industry, because the quantity of imports was minimal.
123. Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p37. In this
determination, Lucky Owens Corning Co. Ltd. imported 26.6% of domestic needs and had a spe-
cial relation with Owens Corning Fiberglass Co. in USA and ASAHI Co. in Japan in the form of
joint venture.
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6.2. Material Injury etc.
In cases where the importation of foreign goods for sale at a price
lower than the normal price causes or threatens to cause material injury
to a domestic industry or materially retards the establishment of a domes-
tic industry, a duty may be imposed on the goods concerned in an amount
equal to or less than the dumping margin. 124
 Therefore, the dumped im-
ports have to cause material injury, or threaten to cause material injury
or materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry in order to
impose an anti-dumping duty.
The term "material injury" is not defined in the Act or in the
Decree. However, the KTC must be based on substantial evidence including
the quantity of imported dumping goods, the price of dumped goods, actual
situation (economic factors) of a domestic industry, and their substantial
or potential effect on a domestic industry, in order to determine material
injury etc.125
In Korea, however, most of the domestic industries in injury find-
ings have been the start-up industries. 	 In Phosphoric Acid, 126 a domes-
tic producer was planning to produce from the end of 1992 but production
was delayed until Sep. 1992 because of dumped imports.
	 In
Ballbearings, 127 and in Printing Plate, 128 domestic producers started to
supply in the second half of 1989. In Glass Fiber, 129
 a domestic producer
commenced its commercial production in April 1992. Therefore, the KTC had
124. Article 10(1) of the Korean Customs Act.
125. Article 4(7)(1) of the EDCA.
126. Phosphoric Acid (China) FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p24.
127. Ballbearing (Thailand) FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p138.
128. Printing Plate (Japan) FMA No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p195.
129. Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p37.
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to decide whether a domestic industry concerned was an established indu-
stry or in the process of establishment, in the abovementioned determina-
tions. An industry in the process of establishment is defined as one
which does not have reasonable profit or reach break-even point after
commencing commercial production; this includes the industry under con-
struction of production facility after substantial investment activity. 130
As a result, all the above-mentioned domestic industries were regarded as
industries in the process of establishment, because they had neither
achieved reasonable profit nor reached the break-even point.
Next, the KTC examines whether the establishment of a domestic indu-
stry was materially retarded by the dumped imports. 	 Therefore, to the
KTC, the examination of the actual market situation (economic factors) is
the most important test for a finding of injury. In Printing Plate, the
KTC determined that the Korean industry's production, sales volume and
market share were increased 131
 but this growth was below the level that
could normally have been expected at a time when domestic consumption was
rising and was a necessary consequence of its appearance on the market.132
Furthermore, the domestic industry had operated at a deficit during the
investigation period because its sales volume was too small and price was
depressed. 133
 In all the above-mentioned investigations, prices of domes-
130. Ballbearings (Thailand) FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p138, Printing Plate (Japan)
FMA No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p195, and Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-
57, OG (1994) No 12786, p37.
131. Compared to the volume of domestic consumption, domestic production or its sales volume
was very small.
132. Printing Plate (Japan) FMA No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p197.
133. Ibid, p198. Ballbearings (Thailand) FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p140, Glass
Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p39. In Glass Fiber, average
sales price of domestic goods was below production cost because the imported goods were
selling not only below the average sales price of domestic goods, but also at less than the
normal price.
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tic goods fell, their profitability deteriorated, and R&D investment by
the domestic industry was slowed down, even though their production and
capacity utilisation rate increased and their sales and market share grew.
As a result, the KTC determined that the establishment of a domestic
industry was materially retarded.
If imports and their market share increased while the domestic
industry's sales volume and market share decreased and the domestic indu-
stry had been operated at a deficit, 134 the increased volume of dumped
imports is justified as a reason for injury findings.
6.3. Causation
According to Article 10(1) of the Korean Customs Act, if the dumped
imports cause injury to a domestic industry, an anti-dumping duty may be
imposed. Therefore, the KTC examines the impact of the dumping goods on a
domestic industry through domestic price and sales volume. 135
 In Printing
Plate, the KTC determined that determination of injury shall be made, if
the dumped imports are one of the causes of injury, and though they need
not to be the principal or significant cause of such injury.136
In examining of the effects of dumped imports, according to the
KTC, if such imports were sold at a lower price than the selling price of
similar domestic products, and if the selling price of similar domestic
products were less than the cost of production, the causal link between
134. Phosphoric Acid (China) FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p24.
135. Phosphoric Acid (China) FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p25, Ballbearings (Thailand)
FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p140, Printng Plate (Japan) FMA No 12606, p199, and Glass
Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p40.
136. Ibid. p199. It should always be borne in mind, however, that determination of injury
should be made only if the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, causing in-
jury.
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the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the domestic industry is
established)- 37 Furthermore, if the increased volume and growing market
share of the dumped imports coincided with the loss of market share, price
erosion and deterioration in the financial situation of the domestic
industry, the causal link is established.138
The KTC has to consider whether factors other than dumped imports,
i.e. exchange rate fluctuation 139
 and imports from other countries ,140
could have caused the injury to the domestic industry. So far, there has
been no case where factors other than dumped imports have caused a detri-
mental impact or injury to the Korean industry.
In addition to Article 10(1) of the Korean Customs Act, there could
be another aspect of the causation issue, i.e., cumulation. However,
cumulation is neither prescribed by the Act or the Decree nor established
by practice. In Fiber Glass, however, the KTC held that if a product is
imported into Korea from more than one country, and if imported products
compete with each other and with domestic goods, the impact of imports
should be evaluated cumulatively. 141 The gist of this finding indicates
137. Ballbearings (Thailand) FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p141, Printing Plate (Japan)
FMA No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p200, and Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-
57, OG (1994) No 12786, p40. In these determinations, the KTC held that the consequent
impact of the dumped imports can be seen more clearly through the effect on the price rather
than the effect on the quantity of imported dumping goods when the domestic industry is in
the process of the establishment.
138. Phosphoric Acid (China), FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, p25, and Soda Ash (China)
FMA No 1993-75, OG (1993) No 12606, p190.
139. In Ballbearings (Thailand), however, factors other than dumped imports, e.g. exchange
rate fluctuation had improved Won-based sales and profit because of the devaluation of the
Won (Korean currency). Ballbearings (Thailand) FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p141.
140. In Soda Ash, the KTC held that Soda Ash from America did not cause injury, because of
the difference in distribution channel.
141. Glass Fiber (USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p39.
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that the cumulation requirement is met whenever: (1) goods are imported
from more than one country; and (2) imports compete with each other and
with domestic goods. 142 This is in violation of Article 8(2) of the GATT
Anti-dumping Code, because duty should not be imposed if the imported goods
are not dumped, even if they are imported from more than one country and
compete with each other. First of all, there should be a provision for
cumulation. Furthermore, it must always be borne in mind that only after
proving that imported goods are dumped and causing injury to the domestic
industry of the similar goods, should duty be imposed on all imported
goods from more than one country found to be dumped and causing injury.
142. The KTC held that substitutability and similarity of channels of distribution etc. are
examined in order to evaluate whether imported goods compete with each other and with domes-
tic goods.
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II. THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITY
1. INTRODUCTION
Once a complaint is lodged, the Commission, whether dumping and
injury caused therefrom is found or not, should terminate the proceeding
either with the acceptance of price undertakings by the exporters or
imposition of anti-dumping duties on them, or without protective measures
where no dumping or injury is found or the complaints is withdrawn or
where the Commission arrives at the conclusion that the interest of the
Community- 43
 does not require a continuation of the proceeding. In accor-
dance with GATT rules ,144 a provisional anti-dumping duty or a definitive
anti-dumping duty should be imposed in the Community where preliminary
examination or the facts as finally established show that there is dumping
and injury caused therefrom, and the interests of the Community call for
Community intervention. Therefore, it is not enough to impose anti-dump-
ing duty that dumping and injury caused therefrom is found; the interests
of the Community should call for Community intervention.145
143. The Community interests test is very common in the Community's approach towards protec-
tive measures concerned with foreign trade including anti-dumping and countervailing duties,
safeguard measures (Article 15 of Council Regulation No. 288/82) or measures pursuant to the
new instrument (Article 9 and 10 of the Council Regulation No. 2641/84).
144. Article 8(1) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that the decision whether or not to
impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all requirements for the imposition have been
fulfilled	 are decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing country or cus-
toms territory. Therefore, it may be interpreted that the authorities in the importing
country or customs territory have discretion to decide whether or not to impose antidumping
duty.
145. Article 11(1) and 12(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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2. THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY'S INTERESTS
In the Community's Anti-dumping Regulation, however, no definition
of the interests of the Community has been found. According to the Com-
mission's Guide to European Communities' Anti-dumping and Countervailing
Legislation, 'Community interests may cover a wide range of factors of
which the most important are the interests of consumers and users of the
imported product and the need to have regard to the competitive situation
within the Community market.'
	
It seems that the Commission equated the
interest of the consumers and users with the interest of the Community
industry. In assessing the Community interest, however, one basic princi-
ple of which the Commission has taken account is that putting an end to
distortions of competition arising from unfair commercial practices, and
thus re-establishing open and fair competition on the Community market, is
fundamentally in the interest of the Community.146
Recently, the Community interests test has become an increasingly
important aspect in the implementation of the Community's anti-dumping
policy and it is taken into account before the application of anti-dumping
measures. For example, the short term benefits of low prices for indus-
trial users and consumers, are weighed against the injurious effects of
the dumped imports in terms of the industrial and social costs of the
contraction or elimination of firms, sectors or whole industries)-47
It seems that Community authorities have equated the interests of
the Community with the interests of the Community industries, especially
146. REWS (Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, OJ (1993) L 112/20, p26. 	 DRAMs
(Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p22.	 Pocket flint lighters (Korea,
Japan, China and Thailand), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1386/91, OJ (1991) L 133/20, P26. 	 Audio tapes
in cassettes (Korea, Japan, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, p17.
147. Commission, 11th Anti-dumping Report (1992), Corn. (93) 516 final, p4.
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the interests of the complainant industry. 148 Compared with the interests
of consumers or user industries, the Community has given more weight to
the interests of the complainant industry, stating that in the long term
it is in the consumers' or users' interests to ensure that a viable Com-
munity industry does not disappear, has competitive power, and is preven-
ted from the declining so that the Community does not become dependent
upon external sources of supply, and the availability of choice is main-
tained. 149 The Council stated that it would in the end be in the consu-
mers' interests to grant protection to the Community industry because any
advantage to the consumers in being supplied with dumped products might
later disappear owing to reduced competition when the Community industry
had to give up its production.15°
There has been, however, significant change in the Community's
attitude to interpret the interests of the Community. 	 In DRAMs, 151 the
Community authority considered that the maintenance of a strong and viable
Community DRAM industry was important for strategic reasons,	 i.e., the
Commission considered that in view of the central function of the DRAM
industry as the technology driver for the semiconductor industry in par-
ticular and the electronics industry in general and as a key component in
the information processing and telecommunication equipment industry, a
148. This attitude is supported by Article 15(2) of the Anti-dumping Regulation which pro-
vides that the Commission shall publish a notice, within six months prior to the end of the
five years period, of the impending expiry of the measure in question and inform the Commun-
ity industry known to be concerned.
149.	 Typewriters	 (Japan),	 Coun.Reg.(EEC)	 No	 1698/85,	 OJ
site(dead-burned)	 (China and N.	 Korea),	 Com.Reg.(EEC)	 No
(1985)
	 L
3531/82,
163/1,
	 p9,
OJ	 (1982)
Natural magne-
L	 371/25,	 p27,
Photocopiers (Japan),	 Coun.Reg.(EEC)	 No 537/87,	 OJ	 (1987)
of polyester (Korea),	 Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1956/92, OJ 	 (1992)
150.	 Radio-broadcast receivers (Korea), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No
151.	 DRAMs (Korea),	 Com.Reg.	 (EEC) No 2686/92, OJ	 (1992) L
L54/12,
L 197/25,
2306/92,
272/13,
p 28, and Synthetic fibres
p31.
OJ	 (1992)	 L 222/8,	 p13.
p23.
171
viable and strong Community DRAM industry was of the utmost importance,
not only for technological reasons but also for the electronics and the
information processing and telecommunication equipment industry as a whole
in the Community. As a result, the scope of the interests of the Commun-
ity which were considered to be equated with the interests of the Commun-
ity industries concerned would have been interpreted to expand to the
downstream industries. 152
3. THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERESTS REQUIREMENT
The Community interests test has become an increasingly important
aspect in the implementation of the Community's anti-dumping policy, al-
though one can argue that 'in many cases, once dumping and injury are
found and measures are likely to give relief to the complainant industry,
there is a presumption that such measures would be in the Community inter-
ests'. 153
The role of the Community interests test could be considered to
have grown, to the extent that the procedures for dumping investigation
and injury finding have become progressively judiciary.
There are very few cases in which the proceeding has been termina-
ted based on the fact that it is not in the interests of the Community to
impose any measures even though dumping and injury caused thereby were
152. In Audio tapes in cassettes, the Commission took the same view and held that this
demise would negatively influence the Community production of raw materials and other related
magnetic goods. See, Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, p17.
153. J. Bourgeois, "EC Antidumping Enforcement-selected second generation issues", 1985, For-
dham Corp.L.Inst., 563, at 589.
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found. 154 As a result, the Community interests test has been regarded as
playing a minor role in anti-dumping determinations. This test has also
been used to adjust the remedy. In Hydraulic excavators, 155
 the Commun-
ity authority determined that it was not in the Community interests to
accept undertakings in the light of present trade relations with Japan.
Thus, the Council finally imposed definitive duties instead of acceptance
of undertaking. It may be questioned, upon which requirements among the
dumping, injury finding and the Community interests, the level of the duty
should be based. According to Article 11(1) and 12(1) of the Anti-dumping
Regulation, only when Community intervention is called for, is the Commun-
ity interest considered.
	 Therefore, it seems to be more reasonable to
interpret that once Community intervention has been decided, the level of
duty should be based on the dumping and injury margin.156
4. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
The anti-dumping policy is used as a measure to protect domestic
154. Alumunium, Com.Dec.84/103/EEC, OJ (1984) L 57/19 (termination), p22. In this determina-
tion, the Council took account of the fact that, since the opening of the investigation,
prices both worldwide and on the Community market had increased considerably. Moreover, the
price trend indicated no significant reduction in market prices in the foressable future.
The Council therefore concluded that it was not in the Community's interests to take protec-
tive action.
155. Hydraulic excavators (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1877/85, OJ (1985) L 176/1, p4. In
Glycin (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2322/85, OJ (1985) L 218/1, p3, the Council determined that
it was considered in the interests of the Community to impose protective anti-dumping duties
which could not fully eliminate the injury determined to have been suffered by the main
Community producer. Thus the Council took protective anti-dumping duty less than the dumping
margin and less than necessary to alleviate the injury.
156. See, C. Stanbrook, The Impact of Community Interests and Injury Determination on Anti-
dumping Measures in the EEC, (1985) Fordham Corp. L. Inst., 623 at 631.
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import-competing producers, but from the viewpoint of consumers, 157 and
import-using industries, it might be argued that the introduction of pro-
tective measures would not be in the Community interest, because it would
make them less competitive; 158 while exporting industries 159
 might face
retaliation by trading partners. 160 Thus, although the Anti-dumping Regu-
lation has stipulated generally that the interests of the Community must
be considered before the imposition of anti-dumping duties, as has been
seen, this provision does not automatically guarantee that the interests
of consumers of imported products and import-competing domestic products
are taken into account seriously in the implementation of anti-dumping
policy.
157. Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan and H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990)
L313/5, p17, Video cassette recorders (Korea and Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2684/88, OJ (1988)
L 240/5, p15, and Typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1, p9. In
Audio tapes in cassettes, the Commission stated that 'as far as the consumers are concerned,
it should be pointed out that they have no right to continue to take advantage of the effect
of unfair trade practices. Anti-dumping duties are designed to prevent the disappearaaaance
of the Community industry and to preserve the choice of consumers.'
158. In DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p23, the Commission
stated that it would not be acceptable that advantages gained in the past through unfair
trade practices could be invoked as a justification for not taking the necessary steps to re-
establish a fair trading situation. In Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan and
Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, p17, the Community took the view that the elimi-
nation of unfair competition should eventually lead to the strengthening of competitive
condition.
159. Deep freezers (USSR), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 29/87, OJ (1987) L 6/1, p3.
The ECJ held that the Council's decision to take protective measures was adequate even though
the imposition of anti-dumping duties would have an adverse effect on the Community's own
export to the Eastern European Countries, which could take retaliatory measures, see, case
294/86 and 77/87, Technointorg v Commission and Council, ECR [1988] 6077, at para 23.
160. In Deep freezers, the importer argued that the protective anti-dumping measures have an
adverse effect on its own exports under offset agreements with Eastern European countries.
The Council, however, rejected this arguement because of the difficulties facing Community
production of deep freezers.
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In the absence of the Community interests provision, consumer inter-
ests can be seriously taken into account by participation in anti-dumping
proceedings on the side of foreign suppliers or domestic importers.
	 It
should be noted, however, that if a provision on a public interest in
general does not exist or if it is practically applied only in rare cir-
cumstances, the participation of consumers in anti-dumping proceedings can
have only a much narrower purpose, because the public interest is not
taken into account in investigation during routine anti-dumping proceed-
ings. All that matters is whether dumping has caused or threatens to
cause material injury to import-competing domestic producers. 	 In addi-
tion, consumers may be reluctant to get involved. 161
If a public interest provision exists, participation by consumer
representatives is essential, because the decision to invoke the public
interest provision or to consider an override may be influenced decisively
by the evidence and argument that is submitted during the anti-dumping
proceeding. Therefore, the participation of organised consumer groups or
representatives could be very useful.	 In spite of the fact that, as
discussed above, the interest of the Community is protected by the Commun-
ity Anti-dumping Regulation, anti-dumping measures are deemed to be employed
as instruments of commercial defence to protect the interests of import-
competing producers which are treated as identical with the interests of
the Community.
161. Because participation in anti-dumping proceedings on the side of foreign suppliers or
domestic importers of dumped products might do harm their business reputation, or they may
fear to antagonise their domestic suppliers on whom they mainly depend and who will remember
at times of short supply. Furthermore, consumers are not well organised enough to regard
participation in anti-dumping proceedings as profitable, even if their intervention on the
side of importers could affect the outcome.
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Chapter 6 : ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION SYSTEMS
1. BACKGROUND AND SITUATION IN KOREA
In 1987, the European Community amended its anti-dumping legisla-
tion, Regulation 2176/84, 1 to adopt a distinct procedure enabling it to
counter what it perceived to be circumvention of anti-dumping duties on
finished products through the importation of parts and materials for use
in the assembly or production of like finished production through the
setting up of the so-called 'screwdriver plants' in the Common Market.
These new rules were contained in Council Regulation (EEC) No 1761/87 2
 and
are presently incorporated into Council Regulation (EEC) 2423/88.3
The new anti-circumvention rules, however, establish a rule of
origin specially designed for anti-dumping purposes and have a discrimina-
tory effect against related or associated parties with exporters whose
products are subject to an anti-dumping duty. 4 It must be feared even in
some Member States of the EC that foreign investment in the EC may be
hampered by this new legislation.5
The Community rules on certain forms of diversion should comply
with the GATT Anti-dumping Code because the Community's anti-dumping rules
were adopted in accordance with Article VI of the GATT and the GATT Anti-
1. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2176/84, OJ (1984) L 201/1.
2. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1767/87 amending Coun.Reg. No 2176/84, OJ (1987) L 167/9.
3. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
4. Article 13(10)(a) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation provides that Definitive anti-
dumping duties may be imposed on products that are introduced into the commerce of the Com-
munity after having been assembled or produced in the Community, if the value of parts used
in the assembly operation and originating in the country of exportation of the product sub-
ject to anti-dumping duty exceeds the value of all other parts used by at least 50%.
5. Japan's Trade Minister, Hajime Tamura, said at the time of adoption of the 'part amend-
ment' that the application of the anti-circumvetion legislation could 'seriously affect' the
investment plans of many Japanese companies in Europe. See Agence Europe, 26 June 1987, p9.
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dumping Code. 6 Article VI of the GATT is concerned with trading between
countries and does not deal with the possibility of imposing anti-dumping
duties on products manufactured within importing countries. 7 Furthermore,
a GATT panel, instituted at the request of Japan in 1988 to scrutinise the
GATT-consistency of the EC's parts Amendment, 8 communicated its finding to
the EC and Japan on March 22, 1990. 9 As has been reported, the GATT panel
has ruled that the measures taken pursuant to the EC provision violate
GATT rules. 10
The most popular methods for evading or circumventing anti-dumping
duties can be divided into two categories, namely circumvention related to
the product scope of the anti-dumping measures and circumvention related to
product from a certain country. However, there is no provision in the
6. Preamble of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
7. Article VI of the GATT defined dumping as where products of one country are introduced
into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products.
8. During the period between the adoption of Article 13(10) in 1987 and the communication of
the GATT Panel Report in 1990, eight proceedings under Article 13(10) have been initiated and
resulted in the imposition of duties: Electronic scales, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1021/88, OJ (1988)
L 101/1; Electronic typewriters, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1022/88, OJ (1988) L 101/4; Hydraulic
excavators, Com.Dec.88/225/EEC, OJ (1988) L 101/24; Plain paper photocopiers, Coun.Reg.(EEC)
No 3205/88, OJ (1988) L 284/36; Ball bearings, Com.Dec. 89/57/EEC, OJ (1989) L 25/90, Video
cassette recorders, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 501/89, OJ (1989) L 57/55; Dot-matrix printers,
Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3042/89, OJ (1989) L 291/52.
9. GATT, Report by the Panel, EEC-Japan, Regulation on imports of parts and components
(hereinafter referred to as the "GATT Panel Report"), reproduced by R.M. Bierwagen, GATT
Article VI and the Protectionist Bias in Anti-dumping Laws, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publish-
ers, Deventer and Boston, 1990, pp237-246, (hereinafter referred to as "R.M. Bierwagen"). The
summary of the GATT Panel's findings which follows is based on this publication.
10. In subsection 6.1 of the GATT Panel Report, the Panel said that the duties imposed by the
EEC under Article 13(10) of the Council Regulations Nos 2176/84 and 2423/88 on products
assembled or produced within the EEC by enterprises related to Japanese manufacturers of
products subjected to anti-dumping duties are inconsistent with Article III:2, first sen-
tence, and are not justified by Article XX(d) of the General Agreement.
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GATT Anti-dumping Code regarding approved measures against circumvention.
If the disciplinary legal system is no longer appropriate to defend its
objectives, one of the very clear alternatives is to redefine the disci-
plinary legal measures in legislation.	 Therefore, some of the leading
countries in international trade have depended on unilateral measures.
The European Community, for instance, enacted a Regulation" against the
circumvention of anti-dumping duties by sub-assembly dumping.
Basically, there are some problems involved. First, given that the
Community anti-dumping rules were adopted in accordance with Article VI of
the GATT, anti-dumping duties should be imposed where dumping is estab-
lished and injury is caused by reason of dumped imports. 12 Dumping of the
components will not be established even though the conditions 13 are satis-
fied. Therefore, the imposition of duties should not be allowed in cases
where dumping is not established.
Second, it could be argued that any exception to the GATT gives a
justification to impose anti-circumvention duties, where the imposition of
duties is not allowed because dumping is likely but not established in
accordance with Article VI of the GATT.14
Third, the EC anti-circumvention rules apply only where assembly in
the European Community is performed by related parties. As a result,
where independent Community manufacturers assemble or independent Commun-
ity producers benefit from 'dumped' components no duties are imposed.15
11. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1761/87, OJ (1987) L 167/9.
12. Preamble of the Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1, p2, states that such as-
sembly or production is considered 'likely' to lead to circumvention of the anti-dumping
duties.
13. The three sub-paragraphs of Article 10(a) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
14. This issue will be dealt in sub-title 4. Compatibility with GATT rules.
15. photocopiers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 535/87, OJ (1987) L 54/12, paras. 50, where one
Community producer produced an added value of 20-35% with regard to low volume copiers.
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Consequently, the Community authorities treat the same category of cases
differently even though they should not, and the discriminatory treatment
is prohibited by Article 13(5) of the same Regulation.16
Finally, it is questionable whether anti-circumvention rules should
be permitted to enlarge the coverage of an order to parts or new products
without making a separate injury determination as to the parts or new
products. In this case, it must be recalled that anti-dumping duties
should be imposed only to injurious dumped imports.
There is no anti-circumvention provision in the Korean Customs Act
or in its Enforcement Decree. 17 As a result of the Country's trade liber-
alisation policy, one of the main issues is to protect the domestic indu-
stry concerned in Korea, because imports are increasing rapidly. Anti-
dumping measures have been regarded as the most efficient measure for the
protection of the domestic industry concerned, 18 and they will be applied
more frequently than before. 19
 Therefore, it could be predicted that
foreign producers or exporters will try to avoid or circumvent the anti-
dumping duties by exporting parts and components and assembling them in
16. Article 13(5) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation provides that where a product is
imported into the Community from more than one country, duty shall be levied on a non-
discriminatory basis on all imports of such product found to be dumped and causing injury.
17. There is no anti-circumvention determination in Korea, either.
18. In case of Phosphoric Acid, 89.3% of the total quantity of imports was from China in
1992. However, it decreased to 68.1% in 1993 when the anti-dumping duty started to be im-
posed, and 46.8% in 1994. In case of Soda Ash, 12.5% of the total quantity of imports was
from China in 1993. However, it reduced to 4.6% in 1994 because of the antidumping duty.
See, Seoul Shinmun, 'Imports restraint effect of anti-dumping duties', Jan. 25, 1995, p18.
19. Until recently, Korea has 'suitably' taken care of the dumping lawsuit cases taking into
consideration the trading friction, but in the future, it is planned to positively utilize
the anti-dumping system as a political means in preparation of the settlement of Uruguay
Round negotiations and opening domestic market. See, Joong-ang Il Bo (Korean Daily Newspa-
per), 'Decision Regarding the Dumping of Imported PoIyacetal', Feb. 26, 1991, p17.
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Korea. That is why an anti-circumvention measure needs to be prescribed
in the Korean rules. From this viewpoint, an analysis of the Community's
anti-circumvention system is pertinent because the Community's anti-cir-
cumvention rules themselves and its practice could be a kind of legisla-
tive mode1.2°
1.1. Foreign Investment in the EC
The anti-circumvention rules of the Community stipulate that pro-
ducts which are introduced into the commerce of the Community after having
been assembled or produced in the Community may become subject to defini-
tive anti-dumping duties when three conditions are met. 21
 This means that
anti-dumping duties would be imposed on products which would be classified
as a 'made in Europe' by anti-circumvention rules. First of all, this is
clearly inconsistent with the EC Treaty, in which anti-dumping measures
were allowed to apply to products originating in EC Member countries only
during the transitional period before the completion of the European
 2Union.2
If one of the main purposes of the anti-dumping measures would lead
to increased European production, there is no reason why the condition of
increased European production should be limited only to those who are not
related to a company found to be dumping. 	 In addition, in many cases,
20. Sharp increase in Korean direct investment in the Community is another reason to require
an analysis on the Community's anti-circumvention system.
21. Article 13(10)(a) of the 1988 Regulation, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2423/88, OJ (1988)
L 209/1. _Three conditions are a related EC producer to an exporter of the like product sub-
ject to duties, commencing or increasing of its production after the opening of the anti-
dumping investigation, and a maximum content requirement. Those conditions will be discussed
in more detail.
22. See, Article 91(1) of the EEC Treaty.
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foreign companies established manufacturing plants in Europe long before
there was any hint of possibility of an anti-circumvention action. The
difficulty therefore arises of how to distinguish action with intent of
circumvention from honest business behaviour and how to protect honest and
fair business behaviour against misuse of anti-circumvention provisions
for protectionist purposes.
	 Not only Member States but also the EC has
created legal certainty on the part of companies investing in Europe.
Sudden changes in the law may lead to ambiguity and unfairness, because
an operation which has been a legitimate part of the European industry on
the basis of the former law can not suddenly become an operation designed
to circumvent anti-dumping duties. This change in law may be construed as
proof that the promises of the EC authorities promoting foreign investment
are unreliable. Furthermore this may be connected to the freezing of
future investment decisions in Europe, because such investment might be
regarded as circumvention.
1.2. Input 23 and Sub-Assembly Circumvention.24
When an anti-dumping duty is imposed on certain products, the for-
eign producers or exporters can avoid or evade the anti-dumping duties by
exporting raw or semi-finished products; the buyer in the importing coun-
try then processes these raw or semi-finished products and sells them in
23. When raw or intermediate materals or products, such as steel wire, are sold below their
home market price, then used in the manufacture of an end-product and then exported, it is
defined as input (downstream) dumping.
24. When components of an end-product, such as the circuit boards and colour picture tubes
for a colour television set, which need only minor assembling operations are dumped and then
assembled, it is defined as sub-assembly (upstream) dumping. See, R.M. Bierwagen, supra note
9, p53.
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his country or exports to a third country. 25 It should be remembered that
there are no rules governing input dumping in the present GATT Code.
According to the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, it has been clearly
indicated that 'the General Agreement was clear that there was no such
thing as 'secondary dumping'. If one applied the normal GATT test, namely
the domestic price in the country of exportation, then the
conclusion...was that there was no dumping. The fact that certain inputs
had been dumped would not lead to the conclusion that, as far as the final
product was concerned, there had not been normal conditions of trade. The
test of cost of production would also lead to a no dumping conclusion
because there was nothing abnormal in the fact that producers used imports
they could buy in the normal market under normal market condition even if
these normal conditions implied dumping.	 The investigating authorities
had to calculate production costs on the basis of the real costs for the
producer. In these circumstances the reply was clear - at least under the
General Agreement and the Code - there was no dumping and nothing could be
done about it.,26
When anti-dumping measures are applied not on parts or sub-assem-
blies, but on a finished product, the foreign producer or exporter who
25. It was suggested that an injured country should be permitted to impose anti-dumping
duties against an intermediate refining and exporting country whose manufacturers are taking
advantage of the cost benefits of accepting dumped raw material. It should be remembered
that such duties could be imposed only when dumping is established. See, Shi-Ling Hsu,
'Input Dumping and Upstream Subsidies: Trade Loopholes Which Need Closing', (1986) 25 CJTL,
p153.
26. GATT, Analytical Index, Notes on the Drafting, Interpretation and Application of the
Articles of the General Agreement, at VI-3 (1984), reproduced in E. Vermulst & P. Waer,
"Anti-Diversion Rules in Anti-dumping Procedures: Interface or Short-Circuit for the Manage-
ment of Interdependence?", (1990) Plich.J.Int'l L. (vol. 11), p1125. Input dumping is beyond
the scope of this thesis, because, in the Community's anti-dumping regulation, there is no
provision to rule on input dumping.
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wants to avoid or evade the anti-dumping duties can move upstream and start
exporting parts which can be assembled into the finished product in the
importing country 27 or in a third country; the finished product can be
exported to the importing country later. 28 This circumvention conduct has
been rather popular in practice 29
 and has been mainly targeted by the EC.
Dumping of sub-assemblies is likely to occur if there are markets for the
finished product and for parts respectively, and when the finished product
is subject to anti-dumping duties and the parts of this product are expor-
ted and assembled in the importing country or in a third country.	 The
European Community is the first to enact a Regulation against the circum-
vention of anti-dumping by sub-assembly dumping, which will be discussed
later in this thesis."
1.3. New Generation Products.
An exporter has tried to avoid or evade the imposition of anti-
dumping duties on his products by making some functional alterations to it
so that his products no longer fall within the classification of the
product subject to the anti-dumping duties.
In GATT rules, this situation is governed by the 'like product'
definition.	 It seems clear that minor product alterations, for example
the difference between a passenger car and the same car with a radio,
27. This is dealt in sub-title 2. The EC's approach toward circumvention.
28. This will be discussed in sub-title 3. Production in third countries.
29. See, supra note 8.
30. There may be conflict of interests, namely producers or importers of a finished product
enjoy cheap inputs, but they have tried to lobby against cheap competing finished products
through import restrictions. Consumer interests are equated with cheap products, but may be
overridden by other interests as well. All these issues are deeply involved in high unim-
ployment in the West.
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cannot be judged to be different 'like products'.31
New generation products, however, raise serious 'like product'
questions. A compact disc player which is compared to a record player
should be regarded as a 'new generation' product because they have differ-
ent appearance, use and different technology. In the case of semiconduc-
tors, however, it is questionable whether a 16 K Dynamic Random Access
Memory(DRAM)	 chip and a 16 M DRAM chip are still categorised as 'like
product'. 32 The issue of new generation product should be dealt in the
definition of the "like product", because the Community anti-circumvention
rules apply only to products that are introduced into the commerce of the
Community after having been assembled in the Community.33
2. THE EC's APPROACH TOWARD CIRCUMVENTION
2.1. Background
On June 22, 1987, the Council of the European Community adopted
Regulation l761/87,
	 Regulation 2176/84 by introducing a new
article 13 paragraph (10) which is now incorporated in Regulation 2423/88.
Article 13(10) provides that definitive anti-dumping duties can be imposed
on products that are introduced into the commerce of the Community after
having been assembled or produced in the Community. Therefore, this test
31. In case of most consumer branded products, the new and old series will normally not be
regarded to be different 'like products' requiring a completel y different new investigation
of dumping.
32. With respect to current density and future density DRAMs, all densities of DRAMs includ-
ing future densities are one like product. See, DRAMS (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2112/90, OJ
(1990) L 193/1, p2, and DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p15.
33. Article 13(10) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
34. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1761/87, OJ (1987) L 167/9.
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is applied only for decoding anti-circumvention of anti-dumping duties
through production within the EC.35
In order to impose anti-dumping duty on the circumventing parts,
three cumulative prerequisites 36 should be satisfied:
First, the assembly must have been carried out by a party related
or associated with exporters subject to anti-dumping duties. Second, the
EC assembly operation must have been started or substantially increased
after the opening of the anti-dumping investigation. Third, the volume of
parts or materials used in the assembly operation and originating in the
exporting country subject to the anti-dumping duty must exceed the value
of all other parts or materials used by at least 50%.37
In applying this provision, account will be taken of the circum-
stances of each case, and, inter alia, of the variable costs incurred in
the assembly or production operation and of the research and development
carried out and the technology applied within the Community. 38 Based on
this paragraph, the Community authorities enjoy the margin for discretion
to consider the circumstances of each case, including the variable costs,
the research and development, and the technology.
In addition, the third paragraph of Article 13(10)(a) stipulates
that parts or materials suitable for use in the assembly or production of
such products and originating in the country of exportation of the product
subject to the anti-dumping duty can only be considered to be in free
circulation in so far as they will not be used in an assembly or produc-
35. Therefore, in the EC, circumvention of anti-dumping duties through production in third
countries has been governed by the existing rules, such as rules of origin and custome clas-
sification.
36. First paragraph of Article 13(10)(a) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
37. These condition are discussed in title 2.2. in this chapter.
38. Second paragraph of Article 13(10)(a) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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tion operation. In addition, products assembled or produced in the Com-
munity shall be declared to the competent authorities before leaving the
assembly or production plant for their introduction into the commerce of
the Community. 39 This declaration is equivalent to the normal request for
release for free circulation referred to in Article 2 of Council Directive
79/623/EEC."
The rate of anti-dumping duty for products assembled or produced in
the Community must not apply to the total value of the assembled product
but only to the cif value of the parts or materials imported from the
country of the related or associated foreign producer. 41
 However, the
GATT Panel declared that the anti-circumvention duties on the finished
products subject imported parts and materials indirectly to an internal
charge and that they are consequently contrary to Article 111;2, first
sentence42 because like parts and materials of domestic origin are not
subject to any corresponding charges. 43 In addition, the amount of duty
collected shall not exceed the amount which is required to prevent circum-
vention of the anti-dumping duty.44
39. Ibid, Article 13(10)(b).
40. Council Directive 79/623/EEC on the harmonization of provisions laid down by law, or
administrative action relating to custons debt, OJ (1979) L 179/32.
41. Article 13(10)(c) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
42. Article 111:2, first sentence of the GATT provides that the products of the territory of
any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
43. Sub-paragraph 5.9. of the GATT Panel Report.
44. Article 13(10)(c) of the 1988 Regulation.
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2.2. Conditions For Imposing Anti-Circumvention Duty.
2.2.1. The Assembly and Production Carried Out By
Related or Associated Party To An Exporter Subject
To Anti-dumping Duties.45
In spite of the fact that Regulation 2423/88 states in several
cases the concept of a related party or a associated party, 46 there is no
clear concept of a related party or an associated party and those concept
have yet to be defined by the Commission practice. Furthermore, the
distinction between 'related parties' 47 and 'associated parties' is some-
what ambiguous. 48 Nevertheless, it has been approved that anti-circumven-
tion rules are applicable to independent parties as well as to related or
45. Ball bearings, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2089/84, OJ (1984) L 193/1, Electronic typewriters,
Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1, Hydraulic excavators, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No
1877/85, OJ (1985) L 176/1, Electronic scales, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1058/86, OJ (1986) L 97/1,
Plain paper photocopiers, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 535/87, OJ (1987) 54/12, Dot-matrix printers,
Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3651/88, OJ (1988) L 317/33, and Video cassette recorders, Coun.Reg.(EEC)
No 501/89, OJ (1989) L 57/55.
46. Article 2(7) and (8)(b) on normal value and export price, and Article 4(5) on the defini-
tion of Community industry for injury purpose. See Chapter 4 and 5.
47. GATT Doc. No. ADP/M/5, Annex 11(1981) states that companies can be considered to be
related when one controls the other or when both jointly control or are controlled by a third
party, provided there are grounds for believing that the effect of the relationship is such
as to cause the domestic producers to behave differently from those domestic producers who
are not related. See, Article 1(2), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1224/80, on the valuation of goods for
customs purposes, OJ (1980) L 134/2.
48. Companies can be regarded to be associated when there is a contractual arrangement be-
tween thems. In Nachi Fujikoshi Corp. v. Council [1979] ECJ 1363 and 1375, Council insisted
that undertaking which are 'associated in business' means not only undertakings which are
interconnected, but those which maintain other contractual or non-contractual relationship
which create a special link, regardless of the relationship created by the very fact of the
purchase or sale transaction.
187
associated parties. In the Electronic scales, 49 a Dutch company which was
not a subsidiary of an exporter subjected to anti-dumping duties was regar-
ded as being associated because it had 'substantial capital links and
close economic and commercial relations with a Japanese exporter'.
Furthermore, it should be noted that anti-dumping duties may be
imposed on products made in the Community, even if the related or associa-
ted foreign company has never exported the product.	 In the Electronic
typewriters, 50 for instance, even though Matsushita had never exported
complete electronic typewriters to the Community, a duty was imposed on
its assembly operations, i.e., the residual duty which applied to Japanese
products 51
49. Electronic scales (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1021/88, OJ (1988) L 101/1, pl. Definitive
duties were imposed by Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1058/86, OJ (1986) L 97/1, and one exporter con-
cerned challenged the Council Regulation before the Court. Case C-191/86, Tokyo Electric Co.
Ltd v Council, not yet reported.
50. Electronic typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1022/88, OJ (1988) L 101/4, p7.
51. Definitive duties were imposed by Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1, and all
companies in this determination appealed to the ECJ for annulment. Case 56/85, Brother
Industries Ltd v Commission [1988] ECR 5655, Case 250/85, Brother Industries Ltd v Council
[1988] ECR 5683, Joined cases 277 and 300/85, Canon Inc. and Others v Council [1988] ECR
5731, Case 301/85, Sharp Corporation v Council [1988] ECR 5813, Case 260/85, TEC v. Council
[1988] ECR 5855, and Joined cases 273/85 and 107/86, Silver Seiko Ltd and Others v Council
[1988] ECR 5927. Application against the Commission was dismissed and application for an
order suspending the final duties was denied.
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2.2.2. Starting Up or Substantial Increase
After the Opening of Anti-dumping Investigation.52
The start or increase in assembly or production may very well
happen after the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty. 53
 Further-
more, there is neither a clear definition of 'substantial increase', nor
any legal guidelines.
In Photocopiers, 54 both canon assembly operations in Bretagne and
Giessen had shown 30% increase in production. But increase in production
in Giessen followed a period of small increase (4.6%) in production.
Nonetheless, the Community stated that it would not be reasonable to
consider the respective increase at the canon plants as constituting less
than substantive increase.55
In Ball bearings, 56 both companies, NSK Bearing Ltd in UK which is
52. Electronic scales, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1021/88, OJ (1988) L 101/1, pl, Electronic typewri-
ters, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1022/88, OJ (1988) L 101/4, p5, Hydraulic excavators, Com.Dec.(EEC)
88/225/EEC, OJ (1988) L 101/24, p25, and Dot-matrix printers, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3042/89, OJ
(1989) L 291/52, p53. In these determinations, the companies concerned started their assemb-
ly operations after the initiation of original anti-dumping investigations.
53. In Plain paper photocopiers, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3205/88, OJ (1988) L 284/36, p37, two
companies of nine comppanies concerned, Olivetti and Develop, and in Ball bearings, Com.Dec.
89/57/EEC, OJ (1989) L 25/90, p90, all companies referred to in this determination had assem-
bled PPCs independently prior to the initiation of the original anti-dumping investigations.
54. Plain paper photocopiers, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3205/88, OJ (1988) L 284/36, p37. Definitive
duties was imposed by Coun.Reg.(EEC) 535/87, OJ (1987) L 54/12. Most companies in this
determination brought actions against Council before the ECJ. Case C-171/87, Canon Inc. v
Council, [1992] ECR 1-1237; Case C-172/87, Mita Industrial Co. Ltd v Council, [1992] ECR I-
1301; Case C-174/87, Ricoh v Council, [1992] ECR 1-1335; Case 175/87, Matsushita Electric Co.
Ltd v Council, [1992] ECR 1-1409; Case C-176/87, Konishiroku Photo Industry Co. Ltd v Coun-
cil, [1992] ECR 1-1493; Case C-177/87, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, [1992] ECR 1-1535;
Case C-178/87, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd v Council, [1992] ECR 1-1577; and Case C-179/87, Sharp
Corporation v Council, [1992] ECR 1-1635.
55. Ibid, p38.
56. Ball bearing (Japan), Com.Dec.89/57/EEC, OJ (1989) L 25/90, p90.
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related to Nippon Seiko KK and NTN Kugellagerfabrik in Germany which is
related to NTN Tokyo Bearing Co. Ltd., were found to have established
assembly or production plants for ball bearings in the Community prior to
the opening of the relevant anti-dumping investigation and, for both these
plants, it was claimed that no substantial increase in quantities assem-
bled had occurred since the date of the initiation of the proceedings. It
was, however, established that, at both plants, the volume of ball bear-
ings assembled increased by more than 24% in the year following the open-
ing of the original investigation, and that, if the subsequent year were
used as the basis, the increases in both cases were found to be more than
40% for the two year period. These increases followed a period of rela-
tive stability in production from 1980 to 1983 inclusive, during which the
number of ball bearings produced over the four year period increased by
only 2.3% in one case and not at all in the other. Thus, it could have
been regarded as substantial increase in production under Article
13(10)(a).57
A major concern on this point is that a decision to start or in-
crease in production requires planning or substantial lead time prior to
the opening of such proceedings. 58
 Even if it is true that these 'start-
ing' or 'substantial increase' conditions to a certain degree protect
long-standing foreign investment in the Community, they could bring on a
57. Ibid, p91.
58. It is not easy to determine when an assembly operation begins. See, Case C-26/88, Bro-
ther Int'l GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Giessen, [1989] ECR 4253, at 4278, for an interpretation of
Article 6 of Regulation 802/68. In its judgment, the Court held that the mere assembly of
previously manufactured parts originating in a country differet from that in which they were
assembled is sufficient to confer on the resulting pproduct the origin of country in which
assembly took place, provided that such assembly represents the decisive production stage
during which the use to which the component parts are to be put becomes definite and the
goods in question are given their specific qualities.
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freezing of a bona fide investment decisions to commence or augment pro-
duction in Europe because of a fear that such expansion or establishment
might be regarded as circumvention.59
2.2.3. More Than 50% of the Value of Parts or Materials 60
Originating in the Exporting Country.
This condition which imposes 'buy-European' or a maximum content
requirement is perhaps the core factor of the anti-circumvention rules,
because according to Article 13(10)(a), subparagraph 3 of the Regulation,
if parts or materials which are used in the assembly or production opera-
tions, originating in the country of exportation of the product account
for less than 60% of the total value of those in the finished products,
this provision will not apply. 61 In Dot-matrix printers, the anti-dumping
duty was not extended to some printers assembled in the Community because
the weighted average value of Japanese parts or materials was found not to
exceed the value of all other parts or materials used by at least 50%.62
59. R.M. Bierwagen, GATT Article VI and the Protectionist Bias in Anti-dumping Laws, Kluwer
Law and Taxation Publishers, Denver & Boston, 1990, p68.
60. Value of parts and materials from the country of export is determined on an into-EC-
factory', duty paid basis. This includes freight and all related costs incurred in deliver-
ing the product to the factory concerned which is located in the Community. See, Electronic
typewriters, OJ (1988) L 101/4, at 5, Electronic scales, OJ (1988) L 101/1, at 2, and Plain
paper photocopiers, OJ (1988) L 284/36, at 38.
61. If the weighted average value of parts originating in the country of exportation of the
product were found to be less than 60%, it is considered inappropriate to extend the anti-
dumping duty to the product. See, Electronic scale, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1021/88, OJ (1988) L
101/1, p2. Electronic typewriters, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1022/88, OJ (1988) L 101/4, p5. Hydrau-
lic excavators, Com.Dec.88/225/EEC, OJ (1988) L 101/24, p25. 	 Plain paper photocopiers,
Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3205/88, OJ (1988) L 284/36, p37.
	
Ball bearings, Com.Dec.89/57/EEC, OJ
(1989) L 25/90, p91. It has been, therefore, referred to as the 60/40 provision.
62. Dot-matrix printers, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3042/89, OJ (1989) L 291/52, p53.
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If producers are related to the exporters or importers or are
themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product, the term 'Community
industry' may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers."
However, in Photocopiers," in spite of the fact that one complainant
(Rank Xerox's UK assembly plants) added only between 20 and 35% to the
value of the total product in the Community, it was considered part of the
Community industry.65
	
As a result, the Community has applied stricter
rules to a subsidiary of a foreign supplier even if they had have more
European content than products sold by companies which had brought the
anti-dumping complaint." Strictly speaking, 50% of the total value must
be of Community or third country origin in order for the product not to be
included in the anti-circumvention proceeding.
This condition contains very delicate problems because of the
necessity of deciding the origin of the parts or materials. EC practice
in deciding origin of parts or subassemblies manufactured in the EC has
varied significantly.
In some determinations, 67
 the Commission decided origin depending on
producers of the parts or subassemblies.
	 If the producer who is under
63. Article 5 of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
64. Plain paper photocopiers, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 535/87, OJ (1987) L 54/12, p. In this deter-
mination, the Commission decided to include EC producers in the categories of the Community
industry not relying on origin rules or parts requirement, but rather on ambiguous reasons
such as the foreign invester's or their related parties' intentions to increase local value-
added or their long-term contribution to investment and employment in the Community.
65. Plain paper photocopiers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 535/87, OJ (1987) L 54/12, para. 55.
66. The Commission took the view that the operations by the complainant were not substantial-
ly increased (by only 4%) after the opening of the anti-dumping investigation. See, Photo-
copiers, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3205/88, OJ (1988) L 284/36, p37, para. 8.
67. Electronic scales, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1058/86, OJ (1986) L 97/1, and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No
1021/88, OJ (1988) L 101/1, p2. Hydraulic excavators, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1877/85, OJ (1985) L
176/1, and Com.Dec.88/225/EEC, OJ (1988) L 101/24, p25.
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investigation or related to such producer manufactured the parts and
subassemblies, and if the value of sub-parts was included in the value of
parts or subassemblies, the cost of this 'in-house' assembly, i.e. assemb-
ly by the company under investigation, is not to be included in the value
of parts or materials.68
This position of the Community was changed significantly in Photo-
copiers." In this determination, however, the Commission granted a
request to include in-house cost of production of certain sub-parts in the
value of other parts or materials based on 'destruction theory 1 . 7° The
acceptance of costs of production was followed in the Ball bearings 71 and
the Printer72 proceedings.
It may be argued whether the Community is consistent in valuation
on the treatment of 'cost of assembly' of parts from various sources. In
particular, as has been discussed above, sub-assembly costs included in
parts from the exporting country have been treated very differently from
sub-assembly costs in the value of parts sourced in-house or from indepen-
dent suppliers in the EC or in some cases third Countries.
68. Electronic scales, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1021/88, OJ (1988) L 101/1, p2. However, if the
producer who is an independent producer manufactured the parts or materials, and if the parts
and material had acquired European origin in the production process, the whole parts would be
treated as European.
69. Plain paper photocopiers, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3205/88, OJ (1988) L 284/36, p38.
70. If a part could be dismantled without destroying any of the sub-parts, according to this
theory, it was considered to be subassembly. If , however, in dismantling a part, one or
more sub-parts would be destroyed, it would be regarded as a single part, thus 'in-house'
assembly costs would included in the value of parts or materials.
71. Ball bearings(Japan), Com.Dec.89/57/EEC, OJ (1989) L 25/90, p91.
72. Serial-Impact Dot-Metrix Printers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3042/89, OJ (1989) L 291/53,
p53.
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2.2.4. Other Relevant Circumstances.
Regarding the consistency of the approaches of the Community author-
ities, the wide discretion conferred upon them is worthy of attention,
because this discretionary power is involved in several crucial parts of
the Regulation. The Regulation should define some concepts in more de-
tails, for example, when parties are to be considered as related or asso-
ciated, and what is meant by substantial increase in production.
In applying those three conditions, account shall be taken of
additional factors, according to the second paragraph of Article 13(10)(a)
of the Regulation.
In assessing other circumstances, one of the additional factors
which has been frequently argued by the foreign investor accused of
'screwdriving' and to which the Community authorities may give favourable
treatment, is that it was impossible to find sources of supply in the
Community which could guarantee quality. 73 The Community, however, has
not accepted this claim on the grounds that 'this assertion appears to
confuse the distinct issue of quality and technical specifications since
Community producers of PPCs of comparable quality to those of the compa-
nies concerned source their parts in the Community and have proved that it
is not indispensable to use parts predominantly of Japanese origin'.74
As to the labour market in the EC, the effect on companies under
investigation is regarded to be negative on the grounds that the companies
investigated only carry out assembly operations, whereas the Community
producers normally have an integrated, in-depth production which requires
73. Plain paper photocopiers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3205/88, OJ (1988) L 284/36, p39, and
Electronic typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1022/88, OJ (1988) L 101/4, p6.
74. Plain paper photocopiers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3205/88, OJ (1988) L 284/36, p39.
There may be some exceptional cases, for example, all European producers of microwave ovens
currently depend on imports from Japan or Korea for the major part, the magnetron.
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more personnel.	 Furthermore, the increased sales of assembled products
result in decreased sales by the Community producers, causing a net loss
of employment in the Community.75
If carrying out of research and development or transferring techno-
logy is claimed by the companies under investigations, it can be expected
that the Community authorities may decide not to apply the anti-circum-
vention rules. 76 The claim of technology transfer, however, has been
rejected on the ground that the amount of technology transferred was
minimal and related merely to assembly. 77 From 1987 to 1989, the Commun-
ity relied on this importing country circumvention as a main issue to
apply a maximum local content requirement until a GATT panel ruled in 1990
that this EC's 60/40 rule violated GATT rules.78
75. Electronic scales (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1021/88, OJ (1988) L 101/1, p2, and uphelded
by Plain paper photocopiers determination, Ibid, p39.
76. In most anti-circumvention determinations, R&D activities and technology transfer were
denied by the Community authorities. See, Electronic scales (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) NO
1021/88, OJ (1988) L 101/1, p2. Electronic typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1022/88, OJ
(1988) L 101/4, p7. Plain paper photocopiers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3205/88, OJ (1988) L
284/36, p 39. Dot-matrix printer (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3042/89, OJ (1989) L 291/52, p54.
77. Electronic typewriters (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1022/88, OJ (1988) L 101/4, p6, and
uphelded by the Plain paper photocopiers determination, Ibid, p39.
78. Sub-paragraph 6.2. of the GATT Panel Report. The Panel report concluded that the deci-
sion of the EEC to suspend proceeding under Article 13(10) conditional on undertakings by
enterprises in the EEC to limit the use of parts or materials originating in Japan in their
assembly or production operations, was inconsistent with Article 111:4 and not justified by
Article XX(d) of the General Agreement.
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3. PRODUCTION IN THIRD COUNTRIES
3.1. Introduction
One of the basic questions is what criterion should be used, in
determining dumping and imposing anti-dumping duties to country of export
or country of origin. Depending on Article 2(3) 79 of the GATT Code,
country of origin and country of export have not necessarily coincided.
From the viewpoint of anti-circumvention, it seems that there are very
delicate problems. First of all, Article 2(3) of the GATT Code is an
exception to its Article 2(1) 80 . Therefore the concept of dumping should
be redefined if there are alternatives in normal value. If the exporting
country is the only criterion, anti-dumping duties are easily evaded by
selecting a low normal value exporting country.
3.2. Third Country Production
A foreign producer or exporter might avoid the imposition of anti-
79. Article 2(3) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that 'in the case where products are
not imported directly from the country of origin but are exported to the country of importa-
tion from an intermediate country, the price at which the products are sold from the country
of export to the country of importation shall normally be compared with the comparable price
in the country of export'. However, comparison may be made with the price in the country of
origin, if, for example, the products are merely transshipped through the country of export,
or such products are not produced in the country of export, or there is no comparable price
for them in the country of export.
80. Article 2(1) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that 'for the purpose of this code a
product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one
country to another country is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country'.
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dumping duties simply by moving its manufacturing plant to and exporting
from a third country which is free from an anti-dumping duty or is covered
by significantly lower anti-dumping duties. Therefore, this third country
production may put the foreign producer in a advantageous position to cope
with any future dumping investigation even though it cannot be a permanent
shelter.
The most controversial patterns of third country production are
cases in which the producer in third country simply assembles parts origi-
nating in the country subject to anti-dumping duties. In this case, it
can be argued that products from third country should be subjected to
anti-dumping duties without conducting a separate dumping investigation.81
A maximum imported content requirement in Article 13(10) (a) of the
Regulation in fact plays an important role as a rule of origin specially
designed for the purpose of imposing anti-circumvention duties as wel1.82
One of the objectives of rules of origin in international trade law, is to
decide where is the real place of production of certain products. Indeed,
anti-dumping duties do only apply to products exported from certain coun-
tries listed in the anti-dumping law. Foreign producers or exporters will
therefore try to avoid or evade the imposition of anti-dumping duties
simply by production in and then exporting from certain third countries
81. In Colour TV receivers, Com.Reg.(EC) No 2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p57, the Commission
took the view that the CTVs assembled in Turkey were treated for the purpose of establishing
the normal value, as if they had been produced in Korea by the Korean producer.
82. Fulfilment of those conditions provided in Article 13(10)(a), however, does not guarantee
an automatic imposition of anti-circumvention duties, because the first paragraph of this
provision stipulates that definitive anti-dumping duties may be imposed, not shall be im-
posed, even if more than 60% of the parts or materials value is originating in the exporting
countries. For this reason, the EC authorities enjoy the discretion not to impose anti-
circumvention duties. These discretionary factors, as discussed already, are listed in the
other relevant circumstances which is provided in the third paragraph of Article 13(10)(a).
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which are not covered by the imposition of an anti-dumping duties. Then,
for the purpose of the implementation of anti-dumping measures, a certain
product will be analysed by rules of origin.83
According to Article 13(7) of the Regulation, in the absence of any
special provisions to the contrary adopted when a definitive or provision-
al anti-dumping duty was imposed, the rules on the common definition of the
concept of origin shall apply. Thus the Community authorities have relied
on the origin rules 84 provided in Regulation 802/68.85
3.3. Origin in the Context of an Anti-dumping Law
Article 5 of Council Regulation 802/68 86 provides that: a product
in the production of which two or more countries concerned will be regar-
ded as originating in the country in which the last substantial process or
operation that is economically justified is performed, having been carried
out in an undertaking equipped for the purpose, and resulting in the
manufacture of a new product or representing an important stage of man-
83. In intra-Community trade, the problem of certain products' origin arises only where a
product from a particular country is subject to a quota in one member state and the Commis-
sion may authorise that member state to take necessary protective measures, including limita-
tion of free circulation in the Community, in accordance with Article 115 of the EEC Treaty.
84. Origin rules can be divided into two broad parts: preferential and non-preferential rules
of origin. The preferential rules of origin serve to decide whether preferential treatment
to imports from certain third countries provided in the trading arrangement is applicable,
while in other cases, the non-preferential origin rules apply. As a result, origin rules of
the Community apply to its external trade with countries without preferential trading arran-
gement such as Japan, the United States and Korea.
85. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 802/68, OJ (1968) L 148/1, as amended by Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 1318/71, OJ (1971) L 139/6.
86. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 802/68 on the Common Definition of the Concept of the Origin of Goods,
OJ (1968) L 148/1.
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ufacture.
Article 6 of Council Regulation 802/68 87 containing an anticircum-
vention provision provides that: any process or work in respect of which
it is established, or in respect of which the facts as ascertained justify
the presumption, that its sole object was to circumvent the provisions
applicable in the Community or the Member States to goods from specific
countries shall in no case be considered, under Article 5, as conferring
on the goods thus produced the origin of the country where carried out.
One of the main objects of provisions quoted above is to make sure
that origin is not bestowed by operations which are designed to circumvent
the anti-dumping provisions applicable in the Community to product from
certain countries. Furthermore according to those provisions, which are
very different from a maximum content requirement in the anti-dumping law,
any product originating in production that is not a screwdriving operation
will most likely be regarded as a product 'made in Europe'.
In some determinations, 88
 the Community has been willing to com-
mence a new anti-dumping proceedings in order to decide whether products
from the exporting country really had that exporting country's origin. In
two determinations, Ball bearings89 and	 Electronic typewriters, 90 the
Commission terminated anti-dumping proceedings, stating that the operations
carried out in Thailand and Taiwan were not sufficient to confer Thai or
Taiwanese origin, although the ball bearings or electronic typewriters
referred to were shipped from such countries to the Community. Especial-
87. Ibid.
88. Small screen colour televisions (Korea), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1048/90, OJ (1989) L 107/56,
and Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan and U.K.), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1251/91, OJ (1991) L
119/35.
89. Certain ball bearings (Thailand), Com.Dec.85/158/EEC, OJ (1985) L 59/30 (termination).
90. Electronic typewriters (Taiwan), Com.Dec.86/193/EEC, OJ (1986) L 140/52 (termination).
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ly, ball bearings from Thailand were not conferred Thai origin within the
meaning of Commission Regulation No.1836/78.91
In Electronic typewriters from Taiwan, Brother in Brother Interna-
tional GmbH challenged against this decision 92
 indirectly, and the Court,
supporting the position of the Commission, held that 'the assembly is
sufficient to confer on the resulting product the origin of the country in
which assembly took place, if from a technical point of view and having
regard to the definition of the goods in question such assembly repre-
sents the decisive production stage during which the use to which the
component parts are to be put become definite and the goods in question
are given their specific qualities'.93
Therefore, if the product has not acquired third country origin in
the assembly process, it continues to have the origin of the genuine
exporting country, and then any anti-dumping duties applicable to the
producer in genuine exporting country will be applied to the product
coming from a third country.94
91. Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1836/78 concerning the determination of the origin of ball, roller or
needle roller bearings, OJ (1978) L 210/49. The Commission has also enacted certain product-
specific Regulations under Regulation 802/68. These regulations define more precisely the
criteria for origin in the case of the specific products concerned. These regulations in-
clude: Com.Reg.(EEC) No 37/70, OJ (1970) L 7/6 (spare parts); Com.Reg.(EEC) No 288/89, OJ
(1989) L 33/23 (integrated circuits).
92. Brother challenged this decision directly on the basis of Article 173(2) of the EEC
Treaty. This direct action, however, was declared inadmissible by the Court. Case 229/86,
Brother Industries LTD and Others v Commission [1987] ECR 3757, at 3762.
93. Case C-26/88, Brother International GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Giessen, ECR [1989] 4253, at
4283.
94. In Colour TV receivers (Korea, Malaysia, China, Singapore, Thailand), Com.Reg.(EC) No
2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50, p57, the Commission repeated this view and took the view that
the CTVs assembled in Turkey were treated as if they had been produced in Korea by the Korean
producer, because all the sets produced by this Turkish company and exported to the Community
were found to be of Korean origin.
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4. COMPATIBILITY OF THE EC ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION RULES
WITH GATT PROVISIONS
4.1. General Developments
In 1988, after a series of anti-circumvention determinations on
Japanese products, a GATT Panel 95 was instituted at the request of Japan
in order to scrutinise the GATT-consistency of the EC anti-circumvention
rules.
The Panel examined the GATT compatibility of:
(1) the imposition of duties under Article 13(10);
(2) the acceptance of undertakings under Article 13(10);
(3) Article 13(10) itself; and
(4) the non-publication of criteria for accepting part undertakings
and the administration of the rules of origin for parts and
materials 96
95. The Panel members were J. Greenwald (USA, chairman), T. Grosser (New Zealand) and C.
Thomas (Canada). See, Trade Policy: The European Commission's Objection to the Conclusion of
the GATT Panel on the "Screwdriver" Aspect of the Anti-dumping Policy, Agence Europe No
5235, at 7 (Apr. 13, 1990).
96. The Panel held that the issue of whether the administration of the anti-circumvention
provision is consistent with Article X is no longer relevant because the anti-circumvention
duties and the acceptance of parts undertakings are inconsistent with Article 111:2 and 4,
and not justifiable under Article XX(d). See, subparagraph 5.27. of the GATT Panel Report.
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On 22 March 1990, the GATT Panel communicated to the Community and
Japan97 that it had found that the EC anti-circumvention measures taken
under Article 13(10) were in violation of GATT. Therefore, in this thesis,
each of the above issues will be examined in the light of the provisions
of the GATT, and then GATT compatibility of the anti-circumvention rules
in the light of the exception in the GATT will be discussed.
4.2. The Imposition of Anti-Circumvention Duties
4.2.1. Are Anti-circumvention Duties, Customs Duties?
The issue argued with regard to the anti-circumvention duties, was
whether the anti-circumvention duties could be considered to be either
duties imposed on or in connection with importation within the meaning of
Article 11:1(b) 98 or internal taxes within the meaning of Article 111:299
97. E. Vermulst, "Commercial Defence Actions and Other Int'l Trade Developments in the Eur-
opean Communities II: 1 July 1989 - 30 June 1990", 2 EJIL (1990), p167. The Community
blocked the adoption of the Panel Report at the GATT Council meeting of April 3, 1990.
However, the Community lifted its blockade to the adoption of the Panel Report in the GATT
Council meeting of May 16, 1990. See, E. Vermulst & P. Waer, supra note 26, p1183.
98. Article II:1(b) of the GATT provides that the products decribed in Part I of the Schedule
relating to any contracting party, which are the products of territories of other contracting
parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and
subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from
ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for therein. Such products
shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly
and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing
territory on that date.
99. Article 111:2 of the GATT provides that the products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, dir-
ectly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.
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of the GATT.100
The Panel made clear that the anti-circumvention duties, based on
Article 13(10 ), 101 are imposed not on imported parts or materials but on
the finished products assembled in the Community, and not imposed condi-
tional upon the importation of a product or at the time or point of impor-
.tation. 102 As a result, the anti-circumvention duties are not regarded as
customs duties. However the Community argued that the anti-circumvention
duties should be regarded as customs duties with the reason that the
purpose of these duties is to eliminate circumvention of anti-dumping
duties on finished products and that they are identical in nature to anti-
dumping duties.1"
The Panel disagreed. The Panel determined that the relevant fact,
according to the text of Article I, II, III and the Note to Article III,
is not the policy purpose attributed to the charges but, rather, whether
the charge is due on importation or at the time or point of importation.
Therefore, the policy purpose of the charge is not relevant to determining
the issue of whether the charge is imposed in connection with importation
within the meaning of Article II:1(b). 104
The basic objective underlying Article II and III, namely that
discrimination against products from other Contracting parties should only
take the form of ordinary customs duties imposed on or in connection with
importation and not the form of internal taxes, could not be achieved,
because the Community treats imported parts and materials subject to anti-
100. Subparagraph 5.4. of the GATT Panel Report.
101. Article 13(10) of the Community Regulation provides that definitive anti-dumping duties
may be imposed on products that are introduced into the commerce of the Community after
having been assembled in the Community.
102. Subparagraph 5.5. of the GATT Panel Report.
103. Ibid.
104. Subparagrapph 5.6. of the GATT Panel Report.
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circumvention duties as not being 'in free circulation'. 105 	Therefore,
the anti-circumvention duties are not levied 'on or in connection with
importation' and consequently do not constitute customs duties within the
meaning of Article 11:1(b).'06
4.2.2. If not, Could the Anti-Circumvention Duties be
Justifiable under Article XX(d)107?
The EC argued that anti-circumvention duties are not anti-dumping
duties, but measures designed to prevent circumvention of anti-dumping
duties, and therefore, Article 13(10) is necessary within the meaning of
Article XX(d). 108 In other words, adoption or enforcement of anti-
circumvention measures is necessary to secure compliance with the Council
Regulation No 2423/88 and the regulations imposing definitive anti-dumping
duties on the importation of the finished products which are not inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this Agreement.
However, in order for an anti-circumvention measure to be justified
by Article XX(d), it must secure compliance with laws and regulationsl"
105. Third paragraph of Article 13(10) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
106. Sub-paragraph 5.8. of the GATT Panel Report.
107. Article XX(d) of the GATT provides that ... , nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures necessary to
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopo-
lies, the protection of patents, trade marks and coppyrights, and the prevention of deceptive
practices'.
108. Subparagraph 5.11. of the GATT Panel Report.
109. Laws and regulations include only the individual regulations imposing definitive anti-
dumping duties because the general anti-dumping regulation of the Community does not estab-
lish obligations that require enforcement. See, sub-paragraph 5.18. of the GATT Panel Re-
port.
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that are not inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT. 110 As a re-
sult, in order to be justified by Article XX(d), the anti-circumvention
measure is to secure compliance with laws or regulations, namely the indi-
vidual regulations imposing definitive anti-dumping duties. It could not
be established, however, that the anti-circumvention duties 'secure com-
pliance with' obligations under the Community anti-dumping regulations,
for two reasons.
First, the text of Article XX(d) merely covers measures to secure
compliance with laws or regulations, or measures designed to prevent
actions that would be illegal under laws or regulations, and not with
their objective,
Second,
 the qualification 'to secure compliance under laws and
regulations, should be construed to mean not 'to ensure the attainment of
the objectives of the laws and regulations' but 'to enforce obligations
under laws and regulations'. 112
 Therefore, the Community would be permit-
ted to act inconsistently with the GATT whenever such inconsistency is
necessary to ensure that the obligations which the Community may impose
consistently with the GATT, under its laws or regulations, are effectively
enforced. However, the anti-circumvention duties, i.e. measures, do not
serve to enforce the payment of anti-dumping duties, i.e. laws and regula-
tions which are not inconsistent with the GATT. Therefore, the anti-
circumvention duties could not be justified under Article XX(d) of the
GATT. 113
110. Subparagraph 5.14. of the GATT Panel Report.
111. Subparagraph 5.16. of the GATT Panel Report.
112. Subparagraph 5.17. of the GATT Panel Report.
113. Subparagraph 5.18. of the GATT Panel Report.
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4.3. Acceptance of Undertakings
During the period between the adoption of Article 13(10) in June
1987 and the establishment of the Panel in October 1988, investigations
under Article 13(10) resulted in the imposition of duties on products
assembled in the Community in eight cases, and in the acceptance of under-
takings in seven cases which led to the revocation of the duties initially
imposed. 114 These undertakings related to changes in the sourcing of
parts and materials used in assembly operations in the Community. 115
Therefore, it could be argued whether the acceptance of undertakings to
limit the use of imports parts and materials is inconsistent with Article
111:4 of the GATT. 116
The panel suggested that not only requirements which an enterprise
is legally bound to carry out, but also those which an enterprise volun-
114. Electronic typewriters, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1329/88, OJ (1988) L 123/31, Com.Dec.
88/300/EEC, OJ (1988) L 128/39, Com.Dec.88/387/EEC, OJ (1988) L 183/1, Com.Dec.88/387/EEC, OJ
(1988) L 183/39, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2329/88, OJ (1988) 203/1 and Com.Dec.88/424/EEC, OJ (1988)
L 203/25, Electronic scales, Com.Dec.88/398/EEC, OJ (1988) L 189/27, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No
2735/88, OJ (1988) L 244/1, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 502/89, OJ (1989) L 58/1, Plain paper photocop-
iers, Com.Dec.88/638/EEC, OJ (1988) L 355/66, Dot-matrix printers, Com.Dec. 89/543/EEC, OJ
(1989) L 291/57, and Com.Dec.89/596/EEC, OJ (1989) L 340/25.
115. Dot-matrix printers (Japan), Com.Dec.899/543/EEC, OJ (1989) L 291/57, p58 and 59, the
Commission accepted the undertakings because the weighted average value of Japanese parts or
materials was found not to exceed the value of all other parts or materials used by at least
50%, and therefore, the change in the sourcing of parts and materials of assembly operations
in the Community was sufficient.
116. Article 111:4 of the GATT provides that the products of the territory of any contractiing
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment
no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, pur-
chase, transfortation, distribution or use.
206
tarily accepts in order to obtain an advantage from the government117
constitute requirements within the meaning of Article 111:4 of the
GATT. 118
Therefore, the decisions of the Community to suspend proceedings
under Article 13(10) conditional on undertakings by enterprises in the
Community to limit the use of parts or materials originating in Japan in
their assembly operations are inconsistent with Article 111:4 of the
GATT. 119
4.4. Article 13(10) Itself
It could be argued whether the anticircumvention provision itself
violates the Community's obligations under the GATT, if all measures taken
under Article 13(10) are inconsistent with GATT. It should be noted,
however, that the anti-circumvention provision does not mandate the impo-
sition of duties or other measures by the Community authorities: it merely
authorises the Community authorities to take certain actions. Therefore,
legislation merely giving the executive authorities the possibility to act
inconsistently with GATT provision, cannot constitute a violation of that
provision.
As a result, the Panel concluded that although it would be desir-
able if the Community were to withdraw Article 13(10), the Community would
meet its obligation under the GATT if it were to cease to apply the anti-
117. The consequence of not offering an undertaking, or of withdrawing an existing undertak-
ing, can be the continuation of procedures that may lead to the imposition of the anti-
circumvention duties, according to Article 10 (1) and (6) of the Community anti-dumping regu-
lation.
118. Subparagraph 5.21. fo the GATT Panel Report.
119. Ibid.
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circumvention provision in respect of contracting parties)-2°
5. CONCLUSION
The Community applies different sets of rules to production opera-
tions within the Community 121
 and production operations in third coun-
tries 122
 in order to prevent diversion operations. As a result, products
which are manufactured in the Community and for which the Community origin
certificates have been obtained may nevertheless fail the maximum imported
content requirement. 123
In addition, not only the anti-circumvention duties imposed by the
Community under Article 13(10) of the Community anti-dumping regulation on
products assembled within the Community by the related party to the expor-
ter of products subjected to anti-dumping duties, 124 but also the decisions
of the Community to suspend proceedings under Article 13(10) conditional
on undertakings by companies in the Community to limit the use of parts or
materials originating in exporting countries in their assembly, are incon-
sistent with the first sentence of Article 111:2, and not justified by
Article XX(d) of the GATT.125
Nonetheless, the Community stated that it would not amend its anti-
circumvention rules until it saw the outcome of the talks on dumping and
circumvention on the Uruguay Round trade talks. 126
 However, it has failed
120. Subparagraph 5.26. of the GATT Panel Report.
121. Article 13(10) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
122. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 802/68, on the Common Definition of the Concept of the Origin of
Goods, OJ (1968)L 148/1.
123. Article 13(10)(a) of the Community anti-dumping regulation.
124. Subparagraph 6.1. of the GATT Panel Report.
125. Subparagraph 6.2. of the GATT Panel Report.
126. Dullforce, "EC Defers to Screwdriver Ruling", Financial Times, May 17, 1990, p4.
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to reach consensus on the anti-circumvention issue and the concept of
"like product" was not changed in the Uruguay Round.127 It remains to be
seen whether the Community will amend its anti-circumvention provisions in
its 1988 anti-dumping regulation. Whether or not it does so, it should
always be remembered that anti-dumping duties can only be imposed where
dumping and resulting injury is established, and finding of dumping and
resulting injury with regard to a finished product cannot be extended to
its parts and subassemblies unless there has been a separate determination
that the parts are actually dumped and thereby have caused injury to the
domestic production of the "like product", i.e., the parts in the import-
ing country. 128
127. Commission, Proposal for a Coun.Dec. concerning the conclusion of the results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-94), COM(94) 143 final.
128. GATT, Report by the Panel, EEC-Japan, Regulation on imports of part and components. E.
Vermulst & P. Waer, supra note 26, p1186. R.M. Bierwagen, supra note 9, p 62-65.
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Chapter 7 : RELIEF AND REVIEW SYSTEMS
I. RELIEF
The Anti-dumping Regulation provides three types of relief which may
be ordered by Community authorities: undertakings, provisional anti-dumping
duties, and definitive anti-dumping duties. In 1994, the Community had 151
measures in force. Of 151 measures, 128 were in the form of duties and 23
in the form of undertakings. 1 Of all measures in force 57, or 37.7% of
the total, were imposed against the state trading countries including
China with 26 measures. The other countries most involved were Japan with
16 measures, Republic of Korea with 12 and Turkey with 8.
1. UNDERTAKINGS
Undertakings are offers from importers or exporters of dumped
products and concern revision of prices or cessation of exports to the
extent that the Commission is satisfied that either the dumping margin or
the injurious effects of the dumping are eliminated.2
During recent years imposition of anti-dumping duties has been
adopted more frequently, even though undertakings have played a very
1. Commission, 13th anti-dumping report (1994), CON(95) 309 final, p7, (hereinafter referred
to as "anti-dumping report"). It is worth bearing in mind that these measures only affect
0.71% of total imports to the Community although substantial in relation to numbers of in-
vestigations.
2. This definition of undertakings does not include voluntary restraint agreements between
the Community and exporting country government, or between industries. An analysis of these
agreements is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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important role in the Community Anti-dumping proceedings. 3	It is well
demonstrated by the fact that the Commission did not terminate any invest-
igations solely on the acceptance of price undertakings in 1992. However,
some cases were terminated by the acceptance of undertakings as well as
imposition of duties simultaneously. 4 Not only in 1992, but also in 1988,
no investigations were concluded by the acceptance of price undertakings.
This does not mean, however, that undertakings were not accepted at all.
If certain exporters refuse to co-operate during the investigation, it is
also the practice of the Community to apply duties in respect of all
imports from a specific country and to exclude from the duty those imports
from exporters who have co-operated in the investigation and have offered
an acceptable price undertaking.5
1.1. The Procedural Aspects of an Undertaking
The Community authorities enjoy a wide discretion in this field of
undertakings because they may terminate the investigation without the
imposition of duties only where the Commission considers that the under-
takings offered by the exporters are acceptable. 6 It should be noted that
even though in the determination in Plain paper photocopiers, the Council
declared that it is the Community's traditional practice not to accept
3. During the period 1988-1991, a total of 123 investigations were concluded. Among them 65
investigations were concluded by imposition of definitive duties, while only 17 investiga-
tions were concluded by acceptance of price undertaking.
4. Thermal paper, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 729/92, OJ (1992) L 81/1, and Ferro-silicon, Coun.Reg.
(EEC) No 3642/92, OJ (1992) L 369/1.
5. In Oxalic acid (Korea and Taiwan), Com.Dec.88/353/EEC, OJ (1988) L 160/63, p63, and Coun.
Reg. (EEC) No 2089/88, OJ (1988) L 184/1, p2, price undertakings were accepted from exporters
even though the investigations were concluded by the imposition of definitive duties.
6. Article 10(5) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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undertakings from importers, however, it did not respect its own tradi-
tional practice in Outboard motors. 7 In Technointorg, the Court, citing
the Ballbearing case, 8
 confirmed that Article 10 gives the Commission
discretion to accept or reject undertaking.9
The termination of an investigation as a result of an undertaking
offered should be decided in conformity with the procedure provided for in
Article 9(1), as have discussed above. 10 However, for the termination of
a proceeding with an acceptance of undertaking, the Commission should know
the existence of dumping and injury caused thereby. Therefore, undertak-
ings are likely to be negotiated after on-the-spot verification by the
Community authorities, even though they are offered during the course of
an investigation. Furthermore, it is the Commission's practice to make a
final determination that dumping has caused injury to a industry in the
Community before it accepts an undertaking. The acceptance of undertak-
ings does not always lead to the termination of the investigation because
if the undertaking is accepted, the investigation of injury shall never-
theless be completed if the Commission, after consultation, so decides or
if a request is made by exporters representing a significant percentage of
the trade involved. In such a case, if the Commission, after consulta-
tion, makes a determination of no injury, the undertaking shall automatic-
ally lapse. However, where a determination of no injury is due mainly to
7. In Plain paper photocopiers (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 535/87, OJ (1987) L 54/12, p29, the
Commission rejected undertakings offered by importers although it accepted undertakings from
importers in Outboard motors (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1305/87, OJ (1987) L 124/1, p3.
8. Case 240/84, NTN Tokyo Bearing v Council, ECR [1987] 1809.
In this case, the Court decided that undertakings were not a satisfactory solution to be
sufficient and considered the Commission's reasons given for rejecting price undertaking to
be effective.
9. Case 294/86 and 77/87, Technointorg v Commission and Council, ECR[1988] 6077, at 6117.
10. Article 9(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. See, Chapter 3, subsection 3.5.
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the existence of an undertaking, the Commission may require that the
undertaking be maintained.11
Undertakings may be suggested by the Commission, but the fact that
such undertakings are not offered or an invitation to do so is not accep-
ted, shall not prejudice consideration of the case.12
Reversing the Commission's previous practice, 13 it made it clear in
1984 in Sodium carbonate14 that it would no longer accept undertakings
from companies, so called prospective exporters, that were not involved in
dumping or had not exported during the investigation period because of
difficulty in determining an appropriate export price for prospective
exporter, difficulty or impossibility of determining the volume of any
future exports, and an unreasonable administrative burden on the invest-
igative authorities which would impede expeditious termination of an anti-
dumping investigation. However, in Video cassette and video tape reels,15
the Council, considering the problem of companies which started or would
start exporting video cassette to the Community after the end of the
investigation period, noted that the Commission was ready to initiate
without delay a review proceeding whenever the exporting company could
show the Commission, and supply to that sufficient evidence, that it was a
prospective exporter. This means that the Commission has changed its prac-
11. Article 10(4) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
12. Article 10(3) of the Community An01-dumping Regulation.
13. Acrylic fibres (USA), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2275/84, OJ (1984) L 209/1, p2.
14. In Sodium carbonate (USA), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3337/84, OJ (1984) L 311/26, p26-7, the
Commission stated that on previous occasions where non-exporters offered undertakings in
respect of possible future exports to the Community, these undertakings were accepted or
refused on the merits of each case. This practice has been reviewed and it has been conclu-
ded that, in general, undertakings from potential exporters should not be accepted.
15. Video cassette and video tape reels (Korea and Hong Kong), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1768/89, OJ
(1989) L 174/1, p6.
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tice regarding acceptance of undertakings from prospective exporter.
1.2. Withdrawal or Violation of Undertakings
The Commission may terminate the investigation without imposing
provisional or definitive anti-dumping duties where acceptable undertakings
are offered. The Commission, however, may require any party from whom an
undertaking has been accepted to provide, periodically, information rele-
vant to the fulfilment of such undertakings, and to permit verification of
pertinent data. Non-compliance with such requirements shall be construed
as a violation of the undertaking. 16 And where an undertaking has been
withdrawn or where the Commission has reason to believe that it has been
violated and where Community interests call for such intervention, it may,
after consultation and after having offered the exporter concerned an
opportunity to comment, apply provisional anti-dumping duties forthwith on
the basis of the facts established before the acceptance of the undertak-
7
•ng 1i.
1.3. Merit and demerit of Undertakings
Price revision undertakings which normally should increase export
prices to the Community are to be consummated in successive steps over a
number of months and imply the predictable dumping margin plus the expec-
ted rise in manufacturing costs in the country of origin.
Price revision undertaking is more favourable than anti-dumping duty
for exporters because the former is advantageous in that the benefit of
16. Article 10(5) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
17. Article 10(6) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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the price increase accrues to the exporter, whereas the price increment
result from the latter goes into the Community's coffers rather than those
of the exporter. According to Article 13(6), undertakings can be limited
to a certain region, whereas dumping and injury is established on a regio-
nal basis. In this case, the Commission should give exporters an oppor-
tunity to offer undertakings in respect of the region concerned)- 8 If an
adequate undertaking is not given promptly or is not fulfilled, a duty may
be imposed in respect of the Community as a whole.19
A demerit may be found in the requirement to submit regular reports
to the Commission showing compliance. Undertakings have a direct effect
on the price for the exported product, whereas an anti-dumping duty's
effect on the price is less immediate. Furthermore, a definitive duty can
be imposed while an undertaking is still in force, 2° because decisions to
accept undertakings shall be subject to review; moreover, the investiga-
tion should be re-opened where the circumstances so require.21
From the viewpoint of the Commission, termination of proceedings as
a result of accepting undertakings means that the matter is solved short
of a finding of dumping and injury and the Community industry can get a
quick protection. Undertakings also present the demerit that they may be
difficult and administratively burdensome to monitor, and for products
which come in different models or versions, which evolve rapidly, it may
18. In Plasterboard (Spain), Com.Dec.85/209/EEC, 0.1 (1985) L 89/65, p66, injury was assessed
on a regional basis, namely in Ireland only; and this was the first time the regional criter-
ia were applied in Community investigations.
19. Article 13(6) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
20. Case 256/84, Koyo Seiko Ltd v Council and Commission, ECR (1987) 1899, at 1916, para. 12.
The Court held that the fact that the undertakings entered into by Koyo Seiko in 1977 were
still in force when the Commission decided to initiate the review, was consistent with the
provisions of Article 14.
21. Article 14(1) and (2) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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be difficult to formulate an effective undertaking. Furthermore, under-
takings can play a detrimental role to consumers, because of their infla-
tionary influence.
2. IMPOSITION OF ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
2.1. General Principles
Anti-dumping duties should be imposed by Regulation. 22
 Such Regu-
lation should indicate in particular the amount and type of duty imposed,
the product covered, the country of origin or export, the name of the
supplier, if practicable, and the rationale on which the Regulation is
based. 23
The amount of such duties should not exceed the dumping margin
provisionally estimated or finally established; it should be less if such
lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury. 24
2.1.1. Dumping Margin
In accordance with Article 8(1) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code,25
Article 13(3) of the Anti-dumping Regulation provides that the amount of
the duty should not be more than the dumping margin if such lesser duty
would be adequate to remove the injury. As a result, it has become the
Commission's practice to compare the Community prices 26 with either the
22. Article 13(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
23. Ibid, Article 13(2).
24. Ibid, Article 13(3).
25. Article 8(1) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that it is desirable that the duty be
less than the margin, if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the
domestic industry.
26. The prices at which the products under investigation are sold in the Community.
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actual prices of domestic products or with target prices 27 for domestic
products, as discussed above. Therefore, when the injury margin is lower
than the dumping margin, the anti-dumping duty is set at the level of the
injury margin.
2.1.2. Retroactive Anti-dumping Duties
In accordance with the Article 11 of the GATT Anti-dumping Code,28
the Anti-dumping Regulation of the Community recognises authorisation of
the imposition of retroactive duties, providing that the Council may
decide to apply the definitive anti-dumping duties to products which were
imported not more than 90 days prior to the date of application of provi-
sional duties. Retroactive duties may be imposed where the Council deter-
mines that there is a history of dumping which caused injury or that the
importer was or should have been, aware that the exporter practices dump-
ing and that such dumping would cause injury, and that the injury is
caused by sporadic dumping to such an extent that, in order to preclude it
recurring, it appears necessary to impose an anti-dumping duty retroact-
ively on those imports, or that an undertaking has been violated.29
Even though it has become incrementally routine for complainants to
supplicate for imposition of retroactive duties, 3 ° no retroactive anti-
dumping duties have been imposed up to the present.
27. The prices calculated on the basis of full cost of production plus a reasonable profit.
28. Article 11(1) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that anti-dumping duties and provi-
sional measures shall only be applied to products which enter for consumption after the time
when the decision taken under paragraph 1 of Article 8 and paragraph 1 of Article 10, re-
spectively, enters into force.
29. Article 13(4)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
30. Video Cassette Tapes, 88/C 212/03, OJ (1988) C 212/11, and Com.Reg.(EEC) No 4026/88, OJ
(1988) L 356/47, p47.
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2.1.3. Prospective Exporters
A practice that was not predicted when the GATT Anti-dumping Code
was formulated, concerns the treatment of new exporters of like products,
who not only were not covered in the original anti-dumping investigation
but also have not exported during the investigated period. In the Commun-
ity, the Commission generally investigates all the exporting companies
known to it through on-the-spot verification. 	 As a result, individual
rates of duty are made for each exporting company investigated. Further-
more, the highest individual rate of duty determined in the original anti-
dumping investigation is applied to potential exporters who have not
exported anything to the Community yet. Therefore, prospective exporters
have been treated in a very discriminatory fashion as a result of the
Sodium carbonate determination31 in 1984. In this determination, as
discussed above, 32 the Commission declared that it would not accept under-
takings from potential exporters any more. Moreover the Commission,
stating that 'if they begin to export to the Community, it may be ap-
propriate to apply Article 14 and Article 16 of the Regulation', does not
permit them to apply for a review unless they have exported and paid the
highest duty to the Community.
Theoretically, prospective exporters may try to make some sales,
get refunds and apply for a review, later. However, practically, it is
unlikely to be successful as a result of the protectionist tilt in the
refund procedure.33
31. Sodium carbonate, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3337/84, OJ (1984) L 311/26, p26-7. The position of
the Commission was consistently applied in the Electronic typewriters, Com.Reg. (EEC) No
3649/84, OJ (1984) L 335/43, p47, and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1698/85, OJ (1985) L 163/1, p10, and
Hydraulic excavators, Com.Reg.(EEC) No 595/85, OJ (1985) L 68/13, p16, and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No
1877/85, OJ (1985) L 176/1, p4.
32. See, supra note 14 in this Chapter.
33. See, refund procedure in subsection 5 in section II review systems.
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Moreover, the Commission's practice on the prospective exporter is
incompatible with the GATT rule which stipulates that when an anti-dumping
duty is imposed in respect of any product, such anti-dumping duty should be
collected in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such
products from all sources found to be dumping and causing injury.34
Therefore, a source of imports which has never exported a certain product
to the Community, should not be subject to imposition of anti-dumping
duties. In addition, it should not be regarded to have been found to be
dumped and causing injury. It should be noted that the amount of anti-
dumping duty must not exceed the margin of dumping. 35 Therefore, in case
of prospective exporters, no margin of dumping has been established be-
cause they have never exported to the Community. For the reasons de-
scribed above, the legality of any practice of imposing the highest rate
of individual duty determined in the original anti-dumping investigation,
on companies which have never exported the product, is very questionable.
2.2. Provisional Duties36
The European Parliament, in its resolution on the Community's anti-
dumping activities, 37
 considered that once a preliminary determination of
dumping and injury has been established, provisional duties should normal-
34. Article 8(2) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
35. Ibid, Article 8(3).
36. In 1994, 25 provisional anti-dumping duties were imposed as a result of anti-dumping in-
vestigation, compared to 16 in 1993 and 18 in 1992. Among them, 3 provisional duties were
imposed on products imported from Korea, Electrolytic capacitors, Com.Reg.(EC) No 371/942, OJ
(1994) L 48/10, Microdisks, Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5, and Colour TV Receiv-
ers, Com.Reg.(EC) No 2376/94, OJ (1994) L 255/50.
37. The European Parliament, Resolution on the Community's anti-dumping activities, OJ (1982)
No C 11/37, p39.
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ly be imposed unless the defendant offers a satisfactory price undertak-
ing. This view has become the Commission's practice 38 and is currently
incorporated in the Regulation which stipulates that where preliminary
examination shows that dumping or a subsidy exists and that there is
sufficient evidence of injury caused thereby and the interest of the
Community calls for intervention to prevent injury being caused during the
proceeding, the Commission, acting at the request of a Member state or on
its own initiative, shall impose a provisional anti-dumping duty. In such
cases, release of the products concerned for free circulation in the
Community shall be conditional upon the provision of security for the
amount of the provisional duty, definitive collection of which shall be
determined by the subsequent decision of the Council under Article
12(2). 39 Fluctuations in the number of provisional duties imposed 40 up to
the present do not mean that the Commission's approach to these measures
keeps changing. The reason is that the Commission is always prepared to
impose provisional duties when the circumstances so require.
The Commission shall take such provisional action after consultation
or in cases of extreme urgency, after informing the Member States. In
this latter case, consultations shall take place 10 days at the least
after notification to the Member States of the action taken by the Commis-
.on 41si.
Where a Member state requests immediate intervention by the Commis-
sion, the Commission shall within a maximum of five working days of re-
ceipt of the request, decide whether a provisional anti-dumping duty
38. Commission, 7th anti-dumping report, COI (90) 229 final, p4.
39. Article 11(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
40. 18 provisional anti-dumping duties were imposed in 1992, compared to 19 in 1991, 23 in
1990 and 10 in 1989.
41. Article 11(2) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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should be imposed.42
The Commission shall forthwith inform the Council and the Member
States of any decision taken under this Article. The Council, acting by a
qualified majority, may decide differently. A decision by the Commission
not to impose a provisional duty shall not preclude the imposition of such
duty at a later date, either at the request of a Member state, if new
factors arise, or on the initiative of the Commission.43
Provisional duties shall have a maximum period of validity of four
months. However, where exporters representing a significant percentage of
the trade involved so request or, pursuant to a notice of intention from
the Commission, do not object, provisional anti-dumping duties may be
extended for a further period of two months.44
Any proposal for definitive action, or for the extension of provi-
sional measures, shall be submitted to the Council by the Commission not
later than one month before expiry of the period of validity of provision-
al duties. The Council shall act by a qualified majority.45
After expiration of the period of validity of provisional duties,
the security shall be released as promptly as possible, to the extent that
the Council has not decided to collect it definitively. 46
42. Article 11(3) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
43. Ibid, Article 11(4).
44. Ibid, Article 11(5).
45. Ibid, Article 11(6).
46. Ibid, Article 11(7).
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2.3. Definitive Action47
Different from provisional duties, which are imposed by the Commis-
sion, definitive duties as final action are under the Council's exclusive
power even though it imposes definitive duties based on a Commission's
proposal after consultation with the Advisory Committee. Therefore, the
Regulation stipulates that where the facts as finally established show
that there is dumping during the period under investigation and injury
caused thereby, and the interests of the Community call for Community
intervention, a definitive anti-dumping duty shall be imposed by the Coun-
cil, acting by qualified majority on a proposal submitted by the Commis-
sion after consultation.48
In Shovels, 49 however, not the Council but the Commission decided
that it was not necessary to collect the provisional duty, since no im-
ports of shovels had been made below the undertaking price, after the
imposition of the provisional duty.
Where a provisional duty has been applied, the Council shall de-
cide, irrespective of whether a definitive anti-dumping duty is to be
imposed, what proportion of the provisional duty is to be definitively
collected. The Council shall act by qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission. 50
The definitive collection of such amount shall not be decided upon
unless the facts as finally established show that there has been dumping
47. In 1994, 19 definitive anti-dumping duties were imposed as a result of anti-dumping in-
vestigations.	 Among them, 2 definitive duties was imposed on imports from Korea. Electro-
lytic capacitors, Coun.Reg.(EC) No 1384/94, OJ (1994) L 152/1, and Bricrodisks,
No 2199/94, OJ (1994) L 236/2.
48. Article 12(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
49. Shovels (Brazil), Com.Dec.84/632/EEC, OJ (1984) L 330/28.
50. Article 12(2)(a) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
Coun.Reg.(EC)
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and injury. For this purpose, injury shall not include material retarda-
tion of the establishment of a Community industry, nor threat of material
injury, except where it is found that this would, in the absence of provi-
sional measures, have developed into material injury. 51
The Council may suspend the duty temporarily, where it considers
that further investigation is needed. In Synthetic fibres of payester,52
the anti-dumping duty which was imposed in l988
	 suspended for a
period of five months with regard to fibrefill. During that period, the
Council asked the Commission to carry out a further investigation into the
allegations of the existence of shortages of fibrefill. Since the invest-
igation showed that the allegations of a shortage were unfounded, the
suspension was terminated. Furthermore, the Council, based on an under-
taking by one of the exporters on whom definitive duties have been imposed
already, may set out the duty imposed differently. In Certain electronic
typewriters, 54 the Council, based on an undertaking from Kyushu Matsushita
which removed the conditions justifying the anti-dumping duty to typewri-
ters assembled in the Community, corrected the duty imposed.
51. Article 12(2)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
52. Commission, Notice regarding the anti-dumping proceeding concerning synthetic fibres of
polyesters, OJ (1989) No C 119/15.
53. Synthetic fibres of polyester, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3946/88, OJ (1988) L 348/49, p54. In
this determination, the Council stated that the application of the definitive anti-dumping
duty should be suspended for fibrefill for a period of five months as from the entry into
force of this Regulation, working on the supposition that a review might lead to different
findings.
54. Certain electronic typewriters, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1329/88, OJ (1988) L 123/31, p31,
Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2076/88, OJ (1988) L 183/1, and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2329/88, OJ (1988) L
203/1. See also Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1022/88, OJ (1988) L 101/4. In these determinations, the
Council stated that Regulation (EEC) No 1022/88 extending the anti-dumping duty to certain
electronic typewriters assembled in the Community should be amended to the extent it con-
cerned Canon Bretagne, Kyushu Matsushita, and Sharp, based on the undertaking accepted.
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2.4. An Additional Anti-dumping Duty
(Anti-absorption Duties)55
The Community's Anti-dumping Regulation contains a novel provision
to provide that anti-dumping duties should not be borne by the exporters
but by the importers and/or customers. It means that the Community forces
the exporters to pass the anti-dumping duties on to customers. 56 This
entirely new Article 13(11) 57 is interpreted to provide the Community
authorities with increased powers to deal with the situation where the
exporters, in whole or in part, either directly or indirectly have borne
the anti-dumping duties imposed instead of raising the price. As a re-
sult, an additional anti-dumping duty may be imposed to compensate for the
amount borne by the exporter. This means that the additional duty cannot
be higher than the original anti-dumping duty.58
In response to a complaint from any party directly concerned who
55. Since the possibility for these Article 13(11) reviews was incorporated into the Commun-
ity Anti-dumping Regulation in 1988, 6 such reviews have been initiated, 2 in 1994 and 4 in
1991, including Silicon metal determination of which was concluded in 1992, when an addition-
al duty was imposed on imports of Silicon metal from China. Silicon metal (China),
Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1607/92, OJ (1992) L 170/1.
56. It is worth remembering that if the exporters were to bear the anti-dumping duty, and if
there were no anti-absorption duties in the Community, the exporters would have to suffer
financially in their management in order to maintain cheap export price, after the imposition
of anti-dumping duties, the Community could get anti-dumping duties revenue, and consumers
could still enjoy cheap imported products without inflation pressure. Then, the investiga-
tion could be re-opened as a result of review. If the exporters increased the export price,
their competitiveness would be weakened.
57. Different from the anti-circumvention rules, the provision does not provide that the
provisions of this Regulation concerning investigation, procedure, and undertakings apply to
all questions arising under this paragraph.
58. Article 13(11)(a). When the dumping has increased significantly, the Commission should
initiate a review proceeding.
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submits sufficient evidence showing that the duty has been borne by the
exporter, the Commission must initiate investigation and the exporters
and importers concerned should be given an opportunity to comment. 59 A
provisional and definitive duty can be imposed as an additional duty."
During the investigation, Article 7(7)(b) applies.61
Up to the present, the Commission has initiated 6 investigations,62
2 in 1994 and 4 in 1991, under this new rule. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the possibility of using this measure is increasing. Further-
more, this rule would be likely to play a conclusive role to force the
exporters to raise prices more than they did before. However, it is
questionable whether this anti-absorption rule is compatible with the GATT
rules, because the GATT rules permit imposition of an anti-dumping duty
only where there is dumping which causes injury. 63 Therefore, it should
be noted that application of additional anti-dumping duty without examina-
tion of dumping and injury is inconsistent with GATT rules.
2.4.1. Conditions for Bearing the Anti-dumping Duty
Insofar as the results of the investigation show that the absence
of the resale price increase to the first independent buyer of the product
subject to the anti-dumping duty by an amount corresponding to the anti-
dumping duty is not due to a reduction in the costs and/or profits of the
importer for the product concerned, then the absence of such price in-
crease shall be considered as an indicator that the anti-dumping duty has
59. Article 13(11)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
60. Ibid, second paragraph of the Article 13(11)(b)
61. Ibid, Article 13(11)(d).
62. Commission, 11th anti-dumping report (1992), COM(93) 516 final,
ing report (1995), C014(95) 309 final, p46.
63. See, Article VI(1) of the GATT.
p70, and 13th anti-dump-
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been borne by the exporter." In respect of the imposition of an addi-
tional anti-dumping duty, two factors are to be considered; the resale
price to the first independent buyer and the costs and profits of the
importer.	 In the case of the resale price, it is almost impossible to
examine whether there is a price increase or not, if new models are intro-
duced, and so, there is no previous resale price. In addition, the expor-
ter can argue that a price increase as a result of an anti-dumping duty
imposed is avoided by a reduction in the distribution cost and/or a reduc-
tion of profits of the related importer. 65
 In Silicon metal, 66 the Com-
mission determined that all or part of the anti-dumping duty had been
borne by the exporters concerned on the ground that following the imposi-
tion of a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal from
China, 67 the import price at Community borders (the cif price before
payment of customs duties and anti-dumping duty) of silicon metal from
China fell considerably. Therefore, by reducing their prices for export
to the Community after imposition of an anti-dumping duty, the exporters
had borne the anti-dumping duty. The organisation representing user
industries, however, argued that the quality of the product concerned
justified a lower price and the decrease in the import price of silicon
metal from China could be linked to an overall trend in the market for
64. Ibid, first paragraph of Article 13(11)(a) and 13(11)(c), read jointly.
65. In the case of the unrelated importer, the anti-dumping duty can be borne by lowering
export price. As a result, the duty-paid export price for the unrelated importers remains
the same, irrespective of imposition of the anti-dumping duty. In this case, the Commission
would compare the original export price with the export price after the imposition of final
duty to determine whether the duty has been borne by the exporter.
66. Silicon metal (China), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1607/92, OJ (1992) L 170/1, p2-3. In this
determination, since the decrease in the import price as a percentage of the amount of anti-
dumping duty has been calculated at 178% after the imposition of a provisional duty, the
anti-dumping duty has been borne completely.
67. Silicon metal (China), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 720/90, OJ (1990) L 80/9.
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imports of the product concerned into the Community. The Commission did
not accept those argument on the grounds that the alleged difference in
quality could not justify the considerable decrease in the export price
since this did not constitute a new fact, and furthermore, examination of
the customs statistics clearly revealed a considerable price decrease in
the imported products from China, while the import price of the metal from
other countries had remained stable over the same period.
2.4.2. Retroactivity of the Additional Duty
According to the third paragraph of Article 13(11)(b), the addi-
tional duty may be imposed retroactively. Moreover the Article, providing
that the additional duty may be imposed on products in relation to which
the obligation to pay import duties under Directive 79/623/EEC has been
incurred after the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty, sets the
precise moment at which the additional duty can be imposed. Therefore,
the additional duty can be imposed retroactively to the goods released for
free circulation in the Community, from the moment the duty began to be
borne by the exporter. 68 It may be debated, however, whether retroactiv-
ity could be applied back earlier than the adoption of the new rule. In
Silicon metal, the Council stated that the amount of absorption of duty is
calculated on the basis of the difference between the import price during
the period of the initial investigation (1 Jan. to 31 Dec. 1988), and the
import price during the period following imposition of a provisional
anti-dumping duty (1 Apr. 1990 to 30 Sep. 1991).69
It should be noted that it seems questionable whether the retroac-
tive application of the additional anti-dumping duty is compatible with
68. The third paragraph of Article 13(11)(b).
69. Silicon metal (China), Coun.Neg.(BEC) No 1607/92, OJ (1992) L 170/1, p2.
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GATT rules. According to Article 11(1) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code, the
retroactive application of anti-dumping duty is accepted in only two
situations; retroactive collection of provisional duty 70 or in cases of
sporadic dumping. 71 Retroactivity of the additional anti-dumping duty is
nothing to do with these situation mentioned above.
2.4.3. Application of the Additional Duties in the
Context of Anti-circumvention Duties
Where anti-dumping duty on imported products is increased by the
additional duty, and where an anti-circumvention duty is already imposed
on the products which were assembled in the Community by related parties,
it seems to be reasonable to recalculate the amount of the anti-circumven-
tion duty, because the amount of anti-circumvention duty is recalculated
in proportion to the increase in the additional duty. It is questionable,
however, whether anti-circumvention duty can be increased pursuant to the
additional duty only, if there is no increase in the price of the products
assembled in the Community after imposition of anti-circumvention duty.
In this regard, one can argue that the additional anti-dumping duty should
be applied as long as the anti-dumping duty has been borne by the expor-
ter. 72 As a result, anti-circumvention duty should be recalculated if the
prices of the products assembled in the Community have not increased in
70. Article 11(1)(i) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that where a final finding
of injury is made or, in case of a final finding of threat of injury, where the effect of the
dumped imports would have led to a finding of injury, anti-dumping duties may be levied
retroactively for the period for which provisional measures have been applied.
71. Article 11(1)(ii)(b) of the GATT 1979 Anti-dumping Code provides for cases where the
authorities determine that the injury is caused by sporadic dumping to such an extent that,
in order to preclude it recurring, it appears necessary to levy an anti-dumping duty retro-
actively on those imports.
72. Article 13(11)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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spite of the imposition of anti-circumvention duty.
It could, however, be argued that anti-circumvention duty could be
increased with the application of the additional duty only, for prevention
of circumvention of the duty imposed on imported products. The reason is
that the anti-circumvention duty has, as its original purpose, prevention
of circumvention. Therefore, the additional duty could not be applied to
the products assembled in the Community so long as the anti-dumping duty
has not been circumvented.
Taking into account both argument above, recognising the special
function of anti-circumvention duties, it is more reasonable to discourage
attempts to apply measures in Article 13(11) to duties imposed by Article
13(10).
3. RELIEF SYSTEMS IN KOREA
3.1. Undertakings73
An exporter of the product under consideration, during the course
of an investigation, can offer an undertaking under Article 10(3) of the
Act, 74
 presenting his intention in writing. 75
 Since 1989, however, under-
73. From 1986 to 1993, 15 investigations were initiated. Of these 15 investigations, only 2
investigations were concluded by the acceptance of undertakings. Dicumyl Peroxide (Japan,
Taiwan), April 15, 1986, and Alumina Cement (France), Sep. 2, 1988. KIP, Policies related
to Trade in Korea', p202, At the time of writing, it is not possible to get original docu-
ments of these two because access to documents is not allowed.
74. Article 10(3) of the Act provides that if an investigation is initiateed or if provision-
al measures are taken, the exporter of the goods concerned or the Minister of Finance (here-
inafter referred to as "Minister") may offer an undertaking in which prices are revised or
exports are ceased or reduced to the extent that injury caused by dumping is eliminated.
75. Article 4(11)(i) of the EDCA.
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takings have never been offered. The Korean authority, i.e. the Ministry
of Finance, enjoys a wide discretion because it may accept an undertaking
which offers an immediate revision of price, 76 or a cessation of export 77
or reduction of the volume of export below a certain level, in terms as
determined after consultation with the Minister, 78 and may not accept an
undertaking where it is deemed difficult to secure the fulfilment of the
undertaking, 79 and may offer the undertaking to the exporter specified. 80
When undertakings are offered, the contents of such undertakings
should be notified to the chief of administration concerned, the invest-
igation authorities, and interested persons. 81 The Minister may not
accept or offer undertakings before the report on the result of a prelimi-
nary investigation or the letter of resolution on a preliminary determina-
tion are submitted. 82 When accepting undertakings or notifying the accep-
tance of the undertakings, the Minister may require the exporter to pro-
vide, periodically, data relevant to the fulfilment of such undertakings,
and to permit verification of the said data. 83 Non-compliance with such
requirements or non-fulfilment of the undertaking accepted should be
construed as a violation of the undertaking, and the Minister may continue
to take measures for preventing dumping. 84 If the undertaking is accep-
ted, the investigation should be suspended or terminated, and the provi-
76. Dicumyl Peroxide (Japan, Taiwan), and Alumina Cement (France). See, KIP, p202.
77. Dicumyl Peroxide (Japan, Taiwan). Ibid.
78. Article 4(11)(ii) of the EDCA.
79. Article 4(11)(iv) of the EDCA.
80. Article 4(11)(v) of the EDCA.
81. Article 4(11)(iii) of the EDCA.
82. Article 4(11)(vi) of the EDCA. It means that for the termination of a proceeding with an
acceptance of undertakings, the Minister should know the existence of dumping and injury
therefrom.
83. Article 4(11)(vii) of the EDCA.
84. Article 4(11)(ix) and (x) of the EDCA.
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sional measures already taken should be cancelled. 85 However, the accep-
tance of the undertaking does not always lead to cancellation of the
provisional measure already taken, because the provisional anti-dumping
duty paid may be not refunded if it is confirmed that material injury,
etc. has occurred. 86
 Even though there is no material injury etc., if it
is judged that a determination of no material injury etc. is due to the
existence of an undertaking, the undertaking is required to be
maintained.87
3.2. Imposition of Anti-dumping Duties
3.2.1. Provisional Duties
Concerning those goods on which an investigation is initiated, if
sufficient evidence is found to lead to the belief that the goods are
imported for dumping and that material injury etc. has resulted therefrom,
and if deemed necessary to eliminate injury that may occur during the
investigation period, a provisional anti-dumping duty is imposed or a
security is ordered, even before the completion of investigation. 88 The
provisional measure, when the preliminary investigation is terminated, may
be taken not less than 60 days after the initiation of the preliminary
investigation. 89
 The maximum validity period of the provisional measure
85. Article 10(4) of the Korean Customs Act.
86. Article 4(11)(viii) of the EDCA.
87. Article 4(11)(x) of the EDCA. When the provisional measure is withdrawn, the provisional
anti-dumping duty paid should be refunded and the offered security should be released.
88. Article 10(2) of the Korean Customs Act.
89. Article 4(10)(i) of the EDCA.
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is 4 months. 90 When a security is offered, it should be more than the
amount of the provisional anti-dumping duty. 91
3.2.2. Definitive Anti-dumping Duties
If the importation of foreign goods for sale at a price lower than
the normal price cause material injury etc., and if it is deemed necessary
to protect the domestic industry concerned, a duty may be imposed in an
amount equal to or less than dumping margin. 92 The anti-dumping duty is
imposed on each exporter" based on a fixed rate of anti-dumping duty or a
fixed standard import price. 94 So far, all definitive anti-dumping duties
have been imposed on the basis of a fixed rate.95
The anti-dumping duty to an exporter who is not subject to invest-
igation should be imposed on the basis of the rate of anti-dumping duty
applicable to an exporter who is subject to investigation, or the rate of
the anti-dumping duty which is equal to the weighted average of the stan-
dard import price, or standard import price. 96
 When the anti-dumping duty
is imposed by specifying an exporting country and when a new exporter of
90. Article 4(10)(ii) of the EDCA. However, where exporters representing a significant
proportion of the trade of such goods so request, this period may be prolonged for a further
period of 2 months.
91. Article 4(10)(iY) of the EDCA.
92. Article 10(1) of the Korean Customs Act.
93. The exporter who exports during the period of investigation and submits materials, but is
not subject to investigation is included. A proviso of Article 4(9)(ii) of the EDCA.
94. Article 4(9)(i) of the EDCA. A fixed standard import price means that the price adds the
cost concerned with import to the adjusted normal price. Article 4(9)(iv) of the EDCA.
95. Phosphoric Acid (China) FMA No 1993-6, OG (1993) No 12350, P25, Ballbearings (Thailand)
FMA No 1993-10, OG (1993) No 12379, p141, Soda Ash (China) FMA No 1993-75, OG (1993) No
12606, p183, Printing Plate (Japan) FMA No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p191, and Glass Fiber
(USA, Japan, Taiwan) FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p27.
96. Article 4(9)(ii) of the EDCA.
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the exporting country who exports after the period of investigation has a
special relation with the exporter who is subject to the anti-dumping
duty, the anti-dumping duty is imposed on the basis of the rate of anti-
dumping duty or the standard import price applied to the latter.97
In cases where the amount of the anti-dumping duty on the goods
imported during the period for which the provisional measures were in
effect, is equal to or exceeds that of the provisional duty, such provi-
sional duty becomes the amount of the anti-dumping duty. 98 Furthermore,
when security is offered, the amount of the anti-dumping duty imposed
retroactively during the period for which the provisional anti-dumping
duty was in effect, should not exceed the amount equivalent to the provi-
sional anti-dumping duty.99
II. REVIEW SYSTEMS
1. INTRODUCTION
Under the Community's Anti-dumping legislation, the Regulations and
Decisions imposing anti-dumping duties and Decisions accepting price
undertakings could be subject to administrative reviews and judicial re-
.	 1
view 00.	 According to the Community Anti-dumping Regulation, the review
could be held either at the request of a Member state or on the initiative
97. Article 4(9)(iii) of the EDCA.
98. Article 4(13)(i) of the EDCA. If it is the other way around, the provisional anti-dump-
ing duty which is equivalent to the difference should be refunded.
99. Article 4(13)(ii) of thee EDCA.
100. There is no special provision in the Community Anti-dumping Regulation for judicial
review. As a result, the general provisions of the EEC Treaty, for example Article 173 and
Article 177, apply. This will be discussed in detail in subsection 4 of this chapter.
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of the Commission. It should be held where an interested party so re-
quest. 101 Article 15, furthermore, provides that anti-dumping duties and
price undertakings should automatically be terminated after five years
from the date on which they entered into force unless this "sunset review"
demonstrates that they should remain in force. 102
Under Article 14, exporters who were not included in the original
anti-dumping investigation because they did not export during the invest-
igation period, but have become subject to anti-dumping measures, may re-
quest administrative review as well. 103 Article 13(11) provides for the
administrative review of anti-dumping duties where the exporters bear the
anti-dumping duty thus reducing the export price and increasing the dumping
n.margi 104
2. Administrative Review (Article 14 Review)
According to Article 14 of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation,
regulations imposing anti-dumping duties and decisions to accept undertak-
ing should be subject to review, in whole or in part, where warranted)-05
101. 16 out of a total of 27 review investigations which were initiated in 1992 were under
Article 14 reviews. See, Commission, 11th anti-dumping report (1992), Com.(93) 516, final.
The period over 1990 to 1994, a total of 69 reviews have been initiated under Article 14.
Among them, 26 measures were repealed and 42 were allowed to continue. Commission, 13th
anti-dumping report (1994), COM(95) 309 final, p46.
102. 23 out of a total of 37 review investigations which were initiated in 1992 were under
Article 15 reviews. Among them 18 measures were allowed to expire automatically, and 5
measures were continued in an amended form. Commission, 13th anti-dumping report, CON(95)
309 final, p46.
103. 1 of the 37 review investigations which were initiated in 1994 was regarded as a "pro-
spective exporter" review. See, subsection 2.1.3. of section I. Relief.
104. See, subsection 2.4. of section V. Relief.
105. Article 14(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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A review may be held either at the request of a Member state or on the
initiative of the Commission. A review should be held where an interested
party so requests and submits evidence of changed circumstances sufficient
to justify the need for such review, if at least one year has elapsed
since the conclusion of the investigation. Where warranted by the review,
the anti-dumping measures should be amended, repealed or annulled by the
Community authorities competent for their introduction. 106
2.1. Conditions for the Initiation of
an Administrative Review
In order to initiate Article 14 review, two requirements should be
met. The first requirement for Article 14 review is that sufficient
evidence of changed circumstances to justify the need for such review is
submitted, while the GATT Anti-dumping Code requests just positive infor-
mation substantiating the need for review. 107
 Compared with the GATT re-
quirements, the Community procedure has stricter requirements to meet,
although the Commission has accepted a wide variety of grounds as evi-
dence of changed circumstances, including increased dumping, 108
 absence of
dumping, 1 ° 9 increased injury, 110
 change in exchange rates, 111 and viola-
106. Second paragraph of Article 14(1) and 14(3) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
107. Article 9(2) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that the investigating authorities
shall review the need for the continued imposition of duty, where warranted, on their own
initiative or if any interested party so requests and submits positive information substan-
tiating the need for review.
108. Ballbearings, 88/C 159/01, OJ (1988) C 159/2.
109. Ballbearings, Coun.Reg.(BEC) No 3528/87, OJ (1987) L 336/1, pl.
110. Acrylic fibres (Mexico), 88/C 117/04, OJ (1988) C 117/3.
111. Acrylic fibres, Ibid.
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tion of an undertaking. 112 Furthermore, even if an interested party has
submitted evidence of changed circumstances, review is not automatically
granted in the Community anti-dumping system because the Commission enjoys
a margin of discretion in deciding whether requests for review are suffi-
cient to justify the need for such review. Therefore, Article 9(2) of the
GATT Anti-dumping Code providing "positive information substantiating the
need for review" could be a good model to decrease administrative discre-
tion in this field.
Even if an administrative review is granted, the outcome of the
review procedure is unlikely to be able to remedy the changed circum-
stances because the review procedure usually takes almost as long as the
original proceeding according to Article 14(2) of the Anti-dumping Regula-
tion providing that the investigation for review should be re-opened in
accordance with Article 7. In practice, it depends on the circumstances
of the case, whether the review may bring about a entirely new proceeding.
In Ballbearings, 113
 the review proceeding was restricted to a particular
party, because the application for review only concerned the individual
situation of that party.
Up to the 1979 Anti-dumping Regulations, 114
 the above mentioned
submission of sufficient evidence was the only requirement for requesting
a review. It could be argued, however, that a party which is reluctant to
112. Copper sulphate, Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2386/88, OJ (1988) L 205/68, p68. An anti-dumping
proceedings may be re-opened where the Commission has reason to believe that undertaking has
been violated, according to Article 10(6) of the Anti-dumping Regulation. In Chemical ferti-
lizer (USA), OJ (1988) C 2/2, the Commission based its action on Article 10(6) and Article 14
because an exporter who had offered an undertaking had withdrawn the undertaking and simul-
taneously submitted a request for a review.
113. Ballbearings, Coun.Reg.(REC) No 3528/87, OJ (1987) L 336/1, pl.
114. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3017/79, OJ (1979) L 339/1, and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1781/79, OJ (1979) L
196/1.
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co-operate in an investigation will request a review as soon as a protec-
tive measure has been made.	 Thus, since the 1982 Anti-dumping Regula-
tion 115 and in the subsequent Regulations, 116
 a review is only held at the
request of an interested party, provided that at least one year has
elapsed since the conclusion of the investigation. 117
 However, this
provision could also be criticised in that it makes no sense to prospec-
tive exporters.	 Thus, in Video cassettes and video tape reels, 118 the
Commission stated that it was prepared to waive this requirement in case
of prospective exporters affected by an anti-dumping duty.
When a review is initiated on the Commission's own initiative,
however, the above-mentioned requirements are not applied. The Commission
does not have to establish sufficient evidence of changed circumstances
nor does it have to respect the one year lapse period. Furthermore, the
Commission has reviewed anti-dumping proceedings relying on changed circum-
stances in genera1, 119 consequences of a judgment of ECJ, 120 incorrect
findings in the preliminary investigation, 121
 and certain procedural
problems .122
115. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1580/82, OJ (1982) L 178/9.
116. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2176/84, OJ (1984) L 201/1, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1761/87, OJ (1987) L
167/9 and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
117. Second paragraph of Article 14(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
118. Video cassettes and video tape reels (Korea and Hong Kong), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1768/89,
OJ (1989) L 174/1, p6.
119. Orthoxylene (Puerto Rico, USA), OJ (1982) C 124/2.
120. Video cassettes and video tape reels (Korea, Hong Kong), note 89 supra.
121. Electronic typewriters (Japan), 85/C 149/03, OJ (1985) C 149/3, P3-
122. Video cassettes and video tape reels (Korea, Hong Kong), note 89 supra.
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3. The "Sunset" Review (Article 15 Review)
Since the 1984 Anti-dumping Regulation,123 anti-dumping duties and
undertakings automatically lapse after five years from the date on which
they entered into force or were last modified or confirmed. This is the
so-called "sunset" review.	 The Commission should, after consultation,
publish a notice of the impending expiry of the measures in question
within six months prior to the end of the five year period. 124
 If an
interested party shows that the expiry of the measure would lead again to
injury or threat of injury, 125 the Commission should, after consultation,
publish a notice of its intention to carry out a review of the measure
prior to the end of the relevant five year period. 128
 The intention of
the review should be published within six months after the end of the
relevant five year period, otherwise the measure should lapse automatical-
ly at the end of that six month period)-27
Where the review of a measure under Article 14 is in progress at
the end of the relevant five year period, the measure shall remain in
force pending the outcome of such review. A notice to this effect shall
be published before the end of the relevant five year period. 128
 However,
where anti-dumping duties and undertakings automatically lapse under this
Article, the Commission shall publish a notice to that effect in the
Official Journal of the European Communities)-29
This so called "sunset" provision is a significant improvement over
123. Coun.Reg.(BEC) No 2176/84, OJ (1984) L 201/1.
124. Article 15(2) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
125. Hardboard (Romania, Brazil and Sweden), Com.Dec.89/377/8Bc,
126. Article 15(3) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
127. Ibid, second paragraph of Article 15(3).
128. Ibid, Article 15(4).
129. Ibid, Article 15(5).
OJ (1989) L 176/51.
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prior legislations130 because it sets the period of validity of anti-
dumping measures. Before the 1984 Regulation, anti-dumping duties or
undertakings had remained in force endlessly, far beyond the needs of
Community industry.
This provision, providing a five-year period for automatic expiry
of anti-dumping measures, guarantees legal certainty.
	
According to the
GATT rules, however, anti-dumping measures should remain in force only as
long as, and to the extent necessary to counteract injurious dumping .131
Thus it is more desirable that anti-dumping measures should lapse even
before the five years period, if they have counteracted injurious dumping.
4. JUDICIAL REVIEW
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The Commission stated in its Explanatory Memorandum 132
 accompanying
its proposal to amend the 1984 Community anti-dumping legislation 133
 that
it was necessary to define more precisely certain rules because of 'relat-
ively vague principles' contained in the Community anti-dumping legisla-
tion which may possibly fall within the competence of the propos ed court
130. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 459/68, OJ (1968) L 93/1, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2011/73, 0.1 (1973) L
206/3, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1411/77, OJ (1977) L 160/4, Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1681/79, OJ (1979) L
196/1, and Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1580/82, OJ (1982) L 178/9.
131. Article 9(1) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code.
132. Commission, Proposal for a Coun.Reg.(EEC) amending Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 on pro-
tection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European
Economic Community, COM(88) 112 final, pl.
133. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2176/84, OJ (1984) L 201/1.
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of first instance. 134
 As a result, the Commission continues to enjoy a
wide discretion in applying the trade defence rules. The exercise by the
Community authorities of their power in the field of trade defence, how-
ever, may be subject to review by the Court of Justice (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "the Court") under Article 173 135 of the EEC Treaty, although
there is no specific provision in the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
In practice, the Court has been reluctant to deal with economic
evaluations the Community authorities make in their decisions. Further-
more, it has restricted itself to review of the legality of the decisions
adopted by the Community authorities. This general attitude of the Court
was well expressed in two cases: the Grundig case 136
 and the Remia
case.
137
 In its judgments in the two cases, the Court emphasised that the
Commission's decisions were based . on an appraisal of complex economic
situations and review of such appraisal, therefore, had to be limited to
verifying whether the relevant procedural rules had been complied with,
and whether there had been a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of
134. Coun.Dec. No 88/591/Euratom,ECSC,EEC, OJ (1988) L 319/1, amended by OJ (1989) C 215/1,
and Coun.Dec. No 93/350/Eurotom,ECSC,EEC, OJ (1993) L 144/21. Through Article 3(3) of 1988
Regulation, the Council decided to re-examine the proposal by the Court of Justice to give
the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) competence to exercise jurisdiction in action
relating to measures to protect trade within the meaning of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty in
case of dumping and subsidy, after two years of operation of the CIF. Furthermore, in its
subsequent amendment in 1993, the Council stated that the entry into force of this Decision
relating to Article 113 of the EEC Treaty in case of dumping, should be deferred to a date to
be fixed by the Council by unanimous decision. See, Coun.Dec. 93/350, p22.
135. Article 173 of the EEC Treaty provides that the Court shall review the legality of acts
adopted by the Community authorities ... and it shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in
actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of compe-
tence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of
any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
136. Joined cases 56 and 58/64, Consten Grundig v Commission, [1964] ECR 299, at 347.
137. Case 42/84, Remia v Commission, [1987] ECR 2545, at 2575.
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powers.
Although the above-mentioned cases were in the field of competi-
tion, the Court has followed the same approach in anti-dumping proceedings.
In the Ballbearings case, the Court, citing the Remia case, reconfirmed
its position and held that the choice between the different methods of
calculation requires an appraisal of complex economic situations.	 The
Court 'must therefore limit its review of such an appraisal to verify
whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the
facts on which the choice is based have been accurately stated and whether
there has been a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers'.138
However, it should be noted that the defendant was forced to prove his
innocence as a result of the fact that the Court was reluctant to review
the facts established by the Commission and the Council.
After initial reluctance to deal with Communit Y authorities' deci-
sions on anti-dumping measures, the Court started to clarify this matter
through the 1983 FEDIOL139 and 1984 Allied Corporation'" judgments. In
these cases, in spite of the fact that the Court recognised complainants
right to institute judicial review, a number of problems remain with
regard to admissibility, judicial protection, and its scope.
2. The Problems of Admissibility
As mentioned above, the decisions of Community authorities are
subject to review by the Court under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty.
According to this Article 'any natural or legal person may institute
proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a
138.Case 240/84, NTN Toyo Bearing v Council, [1987] ECR 1809, at 1854.
139.Case 191/82, FEDIOL v Commission, [1983] ECR 2913.
140.Joined Cases 239 E. 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, [1984] ECR 1005.
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decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addres-
sed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the
former' • 141 Therefore, any natural or legal person may institute annul-
ment proceedings against a decision addressed to himself, and/or against a
decision which is of direct and individual concern to him, although in the
form of a regulation or of a decision addressed to another person.
The reason why actions for the annulment of anti-dumping decisions
often raise problems of admissibility is that anti-dumping proceedings
affect different interested parties, namely foreign exporters, Community
importers, and Community producers, in different ways.
	 Moreover, some
determinations are made in the form of decisions and others in the form of
regulations. Undertakings are accepted by decisions while provisional and
definitive anti-dumping duties and definitive collection of provisional
duties are imposed in the form of regulations. 142 In order to institute
the proceeding for the annulment of anti-dumping decisions, three prere-
quisites must be satisfied; the requirement of a decision, direct concern,
and individual concern.
4.2.1. The Requirement of a Decision
According to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, a regulation shall have
general application. 	 It shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States, while a decision shall, merely, be bind-
ing in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. Having looked at
the basic sources of Community law, it is important to examine the way in
which they have been interpreted by the Court, because its judgments and
its interpretations of the Treaties and Community laws are definitive and
141. Second para. of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty.
142. See, Article 13(1) and 14 of the Anti-dumping Regulation.
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final.
In the Plaumann case, the Court held that decisions are charac-
terised by the limited number of persons affected by them. 143 Later, in
Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt, the Court defined a regulation by saying that 'it
is applicable to objectively determined situations and that it involves
legal consequences for categories of persons viewed in a general and
abstract manner' 144
Despite these definitions from the Court, the question whether of
admissibility of an individual appeal against a determination to impose
anti-dumping duties by regulations remains because the Community authori-
ties do not have power to impose anti-dumping duties by decisions.
With regard to the requirement of a decision, there are two out-
standing arguments. In the first Ballbearings case, Advocate-General
Warner insisted that an anti-dumping regulation is a hybrid instrument.
Therefore for everyone except the Big Four it is a regulation and nothing
but a regulation. Quad each of the Big Four, however, it constitutes a
decision of direct and individual concern) -45 In the Extramet146
 case,
Advocate-General Jacobs said that the requirement of a decision does not
exist independently of the requirement of individual concern.147
Once individual concern is established, therefore, the contested
143. Case 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, [1963] ECR 95.
144. Case 6/68, Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v Council, [1968] ECR 409, at 415.
145. Case 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearings v Council, [1979] ECR 1185, at 1246.
146. Case C-358/89, Extramet v Council, [1991] ECR 1-2501, at 1-2509 and 1-2520.
147. In Case C-152/88, Sofrimport v Commission, [1990] ECR 1-2477, the Court held that 'With
regard to the admissibility of the application for annulment, it must be determined whether
the contested measures are of direct and individual concern to the applicant within the
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty'. In this judgment, the
question whether those contested measures amounted in substance to decisions was not discus-
sed. This approach is supported by the Court's judgment in the Extramet case.
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measure must in substance be a decision, because a true regulation cannot
be of individual concern to anybody. 	 Therefore, as cited in Alusuisse,
the choice of form may not alter the nature of a measure. 148 In the other
words, in determining whether a measure constitutes a regulation or a
decision, the critical criterion is its substance rather than the label
the adopted authorities have chosen to give it. It must be born in mind
that the criterion which distinguishes a regulation from a decision is
whether or not the measure is of general application.
4.2.2. Direct Concern
An applicant will only be of direct concern if there is a direct
relation of cause and effect between the decision and the way in which it
can be applied to him. There must not be any margin of discretion between
the decision and the application of that decision.
This direct concern test is usually considered satisfied in the
anti-dumping cases, because the effect of a regulation involving imposition
or collection of duty is to require the customs authorities of the Member
States to collect the duty on all imports of the product in question into
the Community. The Member States' authorities have no discretion in this
matter because 'such collection was purely automatic and, moreover, in
pursuance not of intermediate national rules but of Community rules
alone' 149
4.2.3. Individual Concern
It seems that if an applicant can prove that he is individually
148. Case 307/81, Alusuisse v Council and Commission, [1982] ECR 3463, at 3472.
149. Case 118/77, ISO. v Council, [1979] ECR 1277, at 1294. In the Alusuisse, the issue
whether the measure was of direct concern to the applicant wasnot even arised. See, Alu-
suisse case, see supra note 147, at 3472.
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concerned by an anti-dumping regulation, the other above-mentioned require-
ments are assumed to be satisfied. 	 In the Plaumann case, 15° the Court
interpreted individual concern test and held that 'Persons other than
those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be individually
concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes
which are peculiar to them, or by reason of circumstances in which they
are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors
distinguishes them individually just as the case of the person addressed'.
When this interpretation has been applied in anti-dumping cases, however,
the Court has drawn a line to distinguish between producers, exporters,
and complainants on the one side and importers on the other.
In the Ballbearings151 cases, the Court concluded that the exporter
and the importer were individually concerned. In Allied I and //152 cases,
the Court held more precisely that the producer and the importer who were
150. Case 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, [1963] ECR 95, at 107. The Court in this case also
held that if the applicant is not individually concerned by the decision, it becomes unneces-
sary to enquire whether he is directly concerned.
151. Case 119/77, Nippon Seiko v Council and Commission, [1979] ECR 1303, at 1327. With
regard to the exporters, the Court held that 'the measure in question is intended to ensure
the strict observance of the stated undertakings by the creation of an additional penalty.
Thus, although drafted in general terms, Article 1 in fact concerns only the situation of the
major Japanese producers who are directly and individually concerned by reason of the under-
takings which they have given to revise their prices'.
With regard to the importers, the Court concluded that 'the special feature of Article 3 does
not concern all importers but only those who have imported the products manufactured by the
four major Japanese producers named in that article'.
152. Joined cases 239 and 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, [1984] ECR 1005 (Allied
I) at 1030, and case 53/83, Allied Corporation v Commission, [1985] ECR 1621 (Allied II), at
1656. In these judgments, the Court ruled that 'measures imposing anti-dumping duties are
liable to be of direct and individual concern to those producers and exporters who are able
to establish that they were identified in the measures adopted by the Commission or by the
Council or were concerned by the preliminary investigation'.
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specially identified by an anti-dumping regulation or who were involved in
preliminary investigations were individually concerned.
In the case of complainants, furthermore, they are considered to be
individually concerned as a result of provisions of the Anti-dumping Regu-
lation providing that 'any natural or legal person, or any association not
having legal personality, acting on behalf of a Community industry which
considers itself injured or threatened by dumped imports may lodge a
written complaint which contain sufficient evidence of the existence of
injurious dumping. 153
The complainant may seek the annulment of an anti-dumping regula-
tion in various situations. 154
 In the FEDIOL case, the applicant sought
the annulment of a communication in the form of a letter from the Commis-
sion informing the applicant that an antisubsidy proceeding would not be
initiated in respect of the matters raised in a complaint previously
lodged by the applicant. The issue before the Court in this case was not
the prOlem of individual and direct concern but the problem of the legal
effect of a letter from the Commission. 	 The Court, however, concluded
that "complainants must be acknowledged to have a right to bring an action
where it is alleged that the Community authorities have disregarded rights
which have been recognised in the regulation". 155 This conclusion was in
accordance with the basic regulation 156 which recognised the existence of
a legitimate interest on the part of Community producers in the adoption
153. Article 5(1) and (2) of the Anti-dumping Regulation.
154. In the FEDIOL case, [1983] ECR 2913, the complainants were dissatisfied with the outcome
of anti-subsidy proceedings. In the Timex case, [1985] ECR 849, the complainants were dissa-
tisfied with the result of an anti-dumping investigation.
155. Case 191/82, FEDIOL v Commission, [1983] ECR 2913, at paragraph 28.
156. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3017/79, OJ (1979) L 339/1.
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antisubsidy measures. In Timex v Council and Commission,157 the applicant,
Timex, sought the annulment of the regulation imposing a duty because it
was dissatisfied with the result of the investigation, in which it was
decided to impose a low level of anti-dumping duty. The Court decided
that the action was admissible because of the applicant's role in the
proceedings before the Commission and of its market position.
In Gimelec and Others, 158 the Commission did not challenge admiss-
ibility and moreover the Court did not discuss it, in spite of the fact
that the applicants had to establish that they were directly and individu-
ally concerned, because the contested decision was not addressed to them.
Therefore, the case law suggests that proceedings may be brought either by
complainants or by an undertaking which, even though it could not lodge
the complaint itself, played a leading role in the initiation of the
complaint. Moreover, such proceedings may be brought either against a
communication addressed to the applicant stating that no action is to be
taken, or against a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty.159
Even though the Commission opened an investigation as a result of a
complaint by an association of mechanical watch manufacturers in France
and the UK, it has not been expressly resolved whether a complainant
association has the right to challenge such a regulation. 	 If so, this
157. Case 264/82, Timex v Council and Commission, [1985] ECR 849, at 866, paragraph 15. In
this case, the Court held that the conduct of the investigation procedure was largely deter-
mined by Timex's observations and the anti-dumping duty was fixed in the light of the effect
on Timex. The contested regulation was therefore based on the applicant's own situation.
Therefore, the action was admissible.
158. Case C-315/90, Gimelec and Others v Commission, [1991] ECR 1-5589, at 1-5603.
159. See, Case 191/82, FEDIOL v Commission, [1983] ECR 2913, at 2936, paragraph 31 and 33;
Case 264/82, Timex v Council and Commission, [1985] ECR 849, at 866, paragraph 15 and 16;
Case C-358/89, Extramet v Commission, [1991] ECR 1-2501, at 1-2511-2, paragraph 22; and Case
C-315/90, Gimelec and Others v Commission, [1991] ECR 1-5589, at 1-5603.
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would be of significance in relation to the test of standing under Article
173 since it is doubtful whether such an association would satisfy either
the requirement of direct concern'" or the requirement of individual
concern.
161
Until the judgment of the Extramet case, the Court took a much
stricter approach to the test of standing in actions brought by importers.
Although the Court accepted the admissibility of an importer who brought
an action in one of the Ballbearings cases, 162 and although the Court
recognised the admissibilit y of a limited group of importers in Nippon
Seiko case, 163 the conclusion has been different which an independent
importer has brought p roceedings for the annulment of an anti-dumping
regulation.
In the Alusuisse case, 164
 the Court did not accept the admissibil-
ity of a private party with the reason that the contested regulations, as
far as independent importers were concerned, applied to objectively deter-
mined situations and entailed legal effects for categories of persons
regarded generally and in the abstract, and constituted therefore measures
of general application. With almost the same reason, the Court in the
160. Case 135/81, Groupement des Agenes des Voyages v Council, [1982] ECR 3799.
161. Joined cases 16 and 17/62, Producteurs de Fruits v Council, [1962] ECR 471, at 479. The
Court held that one cannot accept the principle that an association, in its capacity as
representative of a category of businessmen, could be individually concerned by a measure
affecting the general interests of that category.
162. Case 118/77, ISO v Council, [1979] ECR 1277, at 1292 and 1294. The reason for this
judgment is that the contested measure affected only the major producers and their subsidiar-
ies and exclusive importers. Therefore the contested measure was considered to be a decision
adopted in the form of a regulation.
163. Case 119/77, Nippon Seiko v Council and Commission, [1979] ECR 1303, at 1327.
164. Case 307/81, Alusuisse v Council and Commission, [1982] ECR 3463, at 3472.
248
Allied case reaffirmed the ruling of the A/usuisse case)- 65
 These Court
rulings were followed in a number of subsequent cases, in which an impor-
ter's standing against an anti-dumping regulation was admissible only where
reference to the importer's resale price was used to determine the export
prices which was used to decide whether dumping had occurred, 166
 and where
the anti-dumping duty had been established on the basis of the importer's
resale prices. 167
 As a result, the standing of independent importers was
inadmissible consistently, even though they were the only importers of the
product subject to the anti-dumping duty. 168
Accordingly it was insisted in the Extramet case that Extramet had
no standing to seek a declaration that the contested regulation was void,
inasmuch as it was an independent importer whose selling price was not
considered in determination of the export price. However, the Court,
rejecting this argument, held that although regulations imposing anti-
dumping duties are of a legislative character, inasmuch as they apply to
all the traders concerned, taken as a whole, their provisions may none the
165. Joined cases 239 and 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, [1984] ECR 1005, at 1031,
para. 15.
166. This is permitted by Article 2(8)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. It
provides that in cases where it appears that there is an association or a compensatory arran-
gement between the exporter and the importer or a third party, the export price may be con-
structed on the basis of the price at which the imported product is first resold to an inde-
pendent buyer. See, the orders in Case 279/86, Sermes v Commission, [1987] ECR 3109; Case
301/86, Frimodt Pedersen v Commission, [1987] ECR 3123; and Case 205/87, Nuova Ceam v Commis-
sion, [1987] ECR 4427.
167. See, the Electric motors cases, i.e. Joined cases C-304/86 and C-185/87, Enital v Coun-
cil and Commission, [1990] ECR 1-2939; Joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, Neotype Techmash-
export v Council and Commission, [1990] ECR 1-2945; Joined cases C-320/86 and C-188/87,
Stanko France v Commission and Council, [1990] ECR 1-3013; and Case C-157/87, Electroimpex v
Council, [1990] ECR 1-3201.
168. See, the orders in Sermes, Frimodt Pedersen, and Nuova Ceam, already cited, and the
judgment in Electroimpex case.
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less be of individual concern to a certain trader)- 69
 Although the Court
concluded that measures imposing anti-dumping duties may be of individual
concern in certain circumstances to certain traders who therefore have
standing to bring an action for their annulment, it did not, ironically,
support Extramet's argument that the contested regulation was of individ-
ual concern to it, in so far as it was the largest importer, it was in-
volved in the anti-dumping procedure and it could be fully identified in
the contested regulation. The Court cited only that the applicant was the
largest importer of the product subject to the anti-dumping measure. This
ruling could be interpreted as meaning that the Court indirectly followed
the judgment in the earlier case-law which refused to allow the admiss-
ibility of independent importers, even where they belonged to a closed
category, were fully identifiable in the contested regulation when it was
adopted, and had been involved in the anti-dumping procedure)-70
It should be noted that, as we have seen, the Court has recognised
identification in the contested measure and participation in the procedure
as relevant to the admissibility of actions brought by other applicant,
except independent importers. Since the applicant in Extramet satisfied
above-mentioned condition, the Court should have cited Extramet's argument
in whole. 171
169. Case C-358/89, Extramet v Council, [1991] ECR 1-2501, at 1-2531; Joined Cases 239 and
275/82, Allied Corporation V Commission, [1984] ECR 1005, at 1030, para. 11; and Case 53/83,
Allied Corporation v Commission, [1985] ECR 1621, at 1656, para. 4.
170. See, Case 307/81, Alusuisse v Council and Commission, [1992] ECR 3463; Case 279/86,
Sermes v Commission, [1987] ECR 3109; Case 301/86, Frimodt Pedersen v Commission, [1987] ECR
3123; and Case 205/87, Nuova Ceam v Commission, [1987] ECR 4427.
171. See. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-358/89, Extramet v Council, [1991] ECR
1-2501, at 1-2525.
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4.2.4. Remedies available to the Importers
Before the courts of a Member State
To disallow the admissibility of the independent importers would
not always mean to block their access to any form of judicial review.
According to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, where questions of Community
law are raised before any court of a Member state, that court may request
the Court of Justice (hereinafter the Court) to give preliminary
rulings. 172
 Furthermore, where a question of Community law is raised
before any court of a Member state, that court must bring the matter
before the Court if no judicial remedy is available under national law
against a decision of a court of a Member state. 173
 Therefore, importers
who want to contest a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties or ordering
definitive collection of provisional duties may rely on these provisions.
Because the imposition of duties and definitive collection of provisional
duties by the customs in a Member state are based on a Community measure,
so a question of Community law would arise. As a result, the Court poin-
ted out in Alusuisse and Allied Corporation that importers may contest
before the national courts individual matters taken by the national au-
thorities in application of the Community regulation174 and there is no
risk of conflicting decisions in this area since, by virtue of the mechan-
ism of the reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC
Treaty, it is for the Court alone to give a final decision on the validity
of the contested regulations.175
172. Second paragraph of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.
173. Third paragraph of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.
174. Case 307/81, Alusuisse v Council and Commission, [1982] 3643, at 3473, para. 13.
175. Joined cases 239 and 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, [1984] 1005, at 1030,
para. 13. Therefore access to remedies before the national court is also available to impor-
ters who presently bring the action before the Court under Article 173. See, case 138/79,
Roquette Freres v Council, [1980] ECR 3333, at 3367.
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In the anti-dumping context, proceedings before the national court
is not a completely satisfactory alternative to a direct action before the
European Court. The court in a Member state has no jurisdiction to de-
clare the Community regulations invalid because a ruling to that effect
can be given only by the European Court. 176 Decisions of the European
Court, moreover, could have a uniform character while national court's
decisions do not. Even with reference to a preliminary ruling under
Article 177, the decision of the Court can not cover the same scope for
investigating the matter as a direct action. It is available only in
respect of limited points which are referred to the Court by the national
courts. Even though importers award interim measures 177
 which suspend a
national measure based on a Community regulation by a national court, they
have to bring proceedings in several national courts simultaneously, since
such interim measures would be limited only to the Member state in ques-
tion. However, there is no guarantee of a uniform outcome from several
national courts. Furthermore, it would prejudice the uniform application
of Community law, which is a fundamental requirement of the Community
legal order.
176. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost, [1987] ECR 4199, at 4230, para. 11.
177. Joined cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Suderdithmarschen v Hauptzollamt and
Paderbone, [1991] ECR 1-415, at 1-541 and 1-544. The Court held that Article 189 of the
Treaty has to be interpreted that it does not preclude the power of national courts to sus-
pend enforcement of a national administrative measure adopted on the basis of a Community
regulation. Suspension of enforcement of a national measure adopted in implementation of a
Community regulation may be granted by a national court only if that court entertains serious
doubts as to the validity of the Community measure and, the question of the validity of the
contested measure has not already have been brought before the Court; if there is urgency and
a threat of serious and irreparable damage to the applicant; and if the national court takes
due account of the Community's interests.
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4.2.5. Conclusion
It could be argued whether the Court's case law on the admissibil-
ity of actions for the annulment of anti-dumping regulations is in accor-
dance with the predominant tendency of the Court's case law on the same
issue in other contexts. The answer could be negative, as a result of the
difference between Article 173 of the EEC Treaty and the Anti-dumping
Regulation. The Anti-dumping Regulation, imposing a duty in the form of a
regulation, can claim immunity from judicial review at the suit of natural
and legal persons because Article 173 clearly provides that natural and
legal persons should only have the admissibility to challenge acts that
amounted in substance to decisions.
With regard to admissibility, the main issues which make the Court's
case law on anti-dumping different from the dominant tendency of its case
law are, for instance, the issue of individual concern, the position of
complainants, and the requirement of a decision as we have seen above.
In Extramet, the Court held that the application was admissible
with the reason that the applicant was individually concerned because its
business activities were seriously affected by the contested regulation
and it encountered difficulties in obtaining supplies because the sole
Community producer was its main competitor.178
In other contexts, however, the C
the fact that an applicant carries on a particular economic activity is
not enough to establish individual concern.179 In addition, the mere fact
that a measure may exercise an influence on the competitive relationships
cannot suffice to allow that any trader in any competitive relationship is
178.Case C-358/89, Extramet v Council, [1991] 1-2501, at 1-2532, para. 17.
179.Case 25/62, Plaumann v Commission, [1963] ECR 95. Joined Cases 10 and 18/68, Eridania v
Council, [1969] ECR 459.
ourt has consistently held that
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directly and individually concerned by that measure.18°
With respect to the position of complainant, 181 as we have seen
above, the Court's case laws 182
 are ready to accept annulment proceedings
against anti-dumping regulations by the complainant. As pointed out in
the Extramet case, however, it has not been clear whether a complainant
trade association has standing to challenge such a regulation. According
to the rule applicable outside the anti-dumping field, the Court has
insisted that it would satisfy neither the requirement of direct con-
cern 183 nor the requirement of individual concern.184
On the requirement of a decision, the anti-dumping cases are broadly
consistent with the Court's case law outside the dumping cases. Thus, the
Court's judgments in a series of anti-dumping cases, that a contested regu-
lation should be regarded as a decision in substance once individual
concern is established, are consistent with the predominant tendency of
its case law.185
Such different approaches in the anti-dumping cases, as mentioned
180. Ibid, Eridania Case, at para. 7.
181. Article 5(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation provides that "any natural or
legal person, or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of a Commun-
ity industry ... may lodge a written complaint", while Article 173 of the EEC Treaty provides
only that "any natural or legal person may institute proceeding against a decision addressed
to that person ...".
182. See, Case 191/82, FEDIOL v Commission, [1983] ECR 2913, at 2936, para. 31 and 33; Case
264/82, Timex v Commission and Council, [1985] ECR 849, at 866, para. 15 and 16; Case C-
358/89, Extramet v Council, [1991] ECR 1-2501, at 1-2511, para. 22; and Case C-315/90, Gime-
lec and Others v Commission, [1991] ECR 1-5589, at 1-5603.
183. Case 135/81, Groupement des Agences de Voyages v Commission, [1982] ECR 3799, at 3807,
paragraph 7. In this decision, the Court held that as a non-profit-making association the
Groupement did not and could not submit a tender in response to the invitation to tender so
that the Commission's selection could not in any event have injured it directly.
184. Joined Cases 16 and 17/62, Producteurs de Fruits v Council, [1962] ECR 471, at 479.
185. See, subsection 4.2.1.
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above, are likely to create uncertainty about admissibility which an
applicant must establish in anti-dumping proceedings instituted under
Article 173. Therefore, the Court should establish clear guidelines about
differences in admissibility between the Court's case law in anti-dumping
field and its case law applicable in other contexts.
4.3. Court of First Instance (CFI)
At the request of the Court, the Court of First Instance (herein-
after CFI) was established in order to examine certain petitions which are
subject to an appeal to the Court and limited to matters of law, lodged by
individuals or corporate bodies. 186 The Council, in the founding Decision
of the CFI, decided to examine the Court's proposal to extend the CFI's
competence to exercise jurisdiction in petitions lodged against one of the
Community authorities by individuals relating to commercial defence mea-
sures within the meaning of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty for dumping and
subsidy cases.187
In its opinion 188
 on the draft Council Decision, prepared by the
Court, which was designed to extend the CFI's jurisdiction to all actions
brought by individuals, the Commission considered that actions for annul-
ment would not be significantly influenced by the proposed extension of
the CFI's jurisdiction except in measures to protect trade from dumping
and subsidies.
In the dumping area, the Commission took the view that the setting
up of a double layer of judicial system would be in the interests of
186. Com.Dec. 88/591/Euratom,ECSC,EEC, estabIishiing a Court of First Instance of the Eur-
opean Communities, OJ (1988) L 319/1.
187. Ibid, Article 3(3).
188. SEC(92) 495 final.
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foreign producers and of Community importers instead of Community indu-
stry. Therefore it insisted that it should find a solution to the addi-
tional difficulties caused by a two-tier judicial system, which would
render the decision-making process even more cumbersome and burdened.
This cumbersome procedure may create uncertainty as to the law for all
interested parties. A lack of confidence in the effectiveness of Commun-
ity commercial policy is likely to be created. As a consequence the
Commission proposed to the Council the introduction of a more effective
system which aimed at harmonising and streamlining the decision-making
process with regard to measures of trade protection. 189	This proposal
sets out to simplify the decision-making process by transferring to the
Commission some of the powers currently relying on the Council. According
to the proposal, the decision on a trade protection measure would be taken
in all instances by the Commission after consultation of a committee
composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by the repre-
sentative of the Commission.'"
With respect to the effectiveness of Community commercial defence
189. Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the harmonization and streamlin-
ing of decision-making procedures for Community instruments of commercial defence and modifi-
cation of the relevant Council regulations, 92/C 181/06, 0J (1992) C 181/9, SEC(92) 1097
final. In the introductory remarks of this proposal, the Commission stated that the in-
creased jurisdictional control which would result from the inclusion of measures of commer-
cial defence with the jurisdiction of the CFI makes it imperative that current decision
making procedures for the adoption of such measures be simplified.
190. Ibid. p10. According to Article 12a(3) and (6) of the Proposal, the representative of
the Commission shall submit to the committee a draft of the measures to be taken. The com-
mittee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a time limit which the chairman may lay
down according to the urgency of the matter. The Commission shall adopt measures which shall
apply immediately. However, if these measures are not in accordance with the opinion of the
committee, they shall be communicated by the Commission to the Council forthwith. The Coun-
cil may take a different decision within 20 days of deferment of application of the measures
by the Commission.
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instruments, there is another aspect of the overall problem, namely, the
more lengthy commercial defence procedure in the Community system)- 91
 The
Commission, insisting that excessive time delays cause uncertainty in the
market place, reduce the chances that measures have the desired effect,
and contribute to the creation of a lack of confidence in the effective-
ness of Community commercial policy, 192
 proposes introduction of the
following maximum time-limits for anti-dumping proceedings:
- a maximum 1 month from receipt of complaint to initiation
or rejection of complaint;
- a maximum 9 months between initiation of investigation
and provisional measures;
- a maximum 15 months between initiation of investigation
and definitive conclusion)-93
For the implementation of this time limits, the Commission sug-
gested three preconditions; separate and parallel investigations of dump-
ing and injury/Community interest, a more systematic use of sampling
method in which a large number of parties are involved in the investiga-
tion, and recruitment of additional staff)-94
191. Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the introduction of time limits
for investigations carried out under the Community instruments of commercial defence and
modification of the relevant Council regulations, Com(93) 541 final, pl. According to the
Commission, there are several main reasons for excessive time delays: much broader scope of
its investigation because of a Community interest test and a "lesser duty rule", the absence
of mandatory time limits in Community system, and shortage of staff in the Community anti-
dumping service.
192. Ibid, pl.
193. Ibid, p3. The Commission will review the duration of these time limits within 2 years
after its operation, when it may reduce these time limits further.
194. Ibid, p4 and p7. The Commission needs additional staff to implement the time limit, and
the figures for staff are 10 in 1994, 73 in 1995, and the remaining 65 in 1996.
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5. Reimbursement of Excessive Duty Collected
5.1. Introduction
In the EEC, anti-dumping measures as a trade policy instrument, are
not limited on a transaction to transaction basis but apply to all imports
of a certain product from a country or countries concerned. As a result,
a different dumping margin could be applied to a product from different
exporters of a country or countries involved. Therefore, the duty should
be reimbursed if it exceeds the actual margin in the particular situation.
According to the Community refund procedures provided in Article 16, where
an importer can prove that the duty collected exceeds the actual dumping
margin, taking into account any application of weighted average, the
excess amount must be reimbursed. 195
 This provision indicates three
possible prerequisites for reimbursement of the excess amount; duty col-
lected, actual dumping margin, and evidence.
Regulation 2423188, 196
 like its predecessors Regulation 2176/84,197
Regulation 3017/79, 198 and Regulation 459/68, 199
 however, does not estab-
lish any guidelines about the reimbursement of the duties collected except
to put the reservation that consideration should be given to any applica-
tion of weighted averages.
195. Article 16(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation. This provision implements Arti-
cle 8(3) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code which provides that "the amount of the anti-dumping
duty must not exceed the margin of dumping. Therefore, if subsequent to the application of
the anti-dumping duty it is found that the duty so collected exceeds the actual dumping mar-
gin, the amount in excess of the margin shall be reimbursed as quickly as possible".
196. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
197. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2176/84, OJ (1984) L 201/1.
198. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3017/79, OJ (1979) L 339/12.
199. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 459/68, OJ (1968) L 93/8.
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Until 1984, the Commission did not publish any reimbursement deci-
sions nor was any action for reimbursement brought before the Court. In
1985, the Commission started to publish some of its reimbursement deci-
sions. 200 In 1986, eventually, the Commission laid down guidelines re-
garding the application of Article 16 of the Council Regulation
2176/84. 201 Subsequently, in 1987, the Court rendered its first judgment
on the reimbursement procedure in Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft
case. 202
 In March 1992, the Court rendered an important decision in the
area of refunds.2"
5.2. Procedure for the Refund of Anti-dumping Duties
5.2.1. Standing and Addressee of Application
The Commission's notice is provided for the purpose of informing
interested parties on guidelines regarding the application of refund
provisions of the Anti-dumping Regulation and guiding the internal proce-
dure of the Commission. Therefore, it could be considered that the Com-
mission's notice does not have any legislative character.
According to the Commission's notice, any importer who has paid
anti-dumping duties may apply for reimbursement on condition that he has
not been reimbursed by the exporter or by any third party, and that no
future compensatory arrangement will be made or accepted. 2" In order to
request the reimbursement, the Application should be submitted to the
200. Cotton yarn (Turkey), Com.Dec.85/19/EEC, OJ (1985) L 11/34.
201. Commission, Notice concerning the reimbursement of anti-dumping duties (hereinafter
referred to as the "Commission's notice"), 86/C 266/02, OJ (1986) C 266/2.
202. Case 312/84, Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft v Commission, [1987] ECR 841.
203. Case 188/88, /0421 GmbH and Others v Commission, [1992] ECR 1-1089.
204. Read jointly, Point I(1) and (3)A(d) of the Commission's notice.
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Commission via the Member state in the territor y of which the products
were released for free circulation within three months of the date on
which a definitive duty was paid or a provisional duty was definitively
collected, even in cases where the Regulation imposing the duties in
questions is being challenged before the Court.205
5.2.2. Contents of Application
Importers who have paid duties must prove that the dumping margin
has been reduced or eliminated to such an extent that a reimbursement is
considered justified. Furthermore, all necessary information for the
examination of the admissibility and merits of the application should be
submitted together with documentation and sufficient proof for
.206	
verifica
tion	
-
This information must be related to duty collected 2 ° 7
 and actual
dumping margin. 208
 Incomplete applications which fail to supply this
information within the time limit may be rejected because the Commission
intends to consider only those applications with all necessary informa-
tion.2"
5.2.3. Refund and Administrative Review
When examining any refund application, the Commission can decide at
any time to initiate a review after one year has elapsed since the conclu-
205. Read jointly, Article 16(2) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation and Point I(2),(8),
and (10) of the Commission's notice.
206. Point I(3) of the Commission's notice.
207. Information relating to duty collected includes invoice, customs documents, receipt or
other proof of duty paid and declaration that the duty collected has been paid by the impor-
ter concerned.
208. Information on actual dumping margin should cover information on normal value and export
price.
209. Read jointly, Point I(3) and I(7) of the Commission's notice.
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sion of the original investigation. 210
 Commencement of a refund procedure
could be followed by a review investigation. If it is proved that the
exporter has not dumped or has dumped less than the dumping margin which
was determined in the original investigation, the importer can obtain re-
funds for its imports over the period for which the Commission has estab-
lished that dumping has occurred.
Even though this Commission's notice is a guideline on the internal
refund procedure of the Commission, it does not make clear whether parties
will have the same rights provided in Article 14 review provisions,
because the notice states only that the Commission may inform the parties
directly concerned of any application for the reimbursement of anti-dumping
duties and may afford them an opportunity to comment. 211
 Although the
fact that the Commission chose a notice rather than a regulation could
indicate that the Commission's notice does not have a legislative charac-
ter, legal expectation could be in danger if an importer submitted an
application whose contents satisfied all the criteria stipulated in the
notice, and the Commission did not act in response to the application. In
this respect, the Court in Louwage v Commission, held that "although an
internal directive has not the character of a rule of law which the admin-
istration is always bound to observe, it nonetheless sets forth a rule of
conduct indicating the practice to be followed, from which the administra-
tion may not depart without giving the reasons which have led it to do so,
since otherwise the principles of equality of treatment would be in-
fringed". 212
 Furthermore, the notice did not establish any time limit for
the Commission to process the application. This does not mean, however,
210. Second paragraph of Article 14(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation and Point
1(5) of the Commission's notice.
211. Point 1(9) of the Commission's notice.
212. Case 148/73, Raymond Louwage v Commission, [1974] ECR 81 at 89, para. 12.
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that the parties directly concerned would not bring an action before the
Court. 213
5.3. Substantial Commission Policy on Refunds
5.3.1. The Commission's Position
on the Actual Dumping Margin
When an importer has paid anti-dumping duty and shown that the duty
collected exceeded the actual dumping margin, 214
 the importer is entitled
to a refund. The Commission based on Point I(3) of its notice, however,
has not accepted the argument that the actual dumping margin could be that
determined at the time of the investigation. 215
 In Cotton yarn, 216 in the
Commission's first determination concerning an application for refund, the
Commission made it clear that the Commission did not accept the argument
that the refund calculation should be based on normal values calculated on
a basis different from normal values definitively determined in the in-
vestigation. Therefore, in the refund procedure, the applicant can not
challenge the legality of an anti-dumping regulation, because a refund can
213. If any natural or legal person complain to the Court that an institution of the Commun-
ity has failed to address to that person any act, and if, within two months of being so
called upon, the institution concerned has not defined its position, the action may be
brought within a further period of two months. See, Article 175 of the EEC Treaty.
214. Article 16(1) of the Anti-dumping Regulation and Point I(1) of the Commission's notice.
For the analysis of refund procedure, two dumping margins should be compared: the original
dumping margin and the actual dumping margin. The former is that, based on which an anti-
dumping duty has been paid, and the latter is that, based on whch a refund is claimed.
215. First paragraph of Point I(3) of the Commission's notice stipulates that the Commission
intends to consider only those applications which demonstrate that dumping margin has been
reduced or eliminated and indicate the extent to which a reimbursement is considered justi-
fied.
216. Cotton yarn (Turkey), Com.Dec.85/19/EEC, OJ (1985) 11/34, at 35.
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be based on a change of circumstances between the original dumping margin
at the time of the investigation and the new dumping margin at the time of
the application for the refund. The Commission's view on the legality of
an anti-dumping regulation was supported by the Court in Continentale
Produkten Gesellschaft case 217
 which held that Article 16 does not permit
the validity of the regulation instituting the duties to be challenged or
a review of the general findings made during the previous investigations
to be requested.
Another question could be raised, whether an importer could make a
refund claim based on the actual dumping margin at the time when a refund
is requested. According to the Commission, reimbursement can be allowed
if the importer proves that the data taken into account have changed since
the imposition of the anti-dumping duty. 218
 According to Article 16(1) of
the Anti-dumping Regulation, however, 'consideration must be given to any
application of weighted averages'.
	 It is impossible to consider the
individual values affecting the applicant which may retroactively under-
mine the validity of a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty and the
general findings in the original investigation. 219
 Therefore, although it
seems that a refund could be based on the actual dumping margin at the
time when it is requested, it is only for representative values and
weighted average, but not for general duties. As a result, the Commis-
sion's position in this issue is that an importer should be entitled to a
refund only if it could demonstrate that the representative normal value,
based on the normal values of the original investigation, has decreased,
217. Case 312/84, Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft v Commission, [1987] ECR 841, at 867,
para. 12.
218. Point 26 of the Report of the Judge Rapporteur in Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft
case. See, [1987] ECR 841, at 847.
219. Ibid, Point 25 of the Report of the Judge Rapporteur.
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or that the weighted average export price of all the exporter concerned
has increased following the imposition of anti-dumping duties.
If an importer using a new or non-investigated exporter applies for
a refund, it must prove that the highest dumping margin during the invest-
igation has decreased. If the dumping margin was established again as a
result of the weighted average dumping margin over a certain period of
time, an importer whose individual dumping margin is above the new weigh-
ted average margin just because of the new low weighted average dumping
margin could claim a refund, whether or not its individual dumping margin
has decreased. Otherwise, the general finding of the Commission would be
undermined.
5.3.2. Associated Importer
There have been some differences in the application of anti-dumping
margins for refunds between an independent importer and an associated
importer. 22° For example, if a normal value of 1000 and an export price
of 800 has been established for a exporter, anti-dumping duty of 200 should
be imposed.
	 If the exporter increases its export price to 1000 and its
importer had paid an anti-dumping duty of 200, then normally the importer
is entitled to a refund of 200. The importer can deduct the refund from
resale price to the first buyer and ask a price of 1000.
In the case of an associated importer, however, the export price
has been constructed by deducting all costs incurred between importation
and resale from the resale price. Furthermore, the anti-dumping duty is
included in such a cost. As a result, under the same condition with an
220. According to Point IB(b)(iii) of the Commission's notice, importer and exporter will be
deemed to be associated, in particular, in cases where one of them directly or indirectly
controls the other, or both of them are directly or indirectly controlled a third person, or
together they directly or indirectly control a third person.
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independent importer, as mentioned above, when the exporter increases its
export price to 1000, the importer who has paid anti-dumping duty of 200 is
still not entitled to a refund because the export price after deducting
all costs from the resale price is 800. Therefore, for an associated
importer to qualify for a full refund, it must increase the export price
at least to 1000; in addition, the importer must increase the resale price
to the first independent buyer to 1200. Otherwise the associated importer
is not entitled to apply for a refund.
This Commission's position on an associated importer was supported
by the Court in the NM case. 221 NMB's European subsidiaries insisted
that anti-dumping duties should not be considered to be a cost borne be-
tween importation and resale and therefore should not be deducted in
constructing the export price.
	
Such an interpretation is necessary in
order to avoid unjustified discrimination between associated importers and
independent importers.222
The Court, citing the Anti-dumping Regulation which stipulates ex-
pressly that the anti-dumping duties are to be deducted as costs incurred
between importation and resale, 223 ruled that in cases where the importer
is associated with the exporter, the dumping margin should be calculated
on the basis of export price constructed.
221. NMB GmbH case. See, supra note 202.
222. Ibid, at 1-1737, para. 29 and 30.
223. Ibid, at I-1738, para. 32.
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The discrimination in the treatment of independent importers
 and
associated importers with respect to the refund is justified by	 dif-the
ference in their respective situations in relation to the dumping. 224 The
,
Court concluded, citing Article 2(8)(b) of the Anti-dumping Regulation
that anti-dumping duties should be deducted in constructing the export
price, otherwise independent importer would be in a disadvantageous posi-
tion compared to associated importers.225
In spite of the Court's ruling and consistent Commission's practice
in this issue, it should be noted that the anti-dumping duty different from
customs duty should not be treated as a cost to be deducted because it
should be reimbursed if no dumping has taken place.
On the difference between the GATT Anti-dumping Code and the Commun-
ity Anti-dumping Regulation to the construction of the export price, the
Court held that the Anti-dumping Regulation is consistent with the Anti-
dumping Code 226 with the reason that in GATT Anti-dumping Code allowance
should be made for costs incurred between importation and resale "includ-
ing duties and taxes", and in the Community Anti-dumping Regulation certain
224. The Court considered that the difference in their respective situations affects the
conduct of independent importers and associated importers with respect to the passing on of
anti-dumping duties to their customers. The former may pass on the anti-dumping duties to
their customers because it is not certain that a refund will be granted, and because they
would worry about the loss of interest on the amounts paid and suffer the effects of any
currency devaluation in the meantime. But the latter could refrain from passing on the anti-
dumping duties since they would recognise the commercial practices underlying the dumping and
are not in any doubt with respect to the possibility of obtaining a refund. See, Ibid,
paragraph 37 and 38.
225. Where the importer is associated with the exporter, the price at which the importer buys
the goods is not regarded as a reliable basis for determination of the export price, because
the exporter has the chance to sell the goods at an fictitiously overestimated price, thus
causing the importer to deal at a loss on the Community market.
226. MB GmbH case, at 1-1741, para. 47. See, supra note 202.
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duties, including anti-dumping duties, are specified for which allowance
must be made.	 The Court held "that is the only difference between
them". 227
 This Court's decision has overlooked the "actual wording" and
the importance of anti-dumping duties in the anti-dumping case. According
to the actual wording of the GATT Anti-dumping Code, Article 2(5), it is
clear and it should be interpreted that anti-dumping duties are not inclu-
ded in allowance for costs because it only demands the inclusion of duties
and taxes. Therefore, although it may be the "only difference", there is
a critical difference between the GATT Anti-dumping Code and the Community
Regulation with respect to the construction of the export price. It
follows that there is inconsistency between the Anti-dumping Code and
Anti-dumping Regulation.
5.4. Conclusion
As discussed above, few refund applications have been processed
successfully. The refund application has been granted only if the weigh-
ted average dumping margin for a certain period is lower than the duty.
It could be easier for a refund to be granted if individual dumping mar-
gins for each individual importer could be used. This argument, however,
has been consistently rejected by the Commission and the Court because of
inviolability of the general findings of the original investigation and
because it would substantially increase the workload of the Commission's
227. This is not consistent with the Court's ruling even in the same case, because the Court
rejects the applicant's argument that anti-dumping duties should not be regarded as a cost
between importation and resale and therefore should not be deducted in constructing the
export price with the reason that it is contrary to "the actual wording" of provision in the
Community Anti-dumping Regulation and the Court disregards the difference in "actual word-
ings" between the GATT Anti-dumping Code and the Community Regulation.
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Anti-dumping Division at the investigation stage.
Furthermore in the case of associated importers, it is almost
impossible to qualify for a refund unless the product is resold to the
first independent buyer on a duty unpaid basis. 228
 Otherwise, the Commis-
sion has regarded the anti-dumping duty paid by the associated importer as
a cost and it has been deducted.
It should be borne in mind, however, that the anti-dumping system is
designed to ensure that products are not imported and marketed in the
Community at an artificially reduced price. Therefore, application of the
anti-dumping duty, as a trade protection measure, is intended essentially
to restore fair conditions of competition as regards export price. 	 In
these circumstances, the major element is the dumping margin which must be
offset and the anti-dumping duty should not exceed the dumping margin.
Therefore, the dumping has been eliminated when the sale price in the
Community has been increased to an extent which corresponds to the dumping
margin found. Once that increase has been made, the product in question
is no longer sold at an artificially low price and there is no further
need for measures to protect trade.
In the case of an associated importer, the price to be taken into
consideration is the resale price to the first independent purchaser. If
at a particular resale price a dumping margin is found to exist, and
consequently a duty is imposed, the objective which may be legitimately
pursued by that trade protection measure is that of obtaining a price
increase which will bring that price to the level at which no dumping
228. Point II 2(c) of the Commission's notice states that any reimbursement of anti-dumping
duties paid by an associated importer will be granted only where the products in question
were resold to the first independent buyer on a duty unpaid basis. A reimbursement will be
granted to the company which paid duty, if resale price has been increased by the amount of
the dumping margin or a part thereof.
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would have existed. That increase may not exceed the dumping margin. If
a greater increase were granted, it would no longer be a question of
merely restoring a proper price level but of pushing the price of the
product up to the level at which it was unfairly placed at a disadvantage
by comparison with the competing Community product. In other words, there
would be a shift from defence of trade to protectionism. Therefore, in
order to bring dumping to an end an associated importer must increase his
resale price to an independent purchaser by an amount equal to the dumping
margin found to exist, and no more.
In addition, in the Community refund system, there have been some
basic problems. One is related to the Anti-dumping system of the Community
and the other is concerned with the GATT Anti-dumping system. With respect
to the former, a refund application can be considered only where the duty
exceeds the dumping margin, and only where the application demonstrates
that the dumping margin has been reduced or eliminated. 229
 This means
that any refund application which is based on the fact that the duty
exceeds the injury margin will not be considered. As a result, a refund
will not be granted even though the duty exceeds the injury margin.
Therefore, the Community anti-dumping s ystem systemically prevents the
importer from applying for a refund. The fact that the average dumping
margin established was approximately 40%, whereas the actual measures were
imposed, on average, at half of that rate, 23 ° shows that the application
of the "lesser duty rule" has been used widely and demonstrates that
application for a refund based on the injury margin should be considered.
The next issue is that while the current Article 16 of Regulation
2423/88 makes the importer play a main role in the refund procedure,
229.Point I, 3 of the Commission's notice.
230.Commission, 11th anti-dumping report, (1992), CON(93) 516 final, p4.
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Article 8(3) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code 231
 simply demands that the
amount of duty in excess of the actual dumping margin be reimbursed. The
fact that the excessive duty should be reimbursed to the importer who paid
the duty is very logical but it does not mean that only the importer can
made a refund application. Therefore, it must open the way for an expor-
ter to apply for a refund as well.
6. REVIEW SYSTEMS IN KOREA
The imposition of the anti-dumping duty and the acceptance of the
undertaking may be subject to review, 232
 and as a result of the review,
anti-dumping duty could be imposed, and the content of the undertaking
could be changed, or reimbursement could be ordered. 233
 A review can be
held where the interested person or the competent Ministers having juris-
diction over the industry concerned so request with related documentary
evidence, 234
 provided that at least 1 year has elapsed since the date on
which the anti-dumping duty or the undertaking has entered into force.235
231. Article 8(3) of the GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that if, subsequent to the applica-
tion of the anti-dumping duty, it is found that the duty so collected exceeds the actual
dumping margin, the amount in excess of the margin shall be reimbursed as quickly as pos-
sible.
232. Only in Dicumyl Peroxide, anti-dumping determination was subject to review in Korea.
Dicumyl Peroxide (Japan, Taiwan), KIEP, p201.
233. Article 10(7) of the Korean Customs Act.
234. Reviews could be held where related documentary evidence fell under the following mat-
ters : 1. where enough change in situation to justify change of the content of measure has
occurred since the imposition of anti-dumping duty or the acceptance of the undertaking; 2.
where the domestic industries might be threatened with injury from a termination of the anti-
dumping measure or the undertaking; and 3. where the amount of the anti-dumping duty colleted
exceeds the actual dumping margin. Article 4(14)(i) of the EDCA.
235. Article 4(14)(ii) of the EDCA. Request for a review should be made 6 months before the
effect of the anti-dumping measure or the undertaking is lost.
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Article 4(14)(i) of the Enforcement Decree showed a list of related docu-
mentary evidence, but it is not an exhaustive list, so it should be con-
structed that evidence means evidence of changed circumstances sufficient
to justify the need for review. However, review is not automatically
granted, even though an interested person has submitted evidence of
changed circumstance, because the Minister has a margin of discretion in
deciding whether or not to review.236
The investigation should be concluded within 6 months from the date
on which a review is initiated, and a report of the result of investiga-
tion and the letter of resolution on determination be submitted. 237
 If
the period of application of the anti-dumping measures terminated during
the review period, the effect of such anti-dumping measures should be
maintained in the period of review.238
Furthermore, the imposition of the anti-dumping duty or the under-
taking accepted should lapse after 5 years from the date on which they
entered into force. 239 This is the so-called "sunset review". Even
though the period of validity of anti-dumping measures is declared in the
Korean Customs Act, the procedures are not clearly laid out in the text of
the Act or the Decree. 240 Therefore, the procedures of the "sunset"
review should be stipulated in more detail before anti-dumping determina-
tions start to expire automatically.
In addition to the administrative and sunset review, an additional
236. Article 4(14)(ii) of the EDCA.
237. Article 4(14)(v) of the EDCA.
238. Article 4(14)(vi) of the EDCA.
239. If the content of the anti-dumping duty or the undertaking is changed according to the
result of review, the anti-dumping duty or undertaking should lapse after 5 years from the
date on which they were last modified or confirmed. Article 10(8) of the Korean Customs Act.
240. Because the review procedures in Article 4(14) is not for the "sunset review" but for
the administrative review.
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anti-dumping duty could be considered where the exporter bears the anti-
dumping duty. However, as mentioned above, it must always be borne in
mind that review could give more benefits rather than the imposition of an
additional duty, 241 and that the anti-dumping duty should not be imposed
where there is no injury because injury was eliminated by the imposition
of the anti-dumping duty.
Finally, judicial review 242
 must be guaranteed in order to prevent
unreasonable anti-dumping determination under discretion of the investiga-
tion authorities. However, judicial review is not statutorily determined
in the Korean Customs Act or its Enforcement Decree.	 Therefore, it is
necessary to be prescribed in the Korean anti-dumping law that the anti-
dumping determinations may be reviewed judicially.
241. See, subsection 2.4 on an additional duty in section 1 of this chapter.
242. So far, no judgment has been held by any Korean judicial system on the anti-dumping
determinations.
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Chapter 8 : FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR
THE ANTIDUMPING LAWS
1. INTRODUCTION
When submitting its proposed amendments to the anti-dumping legisla-
tion in 1988, the Commission explained in its explanatory memorandum' why
it needs define more precisely certain rules in the Community's anti-
dumping law. The Commission pointed out six issues as follows:
	 the
changed nature of anti-dumping proceedings, the more frequent use of a
definitive duty instead of an undertaking, the increased litigation there-
from, the ambiguity of the Community's anti-dumping law in certain areas,
the possibility of increased litigation if anti-dumping determinations
were included in the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, and the
growing complexity of cases.	 In the resulting 1988 regulation, 2 the
Commission's administrative practices which had been applied previously,
were codified. The amendment includes the following issues 3 as mentioned
in the previous chapters: the treatment of discounts and rebates and the
calculation of "SGA" expenses and profit in the determination of normal
value, deductible costs in the case of the determination of the construc-
ted export price, adjustments for the fair comparison of normal value and
export prices, the use of averaging and sampling techniques, clarifying
false or misleading information in order to avoid undue disruption to
proceedings, additional anti-dumping duties for the effectiveness of anti-
dumping duty and implementation of the guidelines 4 relating to the refund
1. Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) amending Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84
on protection against dumped or subsidised imports from countries not members of the European
Economic Community, COM(88) 112 final, Brussel, 22 March 1988, pl.
2. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
3. Ibid, p3.
4. Commission, Commission notice concerning the reimbursement of anti-dumping duties, 86/C
266/02, OJ (1986) C 266/2.
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procedure.
All the changes mentioned above have one thing in common; they are
biased in favour of a finding that dumping has taken place. The Commis-
sion insisted in its 1990 Ninth Annual Anti-dumping Report5 that while the
number of investigations initiated in 1988 and 1990 remained relatively
high compared to 1986 and 1989, they are lower than the number initiated
in 1981, 1982 and 1984. 	 The number of anti-dumping measures applied in
1987, 1988 and 1989 was less than half the numbers applied in 1982 and
1983. This analysis is only partly correct and leads to an underestima-
tion of the impact of the Community's anti-dumping system on imports from
countries not members of the Community. While the total number of anti-
dumping measures applied in the years 1981 and 1987 was high compared to
the years 1988 and 1992, the total number of cases of imposition of defi-
nitive duty applied before 1988 was lower than in 1988 and after.6
Before 1988, 22 out of 283 investigations were concluded by deter-
mination of no dumping and 46 investigations were concluded by determina-
tion of no injury, but in 1988 and afterwards only 2 out of 152 investiga-
tions were concluded by determination of no dumping 7 and 33 investigations
were concluded by the determination of no injury. This means that once a
complaint is lodged, the Commission can in almost all cases find the
existence of dumping by virtue of the 1988 Anti-dumping Regulation, but it
is still difficult to prove that the dumped imports are, through the
effects of dumping, causing injury to an established Community industry.
5. Commission, 9th anti-dumping report (1990),	 SEC(91) 974 final, Brussels, 31 May 1991,
p33.
6. While 63 definitive duties out of the total 282 anti-dumping measures were imposed between
1981 and 1987 (22%), 81 definitive duties out of a total 152 anti-dumping measures were im-
posed between 1988 and 1992 (53%).
7. Potassium permanganate (USSR), Com.Dec.91/24/EEC, OJ (1991) L 14/56. Cotton yarn (Egypt)
Com.Dec.92/179/EEC, OJ (1992) L 82/70.
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This seems to be a result of the fact that the Community authorities has
not codified certain other important aspects of their practice, such as
the methods to be used for calculating the injury margin. Considering the
fact that more than 40% of Community anti-dumping duties have been set by
the "lesser duty rule", it is necessary to define more precisely the
methods for calculating the injury margin, but it should not be defined in
such a way that the injury caused by the dumped imports can be proved more
easily than at present.
The Commission reported that only 0.3% of imports from the Asian
newly industrialised economies were subject to anti-dumping duties and
27.6% of the anti-dumping investigations initiated during the 1980s con-
cerned exports from the Far East, including China, 8 and this could be a
result of the increased trade from those countries.	 The investigations
initiated in the years 1988 to 1992 show that, over the period, the sec-
tors most involved were those of chemicals and electronics with, in 1992,
the largest number of initiations or actions again taking place in the
electronics sector. Taking account of the fact that the main export
products from the Far East are in electronics sector, anti-dumping mea-
sures which tend to concentrate on the electronics sector may have a
disproportionate impact on exports from the Far East.
Even though it is true that the relatively high proportion of
anti-dumping cases against certain countries has not prevented these coun-
tries from increasing their trade with Community, the fact that a defini-
tive duty has more frequently been applied in recent determinations could
be a great threat to future exports to the Community.
Based on the Community's anti-dumping activities during the last 13
years, in this chapter three ways of change of the present anti-dumping
8. Commission, 9th anti-dumping report, SEC(91) 974 final, Brussel, 31 May 1991, p34.
275
system will be discussed: change of the Community anti-dumping regulation
itself, to make the conduct of anti-dumping economically rational within
the existing international rules and definitions of dumping, 9
 change of
the Community anti-dumping legislation by the Commission itself, and
change at an international multilateral level, under the auspices of the
GATT.
2. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURE
OF THE COMMUNITY
On 17 July 1992, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council
Regulation on the harmonisation and streamlining of decision-making proce-
dures for Community instruments of commercial defence and the modification
of the relevant Council Regulations. 10 The issue which is being watched
with keen interest is the transfer of certain powers for taking definitive
measures from the Council to the Commission.	 The basic changes in the
decision-making procedure proposed are that (a) the decision to impose
definitive anti-dumping duties would be taken by the Commission which
should be assisted and consulted by a management committee 11 in all
9. The Community anti-dumping regulation has been analysed throughout the thesis; therefore
the remaining two issues will be discussed in this part.
10. SEC (92) 1079 final, and see, OJ (1992) C 181/9. The proposal concerns definitive mea-
sures of commercial defence which were provided under Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 on
protection against dumped or subsidized import, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2641/84 on the
strenthening of the common commercial policy with regard in particular to protection against
illicit commercial practice, and Council Regulation (EEC) No 288/82 on common rules for
imports.
11. see, Coun.Dec.87/373/EEC, laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing
powers conferred on the Commission, OJ (1987) L 197/33.
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cases,
12
 (b) the committee should deliver its opinion on the Commission's
draft within a time limit which is set by the chairman according to the
urgency of the matter; 13 and (c) if the definitive measure imposed by the
Commission is not in accordance with the opinion of the committee, the
Commission should communicate to the Council and the Council may take a
different decision by a qualified majority within the time limit.14
Therefore, the Commission could take even more power in deciding
whether the matter is urgent or not, because the chairman from the Commis-
sion has laid down a strict time limit for the delivery of an opinion from
the committee. Under the current Regulation, it is not the Commission but
the Council which imposes definitive duties by a qualified majority (54
votes out of 76). According to this proposal, however, a qualified major-
ity would be needed not to approve but to oppose the imposition of defini-
tive duties. Furthermore, this qualified majority for opposition to the
imposition of definitive measures has to be reached within twenty days of
the deferral of the application.15
The Commission insisted that these changes are only for internal
Community procedures, 16 but they may affect the position of the Communi-
ty's trading partners. This system would speed up decisions on cases
where there is no disagreement between the Commission and the Member
States.	 These internal changes, however, could result in an even worse
situation for the Community's trading partners because of the lack of
transparency and the shorter period allowed for preparation for the pro-
12. Article 12a(2) and (4) of Commission proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the
harmonization and streamlining of decision-making procedures for Community instruments of
commercial defence and modification of the relevant Council regulations, SEC(92) 1076 final.
13. Ibid, Article 12a(3).
14. Ibid, Article 12a(4) and (5).
15. Ibid, Article 12a(5)
16. Commission, 11th anti-dumping report, COM(93) 516 final, p86.
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ceeding. Up to now, the Member States have played a decisive role in the
qualified majority system of the Council. According to the proposal,
Member States' powers of intervention would be curtailed, not only because
almost all of the decision-making process will be completed in the Commis-
sion, but also because a qualified majority not a qualified minority is
required to oppose the Commission's decision.
As mentioned above, 17 this proposal stemmed from the Commission's
opinion18 on the request of the Court of Justice that measures of commer-
cial defence should be included in the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance. This proposal is still before the Council because no agreement
has been established among the Member States.
Not only the decision-making procedure but also the excessive time
delays of anti-dumping investigations is another aspect of the overall
problem which should be reformed. 19 As a result, on 4 November the Com-
mission put before the Council a proposal for an amendment to Council
Regulations 2° with a view to speeding up investigations and making them
more transparent. 21 The main purpose of this proposal, as mentioned
17. See, chapter 7, title II, subsection 4.3. Court of First Instance.
18. SEC (92) 495 final.
19. According to 6th anti-dumping report, the average time taken to complete the normal in-
vestigations concluded in 1987 was 9.1 months, 9.0 months in 1986 and 9.3 months in 1985.
Average time taken to impose provisional duties in the investigation concluded in 1987 was
7.7 months, 7.6 months in 1986 and 8.0 months in 1985. These excessive time delays are
roughly in conformity with present time spending. See, COM(89) 106 final, p7.
20. This proposal concerns two Community instruments which were provided under Council Regu-
lation (EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1, on protection against dumped or subsidised im-
ports and Council Regulation (EEC) No 288/82, OJ (1982) L 35/1, on common rules for imports.
21. commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the introduction of time limits
for investigations carried out under the Community instruments of commercial defence and
modification of the relevant Council Regulations, COM(93) 541 final.
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above, 22 is the introduction of mandatory time limits for investigations
under Community anti-dumping law.
The Commission, furthermore, pointed out that the imposition of
such deadlines would not be realistic unless investigations of dumping and
injury/Community interest were to be carried out separately and in paral-
lel, clarifications were to be made to existing provisions, 23 and staffing
increased. 24 Therefore, this proposal is principally aimed at (a) incor-
porating time limits, 25 (b) providing a basis for sampling where there are
a large number of parties involved and clarifying the provisions with
regard to interested parties and the treatment of non or partial coopera-
tors, 26 and (c) permitting the imposition of provisional measures for a
full 6 months rather than the current situation where they are first
imposed for 4 months and then, if necessary, extended for a further two
months by the Counci1.27
3. CHANGES AT A MULTILATERAL LEVEL
The 92 countries taking part in the Conference at Punta del Este,
1986, reached a decision on the launching of a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations, to be known the 'Uruguay Round' which is the 8th round
of multilateral trade negotiations following from the Tokyo Round,28
22. See, chapter 7, title II, subsection 4.3 Court of First Instance.
23. It means a more systematic use of sampling. Moreover, the consequences of non-coopera-
tion by interested parties need to be clarified.
24. See, supra note 22, COM(93) 541 final, p4.
25. Article 1(2)(3) and (6) of the Proposal
26. Ibid, Article 1(7).
27. Ibid, Article 1(12).
28. See, Bull. EC 9-1986, point 1.4.1 et seq., and Commission, 20th the General Report on
the Activities of the European Communities, 1986, point 810.
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conducted under the auspices of the GATT since it was established in 1947.
The economic interests of the developed countries differ substantially
from those of the developing countries, and there are also major differ-
ences in the economic interests of the various industrialised countries
themselves. Furthermore, in 1989, negotiations were taking place within
the context of the Uruguay Round to improve, clarify and expand such
agreements as the GATT Anti-dumping Code. 29 As a result, by 1990 this
multilateral trade negotiation had not been concluded although it had been
expected to be concluded in 4 years. Moreover, negotiation of a new GATT
anti-dumping Code was postponed as well. Negotiations on anti-dumping
have proved particularly difficult, with major disagreements between
countries whose economies are mainly export oriented, like Japan, Korea
and Hong Kong, and others, like the Community, whose import and export
trade is more in balanced.
After a year of intensive negotiations on all subjects covered by
the Round, the GATT Director-General, Mr. Arthur Dunkel, was in a position
to table a draft final act in December 1991. The 'Dunkel Paper' by and
large reflected the consensus among the participants, but also included a
number of compromises and trade-offs on the most politically sensitive
issues.
As a part of a draft final act, the GATT Director-General released
his compromise text on anti-dumping because negotiators had failed to agree
29. Because the Uruguay Round aimed to bring about further liberalization and expansion of
world trade to the benefit of all countries, including the improvement of access to markets
by the reduction and elimination of tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff
measures and obstacles. See, Part 1, A, objectives in Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round, Bull. EC 9-1986, point 1.4.4., and Commission, 8th anti-dumping report, SEC(91) 92
final, p13.
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on several important issues.3°
Most of the changes provided for in the 'Dunkel Paper' 31 were incor-
porated in an "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994" (hereinafter referred to as the "1994
GATT Anti-dumping Code").32
In this chapter, the changes are summarised under three headings;
the procedural changes, the determination of dumping, and the determina-
tion of injury. Some of the changes in 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code are in
accordance with the current rules and practice in the Community, but
others may require significant changes from the current application of the
Community law and practices in order to comply with the new GATT Anti-
dumping Code.
3.1. Changes in the Procedure
When compared with the current Community regulation, 33 it seems that
the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code has made changes in the following areas.
Authorities in the importing country should notify the government of
the exporting countries concerned after receipt of a properly documented
30. With respect to the anti-circumvention, for instance, the 'Dunkel Paper' set a 30% local
contents criterion instead of the 40% local content criterion in the current Community Regu-
lation. Furthermore, the Community should make concessions on the determination of dumping
which will inevitably result in lower dumping margins in some areas. This will be discussed
in the next subsection.
31. Draft Final Act Embodying tthe Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 Dec. 1991.
32. Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation (1986-1994), COM(94) 143 final, pp145-
169.
33. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
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application and before an investigation is initiated. 34 However, in the
Community, if the Commission decides to initiate proceedings after con-
sultation, it will not inform the government of the exporting country con-
cerned but only announce the initiation of a proceeding in the Official
Journal of the European Communities. 35
 Therefore, in order to be in
accordance with these new international obligations, in particular those
arising from Article VI of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(hereinafter referred to as 'GATT'), the Community should change its
current practice under its current Anti-dumping Regulation. Once an in-
vestigation is started, it should be concluded within 18 months after its
initiation without exception. 36
 This has been one of the main targets of
reform of the Community legislation. 37 The Community will have to
accelerate reform of its any practices where proceedings often take much
longer.
Where the imported products under investigation are commonly sold
at the retail level, industrial users of the product and representatives
of consumer organisations should have the opportunity to be provided with
information which is relevant to the investigation regarding dumping,
injury and causality. 38 This may improve the position of the consumers in
the Community where the Community interest have been deemed to be the same
as the interests of Community industry.
With respect to sampling techniques, in cases where the number of
exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is too large
34. Article 5(5) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
35. Article 7(1)(a) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
36. Article 5(10) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that 'investigations shall,
except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18
months, after their initiation'.
37. See, supra note 22, COM(93) 541 final.
38. Article 6(12) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
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to determine an individual dumping margin for each of interested parties
concerned in relation to the product under investigation, then samples,
either from a reasonable number of interested parties or products or from
the largest percentage of the volume of the exports from the country in
question, may be applied to establish normal value and export prices.39
Any sampling should be made in consultation with and with the consent of
the exporters, producers or importers concerned." Furthermore, an indi-
vidual dumping margin for a non-sampled producer or an exporter who sub-
mits the necessary information in time should be determined unless indi-
vidual examinations would be unduly burdensome to the authorities.41
However, if a non-sampled producer or an exporter who submits the neces-
sary information in time could be subject to the same weighted average
dumping margin found with respect to sampled producers, the authorities'
undue burden could be relieved.	 The Community's current practice under
its Anti-dumping Regulation which stipulates the use of the most frequently
occurring or representative prices as sampling techniques should therefore
be reviewed. 42
Regarding the Commission's proposal for mandatory time limits for
investigations, the proposal tries to permit the application of provision-
al measures for a full 6 months instead of the current application of a 4
months period and then extension for another 2 months if necessary. 43
39. Article 6(10) of the 1994 GATT Antidumping Code.
40. Ibid, Article 6(10)(1).
41. Ibid, Article 6(10)(2).
42. Article 2(13) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
43. Title 1, Article 1(12) of the Commission's proposal on the introduction of time limits
provides that provisional duties shall have maximum period of validity of four months.
However, where exporters representing a significant percentage of the trade involved so
request or do not object upon notification by the Commission, provisional anti-dumping duties
may have a period of validity of six months. See, supra note 22, COM(93) 541 final, p23.
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This means that the Commission wants to strengthen trade protection
measures by way of a six month period of validity of provisional anti-
dumping duties.	 Ironically, the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code introduces
more protective provisional measures providing that provisional anti-
dumping duties may have a limited duration of six months normally and 9
months where exporters representing a significant percentage of the trade
involved so request, or the authorities concerned so decide, and when
authorities determine that a duty lower than the margin of dumping would
be sufficient to remove injury. 44 Therefore, the Community could justify
its more protective trend in its reforms and, if it wished, enjoy a full 9
months period of validity of provisional antidumping measures.
Giving support to the Community's discretionary practice to accept
or reject undertakings, 45 the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code provides expli-
citly that undertakings offered need not be accepted by the importing
country authorities if they consider their acceptance impractical for
reasons of general policy. 46	Therefore, the Community's discretionary
power to accept or reject undertakings is reinforced by the result of
multilateral trade negotiation and it may reject any undertakings from
exporting countries for general commercial policy which exporters never
expect.
In the Community, the unfair situation of new exporters, who had no
link of any sort with the exporters in the original investigation, who did
not export during that investigation period and who have subsequently corn-
44. Article 7(4) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
45. See, case 294/86 and 77/87, Technointorg v Commission and Council, ECR [1988] 6077, at
6117, and case 240/88, NTN Toyo Bearing v Council, ECR [1987] 1809.
46. Article 8(3) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code. It provides that undertaking offered
need not be accepted if the authorities consider their acceptance impractical, for example,
if the number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or for other reasons, including
reasons of general policy.
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menced exporting or have the firm intention to do so, has been worsened by
the imposition of residual anti-dumping duties set at the highest duty
level imposed in the original case. 47 Therefore new-comers reviews are
becoming more common since the Commission started to carry out such
reviews in 1990. 48 Even though new-comers may offer undertakings, their
the situation is still disadvantageous because if they begin to export to
the Community, it only be possible to apply for an Article 14 review if at
least one year has elapsed since the conclusion of the investigation.
This unfair practice within the Community is challenged by the 1994 GATT
Anti-dumping Code which explicitly provides that the authorities should
promptly carry out a review on an accelerated basis for new comers who are
not related to any of exporters subjected to anti-dumping duties. No
anti-dumping duties should be levied on imports from such exporters while
the review is being carried out. 49 In order to comply with this new GATT
rule, the Community could no longer rely on the one year "lapse rule" in
Article 14.
Another new rule in the 1994 GATT Code is a "sunset" provision
which provides that any definitive anti-dumping duty should be terminated
after 5 years from its imposition. Current Community rules and practice
are well reflected in this GATT rule, but this still can be distinguished
47. Four reviews of anti-dumping measures on new-comers were concluded in 1992 as follows;
Video cassette tapes (Hong Kong), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1292/92, OJ (1992) L 139/1, Video Cass-
ette tapes (Hong Kong), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1769/92, OJ (1992) L 182/6, Monosodium glutamate
(Indonesia) Com.Dec.92/493/EEC, OJ (1992) L 299/40, and Video cassette tapes (Hong Kong),
Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3498/92, OJ (1992) L 354/1. Among them, in Monosodium glutamate, the Com-
mission accepted an undertaking offered by a new-comer (PT Indomiwon Citra Inti) who had the
firm intention to export to the Community but had not started to do so yet, in spite of the
fact that the Council has concluded that undertakings from potential exporters should not be
accepted. See, Sodium carbonate (USA), Coun.Reg. (EEC) No 3337/84, OJ (1984) L 311/26.
48. Video tapes in cassettes (Hong Kong), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3522/90, OJ (1990) L 343/1.
49. Article 9(5) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
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from Community law because there is no obligations to inform importing
country's industries known to be concerned. 50 As has been proved in the
Community, this has been a positive development.	 Since Article 15 was
first introduced into the Community Regulation in 1984 51 and came into
force in 1985, a total of 212 anti-dumping measures have been allowed to
expire automatically.52
3.2. Changes in Substantive Rules
3.2.1. The Determination of Dumping
The 1994 GATT Code gives a clear answer to the question when sales
of the like product in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market
of the exporters do not permit a proper comparison. In relation to the
volume of sales of product in question in the home market of the exporting
country, if the sales constitute 5% or more of the sales to the importing
country, such sales should be considered a basis for the determination of
the normal value. 53
 This is a kind of positive achievement which might
limit the discretionary powers of the anti-dumping authorities in the im-
porting country, but it is not very helpful to exporting countries which
have a small domestic market, like Singapore and Hong Kong. Since Elec-
tronic typewriters in 1984, 54 the Commission has determined that the sales
of individual models on the domestic market of the exporting country would
be used as the basis of normal value if the volume of such sales was equal
50. Article 11(3), and Article 15 of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Regulation.
51. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2176/84, OJ (1984) L 201/1.
52. Commission, 11th anti-dumping report, CON(93) 516 final, p69.
53. See, footnote 2 in Article 2(2) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
54. Electronic typewriters (Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3643/84, OJ (1984) L 335/43, p44.
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to, or more than, 5% of the volume of exports to the Community. 55 And it
must be noted that the Community authorities in Dot-Matrix Printers,56
excluded sales below cost in the domestic market of the exporting country
in applying the above mentioned 5% criterion.
With respect to sales below the per unit (fixed or variable) costs
of production, the GATT Code shows stricter attitudes to the issue of
permitting a finding of dumping than the 1979 GATT Code and the current
Community legislation. 	 Distinguishing prices at the time of sales from
prices for the period of investigation, the GATT Code provides that if the
former is above the weighted average of the latter, such prices should be
considered for recovery of all costs reasonably allocated within a reason-
able period of time, even though prices are below the per unit costs.57
Article 2(2)(1)(1) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code introduces a
more clearly defined rule on the methods of cost calculation. 58 According
to this rule, costs should be calculated on the basis of the exporter's
record which is in accordance with the generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) of the exporting country. This provision would seem to
limit the investigating authorities' discretionary power to calculate
costs by adopting ad hoc accounting methodologies. In DRAMS from Korea,59
55. In Canon case, this determination was supported by the Court. See, joined cases 277 and
300/85, Canon France, Canon Rechner Deutschland, Canon (U.K) v. Council, [1988] ECR, 5731.
Therefore, this 5% rule should be applied on a model-by-model basis, at least in the Commun-
ity.
56. Serial-Impact Dot-Matrix Printers (Japan), Coun.Reg. (EEC) No 3651/88, OJ (1988) L
317/33, p36.
57. Article 2(2)(1) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
58. It provides that costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the
exporter or producer under investigation, provided that such records are in accordance with
the generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect
the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration.
59. DRAMs (Korea), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 611/93, OJ (1993) L 66/1, p3.
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for example, the Commission took the position that all R&D costs actually
incurred in the period of investigation and related to DRAMs, be it cur-
rent or future products, should be allocated to DRAMs sold in the period
of investigation and could not be depreciated, although the Korean produ-
cers claim that R&D costs incurred in the past and deferred to the period
of investigation should be the basis for the determination of the cost of
the production, not R&D costs for the future generation. 6° Therefore,
this Community practice could be challenged, as the Community should now
use the GAAP of the exporting country.
Since Ballbearings, 61 the Community authorities have refused to
accept exporters' requests for special consideration of their production
facilities in a start-up or expansion phase, with the reason that neither
the GATT rules nor Community Regulation 62 provide for a different set of
rules to be applied to exporters in a start-up or expansion phase.° The
Code, however, provides special rules on amortisation and depreciation
periods and allowances not only for capital expenditure and other develop-
ment costs but also for start-up operations." Therefore, it remains to
60. In the discussion of Vermulst and Graafsma, "Commercial Defence Actions and Other Int'l
Trade Developments in the EC: 1 July 1992-31 Dec. 1992", 4 EJIL (No.2) 1993, p290, the au-
thors insisted that this was the first time that the Commission had rejected Korean
GAAP(generally accepted accounting principles) in spite of the fact that in all previous EC
anti-dumping proceedings, Korean GAAP had not been accepted by the Community authorities.
61. Ballbearings (Japan and Singapore), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2089/84, OJ (1984) L 193/1, p2.
62. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 3017/79, OJ (1979) L 339/1.
63. The Commission, in Monosodium glutamate (Indonesia), OJ (1992) L 299/40, made an adjust-
ment for start-up operation because it assumed that capacity was utilized to a reasonable
extent.
64. Article 2.2.1.1 of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code. In its footnote 6, it stipulates
more stringently that the adjustment for start-up operations shall reflect the costs at the
end of the start-up period, or if that period extends beyond the period of investigation, the
most recent costs which can reasonably be taken into account by the authorities during the
investigation.
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be seen whether the Community authorities adjust their practice to comply
with this new GATT rule.
For a fair comparison between the normal value and the export
price, if a conversion of currencies is required, the new Code provides
that such conversion should be made using the rate of exchange on the date
of sale and fluctuations in exchange rates should be ignored. 65 There-
fore, a finding of dumping should not based exclusively on exchange rate
fluctuations.
Contrary to the Community's practice in relation to comparisons
between normal value established on a weighted average basis and export
prices on a transaction by transaction basis which is in favour of a
higher dumping margin, the new Code requires that the dumping margin
should be established by a comparison of a weighted average normal value
with a weighted average export price or by a comparison of the normal
value and export price on a transaction to transaction basis. This is a
very positive change for foreign exporters or foreign producers, and if
the Community changed its current provisions in order to comply with the
new GATT Code, the current situation under which dumping has been found
easily and a higher dumping margin has been artificially created would be
improved. The new Code, however, is silent on sales through related sales
subsidiaries. It simply provides that if the export price is unreliable
because of an association between the exporter and the importer or a third
party, the export price may be constructed, and allowances for costs
including duties and taxes, incurred between importation and resale, and
for the profit accruing, should be made as stipulated in the 1979 Code."
When an exporter sells in both its home market and in the importing coun-
65. Article 2(4)(1) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
66. Read jointly, Article 2(3) and (4) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
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try through related companies, allowances for costs incurred between the
exporter and the first independent buyer should be made not only in rela-
tion to export price, but also normal value, to achieve a fairer compari-
son. The ECJ's position67 in supporting these 'Asymmetrical' methods on
allowances to normal value and export price confirms unfair comparison and
should have been challenged. Moreover, ensuring a fair comparison after
making the basic elements, namely, normal value and export price unfair,
makes no sense.
On the Community's treatment of anti-dumping duties in calculating
dumping margin in refund claims, the so-called "duty as a cost" issue, the
new GATT Code introduces a clear guideline providing that in determining
whether and to what extent a reimbursement should be made, authorities
should calculate the export price with no deduction for the amount of
anti-dumping duties paid."	 Therefore, the inconsistency between GATT
rules and the Community Anti-dumping Regulation which has been supported
by the Court ruling 69
 should be terminated. These new GATT rules should
have a great influence on the Community's existing practice concerning
additional duties.7°
67. Case 260/84, Minebea Company Ltd v Council, [1987] ECR 2000, at 2004, and joined cases
277 and 300/85, Canon Inc. v Council, [1988] ECR 5731, at 5804. See, the judgments on an
anti-dumping duty on imports of ballbearings in cases 240, 255, 256, and 258/84, [1987] ECR
1809, 1861, 1899 and 1923 as well. In those cases, basically, the Court held that calcula-
tion of the normal value and the export price may be made according to the special methods
for each purpose respectively. The fair comparison cannot therefore be conditional on calcu-
lation of the normal value and the export price by identical methods.
According to Article 2(9) of the Anti-dumping Regulation, it is clear that comparison is
considered after the normal value and the export price have been established.
68. Case 188/88, NMB GmbH v Commission, [1992] ECR 1-1689, at 1-1741, para 47.
69. Article 9(3)(3) of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
70. Silicon metal (P.R. China), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 1607/92, OJ (1992) L 170/1.
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3.2.2. The Determination of Injury
In order to examine the impact of the dumped imports on the import-
ing country's industry, the magnitude of the margin of dumping is expli-
citly considered to be one of the relevant economic factors, 71 although
this factor cannot give decisive guidance alone.
By comparison with the Community's law and practice from the per-
spective of an exporter or a foreign producer, the new GATT Code is much
more generous in relation to the rejection of an application or the termi-
nation of an investigation without protective measures. 72 New GATT Code
stipulates that there should be immediate termination of anti-dumping pro-
ceedings where the margin of dumping is de minimis, or the volume of
dumped imports is negligible 73 even though dumping and injury is found.
This new GATT rule will give more room to exporters with a small dumping
margin and exporting countries with low market shares. If the Community
amends its regulation in accordance with this new GATT rule, the number of
investigations which are terminated without protective measures will
sharply increase. 74 The 7% collective market-share test, however, opens
71. Article 3(4) of the 1994 Antidumping Code.
72. In the Community, investigations can be terminated without protective measures only in
the following three cases; no dumping is found; no injury is found; or the withdrawal of the
complaint. See Article 9 of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
73. According to subparagraph 8 of Article 5 of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code, the margin
of dumping which should be considered to be de minimis is less than 2%. The volume of dumped
imports shall normally be regarded as negligible if the volume from any particular country
has represented less than 3% of market share, provided, however, that the total market share
of all exporting countries under investigation, each with less than 3% of market share, is
not more than 7%.
74. In 1992, 12 investigations were terminated without protective measures. Among them, 1
found no dumping, 4 found no injury and 7 resulted from the withdrawal of the complaint.
See, Commission, 11th antidumping report, COM(93) 516 final, p64.
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the possibility of taking protective measures where many countries with
less than a 3% market share are involved. In order to avoid the applica-
tion of a 3% test, Community producers will make complaints about imports
from as many countries as possible.
With respect to cumulation, Article 3(3) of the 1994 GATT Anti-
dumping Code provides that where the import of a product from more than
one country is simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations, the
investigation authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of such
imports only if they determine that: (1) the margin of dumping established
in relation to the imports from each country is not more than de minimis
as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5, and that the volume of imports
from each country is not negligible; and (2) a cumulative assessment of
the effects of the imports is appropriate in the light of the conditions
of competition between imported products and the like domestic product.
Therefore, cumulation can be allowed only where imports of a product from
more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping invest-
igation. This means that cumulating products subject to different invest-
igations, 75 as has been done by the Community in past cases, should no
longer be possible.
75. See, Certain electronic weighing scales (Korea, Singapore), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 1103/93, 0j
(1993) L 112/20; Certain electronic weighing scales (Japan), Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 993/93, 	 OJ
(1993) L 104/4.
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Chapter 9: CONCLUSION
This study has analysed and compared the anti-dumping laws, and
administrative and judicial practice in the European Community and Korea.
Recently, anti-dumping law has played a major role in the complex, techni-
cal field of international trade law. In particular, the new GATT Anti-
dumping Code l
 has been enacted, and a new Community anti-dumping regula-
tion adopted, 2 in order to accommodate the changes of the new GATT Anti-
dumping Code.
This study has sought to show the limitations of the international
rules on anti-dumping. Loopholes in the international anti-dumping rules
have been utilised by the European Community to by-pass international
rules and adopt new, and more protectionist, provisions which victimise
developing, export-oriented countries.	 Therefore, in the following con-
clusion, some comments will be made on the protectionist bias in the
Community anti-dumping law and practice, and as a conclusion, some recom-
mendations will be made for the development of the Korean anti-dumping law
and practice.
1. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
Visibility as well as procedural and substantive fairness shall be
the most important principles underpinning a reasonable antidumping law,
otherwise there is a risk that the protectionist tilts found in the Com-
munity Anti-dumping Regulation and its practice in favour of a finding of
dumping will be used as the legislative model for developing countries.
1. Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the result of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation (1986-1994), COM(94) 143 final.
2. Coun.Reg.(EC) No 3283/94 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not
members of the European Community, OJ (1994) L 349/1.
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Anti-dumping laws increasingly incorporate protectionist tilts.
	 This is
often justified on the ground that it is consistent with GATT or that the
practice was not mentioned in the Code, i.e., was not prohibited.
With respect to visibility, anti-dumping procedures need to become
more transparent in order not to lose credibility.
	 The EC Commission's
decisions sould probably be viewed in a political context, because it is a
political agency combining the functions of prosecutor, judge and jury in
spite of the fact that the proceedings before the Commission are admin-
istrative in nature. Thus, the Commission has the stronger power in the
decision making procedure in the Community, because the Council imposes a
definitive anti-dumping duty or extends provisional measures, acting by
simple majority. 3 This means that there is less democratic control by the
Member States over the Commission's decisions, and that the imposition of
anti-dumping duties is easier, even though the Commission has to justify
its actions according to priciples such as the effectiveness of the Commu-
nity's instruments of commercial defence, or the speedy resolution of
anti-dumping disputes.
2. SUBSTANTIAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF CIRCUMVENTION
Investigations of the establishment of dumping and injury therefrom
are carried out concurrently. 4
 This means there is an unfortunate bias
against the foreign exporter, because it means that the exporters have to
comment on the issue of injury before the complainant has replied to the
injury questionnaire.
Where there is a partial discrepancy in the costs of production
3. Article 1 of the Coun.Reg.(EC) No 522/94, OJ (1994) L 66/10.
4. Article 7(1)(c) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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between companies' replies and their internal documents, the Commission
disregards all costs of production data and makes its findings on the
basis of the facts available. This practice is, however, in favour of a
finding of dumping because information which is favourable to the exporter
is disregarded.	 Furthermore, the Commission disregards any information
which it has been unable to verify. This may cause a suspicion that the
Commission is only using the information which is in favour of a finding
of dumping, because it cannot verify all information due to the short
period allowed for verification and shortage of manpower. 	 The fact that
no official report on the verification is accessible to the parties con-
cerned also demonstrates a lack of transparency in anti-dumping procedures
of the Community.
With respect to substantive fairness, there are a number of crucial
issues for a finding of dumping. All measures or provisions in the Com-
munity Anti-dumping Law and practice in order to inflate normal price and
to depreciate export price should be reviewed. 	 For instance, when the
normal value and the export price is constructed, SGA expenses play a key
role in a finding of dumping, because only direct SGA expenses are deduc-
ted with respect to normal value, while deductions allowed for construct-
ing the export price include direct and indirect SGA expenses and a
reasonable profit margin. 	 This means the normal value is artificially
inflated and the export price is relatively depreciated, in favour of a
finding of dumping. Therefore, for fair competition, allowance given to
the constructed export price should also be allowed to the constructed
normal value.
According to Article 2(6) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code, these
adjustments to the normal value and the export price are to effect a fair
comparison. In order to effect a fair comparison, equal treatment of
sales on the exporter's home market and importing market should be guaran-
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teed i.e., individual sales to contemporaneous individual sales, or the
average export price to the average home market price over an equivalent
period. Equal treatment should also be given to any adjustment in prices
in both markets. Ensuring a fair comparison based on unfair basic ele-
ments i.e., established normal value and export price, does not make
sense. Therefore, the rules on adjustment should not override the fair
comparison requirements, because the purpose of making adjustment to the
prices is to effect a fair comparison between the export price and the
normal value.5
Through the anti-dumping measures a Community industry which pro-
duces like products and is injured by dumped imports has to be protected.
However, the flexible interpretation of the 'like product' notion makes it
possible that the Community industry which does not produce like products
could be protected, because the Commission did not draw a clear line in
the definition of a number of categories of like products. 6 However, the
'like product' notion should be interpreted strictly, in order not to
protect the Community industry which does not produce a like product.
In arriving at a determination of injury, the reason of injury
should be limited to the direct effects of dumped imports 7 as distinct
from volume and prices which are not dumped, or contraction in demand that
is unrelated to the dumped imports, despite negative impact on Community
industry. However, the Commission has tended to include all imports that
5. Article 2(6) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code provides that in order to effect a fair
comprison between the export price and the domestic price in the exporting country (Or the
country of origin), the two prices shall be compared at the same level of trade, and in
respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time.
6. In Korea, the 'like product' or the 'similar goods' notion is interpreted more strictly.
See, Printing Plate, FMA No 1993-76, OG (1993) No 12606, p194, and Glass Fiber, FMA No 1994-
57, OG (1994) No 12786, p36.
7. Article 3(1) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code.
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affect a particular industry in the Community. When the Commission routi-
nely investigates the volume, prices and consequent impact of the total
imports, the injury could be caused not by the dumped imports. Therefore,
determination of injury must be made only if the dumped imports are,
through the effects of dumping, causing injury.
The Community Anti-dumping Regulation regards a significant increase
of the volume of dumped imports and their increase in market share as the
most important test for a finding of injury. If the Community industry
substantially increases its sales volume and market share, it should not
be regarded as being injured, even though imports volume and their market
share is increased as well.	 Even in this situation, if the Commission
considers that the Community industry is injured, this means the Community
industry must dominate all booming industries in the Community.
When the Commission calculated injury margins, in the DRAMs8 deter-
mination, it claimed that the adjusted price of imports had depressed
Community price increase and the sales of DRAMs were made below cost of
production. However, the adjusted price of DRAMs included extensive R&D
expenses, covering three generations ahead of the current commercialisa-
tion which had nothing to do with the allegedly dumped DRAMs. R&D costs
for current commercialisation only should be allocated in calculating
injury margins, because the reason of injury should be limited to the
direct effects of dumped imports.
In the case of lesser duty rules, none of the interested parties can
know the injury margin because of the confidentiality of the data and the
fact that there is no established methodology for the calculation of
injury margins. Up to the present, the calculation of injury margins is
based on four different methodologies; comparison between the adjusted
8. DRAMs (Korea), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2686/92, OJ (1992) L 272/13, p19.
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weighted average resale prices of the dumped imports and the price of a
like product in the Community, comparison of a target price, consisting of
the full costs of production including SGA and a reasonable profit, with
the dumped price, 9
 increase of the price of dumped imports by the amount
by which the target price exceeded the sales prices of the directly compe-
titive Community products, 1 ° and injury margin calculation based on turn-
over on sales and profitability of the Community producers. 11 Therefore,
the Commission has retained much discretion in the calculation of injury
margins and has changed its methodologies for calculation frequently so
that this practice has caused a transparency problem. If the Commission
wants to use different methodologies in the calculation of injury margin
in different determinations, legal expectation could be in danger, and in
order to improve transparency of the investigation, interested parties
should be given the relevant data, in order to compare the results under
different methodologies.	 Moreover, to make matters worse, anti-dumping
duties based on the injury margin are not refundable, because the Commun-
ity authorities only take into account for refund, the dumping margin, not
the injury margin. 12
With regard to refund, there have also been some basic problems.
First, according to the Community Anti-dumping Regulation, the
importer plays a main role in the refund procedure, and the fact that the
excessive duty is refunded to the importer who paid the duty is very
logical, but there is no reason why an exporter should not apply for a
9. Video Cassettes and video tape reels (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 4062/88, OJ (1988) L
356/47.
10. Compact disc players (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 2140/89, OJ (1989) L 205/5.
11. Audio tapes in cassettes (Korea, Japan), Com.Reg.(EEC) No 3262/90, OJ (1990) L 313/5, and
Microdisks (Korea, H.K.), Com.Reg.(EC) No 534/94, OJ (1994) L 68/5.
12. Article 16(1) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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refund. 13
Second, the refund application has been granted only in cases where
the weighted average dumping margin for a certain period is lower than the
original anti-dumping duty. However, it is almost impossible for an
individual importer to prove the change of the weighted average dumping
margin for a certain period. Therefore, it would be much easier for a
refund to be granted if individual dumping margins for each individual
importer could be used.
Lastly, a refund application can be considered only where the duty
exceeds the original dumping margin, and where the application demon-
strates that the original dumping margin is reduced or eliminated. As a
result, any application which is based on the fact that the duty exceeds
the injury margin will not be considered. The lesser duty rule has been
used widely because, in cases where the injury margin is lower than the
dumping margin, the anti-dumping duty is set at the level of the injury
margin. Therefore, consideration should also be given to allowing an
application for a refund based on the injury margin. Otherwise, the
Community refund system could be criticised on the basis that it systemic-
ally prevents the importer from applying for a refund.
The most significant unilaterally adopted rules in the Community
anti-dumping regulation are the rules on circumvention. 	 Circumvention
needs to be stipulated by clear and multilaterally accepted rules. Ac-
cording to anti-circumvention rules of the Community, anti-dumping duties
are imposed not on imported parts or materials but on the finished pro-
ducts assembled in the Community.
Basically, however, anti-dumping rules do not deal with the poss-
13. Article 8(3) of the 1979 GATT Anti-dumping Code demands that the amount of duty in excess
of the actual dumping margin be reimbursed. It could be interpreted that an importer or an
exporter can apply for a refund.
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ibility of imposing anti-dumping duties on products manufactured within
importing countries, but deal with trading between countries. 	 Further-
more, the Community Anti-circumvention rules apply only where assembly in
the Community is conducted by related parties. 	 Therefore, independent
Community manufacturers assembling dumped parts benefit from these rules
because no duties are imposed.
In order to impose anti-dumping duty on the finished products assem-
bled by circumvented parts, three cumulative prerequisites in Article
13(10)(a) should be satisfied. However, the existence of dumping is not
established even though these three conditions are satisfied. Moreover, a
finding of dumping and resulting injury with regard to a finished product
should not be extended to its parts and components unless there has been a
separate determination that the parts have actually been dumped and there-
by have caused injury to the Community production of the 'like product'.
Therefore, it should always be borne in mind that anti-dumping duties can
only be imposed where dumping and resulting injury is established.
In case of prospective exporters, the same principle should be
applied, because a source of imports which has never exported a certain
product to the Community, could not in all justice be regarded as having
dumped and caused injury, and should not be subject to imposition of anti-
dumping duties.
Where the exporter, in whole or in part, either directly or indir-
ectly, has borne the anti-dumping duties imposed, instead of raising the
price, an additional anti-dumping duty may be imposed in order to increase
a price corresponding to the amount borne by the exporter. However, an
additional anti-dumping duty can be imposed only after an examination of
dumping and injury therefrom is conducted, because the fact that anti-
dumping duties were borne by the exporters does not automatically indicate
the continuation of dumping. In fact, this situation could be dealt
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without additional anti-dumping duties. In other words, if the exporter
were to bear the anti-dumping duty, and if there were no anti-absorption
duty in the Community, the exporter would have to suffer financially in
order to maintain cheap export prices even after the imposition of anti-
dumping duties, the Community can get anti-dumping duties revenue, and
consumers could still enjoy cheap products without inflation pressure.
Then, anti-dumping duties could be imposed again, as a result of review.
3. REVIEW
Judicial review has played a very important role in the Community
Anti-dumping system, because a regulation which imposes anti-dumping duty
may be annulled only by the Court's judgment and the judgment is final.
In practice, however, the Court has been reluctant to deal with the econo-
mic evaluation that the Community authorities make in their decisions.
The attitude of the Court has improved since the FEDIOL case 14 and the
Allied case, 15 in which the Court recognised the complainant's right to
institute judicial review.
	 Nevertheless, actions for the annulment of
Commission action applying the Community anti-dumping rules give rise to a
number of problems because determinations for the imposition of antidump-
ing duties are made in the form of regulations. The Court has not con-
sistently accepted the admissibility of independent importers, although
there are some exceptions, 16 while it has accepted the admissibility of
the complainant. In Extramet, 17 however, the Court accepted the admiss-
14. Case 191/82, FEDIOL v Commission, [1983] 2913.
15. Joined cases 239 & 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission, [1984] ECR 1005.
16. Case 118/77, ISO v Council, [1979] ECR 1277, at 1291 and 1294, and Case 119/77, Nippon
Seiko v Council and Commission, [1979] ECR 1303, at 1327.
17. Case C-358/89, Extramet v Council, [1991] ECR 1-2501, at 1-2532.
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ibility of the applicant. These different approaches in the anti-dumping
cases causes uncertainty about the admissibility of the applicant in
anti-dumping proceedings instituted under Article 173. If this uncertain-
ty is to be avoided, the Court should recognise the admissibility of the
independent importer in future judgments, consistently.
Despite this uncertainty, the existence of judicial review has
played a very important role in Community anti-dumping law, because appeal
to the Court is the only way to make antidumping measures void when they
are imposed on imported products. Affected by the Japanese Ballbearings
cases, 18 the Community has improved the previous lack of transparency.
After these cases, the exporters' rights were considerably improved in the
Community anti-dumping regulation 1681/79, which provided that exporters
and importers of the product subject to investigation may request to be
informed of the "essential facts and considerations")- 9 Therefore, it is
worth bringing more anti-dumping cases before the Court, because this
provides more pressure on the Community authorities to improve transpar-
ency in the anti-dumping system.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE KOREAN ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE
With regard to the anti-dumping law in Korea, visibility and fair-
ness in the procedural and substantive aspect of the anti-dumping proce-
dure must also be considered as the most important principles. However,
anti-dumping measures have not been applied frequently, because of insti-
tutional inertia, and therefore there is no established practice in the
18. Cases 113, 118-121/77, Japanese Ballbearings cases [1979] ECR 1185-1363.
19. Article 7(4)(b) of the Community Anti-dumping Regulation.
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application of anti-dumping measures.2°
First of all, the major Korean rules concerning anti-dumping are
dispersed in Article 10 of the Korean Customs Act, Articles 4(2) to 4(15)
of the Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act, and Article 37 and Article
40(6) of the Foreign Trade Transactions Act.	 Therefore, a special Act
governing anti-dumping complaints should be considered and enacted in
order to improve the transparency of the anti-dumping system.
Korea has a bifurcated anti-dumping system under which the Office of
Customs Administration investigates the existence of dumping and the
Korean Trade Commission conducts the injury investigation. This bifurca-
ted system could be switched to a unitary system, perhaps modelled on the
European Community anti-dumping system, in order to speed up investiga-
tions and make them more transparent.
With respect to the procedural aspects, the discretion of the MOF
and the investigation authorities should be reduced, because the interes-
ted person's opportunity to address a public hearing, or to consult an
interested person with opposing views, is very restricted. On the other
hand, most anti-dumping complaints are lodged by the individual campanies,
instead of an association of the industry concerned. Considering that the
main victims of dumping are the products of small and medium sized local
companies, more complaints should be lodged by associations or organisa-
tions, composed of domestic producers or acting on their behalf, because
only a few individual companies can afford to going through the high costs
of anti-dumping proceedings.
With respect to substantive aspects, it is too early to say that
there is established practice. Moreover, in some provisions, a more
20. Between 1986 and 1993, in Korea, only 15 anti-dumping investigations were initiated. Of
these, only 7 investigations were concluded in the form of anti-dumping duties.
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precise definition is required for the transparency of the anti-dumping
proceedings. For instance, the normal price is constructed, if it is
impossible to apply the ordinary trade price due to a "special market
situation" , 21 and the dumping price is calculated on the basis of a
"reasonable criterion" by the MOF, where there is a special relationship
between the parties concerned, and there is no resale to an independent
buyer. 22
 There is no definition of a "special market situation" or a
"reasonable criterion" in the Act or the Decree.
Furthermore, there are two outstanding areas of institutional iner-
tia in the Korean anti-dumping rules: cumulation and anti-circumvention.
In Glass Fiber, 23 the KTC evaluated the impact of imports cumulatively,
even though cumulation is neither prescribed by the Korean Customs Act or
its Enforcement Decree nor established by practice. Therefore, provi-
sions for cumulation should be enacted.
There is no anti-circumvention provision in the Korean Customs Act
or in its Enforcement Decree. As a result of a trade liberalisation po-
licy, one of the main issues is to protect the domestic industry in Korea
because imports are increasing rapidly. Anti-dumping measures have been
regarded as the most effective measure for the protection of the domestic
industry concerned, 24
 and they will be applied more frequently than be-
fore. Therefore it could be predicted that foreign producers or exporters
will try to escape or circumvent the anti-dumping duties by exporting
parts and components and assembling them in Korea. That is why anti-
21. Article 4(6)(1) of the EDCA.
22. Article 4(6)(iv) of the EDCA.
23. Glass Fiber, FMA No 1994-57, OG (1994) No 12786, p39.
24. In case of Phosphoric Acid, 89.3% of the total quantity of imports was from China in 1992.
However, it decreased to 68.1% in 1993 when the antidumping duty started to be imposed, and
dropped further to 46.8% in 1994. See, Seoul Shinmun, 'Imports restraint effect of antidump-
ing duties', Jan. 25. 1995, p18.
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circumvention measures need to be prescribed in the Korean anti-dumping
law.	 When this institutional inertia is rectified, however, it should
always be borne in mind that the anti-dumping duty must be imposed only
where dumping has occurred and injury was caused therefrom. Therefore,
requirement of evidence of dumping and of injury therefrom must be added,
even though the GATT Anti-dumping Code does not contain provisions regard-
ing the circumvention of anti-dumping measures.
This study has looked at anti-dumping laws in the Community and
Korea comparatively in the context of the GATT Anti-dumping rules. De-
spite the fact that the Community anti-dumping law 25 and practice can be a
useful legislative model for the Korean anti-dumping system, there is also
a risk that the protectionist tilts found in the Community law and its
practice can form examples for the Korean law which will be patterned
after the Community law because of the recognised proximity between the
Community and the GATT law.
	 Therefore, it is expected that a new Commun-
ity anti-dumping regulation26
 which has been adopted in order to accommo-
date the changes of the new GATT rules can be a more desirable legislative
model for the current Korean anti-dumping system.
25. Coun.Reg.(EEC) No 2423/88, OJ (1988) L 209/1.
26. Coun.Reg.(EC) No 3283/94, OJ (1994) L 349/1.
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ANNEX I: EXCERPTS FROM THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE
Article VI - Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties
1. The contracting Parties recognise that dumping, by which products
of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less
than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a
contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic
industry. For the purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered
as being introduced into the commerce of an importing country at less than
its normal value, if the price of the product exported from one country to
another
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the
exporting country, or,
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export
to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin
plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.
Due allowances shall be made in each case for differences in condi-
tions and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and other differ-
ences affecting price comparability.
2. In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may
levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than
the margin of dumping in respect of such product. For the purposes of this
Article, the margin of dumping is the price difference determined in
accordance with the provision of Paragraph 1.
4. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of another contracting party shall be subject to anti-
dumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product
from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for the
consumption in the country of origin, or by reason of the refund of such
duties or taxes.
5. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of another contracting party shall be subject to both
anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situa-
tion of dumping or export subsidisation.
6.(a) No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or counter-
vailing duty on the importation of any product of the territory of another
contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or
subsidisation, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten mater-
ial injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard
materially the establishment of a domestic industry.
(b) THE CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive the requirement of sub-
paragraph (a) of this paragraph so as to permit a contracting party to
levy an anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation of any
product for the purpose of offsetting dumping or subsidisation which
causes or threatens material injury to an industry in the territory of
1
another contracting party exporting the product concerning to the terri-
tory of the importing contracting party.
7. A system for the stabilisation of the domestic price or of the
return to domestic producers of a primary commodity, independently of the
movement of export prices, which results at times in the sale of the
commodity for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged
for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, shall be presumed
not to result in material injury within the meaning of paragraph 6 if it
is determined by consultation among the contracting parties substantially
interested in the commodity concerned that:
(a) the system has also resulted in the sale of the commodity for
export at a price higher than the comparable price charged
for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, and
(b) the system is so operated, either because of the effective
regulation of production, or otherwise, as not to stimulate
exports unduly or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests
of other contracting parties.
Ad Article VI
Paragraph 1
1. Hidden dumping by associated houses (that is, the sale by an
importer at a price below that corresponding to the price invoiced by an
exporter with whom the importer is associated, and below the price in the
exporting country) constitutes a form of price dumping with respect to
which the margin of dumping may be calculated on the basis of the price at
which the goods are resold by the importer.
2. It is recognised that, in the case of imports from a country
which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and
where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may
exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph 1,
and in such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to
take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic
prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.
Paragraph 2 and 3
1. As in many other cases in customs administration, a contracting
party may require reasonable security (bond or cash deposit) for the
payment of anti-dumping or countervailing duty pending final determination
of the facts in any case of suspected dumping or subsidisation.
2. Multiple currency practices can in certain circumstances consti-
tute a subsidy to exports which may be met by countervailing duties under
paragraph 3 or can constitute a form of dumping by means of a partial
depreciation of a country's currency which may be met by action under
paragraph 2. By "multiple currency practices" is meant practices by
governments or suctioned by governments.
Paragraph 6(b)
Waivers under the provisions of this sub-paragraph shall be granted
only on application by the contracting party proposing to levy an anti-
dumping or countervailing duty, as the case may be.
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AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI
OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994
Members hereby agree as follows:
PART I
Arricle' 1
Principles•
An anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI
of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated' and conducted in accordance with the provisions
of this Agreement: The following provisions govern the application of Article VI of .GATT 1994 in
so far as action is taken under anti-dumping legislation or regulations.
Article 2
Determination of Dumping
-	 •
2.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a . product is to be considered as being dumped. i.e.
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of
the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country:
When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic
market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market situation or the low volume
of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country', such sales do not permit a proper
comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of
the like product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price is representative,
or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative,
selling and general costs and for profits.
2.2.1 Sales of the like product in the domestic Market of the exporting country or sales to
a third country at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production plus
administrative, selling and general costs may be treated as not being in the ordinary
course of trade by reason of price and may be disregarded in determining normal value
'The term • initiated - is used in this Agreement means the procedural action by which a Member formally commences
an investigation as provided in Article 5.
'Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country shall normally be
considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal value if such sales constitute 5 per cent or more of the
sales of the product under consideration LO the importing Member, provided that a lower ratio should be acceptable where
the evidence demonstrates that domestic sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient magnitude to provide for a
proper comparison.
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only if the authorities: !ermine that such sales are made within an extended period
of time' in substantial ci.....f;tities s and are at prices which do not provide for the recovery
of all costs within a real .',..nable period of time. If prices which are below per unit costs
at the time of sale are above weighted average per unit costs for the period of
investigation, such prices shall be considered to provide for recovery of costs within.
a reasonable period of time.
2.2.1.1 For the purpose of paragraph 2, costs shall normally be calculated on
the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer under
investigation, provided that such records are in accordance with the
generally accepted *accounting principles of the ekporting country and
reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale
of the product under consideration. Authorities shall consider all
available evidence on the proper allocation of costs, *including that
which is made available by the exporter or producer in the course of
the investigation provided that such allocations have been historically
utilized by the exporter or producer, in particular in relation to
establishing appropriate amortization and depreciation periods and
allowances for capital expenditures and other development costs.
Unless already reflected in the cost allocations under this sub-paragraph,
costs shall be adjusted appropriately for those non-recurring items of
cost which benefit future and/or current production, or for
circumstances in which costs during the period of investigation are
affected bY start-up operations.'
1 For the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for administrative, selling and general
costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales
in the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer under
investigation. When such amounts cannot be determined on this basis, the amounts
may he determined on the basis of:
(i) the actual amounts incurred and realized by the exporter or producer in question
in respect of production • and sales in the domestic market of the country of
origin of the same general category of products;
'When in this Agreement the term 'authorities' is used. et shall be interpreted as meaning authorities at an appropriate
	 .
.senior level.
The extended period of time should normall n be one year but shall in no Use be less than six months.
'Sales below per unit costs are made in substantial quantities when the authorities establish that the weighted average
selling price of the transactions under consideration for the determination of the normal value is below the weighted average
per unit costs, or that the volume of sales below per unit costs represents not less than 20 per cent of the volume sold in
transactions under consideration for the determination of the normal value.
The adjustment made for start-up operations shall reflect the costs at the end Of the stan-up period or, if that period
extends beyond the period of investigation, the most recent costs which can reasonably be taken into account by the authorities
during the investigation.
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(ii) the weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realized by other
exporters or producers subject to investigation in respect of production and
sales of the like product in the domestic market of the country of origin;
• (iii) any other reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit so established
shall not exceed the profit normally realized by other exporters or producers
on sales of products of the same general category in the domestic market of
the country of origin.
2.3 In cases where there is no export price or where it appears to the authorities concerned that
the export price is unreliable because of association or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter
and the importer or a third party, the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which
the imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or if the products are not resold to an
independent buyer, or not resold in the condition as imported, on such reasonable basis as the authorities
may determine. •
2.4- A fair comparisOn shall be made between the export price and the normal value. This comparison
shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made
at as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for
differences which affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale,
taxation, levels of trade. quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also
demonstrated to. affect price comparability.' In the cases referred to in paragraph 3, allowances for
costs. including duties and taxes, incurred between importation and resale, and for profits accruing,
should also be made. If in these cases price comparability has been affected, the authorities shall
establish the normal value at a level of trade equivalent to the level of trade of the constructed export
price, or shall make due allowance as warranted under this paragraph. The authorities shall indicate
to the parties in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison and shall not impose
an unreasonable burden of proof on those . parties.
2.4.1 When the comparison under paragraph 4 requires a conversion of currencies, such
conversion should be made using the rate of exchange on the date of sale, provided
that when a sale of foreign currency on forward markets is directly linked to the export
sale involved, the rate of exchange in the forward sale shall be used. Fluctuations
in exchange rates shall be ignored and in an investigation the authorities shall allow
exporters at least 60 days to have adjusted their export prices to reflect sustained
movements in exchange rates during the period of investigation.
2.4.2 Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of
margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on
the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average
of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal value
and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value established
On a weighted average basis may becompared to prices of individual export transactions
if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different
'It is understood that some of the above factors may overlap, and authorities shall ensure that they do not duplicate
adjustments that have been already made under this provision.
Normally, the date of sale would be the date of contract, purchase order, order confirmation, or invoice, whichever
establishes the material terms of sale.
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purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why such
differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a Weighted
average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction comparison.
2.5 In the case where products are not imported directly from the country of origin but are exported
to the importing 'Member from an intermediate country, the price at which the products are sold from
the country of export to the importing Member shall normally be compared with the comparable price
in the country of export. However, comparison may be made with the price in the country of origin.
if, for example, the products arc merely transshipped through the country of export, or such products
are not produced in the country of export, or there is no comparable price for them in the country
of .export.
2.6 Throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ("produit similaire") shall be interpreted
tci mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or
in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has
characteristics closely resembling those of the product -tinder consideration.
2.7	 This Article is without prejudice to the second Supplementary Provision to paragraph 1 of
Article VI in Annex Ito GATT 1994.
Article 3
Determination of Injury'
3.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT -1994 shall be based-on positive
evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the
effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent
impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.
3.2 With regard to the volume of the dumped imports the investigating authorities shall consider
whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative
to production or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of the dumped
imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price
undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing
Member, or whether the effect of such iMports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree
or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one
or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.
3.3 Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to
anti-dumping investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of such
imports only if they determine that (a) the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports
from each country is more than de minimis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume of
imports from each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports
is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the imported products and the conditions
of competition between the imported products and the like domestic product.
'Under this Agreement the term "injury shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic
industry, threat nf material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry
and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
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3.4 The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall
include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the
industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity,
return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; • the magnitude
of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment,.
wages, growth, ability , to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several
of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.
3.5 It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set
forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration
of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be
based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also
examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the
domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped
imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices
of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption,
trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments
in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.
3.6 The . effect of the- dumped imports shall be assessed in relation to the domestic production of
the like product when available data permit the separate identification of that production on the basis
of such criteria as the production process, producers' sales and profits. If such separate identification
of that production is not possible, the effects of the dumped imports shall be assessed by the examination
of the production of the narrowest group or range of products, which includes the like product, for
which the necessary information can be .provided.
3.7 ., A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation,
conjecture or remote possibility. The change in circumstances which would create a situation in which
the dumping would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent.' In making a determination
regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the authorities should consider, inter alia, such
factors as:
(i) a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the domestic market indicating
the likelihood of substantially increased importation;
(ii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the
exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased dumped exports to the
importing Member's market, taking into account the availability of other export markets
to absorb any additional exports;
(iii) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or
:suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further
imports; and
(iv) inventories of the product being investigated. 	 •
No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of the factors
'One example, though not an exclusive one, is that there is convincing reason to believe that there will be, in the near
future, substantially increased importation of the product at dumped prices.
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considered must lead to the conclusion that further dumped exports are imminent and that, unless
protective action is taken, material injury would occur.
3.8 . With respect to cases where injury is threatened by dumped imports; the application of
anti-dumping measures shall be considered and decided with special care.
 4
Definition of Domestic Industry
4.1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "domestic industry" shall be interpreted as referring
to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output
of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products, except
that
(i) when producers are related ' s to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers
of the allegedly dumped product, the term "domestic industry" may be interpreted as
referring to the rest of the producers;
(ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may; for the production in
question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the produCers within
each mai'ket may be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such
market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in question in that market,
and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers
of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory.. In such circumstances,
injury may be found to exist even where a major portion of the total domestic industry
is not injured, provided there is a concentration of dumped imports into such an isolated
market and provided further that the dumped imports are causing injury to the producers
of all or almost all of the production within such market.
4 2 When the domestic industry has been interpreted as referring to the producers in a certain area,
i.e. a market as defined in paragraph 1(ii). anti-dumping duties shall be levied' only on the products
in question consigned for final consumption to that area. When the constitutional law of the importing
Member does not permit the levying of anti-dumping duties on such a basis, the importing Member
may levy the anti-dumping duties without limitation only if (a) the exporters shall have been given
an opportunity io cease exporting at dumped prices to the area concerned or otherwise give assurances
pursuant to Article 8 and adequate assurances in this regard have not been Promptly given, and (b) such
duties cannot be levied only on products of specific producers which supply the area in question.
4.3 Where two or more countries have reached under the provisions of paragraph 8(a) of
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 such a level of integration that they have the characteristics of a single,
'unified market, the industry in the entire area of integration shall be talcen to be the domestic industry
"For the purpose of this paragraph, producers shall be deemed to be revd to exporters or importers only if (a) one
of them chrectly . or indirectly controls the other; or (h) both of them are direci: . .. or indirectly controlled by a third person;
or (c) together they directly or indirectly control a third person, provided that there are grounds for believing or suspecting
that the effect of the relationship is such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently from non-related producers.
For the purpose of this paragraph, one shall be deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in
a position to exercise restraint or direction over the latter.
"As used in this Agreement 'levy shall mean the definitive or final legal assessment or collection of' a duty or tax.
8
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referred to in paragraph 1.
4.,4	 The provisions of paragraph 6 of Article 3 shall be applicable to this Article.
Article 5
Initiation and Subsequent Investigation
5.1 Except as provided for in paragraph 6, an investigation to determine the existence, degree and
effect of any alleged dumping shall be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the domestic
industry.
5.2 An application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury within the
meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement and (c) a causal link between
the dumped imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence,
cannot be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain
such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on the following:
(i) ' the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the domestic
• production of the like product by the applicant. Where a written application is made
on behalf of the domestic industry, the application shall identify the industry on behalf
• Of which the application is made by a list of all known domestic producers of the like
• product (or associations of domestic producers of the like product) and, to the extent
• • possible. a description of the volume and value of domestic production of the like
product accounted for by such producers;
a complete description of the allegedly dumped product, the names of the country or
countries of origin or export in question, the identity of each known exporter or foreign
producer and a list of known persons importing the product in question;
(iii) information on prices at which the product in question is sold when destined for
consumption in the domestic markets of the country or countries of origin or export
(or. where appropriate, information on the prices at which the product is sold from
the country or countries of origin or export to a third country or countries, or on the
constructed value of the product) and information on export prices or, where appropriate,
on the prices at which the product is first resold to an independent buyer in the territory
of the importing Member;
(iv) information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, the effect
of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and the consequent
impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by relevant factors
and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, such as those listed
in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3.
5.3	 The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the
application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.
5.4	 An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless the authorities have
determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of 'support for, or opposition to, the application
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expressed 13 .by domestic producers of the like product, that the apIication has been made by or on
behalf of the domestic industry." The application shall be considered to have been made "by or on
behalf of the domestic industry" if it is supported by those domestic producers whose collective output
constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the . like product produced by that portion
of the domestic industry expressing either support for or opposition to the application. However, no
investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting the application account
for less than 25 per cent of total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry:
5.5 The authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to initiate an investigation, any
publicizing of the application for the initiation of an investigation. However, after receipt of a properly
documented application and before proceeding to initiate an investigation, the authorities shall notify
the government of the exporting Member concerned.
5.6 If, in special circumstances, the authorities concerned decide to initiate an investigation without
having received a written application by or on behalf of a domestic industry for the initiation of such
investigation, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal
link, as described in paragraph 2, to justify the initiation of in investigation.
5.7 The evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered simultaneously (a) in the decision
whether or not to initiate an investigation, and (b) thereafter, during the course . of)the investigation.
starting on a date not later than the earliest date on which in accordance with the provisions Of.this
Agreement provisional measures may be applied.
5.8 An application under paragraph 1 shall bt: rejected anc . u. investigation shall be terminated
promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either
dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case. There shall be immediate termination . in
cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis, or that the volume
of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible. The margin of dumping shall be
considered to be de.minimis if this margin is less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the
export price. The volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded as negligible if the volume
of dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for less than 3 per cent of imports
of the like product in the importing Member, unless countries which individually account for less than
3 per cent of the imports of the like product in the importing Member collectively account.for more
than 7 per cent of imports of the like product in the importing Member.
5.9	 An anti-dumping proceeding shall not hinder the procedures of customs clearance.
5.10	 Investigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no
case more than 18 months, after their initiation.
"In the case of fragmented industries involving an exceptionally large number of producers, authorities may determine
support and opposition by using statistically valid sampling techniques.
'Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members employees of domestic producers of the like product or
representatives of those employees may make or support an application for an investigation under paragraph 1.
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Article 6
.Evidence
6.1 _All interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice of the information
which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider
relevant in respect of the investigation in question.
6.1.1 Exporters or foreign producers receiving questionnaires used in an anti-dumping
investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply.' Due consideration should be
'given to any request for an extension of the 30-day period and, upon cause shown,
such an. extension should be granted whenever practicable.
6.1.2 Subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, evidence presented in
writing by one interested party shall be made available promptly to other interested
parties participating in the investigation.
6.1.3.. As soon as an investigation has been initiated, the authorities shall provide the full
text of the written application received under paragraph 1 of Article 5 to the known
exporters I6 and to the authorities of the exporting Member and shall make it available,
upon request, to other interested parties involved. Due regard shall be paid to the
requirement for the protection of confidential information, as provided for in
paragraph 5.
6.2 Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full opportunity
for the defence of their interests. To this end, the authorities shall, on request, provide opportunities
for all interested parties to meet those parties with adverse interests, so that opposing views may be
presented and rebuttal arguments offered. Provision of such opportunities must take account of the
need to preserve confidentiality and of the convenience to the parties. There shall be no obligation
on any party to attend a meeting. and failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that party's case.
Interested parties shall also have the right, on justification, to present other information orally.
6.3 Oral information provided under paragraph 2 shall be taken into account by the authorities
only in so far as it is subsequently reproduced in writing and made available to other interested parties,
as provided for in subparagraph 1.2.
6.4 The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for all interested parties
to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases, that is not confidential as defined
in paragraph 5, and that is used by the authorities in an anti-dumping investigation, and to prepare
presentations on the basis of this information.
6.5	 Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure would
be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its disclosure would have a
"As a general rule, the time-limit for exporters shall be counted from the date of receipt of the questionnaire, which
for this purpose shall be deemed to have been received one week from the date on which it was sent to the respondent or
transmitted to the appropriate diplomatiC representative of the exporting Member or, in the case of a separate customs territory
Member of the WTO, an official representative of the exporting territory.
being understood that, where the number of exporters involved is particularly high, the full text of the written application
should instead be provided Only to the authorities of the exporting Member or to the relevant trade association.
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significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information Or upon a person from whom that
person acquired the information), or which is provided on 'a confidential basis by. parties to an
investigation shall, upon good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information
shall not be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it." .
. 6.5.1 The authorities shall require interested parties providing confidential information to
furnish non-confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shall be in sufficient
detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted
in confidence. In exceptional circumstances, such parties may indicate that such
information is not susceptible of summary. In such exceptional circumstances, a
statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible must be provided.
6.5.2 . If the authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if the
supplier of the information is either unwilling to make the information public or to
authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form, the authorities may disregard
". such information unless it can.be
 demonstrated to their satisfaction from appropriate
sburces that the information is correct. Is
6.6 Except in circumstances provided for in paragraph 8, the authorities shall during the course
of an investigation satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties
upon which their findings are based.
6.7 In order to verify information provided or to obtain further details, the authorities may carry •
out investigations in the territory of other Members as required, provided they obtain the agreement
of the firms coneerned and notify the representatives of the government of the Member in question,
and unless that Membt:- objects to the investigation. The prOcedures described in Annex I shall apply
to investigations carried out in the territory of other Members. Subject to the requirement to protect
confidential information, the authorities shall make the results of any such investigations available,
or shall provide disclosure thereof pursuant to paragraph 9, to the firms to which they pertain and may
make such results available to the applicants.
6.8 in cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary
information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final
determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available_ The provisions
of Annex II shall be observed in the application of this paragraph.
6.9 The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of the
essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive
measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests.
6.10 The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known
'exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In cases where the number of
exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is so large as to make such a determination
impracticable, the authorities may limit their examination either to a reasonable number of interested
parties or products by using samples which are statistically valid on the basis of information available
"Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members disclosure pursuant to a narrowly-drawn protective order
may be required.
"'Members agree that requests for confidentiality should not be arbitrarily rejected.
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to the authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest percentage of the volume of the exports
from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated.
.1•
6.10.1 Any selection of exporters, producers, importers or types of products Made under this
• paragraph shall preferably be chosen in consultation with and with the consent of the
exporters, producers or importers concerned.
6.10.2 In cases where the authorities have limited their examination, as provided for in this
paragraph, they shall nevertheless determine an individual margin of dumping for any
exporter or Producer not initially selected who submits the necessary information in
time for that information to be considered during the course of the investigation, except
where the number of exporters or producers is so large that individual examinations
would be unduly burdensome to the authorities and prevent the timely completion of
the investigation. Voluntary responses shall not be discouraged.
6.11
	 For the purposes of this Agreement, "interested parties" shall include:
(i) an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to investigation,
or a trade or business association a majority of the members of which are producers,
exporters or importers of such product;
(ii) . the government of the exporting Member; and
(iii) a producer of the like product_ in the importing Member or a trade and business
. association a majority of the members of which produce the like product in the territory
of the importing Member.
This list shall not preclude Members from allowing domestic or foreign parties other than those
mentioned above to be included as interested parties.
6.12 The authorities shall provide opportunities for industrial users of the product under investigation,
and for representative consumer organizations in cases where the product is commonly sold at the retail
lev-el.to provide information which is relevant to the investigation regarding dumping, injUry . and
causality.
6.13 •The authorities shall take due account of any difficulties experienced by interested parties, in
particular small companies, in supplying information requested, and shall provide any assistance
practicable.
6.14 The procedures set out above are not intended to prevent the authorities of a Member from
proceeding expeditiously with regard to initiating an investigation, reaching preliminary or final
determinations, Whether affirmative or negative, or from applying provisional or final measures, in
accordance with relevant provisions of this Agreement.
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Article.7
Provisional Measures
.	 .
7.1	 Provisional measures may be applied only if:
(1) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, a
public notice has been given to that effect and interested parties have been given
adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments;
(ii) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent
injury to a domestic industry; and
(iii) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused
during the investigation.
7.2 Provisional measures may take the form of a provisional duty or, preferably, a security - by
cash deposit or bond - equal to the amount of the anti-dumping duty provisionally estimated, being
not greater than the provisionally estimated margin of dumping. Withholding of appraisement is an
appropriate provisional measure, provided that the normal duty and the estimated amount of the
anti-dumping duty be indicated and as long as the withholding of appraisement is subject to the same
conditions' as other provisional measures.
7.3	 Provisional measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of
the investigation.
7.4 The application of provisional measures shall be limited to as short a period as possible, not
exceeding four months or, on decision of the authorities concerned, upon request by exporters
representing a significant percentage of the trade involved, to a period not exceeding six months. When
authorities, in the course of an investigation, examine whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping
would be sufficient to remove injury, these periods may be six and nine months, respectively.
7.5	 The relevant provisions of Article 9 shall be followed in the application of provisional measures.
Article 8
Price Undertakings
8.1 Proceedings may" be suspended or terminated without the imposition of provisional measures
or anti-dumping duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any exporter to revise
its prices or to cease exports to the area in question at dumped prices so that the authorities are satisfied
that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated. Price increases under such undertakings shall
not be higher than necessary to eliminate the margin of dumping. It is desirable that the price increases
be less than the margin of dumping if such increases would be adequate to remove the injury to the
domestic industry.
"'The word 'may shall not be interpreted to allow the simultaneous continuation of proceedings with the implementation
of price undertakings except as provided in paragraph 4.
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8.2 Price undertakings shall not . be sought or accepted from exporters unless the authorities of the
importing Member have made a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and injury caused
by such dumping.
8.3 Undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities consider their acceptance impractical.
for example, if the number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or for other reasons, including
reasons of general policy. Should the case arise and where practicable, the authorities shall provide
to the exporter the reasons which have led them to consider acceptance of an undertaking as
inappropriate, and shall, to the extent possible, give the exporter an opportunity . to make comments
thereon.
8.4 If an undertaking is accepted, the investigation of dumping and injury shall nevertheless be
completed if the exporter so desires or the authorities so decide. In such a case, if a negative
determination of dumping or injury is made, the undertaking shall automatically lapse, except in cases
where such a determination is due in large part to the existence of a price undertaking. In such cases,
the authorities may require that an undertaking be maintained for a reasonable period consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement. In the event that an affirmative determination of dumping and injury
is made, the-undertaking shall continue consistent with its terms and the provisions of this Agreement.
8.5 Price undertakings may be suggested by the authorities of the importing Member, but no exporter
shall be forced to enter into such undertakings. The fact that exporters do not offer such undertakings.
or do not accept an invitation to do so, shall in no way prejudice the consideration of the case. However.
the authorities are free to determine that a threat of injury is more likely to be realized if the dumped
imports continue.
8.6 Authorities of an importing Member may require any exporter from whom an undertaking
has been accepted to provide periodically information relevant to the fulfilment of such an undertaking
and to permit verification of pertinent data. In case of violation of an undertaking, the authorities of
the importing Member may take, under this Agreement in conformity. with its provisions, expeditious
actions which may constitute immediate application of provisional measures using the best information
available. In such cases, definitive duties may be levied in accordance with this Agreement on products
entered for consumption not more than 90 days before the application of such provisional measures.
except that any such retroactive assessment shall :not apply to imports entered before the violation of
the undertaking.
Article 9-
Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties
9.1 The decision whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all requirements
for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the decision whether the amount of the anti-dumping duty
to be imposed shall be the full margin of dumping or less, are decisions to be made by the authorities
of the importing Member. It is desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all
Members, and that the duty be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove
the injury to the domestic industry.
9.2 When an anti-dumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such anti-dumping duty shall
be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such
product from all sources found to be dumped and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources
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from which price undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have jeen accepted. The authorities
shall name the supplier or suppliers of the product concerned. If, however, several suppliers from
the same country are.involved, and it. is impracticable to name all these suppliers, the authorities may
name the supplying country concerned. If several suppliers from more than one country are involved,
the authorities may name either all the suppliers involved, or, if this is impracticable, all the supplying
countries involved.
9.3	 The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established
under Article 2.
9.3.1 When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a retrospective basis, the
determination of the final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties shall take place
as soon as possible, normally within 12 months, and in no case more than 18 months,
after . the date on which a request for a final assessment of the amount of the
anti-dumping duty has been made. Any refund shall be made promptly and normally
in not more than 90 days following the determination of final liability made pursuant
to this sub-paragraph. In any case, where a refund is not made within 90 days, the
authorities shall provide an explanation if so requested.
9.3.2 When the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a prospective basis, provision
'shall be made for a prompt refund, upon request, of any duty paid in excess of the
margin of dumping. A refund of any such duty paid in excess of the actual margin
of dumping shall normally take place within 12 months, and in no case more than
18 months, after the date on which a request for a refund, duly supported by evidence,
has been made by an importerof the product subject to the anti-dumping duty. The
• refund authorized should normally be made within 90 days of the above-noted decision.
9.3.3 In determining whether and to what extent a reimbursement should be made when the
export price is constructed in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 2, authorities
should take account of any change in normal value, any change in costs incurred between
importation and resale, and any movement in the resale price which is duly reflected
in subsequent selling prices, and should calculate the export price with no deduction
for the amount of anti-dumping duties paid when conclusive evidence of the above
is provided.
9.4 When the authorities have limited their examination in accordance with the second sentence
of paragraph 10 of Article 6. any anti-dumping duty applied to imports from exporters orproducers
not included in the examination shall not exceed:
the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the selected
exporters or producers or.
(ii) Where the liability for payment of anti-dumping duties is calculated on the basis of
a prospective normal value, the difference between the weighted average normal value
of the selected exporters or producers and the export prices of exporteis or producers
not individually examined,
nt is understood that the observance of the time-limits mentioned in this subparagraph and in subparagraph 3.2 may
not be possible where the product in question is subject to judicial review proceedings.
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provided that the authorities shall disregard for the purpose of this paragraph any zero and de rninimis
margins and margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6. The
authorities shall apply individual duties or normal values to imports from any exporter or producer
not included in the examination who has provided the necessary information during the Course of the
investigation, as provided for in subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.
9.5 If a product is subject to anti-dumping duties in an importing Member, the authorities shall
promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping for any
exporters or producers in the exporting country in question who have not exported the product to the
importing Member during the period of investigation, provided that these exporters or producers can
show that they are not related to any of the exporters or producers in the exporting country who are
subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product. Such a review shall be initiated and carried out
on an accelerated basis, compared to normal duty assessment and review proceedings in the importing
Member. No anti-dumping duties shall be levied on imports from such exporters or producers while
the review is being carried out. The authorities may, however, withhold appraisement and/or request
guarantees to ensure that, should such a review result in a determination of dumping in respect of such
producers or exporters, anti-dumping duties can be levied retroactively to the date of the initiation
of the review. .
Article 10
Retroactivity
10.1 Provisional measures and anti-dumping duties shall only be applied to products . which enter
for consumption after the time when the decision taken under paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph I
of Article 9, respectively, enters into force, subject to the exceptions set out in this Article.
10.2 Where a final determination of injury (but not of a threat thereof or of a material retardation
of the establishment of an industry) is made or, in the case of a final determination of a threat of injury,
where the effect of the dumped imports would, in the absence of the provisional measures, have led
to a determination of injury, anti-dumping duties may be levied retroactively for the period for which
provisional measures, if any, have been applied.
10.3 If the definitive anti-dumping duty is higher than the provisional duty paid or payable, or the
amount estimated for the purpose of the security, the difference shall not be collected. If the definitive
duty is lower than the provisional duty paid or payable, or the amount estimated for the purpose of
the security, the difference shall be reimbursed or the duty recalculated, as the case may be.
10.4 Except as provided in paragraph 2, where a determination of threat of injury or material
retardation is made (but no injury has yet occurred) a definitive anti-dumping duty may be imposed
only from the date . of the determination of threat of injury or material retardation, and any cash deposit
made during the period of the application of provisional measures shall be refunded and any bonds
released in an expeditious manner.
10.5	 Where a final determination is negative, any cash deposit made during the period of the
application of provisional measures shall be refunded and any bonds released in an expeditious manner.
10.6 A definitive anti-dumping duty may be levied on products which were entered for consumption
not more than 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures, when the authorities
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determine for the dumped product in 'question that:
• (i) ' there is a history of dumping whin caused injury or that the importer was, or should
have been, aware that the exporter practises dumping and that such dumping would
cause injury, and
(ii) the injury is caused by massive dumped imports of a product in a relatively short time
which in light of the timing and the volume of the dumped imports and other
circumstances (such as a rapid build-up of inventories of the imported product) is likely
to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty to be
applied, provided that the importers concerned have been given an opportunity to
comment.
10. .7 The authorities may, after initiating an investigation, take such measures as the withholding
of appraisement or assessment as may be necessary to collect anti-dumping duties retroactively, as
provided for in paragraph 6, once they have gufficient evidence that the conditions set forth in that
paragraph are satisfied.
10.8	 No duties shall be levied retroactively pursuant to paragraph 6 on products entered for
consumption prior to the date of initiation of the investigation.
Article 11
Duration and Review of Anti-Dumping Duties and Price Undertakings
11.1	 . An anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to
counteract dumping which is causing injury.
11.2	 The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where warranted.
:heir own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition
of the definitive anti-dumping duty, upon request by any interested party which submits positive
information substantiating the need for a review.' Interested parties shall have the right to• request
the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping,
whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both.
If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that the anti-dumping duty
is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.
11.3 . Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs I and 2, any definitive anti-dumping duty shall
be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or from the date of the most recent •
review under paragraph 2 if that review has covered both dumping and injury, or under this paragraph),
unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative or upon
a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a reasonable period
of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence
7I A determination of final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 9, does
not by itself constitute a review within the meaning of this Article.
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of dumping and injurY. n The duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review.
11.4 The provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure shall apply to any review carried
out Under this Article. Any such review shall be carried out expeditiously and shall normally be
concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review.
11.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutaiis mutandis to price undertakings accepted under
Article 8.
Article 12
Public Notice and Explanation of Determinations
12.1 When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of
an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the Member or Members the products of which
are subject to such investigation and other interested parties known to the investigating authorities to
have an interest therein shall be notified and a public notice shall be given.
12.1.1 A public notice of the initiation of an investigation shall contain, or otherwise make
available through a separate report', adequate information on the following:
(i) the name•of the exporting country or countries and the product involved;
(ii) the date of initiation of the investigation;
(iii) the basis on which dumping is alleged in. the application;
(iv) a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is based;
(v) the address to which representations by interested parties should be directed;
(vi) the time-limits allowed to interested parties for making their views known.
12.2 Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether affirmative
or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 8, of the termination of such
an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive anti-dumping duty. Each such notice shall set
forth, or otherwise make available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and
conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities.
All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or Members the products of which
are subject to such determination or undertaking and to other interested parties known to have an interest
therein.
vWhen the amount of the anti-dumping duty is assessed on a retrospective basis, a finding in the most recent assessment
proceeding under subparagraph 3.1 of Article 9 that no duty is to be levied shall not by itself require the authorities to terminate
the definitive duty.
13 Where authorities provide information and explanations under the provisions of this Article in a separate report, they
shall ensure that such report is readily available to. the public.
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12.2.1 A public notice of the imposition of provisional measures shall set forth, or otherwise
make available through a separate report, sufficiently detailed explanations for the
preliminary determinations on dumping and injury. and shall refer to the matters of
fact and law which have led to arguments ' being. accepted or rejected.. Stich a'notice
or report shall, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of-
confidential information, contain in particular:
(i) the names of the suppliers, or when this is impracticable, the supplying countries
involved;
(ii) a description of the product which is sufficient for customs purposes;
(iii) the margins of dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons for
the methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price
and the normal value under Article 2;
(iv) considerations relevant to the injury determination as set out in Article 3;
(v) the main reasons leading to the determination.
A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an
affirma:ive determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the
acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through
a separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons
which have led to the imposition Of final measures or the acceptance of a price
undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential
information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the information described
in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of relevant
arguments or claims made by the exporters and importer's, and the basis for any decision
made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.
12.2.3 A public notice of the termination or suspension of an investigation following the
acceptance of an undertaking pursuant to Article 8 shall include, or otherwise make
available through a separate report, the non-confidential part of this undertaking.
12.3	 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to the initiation and completion
of reviews pursuant to Article 11 and to decisions under Article 10 to apply duties retroactively..
Article 13
Judicial Review
Each Member whose national legislation contains provisions on anti-dumping measures shall
maintain judicial. arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the
prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations and reviews of determinations
within the meaning.of Article 11. Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the authorities
responsible for the determination or review in question.
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Article 14
Anti-Dumping Action on Behalf of a Third Country
14.1	 An application for anti-dumping action on behalf of a third country shall be made by the
authorities of the third country requesting action.
14.2 Such an application shall be supported by price information to show that the imports are being
dumped and by detailed information to show that the alleged clumping is causing injury to the domestic
industry concerned in the third country. The government of the third country shall afford all assistance
to the authorities of the importing country to obtain any further information which the latter may require.
14.3 In considering such an application, the authorities of the importing country shall consider the
effects of the alleged dumping on the industry concerned as a whole in the third country; that is to
say. the injury shall not be assessed in relation only to the effect of the alleged dumping on the industry's
exports to the importing country or even on the industry's total exports.
14.4 The decision whether or not to proceed with a case shall rest with the importing country. If
the importing country decides that it is prepared to take action, the initiation of the approach to the
Council for Trade in Goods seeking its approval for such action shall rest with the importing country.
Article 15
Developing Country Members
It is . recognized that special regard must be given by developed country Members to the special
situation of developing country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping measures
under this Agreernent. • Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall
be explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of
developing country Members.
PART II
Article 16
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices
16.1 There is hereby established a Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices- (referred to in this
Agreement as the -Comminee") composed of representatives from each of the Members. The Committee
shall elect its own Chairman and shall meet not less than twice a year and otherwise as envisaged by
relevant provisions of this Agreement at the request of any Member. The Committee shall carry out
responsibilities as assigned to it under this Agreement or by the Members and it shall afford Members
the opportunity of consulting on any matters relating to the operation of the Agreement or the furtherance
of its objectives. The WTO Secretariat shall act as the secretariat to the Committee.
16.2 The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies as appropriate.
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16.3 In carrying out their functions, the Committee and any s....sidiary bodies may consult with
and seek information from any soiirce they deem appropriate. However, before the Committee or
a subsidiary body seeks such information from a source within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall
inform the Member involved. It shall obtain the consent of' the. Member and any firm to be Consulted.
16.4 Members shall report without delay to the Committee all preliminary or final anti-dumping
actions taken. Such reports shall be available in the Secretariat for inspection by other Members.
Members shall also submit, on a semi-annual basis, reports of any anti-dumping actions taken within
the preceding six months. The semi-annual reports shall be submitted on an agreed standard form.
16.5 Each Member shall notify the Committee, (a) which of its authorities are competent to initiate
and conduct investigations referred to in Article 5 and (b) its domestic procedures governing the initiation
and conduct of such investigations..
Article 17
consultation and Dispute Settlement
17.1	 Except aS otherwise provided herein', the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to
consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement.
17.2	 Each Member shall afford sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity
for consultation regarding, representations made by another Member with respect to any matter affecting
the operation of this Agreement. 	 •
17.3 If any Member considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this
Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or that the achievement of any objective is being impeded.
by another Member or Members, it may, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution
of the matter, request in writing consultations with the Member or Members in question. Each Member
shall afford sympathetic consideration to any request from another Member for consultation.
17.4 If the Member that requested consultations considers that the consultations pursuant to paragraph 3
have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution, and if final action has been taken by the administering
authorities of the importing Member to levy definitive anti-dumping duties or to accept price
undertakings, it may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). When a provisional
measure has a significant impact and the Member that requested consultations considers that the measure .
was taken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7,. that Member may also refer such
matter to the DSB.
17.5	 The DSB shall, at the request of the complaining party, establish a panel to examine the matter
based upon:
(i) a written statement of the Member making the request indicating how a benefit accruing
to it. directly or indirectly, under this Agreement has s been nullified or impaired, or
that the achieving of the objectives of the Agreement is being impeded. and
(ii) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the
authorities of the importing Member.
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17.6	 In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the
authorities' establishment of the facts was proper arid whether their evaluation of those
facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the
evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a
different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be Overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordanCe with
customary rules of ,interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds
that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' .
 measure to be in conformity with
the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.
17.7 Confidential information provided to the panel shall not be disclosed without formal authorization
from the person, body or authority providing such information. Where such information is requested
from the panel but release of such information by the panel is not authorized, a non-confidential summary
of the information, authorized by the person, body or authority providing the information, shall be
provided.
PART 111
•
Article 18
Final Provisions
18.1	 No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994. as interpreted by this Agreement.'
18.2	 Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Agreement without
the consent of the other Members.
18.3 Subject to subparagraphs 3.1 and 3.2, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to
investigations, and reviews of existing measures, initiated pursuant to applications which have been
made on or after the date of entry into force for a Member of the WTO Agreement.
18.3.1 With respect to the calculation of margins of dumping in refund procedures under
paragraph 3 of Article 9, the rules used in the most recent determination or review
of dumping shall apply.
18.3.2 For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article .11, existing anti-dumping measures shall
be deemed to be imposed on a date not later than the date of entry into force for a
Member of the WTO Agreement, except in cases in which the domeitic legislation
of a Member in force on that date already included a clause of the type provided for
in that Paragraph.
24This is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, as appropriate.
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18.4 Each Member shall take all 'necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure,
not later than the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws,•
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may apply
for the Member in question.
18..5	 Each Member shall inform the Committee ofany changes in its laws and regulations relevant
to this Agreement and in the administration of such laws and regulations.
18.6 The Committee shall review annually the implementation and operation of this Agreement taking
into account the objectives thereof.. The Committee shall inform annually the Council for Trade in
Goods of developments during the period covered by such reviews.
18.7	 The Annexes to this Agreement constitute an integral part thereof.
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ANNEX I
PROCEDURES FOR ON-THE-SPOT INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT
TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE 6
1. Upon initiation of an investigation, the authorities of the exporting Member and the firms known
to be concerned should be informed of the intention to carry out on-the-spot investigations.
2. If in exceptional circumstances it is intended to include non-governmental experts in the
investigating team, the firms and the authorities of the exporting Member should be so informed. Such
non-governmental experts should be subject to effective sanctions for breach of confidentiality
requirements.
3. it lould be standard practice to obtain explicit agreement of the firms concerned in the exporting
Membe: DL fore the visit is finally scheduled.
4. ,e,s soon as the agreement of the firms concerned has been obtained, the investigating authorities
should n )tify the authorities ofthe exporting Member of the names and addresses-of the firms to be
visited and -the dates agreed.
5. Sufficient advance notice should be given to the firms in question before the visit is made.
6. Visits to explain the questionnaire should only be made at the request of an exporting firm.
Suc'n a visit may only be made if (a) the authorities of the importing Member *notify the representatives
of he Member in question and (b) the latter do not object to -the visit.
As the main purpose of the on-the-spot investigatiOn is to verify information provided or.to
obtain further details, it should be carried out after the response to the questionnaire has been received
unless the firm agrees to the contrary and the government of the exporting Member is informed by
the investigating authorities of the anticipated visit and does not object to it; further, it should be standard
practice prior to the visit to advise the firms concerned of the general nature of the information to be
verified and of any further information which needs to be provided, though this should not preclude
reqtiests to be made on the spot for further details to be provided in the light of information obtained.
R. Enquiries or questions put by the authorities or firms of the exporting Members and essential
to a successful on-the-spot investigation should, whenever possible, be answered before the visit is
made.
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ANNEX n.
EEST INFORMATION . AVAILABLE IN TERMS OF PAR.A$;„'kkEi-K 8 OF ARTICLE 6. •
• As soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation, th invest;gating authorities should.
r1.%-:.elfyin detail tl`ie information :equired from any interested pari-j, Lnd the mariri r in which that .
information should bc str:ucturc.d by the inlet:ester! party In Its re-:Portse. The authorities should also
!.11-e, that the party is aware that if infonnatirin is not supplied within a rt2sonable time, the authorities
will be free  it , 7111kt! deteiTnirsations on the balls of the facts availalie ,
 including those contained in
the apslication fcr she'initiation of the invest:gation by the domestic industri.
2. Th:; avAorities may also reqUeSI that afl interested party provide its response in a particular
coATIC)LI:.Z.: tape) or computer 1.02,-,guage.	 Jiere such a request is made, the autlicrizies
sholti	 i•.sonable ability of the interested pat-ty
i
.e,, --espond in the preferred mediumor
wmput-r l a igua3e,	 snould not request the party to use for its response a computer system other
than that used by the party. The ailtherity should not maintain a request for a computerized response
if the .intere'r ti,r1	 dces no: mliirrain computerized ac:counts and if pres triting the response as requested
result in in	 e::ira 3•. den on the interested party,	 it would entail unreasonable
cos: anc: '.701,,t)le. The auCri prites shouid nOt rriaintain :,,equest or a r.;:sponse in a panicular
cornP. /ter lazguage if Ll-le is:I:crested pay does not maintain its com?utesized accounts in
c7,.-r.p72ter 7,ar.guaRe	 if preserAing the response as requested would result in an
unst?soraLbit	 ''.:taden on the inter:_sted party, e.g. it would entail unreasonable additional cost
an 5vrk
3. All infornaticn which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it-can be used
Li the	 eestigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely fashion, and, where
which is st,ppied in a me d ium or compuf.er largua2e requested by the authorities, should
en :inc ac,:o.:nt detemlination.s are made. JGCS not rz-nond in the preferred
inddium or contoute:. langUaRe but the 2.21hOr:iieS finci that the circurnsta.rices set out in paragraph 2
:-..ave been sat:se-iv:1, ate failure to respond in the pre:et-fed medium or computer lan guage should not
..o.-s:ed tosignifica:	 th,": investigation.
Where the authorities do r.w have the abil i ty to process information if provided in a particular
!medium (e.g. crr,putr taT,c), the i...-jormaticn shou.ld be su pplied in the form of written material or
ctiur fotin	 to the authori...ie.s.
5.	 Even though the information provided may no be ideal in ell respects, this should not justify
the authorities .?-ro ,ri dis .;-..garding it, provided th,t interested party has acted to the best of its
:IC evidence or inforcation is net accepted, the supplying party shoui :I be informed lonhwith
Vf	 :C=soils ;i",:tref07, and should have an opportunity to provide farther explanations within a
rasonable perioal ,	 account being taken of the time-limits of the investigation. if the .e.r.planations
-re co.nsikr-Y:] by t"lentthorties as not b-t- i,g satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of zuch evidence
irc.ra n 	be given in any -.2u1isiv.-.e. determinations.
. tht authorities have to base th !.tir findings, including the with respect to normal value, on
ien.tzicn f.;--).:1-1 a e/eoniLry soti,..ce, it:eluding the infcsrmation supplied in Lie application for the
ieltatsa c:f th jnvestion, iy s'acu:d e.O so with special cifcizt-ispect:on. /n such eases, the
authorities should, whe:e practicable, check the information from other independent sources at their
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disposal, such as published price lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the
information obtained from other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however, that
if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the
authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party
did cooperate.
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ANNEX III: COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 3283/94,
ON PROTECTION AGAINST DUMPED IMPORTS
FROM COUNTRIES NOT MEMBERS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, OJ (1994) L 349/1
31. 12. 94
	
Official Journal of the European Communities 	 No L 349/1
(Acts whose publication is obligatory)
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 3283/94
Of 22 December 1994
on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European
Community
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular Article 113 thereof,
Having regard to the Regulations establishing the
common organization of agricultural markets and tlke
Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 235 of the
Treaty applicable to goods manufactured from
agricultural products, and in particular the provisions of
those Regulations which allow for derogation from the
!general principle that protective measures at frontiers
may be replaced solely by the measures provided for in
those Regulations,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European
Parliament ( 1 ), .
Whereas, by Regulation (EC) No 2423/88 ( 2), the
Council adopted common rules for protection against
dumped or subsidized imports from countries which are
not members of the European Community;
Whereas, these rules were adopted in accordance with
existing international obligations, in particular those
arising from Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter, GATT), from ' the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT
(1979 Anti-Dumping Code) and from the Agreement on
Interpretation and Application . of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the GATT (Code on Subsidies and
•ountervailing Duties);
Whereas, the multilateral trade-negotiations concluded in
1994 have led to new Agreements on the implementation
of Article VI of GATT and it is therefore appropriate to
amend the Community rules in the light of these new
Agreements; whereas it is also desirable, in the light of
the different nature of the new rules for dumping and
subsidies, to have separate Community rules in these two
areas and, consequently, the new rules on protection
against subsidies and countervailing duties are dealt with
in a separate Regulation;
Whereas, in applying these rules it is essential, in order to
maintain the balance of rights and obligations which the
GATT Agreement establishes, that the Community takes
account of their interpretation by the Community's major
trading partners;
Whereas, the new agreement on dumping, namely, the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of -the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(hereinafter, 1994. Anti-Dumping Agreement), contains
new and detailed rules, in particular, with regard to the
calculation of dumping, procedures for initiation and the
subsequent investigation, including the establishment and
treatment of the facts, the imposition of provisional
measures, the imposition and collection of anti-dumping
duties, the duration and review of anti-dumping measures
arid the public disclosure of information relating to
anti-dumping investigations; whereas, in view of the
extent of the changes and to ensure and adequate and
transparent implementation of the new rules, it is
appropriate to transpose the language of the new
agreements into Community legislation to the extent
possible;
I ) Opinion delivered on 14 December 1994 (not yet published
in the Official Journal).
(2) OJ No L 209, 2. 8. 1988, p. 1. Regulation as amended by
Regulation (EC) No 521/94 (0J No L 66, 10. 3. 1994, p. 7)
and Regulation (EC) No 522/94 (0J No L 66, 10. 3. 1994,
p. 10).
Whereas, it is desirable to lay down clear and detailed
rules on the calculation of normal value, in particular
that in all cases it should be based on representative sales
in the ordinary course of trade in the exporting country;
whereas, it is expedient to define the circumstances - in
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which domestic sales may be considered to be made at a
loss and disregarded and recourse may be had to
remaining sales or constructed value or sales to a third
country; whereas it is also desirable to provide for a
proper allocation of costs, . including in start-up
situations, •where it is •
 also appropriate to lay down
guidance on the dcfinition of start-up and the extent and
method of allocation; whereas it is also necessary, when
constructing normal value, to indicate the methodology
that is to be applied to determine the amounts for selling,
general and administrative costs and the profit that shall
be included in such value;
Whereas, when determining normal value for non-market
economy countries, it appears prudent to set out rules of
procedure for choosing the appropriate market economy
third country that is to be used for such purpose and,
where it is not possible to find a suitable third country,
to provide that normal value may be established on any
reasonable basis;
Whereas, it is expedient to define the export price and to
enumerate the adjustments which are to be made in those
cases where a reconstruction of this price from the first
open-market price is deemed necessary;
Whereas, for the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison
between export price and normal value, it is advisable to
list the factors which may affect prices and price
comparability and to lay down specific rules on when
and how the adjustments shall be made, including the
fact that any duplication of adjustments has to be
avoided; whereas, it is also necessary to provide that
comparison may be made using average prices though
individual export prices may be compared to an average
normal value where the former vary by customer, region
or time period;
Whereas, it is desirable to lay down clear and detailed
guidance on the factors which may be relevant for the
determination of whether the dumped imports have
caused material injury or are threatening to cause injury;
whereas, in demonstrating that the volume and price
levels of the imports concerned are responsible for injury
sustained by a Community industry, attention should be
given to the effect of other factors and in particular
existing market conditions in the Community;
Whereas, it is advisable to define the term 'Community
industry' and provide that parties related to exporters
may be excluded from such industry and to define the
term 'related'; whereas, it is also necessary to provide for
anti-dumping action to be taken on behalf of producers
in a region of the Community and to lay down guidelines
on the definition of such a region;
Whereas, it is necessary to set . down who may lodge an -
anti-dumping complaint, including the extent to which it
should be supported by the Community industry, and the
information on dumping, injury and causality which such
complaint should contain; whereas, it is also expedient to
specify the procedures with regard to the rejection of -
complaints or the initiation of proceedings;
.1
Whereas, it is necessary to lay down how interested
parties shall be given notice of the information which the
authorities require, ample opportunity to present all
relevant evidence and full opportunity to defend their
interests; whereas, it is also desirable to set out clearly the
rules and procedures to be followed during the
investigation, in particular that interested parties have to
make themselves known, present their views and submit
information within specified time limits, if such views
and information are to be taken into account; whereas, it
is also appropriate to set out the conditions under which
an interested party may have access to, and comment on,
information presented by other interested parties;
whereas, there should also be cooperation between the
Member States and the Commission with regard to the
collection of information;
Whereas, it is necessary to lay down the conditions under
which provisional duties may be imposed, including the
condition that they may not be imposed earlier than 60
days from initiation and no later than nine months from
initiation; whereas, for administrative reasons, it is also
necessary to provide that such duties may in all cases be
imposed by the Commission either directly for a
nine-month period or in two stages of six and three
months;
Whereas, it is necessary to specify procedures for
accepting undertakings which eliminate dumping and
injury instead of imposing provisional or definitive duties;
whgreas, it is also appropriate to lay down the
consequences of violation or withdrawal of undertakings
and that provisional duties may be imposed in cases of
suspected violation or where further investigation is
necessary to complete the findings, whereas, in accepting
undertakings, care should be taken that the proposed
undertakings, and their enforcement, do not lead to
anti-competitive behaviour;
29
	 •
31. 12. 94 Official Journal of the European Communities 	 No L 349/3
Whereas, it is necessary to provide for the termination of
cases, by termination without measures or by conclusion
with definitive measures, normally within 12 months, and
in no case later than 15 months, from the initiation of
the investigation; Whereas, investigations or proceedings
should be terminated where the dumping is de mini.mis or
the injury is negligible and it is appropriate to define
these terms; whereas, where measures are to be imposed,
n is necessary to provide for the termination of
vestigations and to lay down that measures should be
ess than the margin of clumping if. such lesser amount
would remove the injury, as well as to specify the method
f calculating the level of measures in cases of sampling;
Vhereas, it is necessary to provide for retroactive
allection of provisional duties as deemed appropriate
nd to define the circumstances which may trigger the
etroactive application of duties to avoid the undermining
f the definitive measures to be applied; whereas it is also
,ecessary to provide that • duties may be applied
etroactively in cases of violation or withdrawal of
nderta kings;
.nereas, it is necessary to provide that measures are to
pse after five years unless a review investigation
dicates that they should be maintained; whereas, it is
so necessary td provide, in cases where sufficient
P dence is submitted of changed circumstances, for
.erim reviews or for investigations to determine
nether refunds of anti-dumping duties are warranted;
nereas it is also appropriate to. lay down that in any
calculation of dumping which necessitates a
construction of export prices, duties shall not be treated
a cost incurred between importation and resale where
e said duty is being reflected in the prices of the
°ducts subject to measures in the Community;
nereas, it is necessary to provide specifically for the
ssessment of export prices and dumping margins
here the duty is being absorbed by the exporter through
form of compensatory arrangement and the measures
e not being reflected in the prices of the products
bject to measures in the Community;
into Community legislation to deal with practices,
including simple assembly in the Community or a third
country, which have as their main aim the circumvention
of anti-dumping measures;
Whereas, it is expedient to permit suspension of
anti-dumping measures where there is a temporary
change in matket conditions which makes the continued
imposition of such measures temporarily inappropriate;
Whereas, it is necessary to provide that imports under
investigation may be made subject to registration upon
importation in order to enable measures to be applied
subsequently against such imports;
Whereas, in order to ensure a proper enforcement of
measures, it is necessary, that Member States monitor,
and report to the Commission the import trade of
products subject to investigation and subject to measures
and the amount of duties collected under this
Regulation;
Whereas, it is necessary to provide for consultations of
an Advisory Committee at regular and specified stages of
the investigation; whereas, the Committee should consist
of representatives of Member States with a representative
of the Commission as chairman;
Whereas, it is expedient to provide for verification visits
to check information submitted on dumping and injury,
though such visits should be dependent on proper replies
to questionnaires being received;
Whereas, it is essential to provide for sampling in cases
where the number of parties or transactions are large in
order to permit a timely completion of investigations;
Whereas, it is necessary to provide that for parties who
do not cooperate sa:tisfactorily other information may be
used to establish findings and such information may be
less favourable to the parry than if it had cooperated;
hereas, the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement does not
min provisions regarding the circumvention of
-dumping measures, though a separate GATT
nisterial Decision recognizes circumvention as a
blem and has referred it to the GATT Anti-dumping
rnmittee for resolution, whereas given the failure of
multilateral negotiations so far and pending the
lcome of the referral to the GATT Anti-Dumping
inmittee, it is necessary to introduce new provisions
Whereas, provision should be made for the treatment of
confidential information so that business secrets are not
divulged;
Whereas, it is essential that provision is made for proper
disclosure of essential facts and considerations to parties
which qualify for such treatment and that such disclosure
is made, with due regard to the decision-making process
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in the Community, within a time period which permits
parties to defend their interests;
Whereas,- it is prudent to provide for an administrative
system under which arguments can be presented in
relation to 'whether measures are in the Community
interest, including the consumer interest, and to lay down
the time periods within which such information has to be
presented as well as the disclosure rights of the parties
concerned;
Whereas, it is imperative to link implementation of time
limits to the establishment of the necessary administrative
structure within the Commission's services; whereas, the
Council, therefore, should specify, in a decision to be
adopted by qualified majority no later than 1 April 1995,
when these time limits are to apply,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
Principles
1. An anti-dumping duty may be applied to any dumped
product whOse release for free circulation in the
Community causes injury.
2. A product is to be considered as . being dumped if its
' export price to the Community is less than a comparable
price for the like product, in the ordinary course of trade,
as established for the exporting country.
3. The exporting country shall normally be the country
of origin. However, it, may be an intermediate country,
except where, for example, the products are merely
transhipped through that country, or the products
conceined are not produced in that country, or there is
no comparable price for them in that country.
4. For the purpose of this Regulation, the term like
product shall be interpreted to mean a product which is
identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the product under
consideration, or in the absence of such a 'product,
another product Which although not alike in all respects,
has characteristics closely resembling those of the product
under consideration.
(a) Where the exporter in the exporting country does not
produce or does not sell the like product the normal
value may be established on the basis of prices of .
other sellers or producers.
(b) Prices between parties which appear to be associated
or to have a compensatory arrangement with each
other may be considered as , being in the ordinary
course of trade and may be used to establish normal
value Only if it is determined that they are not
affected by the relationship.
2. Sales of the like product destined for domestic
consumption, shall normally be used to determine normal
value if such sales volume constitute 5 t70 or more of the .
sales volume of the product under consideration to the •
Community. However, a lower volume of sales may be
used when, for example, the prices charged are
considered representative for the market concerned.
3. When there are no or insufficient sales of the like
product in the ordinary course of trade, or where because
of .the particular market situation such sales do not
permit a proper comparison, the normal value of the like
product shall be calculated on the basis of the cost of
production in the country of origin plus a reasonable
amount for selling, general and administrative costs and
for profits, or based on the export prices, in the ordinary
course of trade, to an appropriate third country, provided
that these prices are 'representative.
4. Sales of the like product in the domestic market of
the exporting country, or export sales to a third country,
at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of
production plus selling, general and administrative costs
may be treated as not being in the ordinary course of
trade by reason . of price and may be disregarded in
determining normal value only if it is determined that
such sales are made within an extended period of time in
substantial quantities, and are , at prices which do not
provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable
period of time.
. ;
Article 2'
Determination of dumping
A. NORMAL VALUE
1. The normal value shall normally be based on the
prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of tracle;by
independent customers in the exporting country.
. (a) If prices which are below costs at the time of sale are
above weighted average costs for the period of
investigation, such prices shall be considered to
provide for recovery of costs within a reasonable
period of time.
(b) The extended period of time should normally be one
year but shall in no case be less than six months and
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sales below per unit cost shall, be considered to be
made in substantial quantities within such a period
when it is establiShed that the weighted average
selling price is below the weighted average unit cost,
or that the volume of sales below unit cost is not less
than 20 % of sales being used to determine normal
value.
• For the purpose of paragraphs ,
 1 to 7, costs shall
ormally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the
larty under investigation, provided that such records are
accordance with the generally accepted accounting
Irinciples of the country concerned and it is shown that
e records reasonably reflect the costs associated with
e production and sale of the product under
onsideration.
I Consideration shall be given to evidence submitted on
the proper allocation of costs, provided that it is
shown that such allocations have been historically
utilized. In the absence of a more appropriate
method, preference shall be given to the allocation of
costs on the basis of turnover. Unless already reflected
in the cost allocations under this rparagraph, costs
shall be adjusted appropriately for those
non-recurring items of cost which benefit future
and/or current production.
Where the costs for part of the period for cost
recovery are affected by the use of new production
facilities requiring substantial additional investment
and by low capacity utilization rates, which are the
result of start-up operations which take place within
or during part of the investigation period, the average
costs for the start-up phase shall be those applicable,
under the abovementioned allocation rules, at the end
of such . a phase, and shall be included at that level,
for the period concerned, in the weighted average
costs referred to in paragraph 4 (a). The length of a
start-up phase shall be determined in relation to the
circumstances of the producer or exporter concerned,
but shall not exceed an appropriate initial portion of
the period for cost recovery. For this adjustment to
costs applicable during the investigation period,
information relating to a start-up phase which
extends beyond that period shall be taken into
account in so far as it is submitted prior to
verification visits and within three months from the
initiation of the investigation.
profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to
production and sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of
the like product, by the exporter or producer under
investigation. When such amounts cannot be determined
on this basis, the amounts may be determined, on the
basis of:
(i) the weighted average of the actual amounts
determined for other exporters or producers subject
to investigation in respect of production and sales of
the like product in the domestic market of the
country of origin;
(ii) the actual 'amounts applicable to production and
sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the same
general category of products for the exporter or
producer in question in the domestic market of the
country of origin;
(iii) any other reasonable method, provided that the
amount for profit so established shall not exceed the
profit normally realized by other exporters or
producers on sales of products of the same general
category in the domestic market of the country of
origin.
7. In the case of imports from non-market economy
countries and, in particular, those to which Council
Regillation (EC) No 519/94 of 7 March 1994 on
common rules for imports form certain third countries
and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 1765/82, (EEC) No
1766/82 and 3420/83 ( 1 ) applies, normal value shall be
determined on the basis of the price or constructed value
in a market economy third country, or the price from
such a third country to other countries, including the
Community, or where these are not possible, on any
•other reasonable basis, including the price actually paid
or payable in the Community for the like product, duly
•adjusted, if necessary, to include a reasonable profit
margin.
(a) For the purpose of this paragraph, an appropriate
market economy third country shall be selected in a
not unreasonable manner, with due account taken of
any reliable information made available at the time of
selection. Account shall also be taken of time limits
and, where appropriate, a market economy third
country which is subject to the same investigation
shall be used.
(b) The parties to the investigation shall be informed
shortly after initiation of the market economy third
country envisaged and shall be given 10 days to
comment.
For the purpose of paragraphs 1 to 7, the amounts
selling, for general and administrative costs and for ( I ) OJ No L 67, 10. 3. 1994, p. 89.
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S.
B. EXPORT PRICE
	 (b) Import charges and indirect taxes
8. The export price shall be the price actually paid or
payable for the product when sold from the exporting
country to the Community.
9. In cases 'where there is no export price or where it
appears that the export price is unreliable because of
association or a compensatory arrangement between the
exporter and the importer or a third party, the export
price may be constructed on the basis of the price at
which the _imported products are first resold to an
independent buyer, or if the products are not resold to an
independent buyer, or not resold in the condition as
imported, on any reasonable basis.
(a) In these cases, adjustment for all costs, including
duties and taxes, incurred between importation and
resale, and for profits accruing, shall be made to
establish a reliable export price, at the Community
frontier level.
(b) The items for which adjustment shall be made include
those normally borne by an importer but paid by any
party, either in or outside the Community, which
appears to be associated or to have a compensatory
arrangement with the importer or exporter, including:
usual transport, insurance, handling, loading and
ancillary costs; customs duties, any anti-dumping
duties, and other taxes payable in the importing
country by reason of the importation or sale of the
goods; and a reasonable margin for selling, general
and administrative costs and profit.
C. COMPARISON
10. A fair comparison shall be made between the export
price and the normal value. This comparison shall be
made at the same level of trade and in respect of sales
made at as nearly as possible the same time and with due
account taken of other differences which affect price
comparability. Where the normal value and the export
price as established are not on such a comparable basis
due allowance, in the form of adjustments, shall be made
in each case, on its merits, for differences in factors
which are claimed, and demonstrated to affect prices and,
therefore, price comparability. Any duplication when
making adjustments shall be avoided, in particular in
relation to discounts, rebates, quantities and level of
trade. When the specified conditions are met, the factors
for which adjustment can be made are listed hereafter:
(a) Physical characteristics
An adjustment shall be made for differences in the
physical characteristics of the product concefned. The
amount of the adjustment shall correspond to a
reasonable estimate of the market value of the
•difference.
An adjustment shall be made to normal value for.an
amount corresponding to any import charges or
indirect taxes borne by the like product and by
materials physically incorporated therein, when
destined for consumption in the exporting country
and not collected ,or refunded in respect of the
product exported to the Community.
	 •
(d) Discounts, rebates and quantities
An adjustment shall be made for differences in
discounts and rebates, including those - given for
differences in quantities, if these are properly
quantified and are directly linked to the sales under
consideration. An adjustment may also be made for
deferred discounts and rebates if the claim is based on
consistent practice in prior periods, including
compliance with the conditions required to qualify for
the discount or rebates.
(d) Level of trade
An adjustment for differences in levels of trade,
including any differences which may arise in OEM
(Original Equipment Manufacturer) sales, shall be
granted where, in relation to the distribution chain in
both markets, it is shown that the export price,
including a constructed export price, is at a different
level of trade to the normal value and the difference
has affected price comparability which is
demonstrated by consistent and distinct differences in
functions and prices of the seller for the different
levels of trade in the domestic market of the
exporting country. The amount of the adjustment
shall be based on the market value of the difference.
(e) Transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary
costs
An adjustment shall be made for differences in the
directly related costs incurred for conveying the
product concerned from the premises of the exporter
to an independent buyer, where such costs are
included in the prices charged. These costs comprise
transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary
costs.
(f) Packing .
An adjustment shall be made for differences in the •
respective, directly related costs of the packing for the
product concerned.
(g) Credit
An adjustment shall be made for differences in the
cost of any credit granted for the sales under
I.
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consideration, provided that it is a factor taken into
account in the determination of the prices charged.
h) After-sales costs
An adjustment shall be made for differences in the
direct costs, of providing warranties, guarantees,
technical assistance and services, as provided for by
law and/or in the sales contract.
) Commissions
An adjustment shall be made for differences in
commissions paid in respect of the sales under
consideration.
, Currency conversions
When the price comparison requires a conversion of
currencies, such conversion should be made using the
rate of exchange on the date of sale, provided that
when a sale of foreign currency on forward markets is
directly linked to the export sale involved, the rate of
exchange in the forward sale shall be used. Normally,
the date of sale should be the date of invoice but the
date of contract, purchase order or order
confirmation, may be used if these more appropriately
establish the material terms of sale. Fluctuations in
exchange rates shall be ignored and exporters shall be
granted 60 days to reflect a sustained movement in
exchange rates during the period of investigation.
D. DUMPING MARGIN
Article 3
Determination of injury
1. Pursuant to this Regulation, the term 'injury' shall,
unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material
injury to the Community industry, threat of material
injury to the Community industry or material retardation
of the establishment of such an industry and shall be
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this
Article.
2. A determination of injury shall be based on positive
evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a)
the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the
dumped imports on prices in the Community market for
like products, and (b) the consequent ithpact of these
imports on the Community industry.
3. With regard to the volume of the dumped imports,
consideration shall be given as to whether there has been
a significant increase in dumped imports, either in
absolute terms or relative to production or consumption
in the Community. With regard to the effect of the
dumped imports on prices, consideration shall be given as
to whether there has been a significant price undercutting
by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a
like product of the Community industry, or whether the
effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a
significant degree or prevent price increases, which
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.
No one or several of these factors can necessarily give
decisive guidance.
i. Subject to the relevant provisions governing fair
iiiparison, the existence of margins of dumping during
ie investigation period shall normally be established on
e basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal
he with a weighted average of prices of all export
ansactions to the Community or by a comparison of
dividual normal values and individual export prices to
e Community on a transaction to transaction basis.
owever, a normal value established on a weighted
lerage basis may be compared to prices of all individual
port transactions to the Community, if there is a
If
ttern of export prices which differ significantly among
ferent purchasers, regions or time periods and the
ethods specified in the first sentence of this paragraph
uld not reflect the full degree of dumping being
ctised. This paragraph shall not preclude the use of
tapling in accordance with Article 17.
I. The dumping margin shall be the amount by which
e normal value exceeds the export price. Where
aping margins vary, a weighted average dumping
rgin may be established.
4. Where imports of a product from more than one
country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping
investigations, the effects of such imports shall be
cumulatively assessed only if it is determined that (a) the
margin of dumping established in relation to the imports
from each country is more than de minimis as defined in
Article 9 (3) and that the volume of imports from each
country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment
of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the
conditions of competition between imported products
and the conditions of competition between the imported
products and the like Community product.
S. The examination of the impact of the dumped
imports on the Community industry concerned shall
include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and
indices having a bearing on the state of the industry
including: the fact that an industry is still in the process
of recovering from the effects of past dumping or
subsidization, the magnitude of the actual margin of
dumping, actual and potential decline in sales, profits,
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output, market share, . productivity, return on
investments, utilization of capacity; factors affecting
Community prices; actual and potential negative effects
on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth,
ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not
exhaustive, nor can 'one or several of these factors
necessarily give decisive guidance.
would create a situation in which the dumping would
cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent.
( a ) In making a determination regarding the existence of
a threat of material injury, consideration should be
given to, inter alia, such factors as:
6. It must be demonstrated, from all the • relevant
evidence presented in relation to paragraph 2, that the
dumped imports are causing injury within the meaning of
this Regulation. Specifically, this shall entail a
demonstration that the volume •
 and/or price levels
identified pursuant to paragraph 3 are responsible for an
impact on the Community industry as provided for in
paragraph 5, and that this impact exists to a degree
which enable's it to be classified as material.
7. Known factors other than the dumped imports, which
at the same time are injuring the Community industry
shall also be examined to ensure that injury caused by
these other factors, is not attributed to the dumped
imports under paragraph 6. Factors which may be
considered in this respect include, inter alia, the volume
and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices,
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of
consumption, trade restrictive practices of and
competition between the foreign and Community
producers, developments in technology and the export
performance and productivity of the Community
industry.
(i) a significant rate of increase of dumped imports
into the Community market indicating the
likelihood of substantially increased imports;
(ii) sufficient freely disposable or an imminent,
substantial increase in capacity of the exporter
indicating the likelihood of substantially
increased dumped exports to the Community,
taking into account the availability of other
export markets to absorb any additional
exports;
•
(iii) whether imports are entering 4 prices that
would, to a significant degree, depress prices or
prevent price increases which otherwise would
have occurred, and would likely increase demand
for further imports; and
(iv) inventories of the product being investigated.
(b) No one of the factors listed above by itself can
necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of
the 'factors considere&must lead to the conclusion
that further dumped exports are imminent and that,
unless protective action is taken, material injury
would occur.
Article 4
Definition of Community industry
8. The effect of the dumped imports shall be assessed in
relation to the production of the Community industry of
the like product when available data permit the separate
identification of that production on the basis of such
criteria as the production process, producers' sales and
profits. If such separate identification of that production
is not possible, the effects of the dumped imports shall be
assessed by the examination of the production of the
narrowest group or range of products, which includes the
like product, for which the necessary information can be
--ovided.
9. A determination of a threat of material injury shall be
based on facts and not merely on allegation, .conjecture
or remote possibility. The change in circumstances which
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, the term 'the
Community industry' shall be interpreted as referring to
the Community producers as a whole of the like products
or to those of them whose collective output of the
products constitutes a major proportion, as defined in
Article 5 (4), of the total Community production of those
products, except that: •
(i) when producers are related to the exporters or
importers or are themselves importers of the allegedly
dumped product, the term 'the Community industry'
may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the
producers;
(ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of the
Community may, for the production in question, be,
divided into two or more competitive markets and the
producers within each market may be regarded as a •
separate industry if (a) the producers within such a
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market sell all or almost all of their production of the
product in question in that market, and (b) the
demand in that market is not to any substantial
degree supplied by producers of the product in
question located elsewhere in the Community. In such
circeimstances, injury may be found to exist even
where a major portion of the total Community
industry is not injured, provided there is a
concentration of dumped imports into such an
isolated market and provided further that the dumped
imports are causing injury to the producers of all or
almost all of the production within such a market.
For the purpose of paragraph 1, producers shall be
considered to be related to exporters or importers only if
a one of them directly or indirectly controls the other;
or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled
by a third person; or (c) together they directly or
indirectly control a third person provided that there are
rounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the
elationship is such as to cause the producer concerned to
ehave differently from non-related producers. For the
urpose of this paragraph, one shall be deemed to
onrrol another when the former is legally or
perationally in a position to exercise restraint or
irection over the latter.
. Where the Community industry has been interpreted
s referring to the producers in a certain region, the
:porters shall be given an opportunity to offer
ndertakings pursuant to Article 8 in respect of the
gion concerned. In such cases, when evaluating the
ommunity interest of the measures, special account shall
taken of the interest of the region. If an adequate
ndertaking is not offered promptly or the situations set
lit in Article 8 (9) and (10) apply, a provisional or
bfinitive duty may be imposed in respect of the
ommunity as a whole. In such cases, the duties may, if
racticable, be limited to specific producers or
xporters.
The provisions of Article 3 (8) shall be applicable to
his Article.
Article
Initiation of proceedings
. Except as provided for in Article 5 (6), an1
vestigation to determine the existence, degree and effect
any alleged dumping shall be initiated upon a written
mplaint by any natural or legal person, or any
sociation not having legal personality, acting on behalf
I the Community industry.
I The complaint may be submitted to the Commission,
or to a Member State, which shall forward it to the
Commission. The Commission shall send Member
States a copy of any complaint it receives. The
complaint shall be deemed to have been lodged on the
first working clay following its delivery to the
Commksion by registered mail or the issuing of an
acknowledgement of receipt by the Commission. -
(b) Where, in the absence of any complaint, a Member
State is in possession of sufficient evidence of
dumping and of injury resulting therefrom for the
Community industry, it shall immediately
communicate such evidence to the Commission.
2. A complaint under paragraph 1 shall include evidence
of dumping, injury and a causal link between the
allegedly dumped imports and the alleged injury. The
complaint shall contain such information as is reasonably
available to the complainant on the following:
(i) identity of the complainant and a description of the
volume and value of the Community production of
the like product by the complainant. Where a
written complaint is made on behalf of the
Community industry, the complaint shall identify the
industry on behalf of which the complaint is made
by a list of all known Community producers of the
like product (or associations of Community
producers of the like product) and, to the extent
possible, a description of the volume and value of
Community production of the like product
accounted for by such producers;
(ii) a complete description of the allegedly dumped
product, the names of the country or countries of
origin or export in question, the identity of each
known exporter or foreign producer and a list 'of
known persons importing the product in question;
(iii) information on prices at which the product in
question is sold when destined for consumption in
the domestic markets of the country or countries of
origin or export (or, where appropriate, information
on the prices at which the product is sold from the
country or countries of origin or export to a third
country or countries or on the constructed value of
the product) and information on export prices or,
where appropriate, on the prices at which the
product is first resold to an independent buyer in the
Community;
(iv) information on the evolution of the volume of the
allegedly dumped imports, the effect of these imports
on prices of the like product on the Community
market and the consequent impact of the imports on
the Community industry, as demonstrated by
relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the
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state of the Community industry, such as those listed
in Article 3 (3) and (5). 	 •
3. The Commission shall, to the degree possible,
examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence
provided in the complaint to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an
investigation.
4. An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to
paragraph 1 unless it has been determined, on the basis
of an examination of the degree of support for, or
opposition to, the complaint expressed by Community
producers of the like product, that the complaint has
been made by or on behalf of the Community industry.
The complaint shall be considered to have been made by
or on behalf of the Community industry if it is supported
. by those Community producers whose collective output
constitutes more than 50 % of the total production of the
like product produced by that portion of the Community
industry expressing either support for or opposition to
the complaint. However, no investigation shall be
initiated when Community producers expressly
supporting the complaint account for less than 25 % of
total production of the like product produced by the
Community industry.
5. The authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been
made to initiate an investigation, any publicising of the
complaint for the initiation of an investigation. However,
after receipt of a properly documented complaint and
before proceeding to initiate an investigation, the
government of the exporting country concerned shall be
notified.
6. If in special circumstances, it is decided to initiate an
investigation without having received a written complaint
by or on behalf of the Community industry for the
initiation of such investigation, this shall be done on the
basis of sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a
causal link, as described in paragraph 2, to justify the
initiation of an investigation.
9. Where, after consultation, it is apparent that there is
sufficient • evidence to justify initiating proceedings the
Commission shall initiate proceedings within 45 days of
the lodging of the complaint and publish a notice in the
Official Journal of the European Communities. Where
insufficient evidence has been presented, the complaint
shall, after consultation, be so informed within 45 days
of the date on which the complaints is lodged with the
Commission.
10. The notice of initiation of the proceedings shall
announce the initiation of an investigation, indicate the
product and countries concerned, give a summary of the
information received, and provide that all relevant
information is to be communicated to the Commission, it
shall state the periods within which interested parties
may make themselves known, present . their views in
writing and submit information if such views and
information are to be taken into ,
 account during the
investigation; it shall also state the period within which
interested parties may 'apply' to -$e heard by the
Commission in accordance with Article 6 (5).
11. The Commision shall advise the exporters,
importers and representative associations of importers or
exporters known to it to be concerned, as well as
representatives of the exporting country and the
complainants, of the initiation of the proceedings and,
with due regard to the protection -of confidential
information, provide the full text of the written
complaint received pursuant to Article .5 (1) to the
known exporters, and to the authorities of the exporting
country and make it available, upon request, to other
interested parties involved. Where the number of
exporters involved is particularly high, the full text of the
written complaint should instead be provided only to the
authorities of the exporting country or to the relevant
trade association.
12. An anti-dumping investigation shall not hinder the
procedures of customs clearance.
Article 6
7. The evidence of both dumping and injury shall be
considered simultaneously in the decision whether or not
to initiate an investigation. A complaint shall be rejected
where there is insufficient evidence of either dumping or
of injury to justify proceeding with the case. Pursuant to
this Article, proceedings shall not be initiated against
countries whose imports represent a market share of
below 1 %, unless such countries collectively account for
3 %, or more, of Community consumption.
8. The complaint may be withdrawn prior to initiation,
in which case it shall be considered not to have been
lodged.
The investigation
1. Following the initiation of the proceedings, the
Commission, acting in cooperation with the Member
States, shall commence an investigation at Community
level. Such investigation shall cover both dumping and
injury and these shall be investigated simultaneously. For
the purpose of a representative finding, an investigation
period shall be selected which, in the case of dumping
shall, normally, cover a period of not less than six
months immediately prior to the initiation of the
proceedings. Information relating to a period subsequent
to the investigation period shall, normally, not be taken
into account.
. 3 7
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2. Parties receiving questionnaires used in an
anti-dumping investigation shall be given at least 30 days
reply. The time limit for exporters shall be counted from
the date of receipt of the questionnaire, which fo this
purpose shall be deemed to have been received . one week
from the day on which it was sent to the exporter or
transmitted to the appropriate diplomatic representative
of the exporting country. An extension to the 30 day
period may be granted, taking due account of the time
limits of the investigation and provided the party gives a
good reason, in terms of its particular circumstances, for
such extension.
3. The Commission may request Member States to
supply information and Member States shall •--take
whatever steps are necessary in order to give effect to
such requests. They shall send to the Commission the
information requested together with the results, of all
inspections, checks or investigations carried out. Where
this iniormafton is of general interest or where its
transmission has been requested by a Member State, the
Comnisson. skvakk f.otwa.td it to the Member States.,
vo('eded ic is not confidentia), in which case a
non-confidential summary shall be forwarded.
4. The Commission may request Member States to carry
out all necessary checks and inspections, particularly
amongst importers, traders and Community producers,
and to carry out' investigations in third countries,
provided the, firms concerned give their consent and the
government of the country in question has been officially
notified and raises no objection. Member States shall take
whatever steps are necessary in order to give effect to
such requests from the Commission. Officials of the
Commission shall be authorized, if the Commission or a
Member State so requests, to . assist the officials of
Member States in carrying out their duties.
S. The interested parties, which have made themselves
known in accordance with Article 5 (10), shall be heard
if they have, within the period prescribed in the notice
ptiNished in the Official Journal of the European
Communities, made a written request for a hearing
showing that they are an interested party likely to be
affected by the result of the proceedings and that there
are particular reasons why they should be heard.
6. Opportunities shall, on request, be provided for the
importers, exporters, representatives of the government
, of the exporting country and the complainants, which
have made themselves known in accordance with Article
S (10), to meet those parties with adverse interests, so
that opposing views may be presented and rebuttal
arguments offered. Provision of such opportunities must
take account of the need to preserve confidentiality and
of the convenience to the parties. There shall be no
obligation on any party to attend a meeting, and failure
to do so shall not be prejudicial to that party's case. Oral
information provided under this paragraph shall be taken
into account in so far as it is subsequently reproduced in
writing.
7. The complainants, importers and exporters and their
representative associations, users and consumer
organizations, which have made themselves known in
accordance with Article 5 (10), as well as the
representatives of the exporting country may, upon
written request, inspect all information made available by
any party to an investigation, as distinct from internal
documents prepared by the authorities of the Community
or its Member . States, which is relevant to the
presentation of their cases and not confidential within the
meaning of Article 19, and that it is used in the
investigation. Such parties may, respond to such
information and their comments should be taken into
consideration, to the extent that they are sufficiently
substantiated in the response.
8. Except in the circumstances provided for in Article
18, the information supplied by interest ed parties an
upon which findings are based, shall be examined for
accuracy to the degree possible.
9. For proceedings initiated pursuant to Article S (9), an
investigation shall, whenever possible, be concluded
within one year. In any event, such investigations shall in
all cases be concluded within 15 months of initiation, in
accordance with the findings made pursuant to Article 8
for undertakings or the findings made pursuant to Article
9 for definitive action.
Article 7
Provisional measures
1. Provisional measures may be applied if proceedings
have been initiated in accordance with the provisions of
Article 5, a public notice has been given to that effect and
interested parties have been given adequate opportunities
to submit information and make comments in accordance
with Article S (10), a provisional affirmative
determination has been made of dumping and consequent
injury to the Community industry, and the Community
interest calls for intervention to prevent such injury. The
provisional measures shall be imposed no sooner than 60
days from the initiation of the proceedings but not later
than nine months from the initiation of the proceedings.
2. The amount of the provisional anti-dumping duty
shall not exceed the margin of dumping as provisionally
established but it should be less than the margin, if such
lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the
Community industry.
3. Provisional measures shall take the form of a security
and the release of the products concerned for free
circulation in the Community shall be conditional upon
the provision of such security.
4. The Commission shall take provisional action after
consultation or, in cases of extreme urgency, after
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informing the Member States. In • this latter case,
consultations shall take place 10 days, at the latest, after
notification to the Member States of the action taken by
the Commission.
S. Where a Member State requests immediate
intervention by the Commission and the conditions in
Article 7 (1) are met, the Commission shall within a
maximum of five working days of receipt of the request,
decide whether a provisional anti-dumping duty should
be imposed.
6. The Commission shall fathwith inform the Council
and the Member States of any decision taken under this
article. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may
decide differently.
7. Provisional duties may be imposed for six months
and extended for a further three months or they may be
imposed for nine months. However, they may only be
extended or imposed for a nine-month period, where
exporters representing a significant percentage of the
trade involved so request or do not object upon
notification by the Commission.
Article 8
Undertakings
1. Investigations may be terminated without the
imposition of provisional or definitive duties upon receipt
of satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any exporter
to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in
question at dumped prices so that the Commission, after
consultation, is satisfied that the injurious effect of the
dumping is eliminated. Price increases under such
undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to
eliminate the margin of dumping and they should be less
than the margin of dumping if such increases would be
adequate to remove the injury to the Community
industry.
2. Undertakings may be suggested by the .Commission,
but no exporter shall be obliged to enter into such an
undertaking. The fact that exporters do not offer such
undertakings, or do not accept an invitation to do so,
shall in. no way prejudice the consideration of the case.
However, it may be determined that a threat of injury is •
more likely to be realized if the dumped imports
continue. Undertakings shall not be sought or accepted
from exporters unless a provisional affirmative
determination of dumping and injury caused by • such
dumping has been made. Save in exceptional
circumstances, undertakings may not be offered later
than the end of the period during which representations
may be made pursuant to Article 20 (5).
	 •.
3. Undertakings offered need not be accepted if their
acceptance is considered impractical, for example, if the
number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or • .
for other reasons, including reasons of general policy.
The exporter concerned may 'be provided with the basis
on which it is intended to propose the rejection of the'
offer of an undertaking and may be given an opportunity
to make comments thereon. The reasons for rejection •
shall be set out in the definitive decision.
4. Parties which offer an undertaking shall be required
to provide a non-confidential version of such
undertaking, so that it 'may be made available to
interested parties to the investigation.
5. Where undertakings are, after consultation, accepted
and there is no objection raised within the Advisor)? .
Committee, the investigation shall be terminated. In all
other cases, the Commission shall submit to the Council
forthwith a report on the results of the consultation, .-
together with a proposal that the investigation be
terminated. The investigation shall stand terminated if,
within, one month, the Council, acting by a .qualified
majority, has not decided otherwise.
6. If the undertakings are accepted, the investigation of
dumping and injury shall normally be completed. In such
\- a case, if a negative determination of dumping or injury
is made, the undertaking shill automatically lapse, except
in cases where such a determination is due in large part
to the existence of an undertaking. In such cases the
authorities may require that an undertaking be
maintained for a reasonable period. In the event that an
affirmative determination of dumping and injury is made,
the undertaking shall continue consistent with its terms
and the provisions of this Regulation.
7. The Commission shall require any exporter from
which an undertaking has been accepted to provide,
periodically, information relevant to the fulfilment of
such undertaking, and to permit verification of pertinent
data. Non-compliance with such requirements shall be •
construed as a violation of the undertaking.
8. Where undertakings are accepted from certain
exporters during the course of an investigation, they
shall, for the purpose of Article 11, be deemed to .take
effect from the date on which the investigation is
concluded for the exporting country.
9. In case of violation or withdrawal of undertakings by
any party, a definitive duty shall be imposed in
accordance with Article 9, on the basis of the facts
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established within the context of the investigation which
lcd to the undertaking, provided that such investigation
was concluded with a final determination on dumping
and injury and the exporter concerned, except in the case
of withdrawal of undertakings by the exporter, has been
given an opportunity to comment.
10. A provisional duty nay, after consultation, be
imposed in accordance with Article 7 on the basis of the
best information available, where there is reascin to
believe that an undertaking is being violated, or in case of
violation or withdrawal of undertaking where the
investigation which led to the undertaking was not
concluded.
Article 9
Termination without measures, imposition of definitive,
duties
1. Where the complaint is withdrawn, proceedings may
be terminated unless such termination would not be in
the Community interest.
2. Where, after consultation, protective measures are
unnecessary and there is no objection raised within the
kdvisory Committee, the investigation or proceedings
slid be terminated. In all other cases,. the Commission
submit to the Council forthwith a . report on the
results of the consultation, together with a proposal that
the proceedings be terminated. The proceedings shall
stand terminated if, within one month, the Council,
acting by a qualified majority, has not decided
ritherwlse.
the expiry of such duties. The amount of the
anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of
dumping established but it should be less than the margin
if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the
injury to the Community industry.
S. An anti-dumping duty shall be imposed in the
appropriate amounts in each case, on a
non-discriminatory basis on imports of a product from
all sources found to be dumped and causing injury,
except as to imports from those sources from which
undertakings under the terms of this Regulation have
been accepted. The Regulation shall specify the duty for
each supplier or, if that is impracticable and, as a general
rule, in the cases referred to in Article 2 (7), the
supplying country concerned.
6.. When the Commission has limited its examination in
accordance with Article 17, any anti-dumping duty
applied to imports from exporters or producers which
have made themselves known in accordance with Article
17 but were not included in the examination shall not
exceed the weighted average margin of dumping
established for. the parties in the sample. For the purpose
of this paragraph, the Commission shalt disregard any
zero and de minimis margins, and margins established
under the circumstances referred to in Article 18. The
authorities shall apply individual duties to imports from
any exporter or producer which is granted individual
treatment, as provided for in Article 17.
Article 10
Retroactivity
3. For proceedings initiated pursuant to Article 5 (9),
injury shall normally be regarded as negligible where the
imports concerned represent less than the volumes set out
in Article 5 (7). For the same proceedings, there shall be
immediate termination where it is determined that the
margin of dumping is less than .2 `1/0, expressed as a
percentage of the export price, provided that it is only the
investigation that shall be terminated where the margin is
below 2 % for individual exporters and they shall remain
subject to the proceedings and may be reinvestigated in
any subsequent review carried out for the country _
concerned pursuant to Article 11.
4. Where the facts as finally established show that there
is dumping and injury caused thereby, and the
'Community interest calls for intervention in accordance
with Article 21, a definitive anti-dumping duty shall be
imposed by the Council, acting by simple majority on a
proposal submitted by the Commission after consultation
of the Advisory Committee. Where provisional duties are
in force, a proposal for definitive action shall be
submitted to the Council not later than one month before
1. Provisional measures and definitive anti-dumping
duties shall only be applied to products which enter free
circulation after the time when the decision taken
pursuant to Articles 7 (1) or 9 (4). as the case may be,
enters into . force, subject to the exceptions set out in this
Regulation.
2. Where a provisional duty has been applied and the
facts as finally established show that there is dumping
and injury, the Council shall decide, irrespective of
whether a definitive anti-dumping duty is to be imposed,
what proportion of the provisional duty is to be
definitively collected. For this purpose, 'injury' shall not
include material retardation of the establishment of a
Community industry, nor threat of material injury,
except where it is found that this would, in the absence
of provisional measures, have developed into material
injury. In all other cases involving such threat or
retardation, any provisional amounts shall be released
and definitive duties can only be imposed from the date
40
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Commission, or upon request made by or on behalf of
Community producers and the measure shall remain in ;e..
force pending the outcome of such review. 	 .
3. If the definitive anti-clumping duty is higher than the
provisional duty, thc difference shall not be collected. If
the definitive duty is lower than the provisional duty, the
duty shall be recalculated. Where a final determination is
negative, the provisional duty shall not be confirmed.
4. A definitive anti-dumping duty may be levied on
products which were entered for consumption not more
than 90 days prior to the date of application of
provisional measures and not prior to the initiation of the
investigation, provided that imports have been registered
in accordance with Article 14 (5), the Commission has
provided the importers concerned with an opportunity to
comment, and:
(i) there is, for the product in question, a history of
dumping over an extended period, or the importer
was aware of, or should have been aware of, the
dumping as regards the extent of the dumping and
the injury alleged or found; and
(ii) in addition to the level of imports which caused
urv during the investigation period there is a
further substantial rise in imports which, in the light
of its timing and volume and other circumstances, is
likely to seriously undermine the remedial . effect of
the definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied.
5. In cases of violation or withdrawal of undertakings,
definitive duties may be. levied in accordance with this
Regulation on goods entered for free circulation not more
than 90 days before the application of provisional
measures, provided that imports have been registered' in
accordance with Article 14 (5), and that any such
retroactive assessment shall not apply to imports entered
before the violation or withdrawal of the undertaking.
(a) An expiry review shall be initiated where the (request
contains sufficient evidence that the removal of the
measures would be likely to result in a continuation
or recurrence of dumping and injury. Such a t,
likelihood may, for example, be indicated by evidence ',,
of continued dumping and injury or evidence that the „.
removal of injury is partly or solely due to the
existence of measures or evidence that the•
circumstances of the exporters, or market conditions,
are such that they would indicate the likelihood of
further injurious dumping.
(b) In carrying out investigations under this paragraph,
the exporters, importers, the representatives of the
exporting country and the -Community producers •
shall be provided with the opportunity to amplify,
rebut or comment on the matters set out in the review
request and conclusions shall be reached with due
account taken of all relevant and duly supported
evidence presented in relation to the question of
whether the removal of measures would be likely, or
unlikely, to lead to the continuation or recurrence of
dumping and injury.
(c) Pursuant to this paragraph, a notice of impending
expiry shall be published in the Official Journal of the
European Communities at an appropriate time in the
final year of the period of application of the measures
as defined in this paragraph. Thereafter, the
Community producers shall, no later than three
months before the end of the five-year period, be .
entitled to lodge a review request in accordance with - •
paragraph 2 (a). A notice announcing the actual
expiry of measures pursuant to this paragraph shall
also be published.
Article 11
Duration, reviews and refunds
1. An anti-dumping measure shall remain in force only
as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract the
dumping which is causing injury.
2. A definitive anti-dumping measure shall expire five
years from its imposition or five years from the date of
the conclusion of the most recent review which has
covered both dumping and injury unless it is determined
in a review that the expiry would be likely to lead to a
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury: Such
an expiry review shall be initiated on the initiative of the
3. The need for the continued imposition of measures
may also be reviewed, where warranted on the initiative -
of the Commission or at the request of a Member State
or, provided that a reasonable period of time of at least •
one year has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive
measure; upon a request, by any exporter or importer or
by the Community producers, which contains sufficient.
evidence substantiating the need for such an interim
review.
(a) An interim review shall be initiated where the request
contains sufficient evidence that the continued
imposition of the measure is no longer necessary to
offset dumping and/or the injury would be unlikely to
continue or recur if the measure were removed or
varied, or that the existing measure is not, or is no
longer, sufficient to counteract the dumping which is
causing injury.
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(b) In carrying out investigations pursuant to this
paragraph, the Commission may, inter alia, consider
whether the circumstances with regard to dumping
. and injury have changed significantly, or whether
existing measures are achieving the intended results in
removing the injury previously established in
accordance with Article 3 of this Regulation. In these
respects, account shall be taken of all relevant and
duly supported evidence in the final determination.
4. A review shall also be carried out for the purpose of
determining individual margins of dumping for new
exporters in the exporting country in question _which
have not exported the product during the period of
investigation on which the measures were based.
(a) The review shall be initiated where a new exporter or
producer can show that it is not related to any of the
exporters or producers in the exporting country
which are subject to the anti-dumping measures on
the product, and where they have actually exported to
the Community following the a bovementioned
investigation period, or where they can demonstrate
that they have entered into an irrevocable contractual
obligation to export a significant quantity to the
Community.
(b) A review for a new exporter shall be initiated, and
carried out on an accelerated basis,,after consultation
of the Advisory Committee and Community
producers ha<Te been given an opportunity to
comment. The Commission Regulation initiating a
review shall repeal the duty in force with regard to
the new exporter concerned by amending the
Regulation which imposed the duty, and making
imports subject to registration in accordance with
Article 14 (5) in order to ensure that, should the
review result in a determination of dumping in respect
of such an exporter, anti-dumping duties can be
levied retroactively to the date of the initiation of the
review.
(c) The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply
where duties have been imposed under the provisions
of Article 9 (6).
S. The relevant provisions of this Regulation with regard
to procedures and the conduct of investigations,
excluding those relating to time limits, shall apply to any
review carried out pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4.
Any such review shall be carried out expeditiously and
shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the
date of initiation of the review.
6. Reviews pursuant to this Article shall be initiated by
the .Commission after consultation of the Advisory
Committee. Where warranted by reviews, measures shall
be repealed or maintained pursuant to paragraph 2, or
repealed, maintained or amended pursuant to paragraphs
3 and 4, by the Community institution responsible for
their introduction. Where measures are repealed for
individual exporters, but not for the country as a whole,
such exporters shall remain subject to the proceedings
and may, automatically, be reinvestigated in any
subsequent review carried out for that country pursuant
to this Article.
7. Where a review of measures pursuant to paragraph 3
is in progress at the end of the period of application of
measures as defined in paragraph 2, such review shall
also cover the circumstances set out in paragraph 2.
8. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, an importer may
request reimbursement of duties collected where it is
shown that the dumping margin, on the basis of which
duties were paid, has been eliminated, or reduced to a
level which is below the level of the duty in force.
(a) In order to request a refund of anti-dumping duties,
the importer shall submit an application to the
Commission. The application shall be submitted via
the Member State of the territory in which the
products were released for. free circulation within six
months of the date on which the amount of the
definitive duties to be levied was duly determined by
the competent authorities or of the date on which a
decision was made definitively to collect the amounts
secured by way of provisional duty. Member States
shall forward the request to the Commission
forthwith.
(b) An application for refund shall only be considered to
be duly supported by evidence where it contains
precise information on the amount of refund of
anti-dumping duties claimed and all customs
documentation relating to the calculation and
payment of such amount. It shall also include
evidence, for a representative period, on normal
values and export prices to the Community for the
exporter or producer to which the duty applies. In
cases where the importer is not associated to the
exporter or producer concerned and such information
is not immediately available, or the exporter or
producer is unwilling to release it to the importer, the
application shall contain a statement from the
exporter or producer that the dumping margin has
'been reduced or eliminated, as specified in this
Article, and that' the relevant supporting evidence will
be provided to the Commission. Where such evidence
is not forthcoming from the exporter or producer
within a reasonable period of time the application
shall be rejected.
(c) The Commission shall, after consultation of the
Advisory Committee, decide whether and to what
extent the application should be granted or it may
decide at any time to initiate an interim review and
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the information and findings from such review,
carried out in accordance with the provisions
applicable for such reviews, shall be used to
determine whether and to what extend a refund is
justified. Refunds of duties shall normally take place
within 12 months, and in no case more than 18
months after the ate on which a. request for a
refund, duly supported by evidence, has been made by
an importer of the product subject to the
anti-dumping duty. The payment of any refund
authorized should normally be made by Member
States within . 90 days of the abovementioned
decision.
•
9. In all review or refund investigations carried out
pursuant to this Article, the Commission shall apply, in
so far as circumstances have not changed, the same
methodology as in the investigation which led to the
duty, with due account being taken of the provisions set
Out in Article 2, and in particular paragraphs 11 and 12
thereof, and the provisions of Article 17 of this
Regulation.
10. In any investigation carried out pursuant to this
Article, the Commission shall examine the reliability of
export prices in accordance with Article 2. However,
where it is decided to construct the export price in
accordance with Article 2 (9), it shall calculate the export
price with no deduction for the amount of anti-dumping
duties paid when conclusive evidence is provided that the
duty is duly reflected in resale prices and the subsequent
selling prices in the Community.
Article 12
1. Where the Community industry submits sufficient
information showing that measures have led to no
movement, or insufficient movement, in resale prices or
subsequent selling prices in the Community, the
investigation may, after consultation, be reopened to
examine whether the measure has had effects on the
abovementioned prices.
2. During an investigation pursuant to this Article,
exporters, importers and Community producers shall be
provided with an opportunity to clarify the situation with
regard to resale prices and subsequent selling prices and if
it is concluded that the measure should have led to
movements in such prices, in order to remove the injury
previously established in accordance with Article 3,
export prices shall be reassessed in accordance with
Article 2 and dumping margins shall be recalculated to
take account of the reassessed export prices. Where it is
considered that a lack of movement in the prices in the
Community is due to a fall in export prices which
occurred prior to or following the imposition of
measures, dumping margins may be recalculated to take
account of such lower export prices.
3. Where a reinvestigation pursuant to this Article
shows increased dumping the measures in force shall be
amended by the Council, by simple majority on a
proposal from the Commission, in accordance with, the
new _findings on export prices.
4. The relevant provisions Of Article S and Article 6
shall apply to any review carried . out pursuant to this
Article, except that such review shall be carried out
expeditiously and shall normally be concluded within six
months of the date of initiation of the reinvestigation.
5. Alleged changes in normal value shall only be taken.
into account pursuant to this Article where complete
information on revised normal values, duly substantiated
by evidence, is made available to Commission within
the time limits set out in the notice of initiation of an
investigation. Where an investigation involves a
re-examination of normal values, imports may be made
subject to registration in accordance with Article 14 (5)
pending the outcome of the investigation.
Article 13
Circumvention
1. Anti-dumping duties imposed pursuant to this
Regulation may be extended to apply to imports from
third countries of like products, or parts thereof, when
circumvention of the measures in force is taking place.
Circumvention shall be defined as a change in the pattern
of trade between third countries and the Community
which stems from a practice, process or work for which
there is insufficient due cause or ecOnomic justification,
other than the imposition of the duty, and there is
evidence that the remedial effects of the duty are being
undermined in terms of the prices and/or quantities of the
like products and there is evidence of dumping in relation
to the normal values previously established for the like or
similar products.
2. An assembly operation in the Community or a third
country shall be considered to circumvent the measures in
force where:
(i) the operation started or substantially increased since,
or just prior to, the initiation of the anti-dumping
investigation and the parts concerned are from the
•country subject to measures; and
(ii) the parts constitute 60 % or more of the total value
of the parts of the assembled product except that in
no case shall circumvention be considered to be
taking place where the value added to the .parts
brought in, during the assembly or completion
operation, is greater than . 25 % of the
manufacturing cost: and
(iii) the remedial effects of the duty are being
undermined in terms of the prices and/or quantities
of the assembled like product and there is evidence
of dumping in relation to the normal values
previously established for the like or similar
products.
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3. Investigations shall be initiated pursuant to this
Article where the request contains sufficient evidence
regarding the factors set out in paragraph 1. Initiations
shall- be made, after consultation of the Advisor),
Committee by Commission Regulation which shall also
instruct the customs authorities to make imports subject
to registration in accordance with Article 14 (5) or to
request guarantees. Investigations shall be carried out by
the Commission, which may be assisted by customs
authorities and shall be concluded within nine months.
When the facts as finally ascertained, justify the extension
of measures, this shall be done by the Council; acting by
simple majority and on a proposal from the Commission,
from the date that registration was imposed pursuant to
Article 14 (5) or guarantees were requested. The-relevant
procedural provisions of this Regulation with regard to
initiations and the conduct of investigations shall apply
pursuant to this Article.
4. Products shall not be subject to registration pursuant
to Article 14 (5) or measures where they are accompanied
by a customs certificate declaring that the importation of
the goods does not constitute circumvention. These
certificates may be issued to importers, upon written
application by the authorities following authorization by
decision of the Commission after consultation of the
Advisory Committee or decision of the Council imposing
measures and they shall remain valid for the period, and
under the conditions, set down therein.;
description of the product and a summary of the material
facts and considerations relevant to the dumping and
injury determinations. In each case, a copy of the
Regulation or Decision shall be sent to known interested
parties. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply
mutatis mutandis to reviews.
3. Special provisions, in particular with regard to the
common definition of the concept of origin, as contained
in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October
1992 establishing the Community Customs Code ( 1 ), may
be adopted in, or pursuant to, this Regulation.
4. In the Community interest, measures imposed
pursuant to this Regulation may, after consultation of the
Advisory Committee, be suspended by a decision of the
Commission for a period of nine months. The suspension
may be extended for a further period, not exceeding one
year, if the Council so decides, by simple majority, on a
proposal from the Commission:- Measures may only be
suspended where market_ conditions have temporarily
changed to an extent that injury would be unlikely to
resume as a result of the suspension, and provided that
the Community industry has been given an opportunity
to comment and these comments have been taken into
account. -Measures may, at any time and after
consultation, be reinstated if the reason for suspension is
no longer applicable.
S. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the normal
application of the provisions in force concerning customs
duties.
Article 14
General provisions
1. Provisional or definitive anti-dumping duties shall be
imposed by Regulation, and collected by Member States
in the form, at the rate specified and according to the
other criteria laid down in the Regulation imposing such
duties. Such duties shall also be collected independently
of the customs duties, taxes and other charges normally
imposed on imports. No product shall be subject to both
anti-dumping and countervailing duties for the purpose
of dealing with one and the same situation arising from
dumping or from export subsidization.
2. Regulations imposing provisional or definitive
anti-dumping duties, or Regulations or Decisions
accepting undertakings or terminating investigations or
proceedings, shall be published in the Official Journal of
the European Communities. Such Regulations or
Decisions shall contain in particular and with due regard
to the protection of confidential information, the names
of the exporters, if practical, or countries involved, a
5. The Commission may, after consUltation of the
Advisory Committee, direct the customs authorities to
take the appropriate steps to register imports, so that
measures may subsequently be applied against these
imports from the date of such registration. Imports may
be made subject to registration following a request from
the Community industry which contains sufficient
evidence to justify such action. Registration shall be
introduced by Regulation which shall specify the purpose
of the action and, if appropriate, the estimated amount of
possible future liability. Imports may not be made subject
to registration for a period longer than nine months.
6. Member States shall report to the Commission on a
monthly basis, on the import trade in products subject to
investigation and subject to measures and the amount of
duties collected pursuant to this Regulation.
Article 15
Consultations
1. Any consultations provided for in this Regulation
shall take place within an Advisory Committee, which
( 1 ) Of No L 302, 19. 10. 1992, p. 1.
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shall consist of representatives of each Member State,
with a representative of the Commission as chairman.
Consultations shall be held immediately at the request of
a Member State or on the initiative of the Commission
and in any event within a period of time which allows
the time limits set by this Regulation to be respected.
2. The Committee shall meet when convened by its
chairman. He shall provide the Member States, • as
promptly as possible, with all relevant information.
3. Where necessary, consultation may be in writing only;
in such case the Commission shall' notify the Member
States and shall specify a period within which they shall
be entitled to express their opinions or to request an oral
consultation which the chairman shall arrange, provided
that such oral consultation can be held within a period of
time which allows the time limits set by this Regulation
to be respected.
4. Consultation shall, in particular, cover:
(i) the existence of dumping and the methods of
establishing the dumping margin;
(ii) the existence and extent of injury;
(iii) the causal link between the dumped imports and
injury;
•
(iv) the • measures which, in the circumstances, are
appropriate to prevent or remedy the injury caused
by dumping and the ways and means for putting
such measures into effect.
Article 16
Verification visits
1. The Commission shall, where it considers it
appropriate, carry out visits to examine the records of
importers, exporters, traders, agents, producers, trade
• associations and organizations and to verify information
provided on dumping and injury. In the absence of a
proper and timely reply, a verification visit may 'not be
carried out.
2. The Commission may carry out investigations in
third countries as required, provided that it obtains the
agreement of the firms concerned, it notifies the
representatives of the government of the country in
question and the latter does not object to the
investigation. As soon as the agreement of the firms
concerned has been obtained the Commission should
notify the authorities of the exporting country of the
names and addresses of the firms to be visited and the
dates agreed.
3. The firms concerned shall be advised of the nature of
the information to be verified during verification visits
and of any further information which needs to • be
provided during such visits, though this should not
preclude requests from being made during the verification
of further details to be provided in the light of
information obtained.
4. In -investigations carried out pursuant to this
paragraph, the Commission shall be assisted by officials r
of those Member States who so request.
Article 17
Sampling
1. In cases where the number of complainants, exporters
or importers, types of product or transactions is large,
the investigation may be limited to a reasonable number
of parties, products or transactions by using samples
which are statistically valid on the basis of information
available at the time of the selection,. or to the largest
representative volume of production, sales or exports
which can reasonably be investigated within the time
available.
2. The final selection of parties, types of products or
transactions made under these sampling provisions shall
rest with the Commission, though preference shall be
given to choosing a sample in consultation with, and with
the consent of, the parties concerned, provided such
parties make themselves known and make sufficient
information available, within three weeks of initiation, to
enable a representative sample to be chosen.
3. In cases where the examination has been limited in
accordance with this Article, an individual margin of
dumping shall, nevertheless, be calculated for any
exporter or producer not initially selected who submits
the necessary information within the time limits provided
for in this Regulation, except where the number of
exporters or producers- is so large that individual
examinations would be . unduly burdensome and prevent
the timely completion of the investigation.
4. Where it is decided to sample and there is a degree of
non-cooperation by some or all of the parties selected
which is' likely to materially affect the outcome of the
investigation a new sample may be selected. However, if
a material degree of non-cooperation persists or there is
insufficient time to select a new sample, the relevant
provisions of Article 18 shall apply.
45
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Article 18
Non-cooperation
1. In cases in which any interested party refuses access
to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information
within the time limits as provided for in this Regulation,
or significantly impedes the investigation, provisional or
final findings, affirmative or negative, may be made on
the basis of the facts available. Where it is found that any
interested party has supplied false or misleading
information, the information shall be disregarded and use
may be made of facts available. Interested parties should
be made aware of the consequences of non-cooperation.
)
2. A lack of a computerized response shall not be
deemed to constitute non-cooperation, provided that the
interested party shows that presenting the response as
requested would result in an unreasonable extra burden
or unreasonable additional cost.
)
3. Where the information presented by an interested
party may not be ideal in all respects it should not be
disregarded, provided that any deficiencies are not such
as to cause undue difficulty in arriving at a reasonably
accurate finding and provided the ' information is
appropriately submitted in timely fashion, it is verifiable
and the party has acted to the best of its ability.
4. If evidence or information is not accepted, the
supplying party should be informed forthwith of the
reasons therefor and should be granted an opportunity to
provide further explanations within the time limit
specified. If the explanations are considered
unsatisfactory, the'reasons for rejection of such evidence
or information should be disclosed and given in any
published findings.
S. If determinations, including those with respect to
normal value, are based on the provisions of paragraph 1
of this Article, including the information supplied in the
complaint, it should, where practicable and with due
regard to the time limits of the investigation, be checked
by reference to information from other independent
sources which may be available, such as published price
lists, official import statistics and customs returns, or
information obtained from other interested parties during
the investigation.
6. If an interested party does not cooperate, or only
cooperates partially, and thus relevant information is
being withheld, the result could be less favourable to the
party than if it had cooperated.
Article 19
Confidentiality
1. Any information which is by nature confidential, (for
example, because its disclosure would be of significant
competitive . advantage to a competitor or because its
disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon
a person supplying the information or upon a person
from whom he acquired the information) or which" is
provided on a confidential basis by •parties to an
investigation shall, upon good cause shown, be treated as
such by the authorities.
2. Interested parties providing confidential information
shall be required to furnish non-confidential summaries
thereof. These summaries shall be in sufficient detail to
permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the
information submitted in confidence. In exceptional
circumstances, such parties may indicate that such
information. is not susceptible of summary. In such
exceptional circumstances, a statement of the reasons
why summarization is not possible must be provided.
3. If it is considered that a request for confidentiality is
not warranted and if the supplier of the information is
either unwilling to make the information available or to
authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form,
such information may be disregarded unless it can be
satisfactorily demonstrated from appropriate sources that
the information is correct. Requests for confidentiality
should not be arbitrarily rejected.
4. This Article shall not preclude the disclosure of
general information by the Community authorities and in
particular of the reasons on which decisions taken
pursuant to this Regulation are based, or disclosure of
the evidence relied • on by the Community authorities in
so far as necessary to explain those reasons in court
proceedings.. Such disclosure must take into account the
legitimate interest of the parties concerned that their
business secrets should not be divulged. •
S. The Council, the Commission and Member States, or
the officials of any of these, shall not reveal any
information received pursuant to this Regulation for
which confidential treatment has been requested by its
supplier, without specific permission from the supplier.
Exchanges of information between the Commission and
Member States or any information relating to
consultations made pursuant to Article 15 or any internal
documents prepared by the authorities of the Community
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or its Member States shall not be divulged except as
specifically provided for in this Regulation.
6. Information received pursuant to this Regulation shall
be used only for the purpose for which it was
requested.
Article 20
Disclosure
1. The complainants, importers and exporters and their
representative associations, and representatives of the
exporting country may request disclosure of the details
underlying the essential facts and considerations, on the
basis of which provisional measures have been imposed.
Requests for such disclosure shall be made in writing
immediately following the imposition of provisional
measures and the disclosure shall be made in writing as
soon as possible thereafter.
2. The parties mentioned in paragraph 1, may request
final disclosure of the essential facts and considerations,
on the basis of which it is intended to recommend the
imposition of definitive measures, or the termination of
an investigation or proceedings without the imposition of
measures, with particular attention being paid to the
disclosure of any facts or considerations which are
different from those used for any provisional measures.
3. Requests for final disclosure, as defined in paragraph
2, shall be addressed to the Commission in writing and
be received, in cases where a provisional duty has been
applied, not later than one month after publication of the
imposition of that duty. Where a provisional duty has
not been applied, parties shall be provided with an
opportunity to request final disclosure within time limits
set by the Commission.
4. Final disclosure shall be given in writing. It shall be
made, with due regard being paid to the protection of
confidential information, as soon as possible and,
normally, not later than one month prior to a definitive
decision or the submission by the Commission of any
proposal for final action pursuant to Article 9. Where the
Commission is not in a position to disclose certain facts
or considerations at that time, these shall be disclosed as
soon as possible thereafter. Disclosure shall not prejudice
any subsequent decision which may be taken by the
Commission or the Council but where such decision is
based • on any different facts and considerations, these
shall be disclosed as soon as possible.
S. Representations made after final disclosure is given
shall be taken into consideration only if received within a
period to be set by the Commission in each case, which
shall be at least 10 days, due consideration being given to
the urgency of the matter.
Article 21
•	 Community interest
1. Pursuant to this Regulation, a, determination as to
whether the Community interest calls for intervention
shall be based on an appreciation of all the various
interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the
doniestic industry and. users and consumers, and a
determination pursuant to this Article shall only be made
where all parties have been given the opportunity to
make their views known pursuant to .paragraph 2. In
such an examination, the need to eliminate the trade
distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore
effective competition shall be given special consideration.
Measures, as determined on the basis of the dumping and
injury found, may not be applied, where the authorities,
on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly
conclude that it is not in the Community interest to apply
such measures.
2. In order to provide a sound basis on which the
authorities can take account of all views and information
in the .decision on whether, or not the imposition of
measures is in the Community interest, the complainants,
importers and their representative associations,
representative users and representative consumer
organizations may, within the time limits specified in the
notice of initiation of the anti-dumping investigation,
make themselves known and provide information to the-
Commission. Such information, or • appropriate
summaries thereof, shall be Made available to the other
parties specified in this Article, and they shall be entitled
to respond to such information.
3. The parties which have acted in conformity with
paragraph 2 may request a hearing. Such requests shall
be granted when they are submitted within the time
limits set in paragraph 2, and when they set out the
reasons, in terms of the Community interest, why the
parties should be heard. 	 .
4. The parties which have acted in conformity with
paragraph 2, may provide comments on the application
of any provisional duties imposed. Such comments shall
be received within one month of the application of such
measures if they are to be taken into account and they, or
appropriate summaries thereof, shall be made available to
other parties who shall be . entitled to, respond to such
comments.
S. The Commission shall examine the • information
which is properly submitted and the extent to which it is
representative and the results of such analysis, together
with an opinion on its merits, shall be.transmitted to the
Advisory Committee. The balance of views expressed in
the Committee shall be taken into account by the
Commission in any proposal made pursuant to Article
9.
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6. The parties which have acted in conformity with
paragraph 2 may request the facts and considerations on
which final decisions are likely to be taken to be made
available to them. Such information shall be made
available to the extent possible and without prejudice to
any ,subsequent decision taken by the Commission or the
Council.
and in derogation from any provisions thereof which
preclude the application of anti-dumping duties;
(iii) special measures, provided that such action does not
run counter to Oligations pursuant to the GATT.
Article 23
7. Pursuant to this Article, information shall only be
• taken into account where it is supported by actual
evidence which substantiates its validity.
Article 22
Final provisions
This Regulation shall not preclude the application of:
(i) any special rules laid down in agreements concluded
between the Community and third countries;
(ii) the Community Regulations in the agricultural
sector and Regulation (EEC) No 1059/69 of the
Council of 28 May 1969 laying down the trade
'arrangements applicable to certain goods resulting
from the processing of agricultural, products ('),
Regulation (EEC) No 2730/75 of'the Council of 29
October 1975 on glucose and' lactose ( 2) and
Regulation (EC) No 2783/75 of the Council of 29
October 1975 on the common system of trade for
ovalbumin and lactalbumin ( 3); this Regulation shall
operate by way of complement to those Regulations
Repeal of existing legislation
Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 is hereby repealed.
References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed
as references to this Regulation.
Article 24
Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 1995.
It shall apply to proceedings and interim review
investigations initiated after 1 September 1994 and to
expiry review investigations for which the notice of
impending expiry of measures has been published after
the same date. However, for proceedings initiated
pursuant to Article 5 (9), the references to time limits
shall only apply after a date which the Council shall
specify , in a Decision to be adopted by a qualified
majority no later than 1 April 1995 on the basis of a
Commission proposal to be submitted to the Council
once the necessary budgetary resources have been made
available.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States.
Done at Brussels, 22 December 1994.
For the Council
The President
H. SEEHOFER
(1) OJ No L 141, 12. 6. 1969, p. 1.
(2) OJ No L 281, 1. 11. 1975, p. 20. Regulation as last
amended by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 222/88 (0J
No L 28, 1. 2. 1988, p. 1).
(3) OJ No L 282, 1. 11. 1975, p. 104. Regulation as last
amended by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4001/87 (0J
No L 377, 31. 12. 1987, p. 44).
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ANNEX IV: EXCERPTS FROM THE KOREAN CUSTOMS ACT
(Translation by the Candidate)
Article 10 (Anti—dumping Duty)
(1) If it is confirmed by the investigation that the importation of
foreign goods for sale at a price lower than the normal price causes or
threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry or materially
retards the establishment of a domestic industry (hereinafter referred to
as "material injury, etc."), and if deemed necessary to protect the domes-
tic industry concerned, a duty may be imposed (hereinafter referred to as
"anti-dumping duty") on the goods concerned in addition to the customs
duty charged pursuant to Article 7 of this Act, in an amount equal to or
less than the difference between the normal value and the dumping price
(hereinafter referred to as "margin of dumping") of such goods by specify-
ing the goods, exporter or exporting country of such goods prescribed by
the Decree of the Ministry of Finance.
(2) Concerning those goods on which an investigation to decide
whether or not to impose anti-dumping duty is initiated pursuant to Para-
graph (1), if sufficient evidence (or as much information as is obtainable
in the case of breach of undertaking mentioned in Paragraph (3) or failure
to comply with a request to submit data or to verify it) is found to lead
to the belief that the goods were imported for dumping and that material
injury etc. has resulted therefrom, and if deemed necessary to eliminate
injury that may occur during the investigation period, the Minister may,
even before the completion of the investigation, either impose a provi-
sional anti-dumping duty in an amount equal to or less than the provision-
ally estimated margin of dumping or order that a security be offered
(hereinafter in this Article referred to as "provisional measures"),
specifying the said goods, the exporting country or the exporter of the
goods and the period.
(3) If an investigation is initiated pursuant to Paragraph(1) or if
provisional measures are taken pursuant to Paragraph (2), the exporter of
the goods concerned or the Minister may offer undertaking whereby prices
are revised or exports are ceased or reduced to the extent that injury
caused by dumping is eliminated.
(4) If the undertaking mentioned in Paragraph (3) is accepted, the
Minister shall suspend or terminate the investigation without taking
provisional measures or imposing an anti-dumping duty, and shall cancel
the provisional measures already taken; however, the investigation may
continue if the Minister deem it necessary, or if the exporter requests
the continuation thereof.
(5) The anti-dumping duty imposed pursuant to Paragraph /1) of the
provisional measures taken pursuant to Paragraph (2) shall he 4golYaghle
to the goods imported since the enforcement date of such duty or ffea9SOTegi
however, among those goods on which the provisional measures were taken
anti-dumping duty may be imposed where stipulated differently in interna-
tional treaties or prescribed by the Presidential Decree.
(6) If the result of the investigation pursuant to Paragraph (1) is
a decision not to impose anti-dumping duty, the provisional anti-dumping
duty paid in compliance with the provisional measure shall be refunded or
the offered security shall be released. However, pursuant to a proviso of
Paragraph (5), if the amount of the anti-dumping duty exceeds that of the
provisional anti-dumping duty, the difference between them shall not be
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collected, and if it is the other way around, the difference shall be
refunded.
(7) The Minister, if deemed necessary, may review the imposition of
the anti-dumping duty pursuant to Paragraph (1) and the acceptance of the
undertaking pursuant to Paragraph (3), and may impose anti-dumping duty or
change the content of undertaking or refund according to the result of
review.
(8) The imposition of the anti-dumping duty under Paragraph (1) or
the undertaking accepted under Paragraph (3) shall lapse after 5 years
from the date on which they entered into force except in a case where the
period of application therefor is fixed by the Decree of the Ministry of
Finance. If the content of the anti-dumping duty or the undertaking is
changed according to the result of review pursuant to Paragraph (7), the
anti-dumping duty or undertaking shall lapse after 5 years from the date
on which they were last modified or confirmed.
(9) Normal value and dumping price, investigation on material injury
etc., details on undertaking, details on the term of validity and imposi-
tion method of anti-dumping duty and provisional measures shall be ruled
by Presidential Decree.
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ANNEX V: EXCERPTS FROM THE ENFORCEMENT DECREE OF
THE KOREAN CUSTOMS ACT
(Translation by the Candidate)
Article 4(2) (Request for the Imposition of Anti-dumping Duty)
(i) Any person having an interest in or the competent Minister
having jurisdiction over the domestic industry subject to material injury,
etc. prescribed in Article 10(1) may request the Minister of Finance to
impose an anti-dumping duty on the goods concerned. This request shall be
replaced by the request for investigation needed for the imposition of an
anti-dumping duty to the KTC (Korean Trade Commission).
(ii) When Article 10(1) of the Act is applied, the term "domestic
industry" means the whole domestic producers of goods identical, homogen-
eous or similar to the imported goods concerned or a group of domestic
producers occupying a considerable portion of the gross domestic output,
provided, that producers having a special relation with exporters and
importers of such imported goods, producers importing them and their
group, prescribed by a Decree of the Finance Ministry, are excluded.
(iii) The term "person having an interest in the domestic industry"
in Paragraph (1) means domestic producers who belong to the domestic
industry which considers itself materially injured etc., and corporations,
organisations, and other individuals, composed by them or acting on
behalf of them, as prescribed by a Decree of the Finance Ministry.
(iv) Any person who desires to request an investigation under Para-
graph (1) shall submit to the Korean Trade Commission triplicate, respect-
ively, an application specifying the following matters and sufficient
documentary evidence concerning the fact of importing the dumping goods
and that of actual injury, etc. caused thereby. In this case, the KTC
shall report to the Minister and the chief of any administration agency
concerned that it has received the request for anti-dumping investigation:
1. The denomination, standards, properties, destination and produ-
cers of such goods;
2. The exporting countries, exporters, actual exports and export
possibility of such goods, and the importers and import possibility
of the Republic of Korea;
3. The ex-factory and market prices of such goods in the exporting
countries, and the export price to the Republic of Korea and the
third country;
4. The denomination, standard, properties, destination, producers,
ex-factory and market prices and cost accounting of identical,
homogeneous or similar goods in Republic of Korea;
5. Actual injury etc. of domestic industry due to the imports of
such goods.
6. If it is required to keep appended materials confidential, the
reason for it; and
7. Other matters as deemed necessary by the Minister.
Article 4(3) (Commencement of Investigation of Dumping
and Material Injury)
(i) The KTC shall, upon receiving a request for the investigation
under Article 4 (2)(i) decide whether or not to initiate the investiga-
tion on dumping and material injury etc., and report the result of the
investigation and the following matters to the Minister within 1 month
from the date it received a request for investigation.
1. Product in question;
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2. The period of investigation; and
3. The exporter of the product in question.
(ii) The KTC may dismiss the request for investigation when it
decide whether or not to initiate investigation, if the request for in-
vestigation fall under one of the following matters;
1. where the person who submitted an application is not the person
who can request imposition of duty under Article 4(2)(i);
2. where sufficient documentary evidence concerning the fact of
dumping and that of material injury etc. is not submitted;
3. where margin of dumping, the quantity of imported dumping goods
or material injury etc. is confirmed to be minimised; and
4. where the initiation of investigation is not necessary because
measures to eliminate the injurious effect to the domestic industry
were taken before the initiation of investigation.
—
(iii) The Minister shall notify petitioner, the exporter of the
goods concerned, and the other interested parties of matters for imposi-
tion of anti-dumping duties and the initiation of investigations within 10
days after reported pursuant to Article 4(3)(1), and shall publish these
matters in the Official Gazette.
Article 4(4) (Investigation of Dumping and Material Injury)
(i) When the existence of dumping and material injury etc. is in-
vestigated, the Office of Customs Administration (hereinafter referred to
as "OCA") shall investigate the matters as to the existence of dumping and
the KTC shall investigate the matters as to material injury etc. In this
case, the OCA and the KTC (hereinafter referred to as "investigation
authorities") may, if deemed to be necessary, have public officials be-
longing to the administrative agency concerned and experts concerned
participated in the activities of investigation.
(ii) The investigation authorities shall carry out a preliminary
investigation as to the existence of sufficient evidence on the existence
of dumping and material injury etc., within three months from the date of
the publication in the Official Gazette, the chief of the OCA shall submit
a report on the result of the preliminary investigation and the KTC shall
submit a letter of resolution on the preliminary determination to the
Minister respectively.
(iii) The Minister shall decide the necessity of a measure pre-
scribed in Article 10(2) of the Act and the matters on the content within
1 month from the date on which a report on the result of the preliminary
investigation and a letter of resolution on the preliminary determination
are submitted under Paragraph (ii). Provided, that if it is deemed to be
necessary, the period for this determination may be postponed within the
limit of 20 days.
(iv) The Minister may suspend or terminate the final investigation
under Paragraph (5), if dumping margin, the quantity of the dumping goods,
or material injury etc. is deemed to be minimised according to the result
of the provisional investigation under Paragraph (ii).
(v) The investigation authorities shall initiate final investiga-
tions respectively, from the next date of the date on which a report on
the result of the preliminary investigation or a letter of resolution on
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the preliminary determination are submitted under Paragraph (ii) unless
there are special reasons as prescribed in the Decree of the Finance Mini-
stry, shall submit a report on the result of final investigation or a
letter of resolution on final determination to the Minister respectively
within 3 months from the date on which final investigation is initiated.
(vi) The investigation authorities, concerned with investigation as
prescribed in Paragraphs (ii) and (v), after consultation with the Mini-
ster, may prolong the investigation period within the limit of 1 month, if
it is deemed necessary to prolong the investigation period or if the
interested person demand prolongation of the investigation period with
justifiable reason.
(vii) The Minister shall decide whether or not to impose the anti-
dumping duty and its content within 1 month from the date on which a
report on the result of final investigation and a letter of resolution on
final determination are received as prescribed in Paragraph (v), and then
shall take a measure for the imposition of an anti-dumping duty as pre-
scribed in Article 10(1) of the Act. Provided, That if it deemed neces-
sary the period may be prolonged with the limit of 20 days.
(viii) The Minister shall take a measure for the imposition of an
anti-dumping duty as prescribed in Paragraph (vii) within 1 year from the
date of the request for investigation under Article 4(2)(i). However, in
case it is deemed that there are special reasons, the Minister may pro-
longed the period for the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, notwith-
standing the provisions of Article 4(3)(i), Article 4(4)(ii),(v) or (vii).
Article 4(5) (Withdrawal of the Request for the Imposition of
Anti-dumping Duty)
(i) If the person who requested the imposition of an anti-dumping
duty pursuant to Article 4(2)(i) desires to withdraw such request, he
shall request the withdrawal of such request to the KTC. In this case,
when the KTC receives the request for withdrawal before its decision on
the initiation of investigation, the KTC may suspend its decision whether
or not to initiate investigation, after consultation with the Minister and
the chief of the administrative agency concerned, and when the KTC re-
ceives such a request after its decision on the initiation of investiga-
tion, it shall notify the Minister.
(ii) The Minister when he receives the notification pursuant to
Paragraph (i), after consultation with the investigation authorities and
the chief of the administrative agency concerned, may have the investiga-
tion under Article 4(4) not to initiate or to terminate, and may withdraw
a provisional measure if it is taken as prescribed in Article 10(2).
(iii) In case where the Minister withdraws a provisional measure as
prescribed in Paragraph (ii), he shall refund the provisional anti-dumping
duty paid in compliance with such provisional measure or release the
offered security.
Article 4(6) (Comparison of Normal Price and Dumping Price)
(i) The term "normal price" in Article 10(1) of the Act means the
ordinary trade price of identical, homogeneous or similar goods which are
consumed in the country exporting them: Provided that if there is no trade
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of such identical, homogeneous or similar goods, or if it is impossible to
apply the ordinary trade price due to a special market situation, the
highest representative price of the prices at which such goods are expor-
ted to a third country from the exporting country or a price summed up the
production cost in the country of origin, management, distribution costs
and profit at a reasonable level (hereinafter referred to as "constructed
price") shall be considered as a normal price.
(ii) If the goods are not imported directly from the country of
origin, but through a third country, the ordinary trade price in the third
country shall be considered as a normal price: Provided, that if the goods
are merely transshipped in the third country, or there is no production
such identical, homogeneous or similar goods or no price to be deemed as a
normal price in the third country, the ordinary trade price in the country
of origin shall be considered as a normal price.
(iii) If the goods are imported from a non-market economy country
under a controlled economy, the ordinary trade price of identical, homo-
geneous or similar goods which are consumed in market economy countries
excluding the Republic of Korea shall be, notwithstanding the provisions
of Paragraph (1) and (2), considered as a normal value, or the export
price or the constructed value at which such goods are exported from a
market economy country to the third countries including the Republic of
Korea, shall be considered as a normal price, but if it is impossible to
deem the prices in such market economy countries as a normal price: Provi-
ded, that in cases where the Decree of the Finance Ministry prescribes,
for instance a non-market country which is converting to a market economy
country etc., the ordinary trade price of the goods pursuant to Paragraph
(1) and (2) may be considered as a normal price.
(iv) The term "dumping price" in Article (10) of the Act means a
price to have been actually paid or to be payable at a price lower than a
normal price as referred to in Paragraph (1) to (3) with respect to goods
which are imported from foreign countries: Provided, that if there exists
a special relation or compensation agreement, prescribed in the Decree of
the Finance Ministry, between the exporter and the importer or a third
person, and it is thereby impossible to rely on the price which has been
paid or is to be paid, it means the price at which such imported goods
have been first resold to a buyer having no special relation or compensa-
tion agreement, but if there is no resale to such a buyer, or the goods
are not resold in such a state as they were imported, it shall be the
price which conforms to a reasonable criterion as prescribed by the Mini-
ster.
(v) A comparison between the normal and the dumping price shall be
made at the same time and in the same trade level (referred ordinarily to
the ex-factory level) as far as possible. In this case, if a physical
characteristic, quantity or condition of sale, difference in taxation,
etc. have an effect on such a comparison of prices, the Minister may
adjust the normal and dumping prices.
(vi) If an interested person requests a price adjustment due to a
difference in physical characteristic, selling quantity and condition, he
shall prove the fact that such difference has a direct effect on manufac-
turing cost or market price.
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Article 4(7) (Determination of material injury, etc.)
(i) The KTC shall be based on substantial evidence including the
following matters, when it investigates and determines material injury
etc. under Article 4(4):
1. The quantity of imported dumping goods (including whether or not
the import of such goods has increased remarkably absolutely or
relatively compared with the domestic production or consumption);
2. The price of dumping goods (including whether or not the price of
dumping goods has fallen remarkably compared with that of domestic
identical, homogeneous or similar goods);
3. The output, operating rate, stocks, selling quantity, market
share, price (including the effect of depression of prices or
prevention of price increases), profits, return on investments,
cash receipts and payment, employment, wages, growth, finance,
investment ability, and technology development of domestic indu-
stry; and
4. The substantial or potential effect of the content of Paragraph 1
and 2 on domestic industry.
(ii) When substantial injury etc. are investigated and determined
under Paragraph (1), a determination of threat of injury shall be based on
the following matters in addition to the matters in Paragraph (1) and
injury caused by dumping goods shall be explicitly foreseeable and immi-
nent:
1. remarkable increase rate of the dumping goods showing the
possibility of substantial increase of imports;
2. substantial increase of production capacity causing the increase
of dumping;
3. whether the price of the dumping goods depress price or prevent
price increase of identical, homogeneous or similar goods, and the
possibility of additional consumption of imported goods;
4. stocks and stocks of identical, homogeneous or similar goods of
the dumping goods.
Article 4(8) (Request for Materials to the Interested Person)
(i) If the Minister or the investigation authorities deem it neces-
sary to determine whether or not to initiate investigations or impose
anti-dumping duty, they may request the administration agency concerned,
domestic producers, exporters, importers, and other interested persons for
necessary cooperation, such as presentation of related materials etc.
(ii) Materials of those submitted under Paragraph (1) and Article
4(2)(iv), which are deemed proper to be kept confidential by nature, or
which are submitted by the interested person under a condition that they
should be kept confidential, with a justifiable reason presented, shall
not be disclosed without the express consent of the person who has submit-
ted them.
(iii) The Minister or investigation authorities may demand the
person who has submitted materials to be kept confidential to file a
summary of such materials which is not confidential. In this case, if the
person is unable to file such summary, he shall file a document in which
the reason is mentioned.
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(iv) If the request of the interested person to keep confidential
under Paragraph (ii) is not deemed proper, or the person who has presented
materials refuses to disclose them without any good reason or to submit a
non-confidential summary pursuant to Paragraph (iii), the Minister or
investigation authorities may not refer such materials unless the accuracy
of materials is proved sufficiently.
(v) If an interested person fails to present relevant documents, or
refuses or prevents an investigation of the investigation authorities, or
it is difficult to verify the investigation or materials for any reason,
the Minister or the investigation authorities may determine whether to
take measures for preventing dumping using available materials, when
deciding whether to impose anti-dumping duty.
(vi) The Minister or the investigation authorities shall not use for •
other purposes such information and materials acquired from the interested
persons or facts informed in connection with a procedure for imposition of
the anti-dumping duty.
(vii) If an interested person related to the investigation requests
an inspection of relevant documentary evidence presented under Article
4(2)(iv) and materials submitted or informed under Paragraph (1) and (9)
and Article 4(11), excluding those to be kept confidential, the Minister
or the investigation authorities shall accept it unless there is any
special circumstance. In this case, such request of the interested person
for inspection of materials shall be made in writing with the reason
therefor and list of documents specified.
(viii) The Minister and the investigation authorities, if it deemed
necessary, or if an interested person requests, may give him an opportun-
ity to address in the public hearing, or to consult an interested person
with opposing views.
(ix) If superintendent of a customhouse, the head of a bank dealing
with a foreign exchange business, the chief of a related agency or the
head of an organisation having an interest deems that imported goods are
dumped ones, he shall inform the Minister and the investigation authori-
ties.
Article 4(9) (The Imposition of Anti-dumping Duty)
(i) The anti-dumping duty pursuant to Article 10(1) of the Act may
be imposed to each exporter based on a fixed rate of anti-dumping duty or
a fixed standard import price. However, to the exporter who fails to pre-
sent relevant document, or refuses or prevents an investigation of the
investigation authorities, or it is difficult to verify the investigation
of materials for any reason under Article 4(8), without any justifiable
reason, the anti-dumping duty may be imposed based on an unitary rate of
anti-dumping duty or an unitary standard of import price.
(ii) The anti-dumping duty imposed to the exporter who is not sub-
ject to investigation as prescribed in Article 4(3)(i) shall be the rate
of the anti-dumping duty applicable to the exporter who is subject to
investigation, or the rate of the anti-dumping duty finding the weighted
average of the standard import price, or the standard import price.
However, among exporters who export during the period of investigation and
are not subject to investigation, to the exporter who submits materials as
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prescribed in provisions of Article 4(8) Paragraph (i) shall be applic-
able.
(iii) In case the anti-dumping duty is imposed by specifying a ex-
porting country pursuant to Article 10(1) of the Act, when a new exporter
of the exporting country who exports after the period of investigation as
prescribed in Article 4(3)(i) has a special relation, as prescribed in the
Decree of the Finance Ministry, with the exporter who is subject to the
anti-dumping duty under Paragraph (i), the anti-dumping duty is imposed on
the basis of the rate of anti-dumping duty or the standard import price
applied to the latter, and if it is other way around, the anti-dumping
duty is imposed as prescribed in Paragraph (1).
(iv) The standard import price prescribed in Paragraph (i) and (iii)
shall be decided within the limits of the price adding the cost concerned
with import to the adjusted normal price in the exporting country pursuant
to Article 4(6)(v).
Article 4(10) (The Application of Provisional Measures)
(i) The provisional measure under Article 4(4)(iii), in case where
the preliminary investigation is terminated as prescribed in Article
4(4)(ii), may be taken after the date on which at least 60 days have
passed after the initiation of the preliminary investigation.
(ii) The maximum validity period of the provisional measure pursuant
to Article 4(4)(iii) shall be 4 months. However, where exporters repre-
senting a significant proportion of the trade of such goods so request, a
validity period for provisional measures may be prolonged for a further
period of 2 months.
(iii) If the Minister deems it necessary, notwithstanding the provi-
sion of Paragraph (ii), he may prolong the validity period of the provi-
sional measures according to international agreements.
(iv) In case when the Minister orders that a security be offered,
the security offered shall be the amount equivalent to the amount of the
provisional anti-dumping duty.
Article 4(11)(Undertaking of Price Revision, Export Cessation, etc.)
(i) When an exporter of the product, during the course of an invest-
igation, offers an undertaking under Article 10(3) of the Act, or requests
a continuation of investigation on injury under Article 10(4) of the Act,
he shall present his intention in writing to the Minister.
(ii) When the undertaking offered under Paragraph (1) concerns an
immediate revision of price, or a cessation of export or reducing the
volume of export below a certain level in a term as determined after
consultation with the Minister within 6 months from the day of undertak-
ing, the Minister may accept such an undertaking: Provided, that in a case
of the undertaking to cease an export, the volume of export between the
day of undertaking and that of export cessation shall not exceed the level
as deemed proper by the Minister.
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(iii) The Minister shall, upon an offer of the undertakings as re-
ferred to in Paragraph (1), notify the contents of such undertakings to
the chief of administration agency concerned, and the investigation au-
thorities, and interested persons. In this case, the chief of administra-
tion concerned, and the investigation authorities, and interested persons
who have been informed of the contents of undertaking, may state in wri-
ting to the Minister their opinions on the contents of undertaking within
20 days from the day on which they are informed thereof.
(iv) The Minister may not accept the undertaking offered under
Paragraph (i), in case where the Decree of the Finance Ministry prescribes
that it is deemed difficult to secure the fulfilment of the undertaking.
(v) The Minister, if deemed to be necessary, may offer the undertak-
ing pursuant to Article 10(3) to the exporter specified. In this case,
the exporter shall notify whether or not to accept the undertaking within
1 month from the date on which the undertaking is offered.
(vi) The Minister may not accept the undertaking mentioned in Para-
graph (ii) or offer the undertaking as prescribed in Paragraph (v), before
the report on the result of the preliminary investigation or the letter of
resolution on the preliminary determination are submitted.
(vii) When accepting the undertaking mentioned in Paragraph (ii) or
notified of the acceptance of the undertaking as prescribed in Paragraph
(v), the Minister may require the exporter to provide periodically the
data relevant to the fulfilment of such undertakings, and to permit
verification of the said data.
(viii) When withdrawing the provisional measure pursuant to Article
10(4) of the Act, the Minister shall refund the provisional anti-dumping
duty paid in compliance with the provisional measure or release the of-
fered security. However, if it is confirmed that material injury, etc.
have occurred as a result of investigation pursuant to Article 4(4), the
Minister may not refund the provisional anti-dumping duty paid in com-
pliance with the provisional measure or may collect the amount equivalent
to the amount of the provisional anti-dumping duty.
(ix) If the exporter does not fulfil the undertaking accepted under
Article 10(4), or fails to submit the materials under Paragraph (7), or
refuses the demand to verify the materials, the Minister may continue to
take measures for preventing the dumping on the basis of the facts avail-
able.
(x) When it turns out that there is no material injury etc., as a
result of investigation under the proviso of Article 10(4) of the Act, the
Minister may invalidate the effect of such an undertaking. However, if it
is judged that a determination of no material injury etc. is due to the
existence of such an undertaking, the exporter shall fulfil the undertak-
ing in a period as deemed proper by the Minister. If the exporter refuses
to fulfil the undertaking, the Minister may continue to take measures for
preventing the dumping on the basis of the facts available.
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Article 4(12) (Retroactive Effect of Anti-dumping Duty)
(i) Among the goods on which the provisional measures are taken
pursuant to the proviso of Article 10(5) the following goods shall be
subject to anti-dumping duty:
1. Goods imported during the period for which provisional measures
were in effect, if a final determination is made that the material
injury had occurred, or	 if it is deemed that a final determina-
tion might have been made, without the provisional measures, that
material injury have occurred in spite of the fact that a final
determination is made that the threat of material injury had oc-
curred;
2. Goods imported after 90 days prior to the enforcement date of the
provisional measures, where the retroactive imposition of the
anti-dumping duty is required to prevent the recurrence of mass
import of the goods in a relatively short period, if there is a
history of dumping which caused material injury, etc. or if the
importer was, or should have been aware of the fact of the dumping
and the material injury, etc. which resulted therefrom;
3. Goods imported after 90 days prior to the enforcement date of the
provisional measures if material injury, etc.is deemed to have
occurred due to the import, in breach of the undertaking under
Article 10(3) of the Act, of the goods on which the provisional
measures were taken; however, this shall not apply to those goods
imported before the date of the above breach of undertaking.
4. Goods imported in the period prescribed by the Minister according
to the provisions under international agreements, etc.
(ii) The person having an interest in the domestic industry as
prescribed in Article 4(2) may request the imposition of anti-dumping duty
pursuant to the proviso of Article 10(5) of the Act, presenting evidence
which fell under any Subparagraphs in Paragraph (i) within 7 days from
the date on which the final investigation pursuant to Article 4(4)(v) is
terminated.
Article 4(13)(Exact Account of the Amount of Anti-dumping Duty etc.)
(i) In case where the amount of the anti-dumping duty on the goods
imported during the period for which the provisional measures were in
effect as prescribed Article 4(12)(i), is equal to or exceeds that of the
provisional anti-dumping duty, such provisional anti-dumping duty shall
become the amount of the anti-dumping duty, and if it is other way around,
the provisional anti-dumping duty which is equivalent to the difference
shall be refunded as mentioned in Article 10(6) of the Act.
(ii) In case where the security is offered as mentioned in Article
10(2) of the Act, and in case where it comes under Article 4(12)(i), the
amount of the anti-dumping duty imposed retroactively during the period
for which the provisional anti-dumping duty were in effect shall not
exceed the amount equivalent to the provisional anti-dumping duty.
Article 4(14) (Review of Anti-dumping Duty and Undertaking)
(i) If the Minister deems it necessary, of if the interested person
or the competent Ministers having jurisdiction over the industry concerned
so requests with related documentary evidence which fell under the follow-
ing matters, the Minister may review the goods on which anti-dumping
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duties are being imposed, or an undertaking is being fulfilled:
1. where there occurs enough change in situation to warrant to
change the content of measure since the imposition of anti-dumping
duty or the acceptance of undertaking;
2. where the domestic industries might be injured from a termination
of the anti-dumping measure or the undertaking; and
3. where the amount of the anti-dumping duty collected exceeds the
actual dumping margin.
(ii) Request for the review under Paragraph (1) may be made after 1
year has elapsed since the anti-dumping duty or the undertaking has en-
tered into force, and shall be made 6 months before the effect of the
anti-dumping measure or the undertaking is lost. In this case, the Mini-
ster shall decide whether or not to review within 1 month from the date of
receiving request for the review.
(iii) The Minister may review the reasonableness of the rate of the
anti-dumping duty being imposed and the undertaking being fulfilled, in
addition to the review as prescribed in paragraph (1), and shall reap-
praise, annually, the dumping price in the month to which the enforcement
date of an anti-dumping duty is belonged.
(iv) When the Minister decides the necessity of the review under
Paragraph (i) or (iii), he may consult with the chief of the administra-
tion concerned and the investigation authorities, and when it is decided
that review is warranted, the investigation authorities shall investigate.
In this case, the investigation may be limited to a changed portion to
justify a review.
(v) The investigation authorities shall conclude the investigation
within 6 months from the date of the initiation of a review as prescribed
in Paragraph (4) initiates, and submit a report on the dumping determina-
tion or on the injury determination to the Minister, and the Minister
shall take a measure as prescribed in Article 10(7) of the Act within 1
month from the date when a report on the dumping determination and on the
injury determination is submitted.
(vi) In case where the review is made for reason as referred to in
Subparagraph 2 of Paragraph (1), if the period of application of the anti-
dumping measures terminated during the review period, the effect of such
anti-dumping measure shall be maintained in the period of review.
(vii) If the effectiveness of an undertaking is lost or is judged to
be lost as a result of the review under Paragraph (1) or (3), the Minister
may demand the exporter who is fulfilling it to revise the undertaking,
and if the exporter refuses to do so, the Minister may take anti-dumping
measures on the basis of the facts available.
Article 4(15) (Notification and Announcement to
the Interested Person etc.)
i) When it falls under any of the following Subparagraphs, the
Minister shall publish the contents thereof in the Official Gazette and
notify it in writing to the interested person:
1. when he has decided to take or not to take measures as prescribed
in Article 10(1) and (2) of the Act;
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2. when he has accepted an undertaking as prescribed Article 10(3)
of the Act, and ceases, terminates, or continues the investigation;
3. when he initiates a review as prescribed in Article 10(7) of the
Act, or changes the contents of anti-dumping measures as a result
of a review; or
4. when the initiation of the investigation is decided as prescribed
in Article 4(3)(i).
(ii) When it falls under any of the following Subparagraphs, the
Minister or the investigation authorities shall notify the contents there-
of to the interested person:
1. when the request for investigation is dismissed as prescribed in
Article 4(3)(ii) or investigation is suspended or terminated as
prescribed in Article 4(4)(4);
2. when the period of investigation is prolonged under Article
4(4)(vi);
3. when the validity of the anti-dumping measures is prolonged as
prescribed in Article 4(4)(viii);
4. when the decision on the initiation of investigation is suspen-
ded, or investigation is terminated as the request for an imposition
of anti-dumping duty has been withdrawn;
5. when the period of provisional measures is prolonged as pre-
scribed in Article 4(10)(ii) or (iii); or
6. when the Minister offers an undertaking under Article 4(11)(v).
(iii) If an interested person requests in writing in the course of
investigation under Article 4(4), the Minister or the investigation au-
thorities shall notify him of the progress of such investigation.
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